‘Out of Darkness Cometh Light’ – Seventieth Anniversary of Floodlit European Football at Wolverhampton II.

Part Two: 1965-2024.

Peter Broadbent with the first of three First Division Championship trophies won with Wolves.

Sadly, in the season they lost the guidance of the great Stan Cullis and were relegated, 1964-65, Wolves also lost the silky skills of inside forward Peter Broadbent after fourteen years when he joined Shrewsbury Town in January 1965. Stan Cullis had signed him from Brentford in 1951, calling it one of his finest-ever signings. A magical playmaker and prolific goalscorer (scoring 145 goals in 497 appearances for Wolves), his delicate touch and crafty body swerve rivalled anything seen in continental football then. Broadbent’s style of play attracted many admirers, including the young George Best, as already mentioned. In his biography, Bestie, Joe Lovejoy said that Best told him that, while he didn’t have an individual hero growing up, he supposed that Peter Broadbent was the closest. Having watched both players from the pitch side as a boy from the mid-sixties to the early seventies, I can recall the similarities in style. However, Broadbent left Wolves just as Best was arriving on the scene for Manchester United. Broadbent won three First Division titles and an FA Cup medal with Wolves, and gained seven caps with England, including at the 1958 World Cup. After leaving Wolves in 1965, he wasn’t selected for the 1966 World Cup.

Ron Flowers (below) was selected for the England squad, but didn’t play in any of the matches in the finals, his 49th and final cap being won on 29 June 1966 against Norway in Oslo. Flowers narrowly missed playing in the final itself, as Jack Charlton caught a cold on the eve of the great game against West Germany and Alf Ramsey put him on stand-by. But Charlton had recovered in the morning and ultimately he never kicked a ball in the tournament nor received a medal. His first cap had been awarded in 1955 so the fact that his last came eleven years later is testimony to the longevity of the wonderful wing-half. Flowers was the last of the great players of the Wolves’ golden era, captaining the club to victory in the 1960 FA Cup Final, but he also left the club towards the end of the decade.

In the meantime, in August 1965, Ronnie Allen, a recently retired star player for local rivals West Bromwich Albion, joined Wolves as a coach. When Beattie resigned following a disastrous start to the team’s campaign in Division Two, Allen was appointed caretaker-manager, a decision not initially popular with the Wolves fans, given his long-term association with the Albion. However, after the turmoil of Cullis’ sacking and relegation from the top flight, the team’s confidence was at ‘rock bottom’, and the West Brom man somehow managed to revive it. In March 1966, Allen bought Mike Bailey from Charlton to stiffen the resolve of the midfield. Bailey was to have a major influence over the coming years, both as a player and captain.

As his reward for halting the slide in his first season, in July 1966, just before the World Cup Finals, and ahead of the new season, Allen was confirmed as the full-time manager. In March 1967, he produced a stroke of genius by signing Derek Dougan from Leicester City. ‘The Doog’ knocked in nine goals in eleven games, leading a great attacking line-up of Terry Wharton, Ernie Hunt, Peter Knowles and Dave Wagstaffe (below), whom Beattie had signed. Their goals brought to an end Wolves’ two-season stay in Division Two. Wolves finished as runners-up to Coventry City, winning promotion back to the First Division.

Peter Knowles is front and centre (No. 10) in this photo of ‘LA Wolves’, United Soccer Association Champions in July 1967.

That summer they accepted an invitation to cross the Atlantic to play in the inaugural United Soccer Association League which began with twelve teams recruited from around the world. For six weeks Wolves were based in Los Angeles and from 27 May to 14 July, the Los Angeles Wolves played fourteen matches, clocking up thousands of air miles and taking in Cleveland, Washington DC and San Francisco. It was an itinerary closer to that of a rock band rather than a football team. In the final, they scored a ‘golden goal’ through Bobby Thomson to win 6-5, with the first five scored by Dougan, Knowles and a hat-trick from Burnside.

During their time in LA, Dave Wagstaffe (above) renewed a Manchester boyhood friendship with Davy Jones of The Monkees, a chart-topping pop group with their own TV series. They watched several of the team’s matches and arranged a visit to the Columbia studios in Hollywood to see the group recording an episode of their series. The story of ‘Waggy and the Monkees’ is well told in the Wolves Museum.

Dave Wagstaffe’s kit and the trophies from the Summer 1967 US Tour

Wolves were ‘Champions of the USA’ and Ronnie Allen won the coach of the tournament award, but in the following 1967-68 season, the Wolves finished a lowly seventeenth in the First Division and Allen decided to move on. But before doing so, he made further astute signings, including those of Frank Munro (from Aberdeen) and Kenny Hibbitt.

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Allen was replaced by Bill McGarry in November 1968, who added more quality signings, including Jim McCalliog from Cup-winning Sheffield Wednesday. In May 1969 Wolves returned to America to play in the the North American Soccer League International League in the guise of ‘Kansas City Spurs’. Their home ground was the Kansas City Municipal Stadium, also a Baseball stadium where The Beatles had played five years earlier when they ‘conquered the USA’. In reality, they were simply the warm-up act for the Wolves whose own ‘Beatle’, Peter Knowles, was again in the squad which topped the League and was crowned champions for a second time.

By then, the wonderful floodlit friendlies had become a thing of the past. On Wednesday 27 August 1969, Wolves unveiled their new floodlights in a League match with Brian Clough’s Derby County. Apparently, the new lights were so powerful that they caused many of the press photographers to over-expose their films. On 3 September, the floodlights lit up the first-ever floodlit game to be broadcast in colour. This was the second-round League Cup clash with Tottenham Hotspur, which Wolves won 1-0. The 1969-70 season started magnificently with Wolves winning their first four games, but then came another bombshell.

The fans’ favourite (and mine), Peter Knowles announced that he was giving up football at the age of twenty-four, to devote the rest of his life to the Jehovah’s Witnesses. In his programme notes for Knowles’ last game against Nottingham Forest, McGarry wrote that he was still hoping that Peter would return for training the next Monday to find his kit laid out for him. The Club held onto his registration for several seasons, but Peter never returned, except once, for a final testimonial at the end of that hiatus. Fortunately, in 1967 Wolves had been joined by another future talented goalscorer in John Richards, although a very different player to Knowles.

Peter ‘knocker’ Knowles had seemed destined to become a great footballer, perhaps rivalling Peter Broadbent or even George Best. A Yorkshireman, he signed from Wolves’ nursery team, Wath Wanderers in 1962, as a seventeen-year-old, making his first-team debut in October 1963, a year after becoming professional, scoring four times in fourteen outings. By the end of the following season, he had established himself as a regular first-team member and although injuries restricted his appearances, he still managed to score eighty-four goals in 188 games. Not only was he wonderfully skilled, but he also revealed a special temperament in how he played the game. Perhaps it was this that also gave him the moral fortitude to turn his back forever on the sport he loved.

Knowles was capped four times for England’s under-23 team, and would surely have become a full international in the following decade. The disappointment of the fans at his sudden departure is therefore understandable, but they also showed respect for his decision. The season as a whole finished disappointingly with Wolves losing eight of their final thirteen games and drawing the other five, taking only five points from a possible twenty-six. The 1969-70 season ended with a thirteenth place finish. Another emerging star of the 1960s was goalkeeper Phil ‘Lofty’ Parkes, who made his debut in November 1966 and would go in the next decade to make 127 consecutive league appearances, 170 in all competitions, a Wolves record.

Phil Parkes in action at Molineux

The Seventies’ Icons:

The Seventies began with two impressive seasons, including the next ‘chapter’ in Wolves’ European narrative which came in 1971-72 when they qualified, as fourth-best league finishers, for the UEFA Cup, renamed from the Inter-City Fairs Cup. After their mixed experience in the Anglo-Italian Cup in 1969-70 and the Texaco Cup in 1970-71 (against Scottish and Irish League teams, which they won, beating Heart of Midlothian over two legs), the Wolves fans looked forward to being back in European Competition proper.

The 1971-72 season was iconic, as Wolves competed in Europe for the first time since 1960-61. In the UEFA competition Wolves took on and beat some of Europe’s most illustrious clubs, beginning with a Portuguese team from the university city of Coimbra. They had qualified by finishing fifth in Portugal’s First Division and had earned a reputation for being hard to beat in knock-out competition; no team had managed to score more than one goal against them over two legs in a European tie. However, in the first leg at Molineux in mid-September, the Wolves managed to smash their visitors’ proud record by beating them 3-0 with goals from John McAlle (pictured below), John Richards and Derek Dougan. In the away leg, Wolves again won by three goals, 4-1, including a hat-trick from Dougan and another rare goal from McAlle. In the next round, Wolves won by the same aggregate of 7-1 against FC Den Haag of the Netherlands, with a 4-0 victory at Molineux on 3 November, with the Dutch scoring three of them – own goals!

Wolves went behind the iron curtain to beat East German team Carl Zeiss Jena in the third round, in a match played in the snow, before meeting Juventus in the Quarter Final. They then went to Italy, travelling with Juventus, Leeds United and Wales legend John Charles as an ambassador who sat on the bench with Bill McGarry and his assistant, Sammy Chung. This turned out to be a tactical masterstroke by McGarry, as Wolves drew in Italy and went on to beat the Italian giants 3-2 on aggregate, 2-1 at Molineux, with goals from Derek Dougan and Danny Hegan.

John Charles

In the Semi-final they faced even tougher opponents in the Hungarian aces Ferencváros and their great centre-forward Flórián Albert, winner of the Ballon d’Or Player of the Year Award in 1967. The first leg was played on a beautiful Budapest Spring afternoon in April 1972, in the Népstadion where they had last met Honvéd. The attendance was 44,763 and kick-off was at 5.30 p.m. Wolves managed to maintain their excellent away form in the competition, drawing a hard-fought game, 2-2. They showed a determined effort after their brilliant young striker John Richards had put them ahead after nineteen minutes. Derek Dougan cleverly drew the defenders away before back-healing the ball back to Richards, who didn’t miss.

The People’s Stadium today, under floodlights.

Ferencváros came back strongly, however, scoring two in eight minutes. István Szőke got the first on the half-hour from the penalty spot, and then the Magyars took a two-goal lead. Flórián Albert netted from open play, shooting past Phil Parkes following Szőke’s tempting cross, making it 2-1 to ‘Fradi’ at half-time. At seventy-four minutes, the home team was awarded another penalty, but this time Parkes magnificently saved Szőke’s shot with his left foot. The Budapest team went close again when Kű headed just over. The Wolves then rallied and won a corner. Dave Wagstaffe swung the ball in and Frank Munro was perfectly placed to nod home the equaliser. After that, Kenny Hibbitt and Jimmy McCalliog smacked in powerful shots, but they didn’t result in a winning goal. The Wolves had almost three times the number of efforts on goal as the home team but the two sides went into the return leg on equal terms. The two teams in Budapest were as follows:

Ferencváros: Vörös; Novák, Pancsícs; Megyesi, Vépi, Bálint; Sőke, Bránkovics, Albert (pictured below), Kű, Múcha (Rákósi). Subs: Rákósi, Fusi, Hórváth, Géczi.

Wolves: Parkes; Shaw, Taylor; Hegan, Munro, McAlle; McCalliog, Hibbitt, Richards, Dougan, Wagstaffe. Subs: Arnold, Parkin, Daley, Sunderland, Eastoe.

The second leg was held at Molineux a fortnight later on 19th April 1972 in front of a disappointingly small crowd (for a European semi-final) of just over twenty-eight thousand. The Wolves were determined not to lose this semi-final as they had their last in Europe, against Glasgow Rangers in 1961. Phil Parkes was once again outstanding, Alan Sunderland came in at right back for the suspended Shaw, and Steve Daley, aged eighteen, made his European debut in place of the also-suspended Dave Wagstaffe. New boy Daley’s dream came true when he put Wolverhampton ahead in the first minute. Goalkeeper Vörös missed Sunderland’s high floating cross, the ball falling to Daley. Just before half-time, up jumped Frank Munro (above) as he had in the away leg to put the home team 2-0 up. Lájos Kű pulled a goal back for ‘Fradi’ two minutes after the interval and then Phil Parkes saved another penalty from Szőke with his leg. It was a very entertaining game, worthy of a final, in which Daley and Hibbitt went close, Dougan hit the bar and Sunderland sent in a thirty-yard screamer before Taylor cleared a József Múcha effort off the line. Wolves won a close match 2-1, and the tie 4-3 on aggregate.

Derek Dougan in the Seventies.

Sixty-four clubs had initially set out to contest the competition, so it was testimony to the strength of English football that two First Division clubs reached the final. Unfortunately for Wolves, the other team was Tottenham Hotspur, one of their cup bogey teams. Wolves lost their home leg 2-1, Martin Chivers scoring both goals for the visitors, and the second leg was drawn 1-1, so the cup went to Spurs. Wolves should have won their first European trophy, and the 3-2 aggregate score over the two legs was not a fair reflection of the games, according to many media reports the day after the match at White Hart Lane, where Wolves gave a brilliant performance. Dave Wagstaffe’s equalising goal in the forty-first minute was one of the greatest goals ever scored by a man in the golden shirt. It was said by those present to be better than the one he scored in the 5-1 thrashing of Arsenal in a snowstorm at Molineux the previous November which had won the BBC’s Goal of the Month competition.

Although the Wanderers’ 1971-72 European campaign was ultimately unsuccessful, it seems curious that it is not remembered at least as favourably as the floodlit friendly matches of 1953-54 against Honved in the club’s annals. In many ways, the Wolves’ victory against Ferencváros in the semi-final of the UEFA Cup, an official competition, can be seen as the pinnacle of the Old Golds’ distinguished European history. Their team that season was perhaps as great as the one that faced Honvéd in 1954, especially in its forward line, though Billy Wright’s half-back line will always be remembered as the finest ever to take the field both for his club and for England. I am too young to have seen the class of ’54, except on video, and the gap between the two periods is too great to make a reasonable comparison. In what was their first European Cup final, the fact that their opponents were Tottenham, though a star-studded team themselves, made it seem less of a European final. The semi-final was a far more fitting final, especially given the star-studded nature of the Ferencváros team which included the ‘Ballon d’Or’ winning Florián Albert (below).

The class of 1971-72 are still the only Wolves side ever to get to a European Final, and, together with Spurs, the first-ever English team in the UEFA Cup. This was also achieved without their inspirational skipper and lynchpin Mike Bailey, who was injured for the last three ties and only played in the second leg of the final, though Jim McCalliog ably replaced him as skipper.

In their first season together, 1971-72, the Dougan-Richards combination scored forty goals in the League and UEFA Cup. I remember watching them in action at the Hawthorns, against West Bromwich Albion, and at Molineux. The duo scored a total of 125 goals in 127 games together in two-and-a-half seasons.

The Strike Partnership of the Seventies: Dougan and Richards.

In 1972-73, Wolves finished fifth in the League and were semi-finalists in both domestic cups. Their league position earned them another place in the UEFA Cup, at the expense of Arsenal, who despite finishing as runners-up in the League, were not allowed to compete because of a rule which only permitted one team per city to enter what had been the Inter-city Fairs Cup. Tottenham finished eighth, but their League Cup win meant that they took precedence over their North London rivals. So Wolves found themselves back in Europe, but they made a departure in the second round of the UEFA Cup when they met the East Germans, Lokomotiv Leipzig, in October 1973. In the first leg, in Leipzig, the Wolves were without their midfield king-pin Mike Bailey and strikers John Richards and Dave Wagstaffe. But no one in the Wolves camp could quite believe the result, a 3-0 defeat, their first away defeat on their UEFA Cup travels. Not since they met Barcelona in the Quarter-final of the European Champions Cup in 1960 had a side put three past Wolves in a competitive European game.

Steve Kindon & Derek Dougan on the ground after a Wolves attack has been frustrated in the UEFA Cup tie against Lokomotiv Leipzig.

The Old Gold tried to rally and rescue the tie in the second leg at Molineux, in a match that the fans who went to see it felt privileged to witness. They had scored the four goals they needed by the 83rd minute, but Lokomotiv scored the all-important away goal in the 72nd minute. So the tie finished 4-4 on aggregate, but the Wolves went out on the away goals rule, which stipulated that, in the event of scores finishing level after both legs, away goals would count double.

It was some compensation that in March 1974 Wolves won the League Cup. They had beaten Liverpool in the fifth round when the 1973 Oil Crisis had threatened kick-off times in the League Cup from October when the oil-producing countries began an embargo on exports to countries perceived to be supporting Israel in the Yom Kippur War, including the UK. This threatened the use of floodlights as there was a concern that the power stations would simply not be able to operate. In the event, Wolves were able to beat Norwich City in the semi-final over two legs and faced Manchester City in the final at Wembley in front of 97,886 fans. Both finalists were in mid-table positions at this time, but Man City had one of the best forward lines in the business from Mike Summerbee on the right, through Colin Bell, Francis Lee, Denis Law and Rodney Marsh. Besides, City had been there before, and recently, beating West Brom a few seasons previously, a match for which I was fortunate to get a ticket.

The Wolves also had an impressive forward line with its striking partnership of Derek Dougan and John Richards, flanked by Kenny Hibbitt on the right and Dave Wagstaffe on the left, with Steve Daley assisting from midfield. But the players were nervous before the game as only Derek Dougan had been to a Wembley final before. Nevertheless, Wolves took the lead through Hibbitt just before half-time. Then Colin Bell equalised for City on the hour. ‘King’ John Richards sealed the win five minutes from time to bring the trophy to Molineux for the first time since the competition began in 1966. Most importantly, Wolves qualified for another season in the UEFA Cup. In 2024 Wolves celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of that victory by inviting surviving players to Molineux, where they were introduced to the crowd at a Premier League game.

But the hobbling Richards didn’t play again that season, while the ageing ‘Doog’ was mostly restricted to the substitutes’ bench. Dougan played his last six full games in 1974-75, two of them in the UEFA Cup when Wolves went ‘one worse’ than their performances in previous seasons by losing in the first round to FC Porto, to a team packed with world stars, including the Brazilian World Cup star, Flavio. The first leg was played in Oporto on Wednesday 18 September. John Richards’ hamstring injury kept him out of the tie and Dave Wagstaffe was also missing. Wolves lost by a humiliating scoreline of 4-1 and trying to turn around a three-goal deficit seemed impossible given Wolves’ recent performances in the competition.

But on the 2nd of October, the true Molineux faithful were treated to another night of fully committed football. The atmosphere was once again electric and the floodlights seemed brighter than ever. The score was 1-1 at the interval following a goal from Bailey, and on the resumption, it only took the snarling Wolves only a minute to score a second when Alan Sunderland crossed the ball, Dougan rose high to head it on and Steve Daley nodded it home. In the photograph below, he is shown celebrating after scoring. In the 79th minute, Wolves won a free-kick which Derek Parkin floated into the danger area. Dougan rose high to meet the ball cleanly, and it was 3-1 on the night. What followed was a display of all-out attacking football from Wolves, but they couldn’t quite get the fourth goal. The season ended in a mid-table finish for the Wolves who were knocked out in their first-round matches in both domestic cups. Derek Dougan hung up his boots after a career spanning twenty years.

The following season the club was surprisingly relegated to the second division after Dave Wagstaffe was sold to Blackburn Rovers early in 1976. In May, Bill McGarry lost his job, with his assistant trainer Sammy Chung succeeding him. Chung turned things around by winning promotion back to the top flight at their first attempt in 1977 and winning the second division title for the first time since Major Buckley.

Eighties & Nineties – The Fall & Rise of the ‘Mighty Wolves’:

Fortunes revived somewhat In the 1979/80 season when Wolves beat Brian Clough’s Nottingham Forest in the League Cup Final at Wembley with Andy Gray scoring the decisive single goal. Forest had won the European Cup in 1979 and went on to retain it in 1980. Emlyn Hughes (below) proudly lifted the only trophy that had hitherto eluded him in his long and distinguished career at Liverpool. Wolves also finished the season in a creditable sixth place, the last time they finished in the top six of Division One. So it was that, at the beginning of the 1980/81 season, the Wolves found themselves on another, fourth UEFA Cup adventure.

But Dutch masters PSV Eindhoven all but put an end to the Wolves’ high hopes in mid-September by beating them 3-1 in Holland. That deficit was always going to be difficult to reverse, even at Molineux, where such things had happened before in European matches. Richards and Gray did everything they could to get the ball in the net, despite the fouls perpetrated against them. The Dutch ‘keeper stopped everything that came his way, but it looked as if the Wolves might just come out on top. Then, in the 38th minute, the lights suddenly went out, as the stadium and much of Wolverhampton town centre were thrown into darkness by a power cut. The players and spectators stood around for twenty-five minutes until the game could be restarted, but it was not until the second half that a Wolves goal came, following a fiftieth-minute goalmouth melée, with Darlaston-born Mel Eves (below) the scorer of what was destined to be the last Wolves’ goal to be scored in a European competition until 2019. Ominously, the lights went out again as Eves scored. Wolves were denied two penalties and, urged on by Emlyn Hughes (above), they threw everything into attack but failed to get another breakthrough.

Once again, the dream was over. As Mel Eves later wrote, neither the players nor the fans envisaged the catastrophes that were looming on the horizon, nor that this would turn out to be their last European adventure for a very long time:

“I often get asked what it was like to be the last Wolves player to score a goal in a European competition; the answer is simple: at the time, neither I, nor anyone else that I know of, could have imagined that this would be Wolves’ last European goal; I’d never have believed it if someone had told me that. I suppose my best answer is that it was great to score any goal for Wolves. Now I can’t wait to lose the tag because for someone to score a European goal would mean we’d have regained our rightful place in the top echelon of English football, back where Wolves belong.”

The 1980s were one of the most difficult decades in the history of British football, and Wolves found themselves at the forefront of the financial struggle. The construction and associated cost of the ‘New Stand’ (below) had really put pressure on finances at Wolves just at the time when the team declined to eighteenth place and was relegated at the end of the 1981-82 season. In the summer of 1982, the club faced bankruptcy, with the local newspaper, The Express and Star, headlining “Wolves Have Gone Bust”. Derek Dougan led a consortium to save the club. It made sweeping changes immediately, replacing its management team with a team led by Graham Hawkins, a former Wolves player and supporter. He guided Wolves to an immediate promotion in 1982-83, when Wolves were runners-up.

However, the promotion was a false dawn, and in 1983-84 Wolves were again relegated after a miserable season in Division One. In the 1984-85 season, Wolves won only eight games in another miserable season. From mid-November 1984 to mid-April 1985 Wolves failed to score a single goal at Molineux. On Saturday 11th May 1985 Wolves played their final Division Two fixture at Ewood Park, Blackburn. Meanwhile, just over the Pennines, fifty-six supporters were tragically killed in a fire at Bradford City’s Valley Parade Stadium. This horrendous event led to the Popplewell Enquiry, which directly affected Molineux.

The North Bank and the Waterloo Road Stand were closed due to their wooden content. When they were declared unsafe at the beginning of the 1985-86 season, the Wolves were close to being unable to play at their ground. But Wolves did take their place in Division Three, the first time they had been in the third tier since 1923-24. The season ended in their third successive relegation. These three disastrous seasons saw the Old Gold plummet from Division One to Division Four in consecutive seasons. Meanwhile, Molineux continued to crumble. The club was saved from being wound up by a three-way consortium led by Asda Supermarkets, which marked a turning point in the club’s fortunes. The Club was then joined as manager by Graham Turner, formerly of Watford and England fame, a boyhood Wolves fan.

Under Turner’s leadership, in 1987-1988, the Wolves stormed to the Fourth Division title and the following season, to the Third Division title. A lot of their success was down to Steve Bull scoring more than fifty goals in two consecutive seasons. As a third-tier player, this earned him a surprise call-up to the England team in 1989. He went on to represent his country in the World Cup in Italy in 1990. He scored four goals in thirteen internationals, but despite scoring 309 goals for Wolves, a club record, he never had the chance to play in European club competition before injury ended his career in 1999.

By the nineties, the Wolves were back in Division Two, so in the 1980s, they had played on almost every league ground in England and Wales. But the Hillsborough Enquiry put more pressure on all these grounds, including Molineux, which added to the costs and issues already faced as a result of the Popplewell Report of 1985.

The Taylor Report meant the clock was ticking and the redevelopment of Molineux needed to happen with a sense of urgency. Lifelong fan Jack Hayward (pictured above) stepped in to purchase the club in 1990 and immediately funded the extensive redevelopment of a by-then-dilapidated Molineux into a modern all-seater stadium, one of the best in the country. The rebuild began in 1991 and was completed in 1993, after which Hayward redirected his investment onto the playing side in an attempt to win promotion to the newly formed Premier League, which took another ten years, into the twenty-first century.

To mark the opening of the new stands, named after Stan Cullis, Billy Wright and Jack Harris, and celebrate the new-look stadium, there was a special fixture against Kispest Honved scheduled for 7 December 1993. This was the first time Wolves supporters had seen a four-sided Molineux since 1985. Interestingly, this was the third friendly floodlit match against Honved at Molineux, thirty-nine years after the first. A lasting memory of that night was Billy Wright and Ferenc Puskás standing in the players’ tunnel before kick-off. Puskás had recently returned from Australia, where he managed South Melbourne between 1989 and 1992. In their playing days, Puskás had twice led Wright a ‘merry dance’ when Hungary met England and now Wright was reduced to laughter when a wag shouted in broad Black Country: “Billy, that’s the closest yo’ve ever got to ‘im.” There was a short delay because of another failure in the floodlighting. But compared with some of the darker days of the previous fifteen years, this was not a major issue since, as Wolves fans knew, Out of Darkness Cometh Light. The capacity all-seated crowd of 28,245 watched the visitors hold Wolves to a 2-2 draw.

Memorabilia from the 1993 Wolves v Honved floodlit friendly at Molineux.

In August 1998, Wolves again met Barcelona in a pre-season friendly match to celebrate the club’s 125th anniversary. Then, after the tragedy of seeing West Brom ‘steal’ promotion by finishing second in Division Two in 2001-02 and losing to Norwich in the play-off semi-final, Wolves finally returned to the top flight after winning against Sheffield United at the Millennium Stadium, Cardiff in the 2003 play-off final. Wolves were back in the top division in time to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of their first-ever friendly under floodlights at Molineux. As John Shipley put it in 2003:

‘Yes, there have been other more recent floodlit friendlies, but none that have recaptured or have gone any way towards evoking the wonderful atmosphere of those games in the 1950s, or those in the various European competitions in which Wolves competed. …’

Shipley (2003), p.191.

Top: Sir Jack Hayward and manager Dave Jones celebrate promotion from the top of an open-top bus
Below: crowds join them in the centre of Wolverhampton.

In 2003-04, I returned to Molineux with my cousin and twelve-year-old son to watch the Wolves beat Manchester United and Fulham in their first season back in the First Division. These were memorable moments, but unfortunately, their return to the top flight under Dave Jones only lasted one season. They finished bottom and returned to what had become ‘the Championship’. After a slow start in the 2004-05 campaign, Jones was dismissed in November 2004 and replaced by former England manager Glenn Hoddle. He managed to steer Wolves to ninth in the 2004-05 campaign and seventh in 2005-06, but then suddenly resigned in July 2006. Sir Jack made his final managerial appointment with Mick McCarthy who set about rebuilding the team when there was hardly any of the squad left. This led to another play-off finish, in which Wolves lost narrowly to West Brom. Nevertheless, the campaign was way above even the most positive Wolves supporter’s expectations, restoring confidence in the Molineux fan base. In the 2007-08 season, Sir Jack’s last, McCarthy led the Wanderers to a strong seventh place, slightly lower than the play-off places. In his time at the club, Sir Jack Hayward had rebuilt the infrastructure of the club, leaving a Molineux to be proud of and a new training ground of a very high standard.

More Ups & Downs, 2008-2017:

In 2008, Jack sold the club to Steve Morgan for a nominal fee of ten pounds on the condition that Morgan would invest up to thirty million in the club. Mick McCarthy won the Championship in 2008-09, only the third Wolves manager to win the second-tier title after Major Buckley and Sammy Chung. His team also won it in fine style in a superb season. They finished seven points clear of runners-up Birmingham City and ten clear of Sheffield United in third. There were also impressively consistent individual performances throughout the team. Wolves were back in the Premier League after five years away and there were many more memorable moments, like the last day of the 2010-11 season that saw the Wanderers narrowly avoid relegation on goal difference. Again, there were some fine victories against Manchester United, Manchester City and Arsenal. The new owner, Steve Morgan, believed that Molineux needed to be bigger to host Premier League football, to take its capacity to forty thousand. The Stan Cullis stand came down at the end of the season and was replaced with a two-tier stand which also houses the club megastore and museum.

Above: The finally completed Molineux stadium, with twenty-first-century floodlighting.

However, the 2011-12 season, with Molineux’s reduced capacity, sadly saw the club relegated. McCarthy was sacked in February 2012, following a dismal display against West Brom. He was replaced by Terry Connor, who could not stop the Wolves from being relegated. Connor’s successor, Norwegian Stale Solbakken, was also dismissed in January 2013 after a run of poor performances, to be replaced by Dean Saunders. He could not prevent a further relegation to League One, the third tier, but the astute appointment of Kenny Jackett ensured that Wolves romped to the League One title in 2014 with a record 103 points. The subsequent promotion back to the Championship felt like another turning point for the club and its fans. Jackett was very unlucky not to get the team into the play-offs at the end of the 2014-15 season, and when the team slipped back to a mid-table place in 2015-16, he left the club.

The 2016-17 season was not the best of seasons, but in the summer of 2017, the ‘Fosun revolution’ (named after the new owners, Fosun International) began to take shape. The appointment of Nuno Espirito Santo signalled the real beginning of the new era, along with the arrival of various Portuguese players. Evertonian Conor Coady, who had arrived at the club in the summer of 2015, took on a new role as a sweeper and was made club captain. Wolves took the Championship apart and won it at a canter with the entire squad impressing and Head Coach Nuno quickly becoming a club hero. The 2017-2018 season for all involved was incredible. Wolves were Champions and back in the Premier League after a five-year gap. This time it felt somewhat different, however. Ruben Neves and Diogo Jota had arrived in 2017, along with Wily Boly.

The Wanderers’ Return To Europe, 2018-20:

In the Summer of 2018, Wolves were joined by further exciting arrivals from Portugal in the guise of internationals, goalkeeper Rui Patricio and Joao Mutinho, sending a clear message of intent to the other Premier League clubs: Wolves were not back in the top flight simply to make up the numbers. They were determined to compete and they succeeded in this by finishing seventh at the end of their first season back, securing a place in the Europa League. Wolves also got to the FA Cup semi-final and their supporters had a wonderful Wembley day out. But despite the heroics from Mexican star Raul Jimenez, the match finished in defeat to Watford.

Above: Diogo Jota fires a shot at goal during Wolves’ return to Europe against Crusaders. Jota scored Wolves’ first goal in European competition for 39 years in the 38th minute.
Picture: Matthew Childs/ Reuters

On the hottest July day on record in 2019, Wolves played the Belfast club Crusaders, who finished fourth in the Irish Premiership in the 2018/19 season, also winning the Irish Cup. Wolves won 2-0 and went through to the next round, after winning by a similar margin in the return leg in Belfast the following week. Before the opening game, highlights of the Molineux team’s historic 1950s triumphs over Spartak Moscow and Budapest Honvéd were beamed on the big screens. After their victory over Crusaders in the Europa League, Wolves then went on to beat the Arminian club Pyunik, 8-0 on aggregate, and on 29 August, they booked their place in the Europa League group stage after beating Torino in front of a jubilant Molineux. The Black Country side were in the main stage of a European competition for the first time since 1980 after coming through three rounds of qualifiers. Their popular Portuguese manager, who had turned the club around since his 2017 appointment when they were in the Championship, named a strong team. They started the game on the back foot, however, with Torino dominating possession and Wolves playing a counter-attacking game. But wing-back Traore was lively down the right and forced a save from Salvatore Sirigu after a sensational surging run, before setting up Jimenez for the opener.

Pictured above, Raul Jimenez scored six goals in as many Europa League qualifiers.

Torino needed three goals at that stage and for about sixty seconds they seemed back in the tie when Italian international Belotti headed in Daniele Baselli’s free-kick. That made it 4-3 on aggregate, but Leander Dendoncker put the game out of reach. Wolves had restored their two-goal aggregate advantage when Diogo Jota’s shot was saved and Dendoncker’s first-time shot from sixteen yards went in via the post. That goal meant Torino needed to score twice to force extra time, and, despite some late chances, a comeback never seemed likely. Wolves’ European run ended up causing problems for their twenty-one-man first-team squad – this was their ninth game in thirty-six days – but that was a problem boss Nuno Espirito Santo wanted:

“Work started two years ago and this is the next step. This is massive for us.

“It has been tough so far. The way the fans push us, they are the twelfth man.”

Former Wolves manager Nuno Espirito Santo

In reaching the Europa League group stage, Wolves had returned to the European competition they played a significant role in inspiring sixty-five years before. Just reaching the Europa League group stage had not been an insignificant task for Wolves. Home and away victories in the play-off round against Torino represented only the eleventh time an English club had beaten the same Italian opposition in back-to-back games in the entire history of European competition. It was a notable achievement for a side whose history was well-known around Europe. In the main stage of the competition, Wolves were drawn against Braga, Besiktas and Slovan Bratislava. They qualified out of the group in second place, only losing one game. Success continued when they then defeated Espanyol in the Round of thirty-two and Olympiacos in the last sixteen. Despite beating the top Greek team in Athens, due to the Covid-19 pandemic supporters were unable to attend. The second leg of the tie took place almost five months later. Wolves progressed to the quarter-final where they played Sevilla at a neutral venue in Germany, behind closed doors and in a one-legged tie. Unfortunately, the Wolves ‘bowed out’ of the competition in a narrow 1-0 defeat. In 1919-20, Wolves replicated their previous season’s seventh-place finish in the Premier League, but with two more points, and only missed out on a return to continental competition on goal difference.

The Post-Pandemic Seasons – The End of the Legend?

Despite the difficult circumstances of the pandemic that had taken control of the world at this point, and the number of games Wolves had to play at home and away, including in European competition, Wolves had not managed to finish this high in the top League since the consecutive seasons of 1959-60 and 1960-61. Nuno’s final season was 2020-21, the majority of it played behind closed doors, and even when crowds did return it was in very minimal numbers. There were also serious injuries to Jimenez, Pedro Neto and Jonny which resulted in the team slipping to thirteenth in the League. Nuno left in 2021 after achieving a measure of greatness to compare with former glories, leaving the supporters with great memories of some extraordinary excursions around Europe before the pandemic hit. In the eyes of the fans, he had become its latest legend.

Current Wolves Manager (since 2023) Gary O’Neil.

On 9th August 2023 Wolves appointed Gary O’Neil as their new manager, following short spells in charge from Bruno Lage and Julen Lopetegui. O’neil had steered Bournemouth to safety the season before. He had only five days to work with the players before the opening day’s visit to Old Trafford where, despite an impressive performance, they lost. The first home games also saw defeats, but then they climbed back to seventh before dropping to fourteenth by the end of the season. Along the way, they recorded great wins against champions Manchester City, Tottenham and Chelsea. They also beat West Brom at the Hawthorns for the first time since 1996, in the FA Cup. However, in the current season, they remain as far away as ever from qualifying for European competition.

The Light Shines on…

In his foreword to the Wolves Museum Guide, Mel Eves recalls his junior school trip to Molineux when he looked ‘in awe at the trophy-filled cabinets’ in the main entrance to the stadium in Waterloo Road. In 1974, like me, he was in the sixth form of Grammar School when he made his first trip to Wembley to see his team, the Wolves, beat a star-studded Manchester City 2-1, to lift the Football League Cup for the first time. His second visit was in 1980 when he was playing in the Wolves team which beat the Nottingham Forest team that went on to retain the European Cup at the end of the season. He commented:

“I was very blessed to be able to play football professionally. It was even more special to fulfil my boyhood ambition with the team I had always supported. Before my nine years at Wolves ended… in May 1984 aged twenty-seven, I had played in 214 games and scored fifty-three goals. … The rich history of the club, from being a founder member of the Football League, all the way through competing with the best in Europe and the Premier League, is brought to life in the Museum experience.”

Mel Eves, quoted in Wolves Museum Guide, 2024, loc. cit.

As a Wolves fan of a very similar age, who as a young lad wanted to play for the Wolves and who visited the Museum earlier this year, I share his opinion, and the city and club motto, Out of darkness cometh light. After all, Chandlers make candles, which shed light into the darkest of corners!

Steffan Chandler buying his shirt, in August 2024, after a tour of Molineux.
Sources:

György Szöllősi (2015), Ferenc Puskás: The Most Famous Hungarian. Budapest: Rézbong Kiadó.

György Szöllősi, Zalán Bodnár (2015), Az Aranycsapat Kinceskönyve (‘The Golden Team Treasure Book’). Budapest: Twister Media.

Bán Tibor & Harmos Zotán (2011), Puskás Ferenc. Budapest: Arena 2000.

Czégány Pál (2021), Albert 80: The Legacy of the One and Only Hungarian Ballon d’Or Winner. Budapest: Ferencvárosi Torna Club: Albert Flórián Labdarúgó Utánpótlás és Sportalapitvány (www.albertalapitvany.hu).

John Shipley (2003), Wolves Against the World: European Nights, 1953-1980. Stroud (Glos.): Tempus Publishing.

Molineux Stadium (2024), Wolves Museum Guide, Third Edition.: Wolverhampton: Synaxis Design Consultancy.

Gallery:

‘Out of Darkness Cometh Light’ – Seventieth Anniversary of Floodlit European Football at Wolverhampton I.

Part One: 1949-1964 – The Cullis Years

Wolverhampton’s Civic Crest
Wolverhampton, The Black Country and the West Midlands, showing the county boundaries in the 1950s-60s

‘They Wore the Shirt’:

At the end of July 2024, my son and I, both fans of Wolverhampton Wanderers (the ‘Wolves’) visited their stadium, Molineux, and their new Museum chronicling the history of the club and the stadium dating back to 1877. The museum itself dates from the 2011-12 season when the Stan Cullis Stand, itself built where the ‘Cow Shed’ end once stood (where I used to stand as a boy) was replaced by a magnificent two-tier stand which also houses the club ‘megastore’ and the museum. One of the most iconic exhibits in the museum is the Rayon Silk shirt (now somewhat faded from its original fluorescent old gold, as seen in two of the photographs below), which the Wolves team wore on a few occasions, firstly in the second half of two league games in 1951.

The shirt in the Museum is thought to have been worn by Brian Punter at a Youth team game against Birmingham County FA as described in Steve Plant’s book, They Wore the Shirt. This occurred at Dudley’s Revo Electric Ground in 1953 when floodlit games began at Molineux. The shirt has no number on the back and is therefore believed to be a prototype. Revo Electric’s ground had floodlights before Molineux itself, and it’s thought that Stan Cullis, the Wolves manager, was in attendance and wanted to see what the shirt looked like under the lights as, of course, It was designed to reflect the floodlights. It’s also believed that Punter wore this shirt with the rest of the Wolves Youth side wearing the standard Wolves shirt of the time.

The floodlit friendly games were all ‘iconic’ but especially the match played on 13th December 1954 against Honved of Budapest, so the golden shirt of ‘poor man’s silk’ represents that famous occasion. It was discovered during a ‘Champions of the World’ project, funded by the national lottery to celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of the iconic Wolves v Honved match. Peter Crump, whose brother found the shirt, writes:

“I love this shirt as it allows us to tell the amazing story of how Wolverhampton Wanderers and the great footballers of that period changed football forever. …

“The Wolves players of this period are not just Wolves Legends, they are footballing legends. Football under the lights gradually become a normal part of the calendar and (they) are still magical to this day.

“I am far too young to remember this era. This period is so special and this wonderful shirt allows us to make sure that we keep this alive. We have a duty to tell this story over and over again and make sure that Stan Cullis’ Gold and Black Army always lives on.”

Quoted in Wolves Museum Guide (2024), p. 48.

Prelude – The Buckley Era, 1927-47:

The story of Wolves’ Golden Era has its roots in Major Frank Buckley’s period as their manager beginning in 1927. During his time at Wolves, Major Buckley showed that he was not frightened of taking decisions that would make him an unpopular figure with supporters. One of these was the sale of Bryn Jones in 1938:

A display panel from the Wolves Museum.

1938 is also notorious in the history of the England football team, as it is in British history, as the year in which the team played in Berlin and gave the Nazi salute in tribute to Adolf Hitler and the fascist régime triumphant in the country and other German-speaking areas of Europe at that time. This was at the peak of the British government’s appeasement policy towards the ascendancy of fascism throughout Europe, especially in Italy and Spain in addition to Germany. The team photo before the game, showing all the players making the salute, was widely published in the national and international press at the time:

In 1934 Buckley signed a young Stan Cullis, who captained Wolves at 19 and England when two days short of his 23rd birthday. He won his first cap in the 5-1 win against Ireland in 1937, the first of twelve (Hitler’s European War prevented him from winning more). England won the match in Berlin 6-3, and despite his refusal to ‘obey orders’, he became one of only six Wolves players to have captained England. Buckley almost won Wolves’ first-ever First Division title for the 1937-38 season, but they were overtaken by Arsenal at the final hurdle.

In 1938, William Ambrose Wright was invited for a trial. Buckley, a tough defender as a player, thought the youngster was too small and was about to release the player when his trainer, Jack Davies (pictured above), persuaded him to retain Wright.

The following year, the team made their first visit to Wembley Stadium but lost unexpectedly to Portsmouth. They did, however, win the ‘wartime cup’ in 1942 under Buckley before his resignation in 1944. He was a strict military disciplinarian in training but transformed the team, paving the way to future post-war success.

The first competitive season after the war was the 1946-47 campaign, led by ex-Bolton Wanderers player, Ted Vizard as manager. Again, it ended in heartbreak when Wolves ‘simply’ needed to beat Liverpool in the season’s final game to win their first top-flight title. Unfortunately for the Wolves, Liverpool won 2-1 and took the title. The match was also the last for Stan Cullis as a player. He retired (aged 31) to become the club’s Assistant Manager in 1947, beginning the ‘Golden Era’ for the team. In the following season, the Wolves finished fifth and in 1948 Cullis became manager.

The Cullis Era Begins, 1948-53 – Cup-Winners & Champions:

The 1949 Cup Final

The following season, 1948-49, Cullis delivered Wolves’ first major trophy since 1908, when, a full decade after losing to Portsmouth, they finally won the FA Cup, beating Leicester City at Wembley. In the following two seasons, however, there was a significant slip in Wolves’ form. But Wolves were much improved in that season, as they returned to the top three. Over the previous ten seasons (excluding the war break), Wolves had finished second three times, third twice, fifth twice and sixth once. The 1952-53 season saw a revival in the club’s fortunes as they finished third in the League, and they continued to secure their place among the top clubs in the country, though they had to wait until 1953-54 to become First Division Champions.

Johnny Hancocks is in the right foreground, wearing a pin-striped suit.

In the season following the late Queen’s Coronation, Wolves became Britain’s best and most celebrated football team. They won their inaugural First Division title, finishing four points ahead of local Black Country rivals West Bromwich Albion. They completed the double over West Brom, which proved vital at the end of the season as only two points were awarded for a win at that time. In the following nine seasons, Wolves finished outside the top three only once.

The Floodlit Friendly Fifties – ‘Champions of the World’, 1953-58:

Towards the end of this initial successful period, the forward-looking board took the monumental decision to be among the first football league clubs to install floodlights, thus heralding a series of memorable night games. The Wolves programme had proudly proclaimed that the Molineux Grounds boasted covered accommodation for thirty thousand plus uncovered space for more than an additional thirty thousand. A system of floodlights would be a great addition to the stadium; however, both the Football League and the FA pronounced that floodlights would not be allowed for League and Cup games, though they could be used for friendly and charity games. In 1953 the construction of the floodlights proceeded apace and the lights were ready for the new season. But they were not allowed to be used for League and Cup games until February 1956. As a result, Wolves had to be innovative, and they invited a series of opponents to Molineux. From September 1953 to December 1962 Wolves played twenty-three iconic games under the lights. These were a mixture of friendlies, Charity Shield, European Cup and Cup Winners’ Cup games. Besides being English League Champions, they had also beaten Glasgow Celtic 2-0 in the second floodlit friendly match at Molineux in October 1953.

The first floodlit match took place a fortnight earlier, on 30 September, against the touring South African team, a game originally scheduled for the afternoon of that day. The honour of playing the very first floodlit game had originally been promised to Celtic, but the system, designed by W. G. France’s Electric Ltd. of Darlaston on the dining table of the Managing Director’s Bilston home, using a scaled model, was ready for use in advance of the prestigious match against the South African tourists. The Wolves board were keen to make the inaugural floodlit match as grand an affair as possible and therefore had the idea to switch the match against South Africa from what might have been, given the inclement late summer weather, a dull Wednesday afternoon fixture, into something that would live in the memory of all who witnessed it.

Probably no more than five or six thousand would have been at the afternoon match, as most people would be working. The Celtic directors readily gave way when the situation was explained to them. The inaugural match under the brand new lights proved to be a ‘magical’ occasion, dubbed variously in the press as ‘Football in Wonderland’, ‘Football in Fairyland’, ‘Football in Technicolor’ and a ‘Footballing Spectacular’. It kicked off at 7.45 p.m. in front of 33,000 curious supporters, the biggest crowd to watch the tourists, despite the ‘dodgy’ weather. The gate was probably a little disappointing for the directors, however, considering how momentous the occasion was. Wolves ran out in their new luminous gold strip contrasting with the bright green shirts of the ‘Springboks’: They ran in 3-1 winners. There weren’t many Wolverhampton people who saw this first match that wouldn’t want to see the Celtic match.

Sure enough, Wolves’ first floodlit friendly against a club side at Molineux resulted in a 2-0 victory over Glasgow Celtic on 14 October 1953, but their first match under lights against continental opposition was against the crack Austrian team, First Vienna FC on 13 October 1954. Wolves had already travelled to Austria to play a friendly against them on a wet Sunday afternoon in August, beating them to win a gold-plated trophy. Returning to Wolverhampton, they then played the FA Charity Shield clash with West Bromwich Albion, their Cup-winning neighbours. The match played on 29 September 1954 was a floodlit epic 4-4 draw, watched by over forty thousand. Wolves raced into a 4-1 lead before being pegged back by the Albion with a future Wolves manager, Ronnie Allen snatching a hat-trick.

Bill Slater, centre-half turned centre-forward (against First Vienna FC), with Bert Williams behind him.

The return match with FC First Vienna was played on a Wednesday night at Molineux in mid-October and ended in a 0-0 draw. Wolves had to make several changes, the most noticeable of which was Bill Slater moving to centre forward. He failed to score, but on any other day, he might have scored a hat trick in what was an excellent performance. Vienna’s goalkeeper, Kurt Smied, gave a heroic display worthy of Bert Williams in keeping the hungry Wolves at bay.

This was followed by a match against Spartak Moscow on a foggy Wolverhampton evening of 16 November and was broadcast live by the BBC. Spartak had recently crushed two of Belgium’s finest sides, Liége and Anderlecht, and a week earlier had beaten Arsenal 2-1 at Highbury, so Wolves knew that they were in for a tough night. The Wolves captain, Billy Wright led his side out clad in their new fluorescent rayon strip of gold shirts and black shorts. But the visitors began playing enthusiastically and panache, moving the ball around with great skill. Twice it had to be cleared from the goal line with Bert Williams beaten, but the Wolves goalkeeper (pictured above) saved several more good attempts on his goal.

Wolves then began to counter with their own display of fierce but fair tackling that led to them moving the ball around with purpose, and they finally went ahead in the sixty-second minute through their outstanding centre-forward, Dennis Wilshaw. Then, seven minutes from time, with the Russians noticeably tiring, Johnny Hancocks got a second. It began to look good for the home team, and the Wolves’ superior stamina now began to tell. In the eighty-eighth minute, Roy Swinbourne added a third, followed a minute later by Hancocks making it four. Wolves had scored three in a little over five minutes against one of the tightest defences in Europe. The 4-0 scoreline may have looked a little flattering, but it might not have looked so emphatic had Bill Shorthouse and Billy Wright not broken up a series of threatening Russian attacks earlier in the game.

Afternoon matches kicked off early in the Winter of 1953, even at Wembley, as there were no floodlights..

During and following their title-winning season in 1953-54, Wolves played hosts to a succession of European club sides, along with teams from as widely spread as Argentina (Racing Club of Buenos Aires) and Israel (Maccabi Tel Aviv), under the new floodlights at Molineux. The most famous of these matches was the game against Honved of Budapest, the crack team of the Hungarian army, eight of whom, including captain Ferenc Puskás, had been in the national team that had beaten England 6-3 at Wembley (the first time England had lost to a continental side on home soil), and 7-1 in Budapest, the previous season. Both these defeats were still fresh in the minds of English fans when, in December 1954, Honved arrived in Wolverhampton. Their team contained many stars from the national ‘Golden Team’ (Arany Csapat) which, besides Puskás, included his well-drilled comrade-soldiers, Bozsik, Kocsis, Lorant, Czibor and Budai.

The full teams who ran out at Molineux behind the captains, Wright and Puskás, were:

Honved: Farago; Rákóczi, Kovács; Bozsik, Lorant, Banyai; Budai, Kocsis, Machos (Tichy), Puskás, Czibor.

Johnny Hancocks in training

Wolves: Williams; Stuart, Shorthouse; Slater, Wright, Flowers; Hancocks, Broadbent, Swinbourne, Wilshaw, Smith.

Scorers for Wolves: Johnny Hancocks (penalty), Roy Swinburne (2)

Scorers for Honved: Kocsis, Machos.

Attendance: 54,998.

To understand the significance of the early floodlit matches, it is important to understand the peculiar social and political context and circumstances of this period of the Cold War, specifically 1953-58. The Hungarian national side, already Olympic Champions in 1952, should also have won the World Cup in the Summer of 1954, held in Switzerland, but were beaten in the final by a West German side which came from 2-0 down to win 3-2. Kocsis was the leading scorer in the World Cup and so, following their own sensational win over Spartak Moscow a month earlier, Wolves were keen to welcome the tormentors of England to Molineux. Since the England team did not meet the ‘Mighty Magyars’ in the finals (they were knocked out by Uruguay in the quarter-finals), this club match at Molineux the following December was billed as the ‘chance for revenge’ by Billy Wright and his boys.

The first biography of Puskás, available worldwide, was published in London in 1955.

The game was played under the new floodlights on a Monday night, 13th December, with 55,000 cheering fans watching at the ground and many more on the new phenomenon of TV. The BBC broadcast the second half live on TV, and the whole match live on the radio. Just as they had led out their national teams in the games the previous season, Billy Wright and Ferenc Puskás were again side-by-side as the two teams ran out onto the pitch, Wolves wearing their golden rayon shirts to reflect the floodlights (pictured below). Billy Wright would have been fully aware of the threat Honvéd posed, having captained England games in the two heavy defeats to Hungary.

The visitors immediately began to play with fantastic ball control and speed of passing. As in the World Cup final, the Hungarian club team went 2-0 up in the first half, and were in full control, their precision passing and speed of attack drawing gasps of appreciation from the crowd. The first goal came from a pin-point free kick which found the head of Kocsis and the ball flew past Bert Williams in the Wolves’ goal like a bullet. This was followed up by a second from the speedy winger, Machos, who was put through the defence by Kocsis. That all happened in the first quarter-hour, but after that Williams pulled off a string of saves to keep the score down to 2-0 at the interval. As the teams left the field at half-time, the crowd rose to salute the Hungarian artistry, but the Wolves fans were worried that their team might be humiliated in the second half, just as the England team had been the year before.

In the second half, however, the Wolves called upon all their fighting spirit and energy reserves. During the interval, the Wolves manager, Stan Cullis, ordered the pitch to be watered again (it had been watered, as usual in winter, before the match). This prevented the pitch from freezing and becoming dangerous to the players. However, the softer surface conditions suited the Wolves’ long-ball playing style more than the short-passing style of the visitors. Johnny Hancocks (above) scored from a penalty soon after the re-start, and, with fifteen minutes left, and the Hungarians tiring on what had become a very muddy pitch, Roy Swinbourne (below) scored twice to win the match 3-2 in a second half televised live throughout Britain, with many national servicemen watching it in their barracks (including my cousin, John Hartshorne). Graham Hughes explained how the morale of one group of National Servicemen was boosted by the victory:

“In 1954 I was serving with the Royal Corps of Signals, stationed at at Sherford Camp near Taunton. On the day of the Wolves’ game with Honved our orders were to move chairs into the NAAFI so the servicemen could watch the BBC broadcast of the game. Myself and my two mates, Taffy Townsend and Les Cockin, being from Wolverhampton, were guests of honour and given front row seats; it was great. When Wolves scored the winner everybody jumped up, shouting and cheering: Scousers, Cockneys, Geordies, the lot; even the officers. In fact, the officers were so pleased, they ordered the NAAFI to stay open so we could celebrate Wolves’ win properly. Fantastic!”

Quoted in Shipley (2003), p.47.

The next day, Wolves were acclaimed as ‘Champions of the World’ in the English press, especially by The Daily Mail. Gabriel Hanot, a sports journalist for ‘L’Équipe’ responded by suggesting that this could only be proved by establishing a continental cup competition. He had long been campaigning for a European tournament, and he stated:

“Before we declare that Wolverhampton Wanderers are invincible, let them go to Moscow and Budapest. And there are other internationally renowned clubs: A. C. Milan and Real Madrid to name but two. A club world championship, or at least a European one – larger, more meaningful and more prestigious than the Mitropa Cup and more original than a competition for national teams – should be launched.”

Quoted in Wolves Museum Guide (2024), p. 17.

A variety of events led to the creation of the European Cup in the following season, 1955/56. However, the short-sighted Football League Management Committee refused to support Chelsea, the 1954/55 champions (they had four more points than Wolves, who finished as runners-up) in their application to take part. The Chelsea Chairman was very enthusiastic about the new competition. He sent a delegate to the April 1955 organising committee in Paris, but the Football League were suspicious of European club football and concerned about potential fixture congestion. They strongly advised Chelsea to withdraw, and the Blues reluctantly gave way to be replaced by Gwardia Warsaw. The only British club to enter this first-ever European Cup was therefore the Edinburgh club Hibernian, then considered to be Scotland’s top team, though they only finished fifth in the Scottish League (to begin with, it wasn’t necessary to be domestic League champions to enter). ‘Hibs’ justified their entry by reaching the semi-finals, losing 3-0 to French club Reims.

The Hungarian team returning to Budapest from Vienna following the 1954 Cup Final.

Meanwhile, in Hungary, there had been a strong public reaction to the ‘Golden Team’ losing in the World Cup Final the previous year. As Tibór Fischer, the historian with Hungarian roots put it in his best-seller, Under the Frog:

‘Hungarians don’t mind dictatorship, but they really hate losing a football match.’

Quoted by György Szöllősi, loc.cit., p. 28.

The Commissars of Hungarian sport: Gustáv Sebes (coach of the national football team) & István Kutas.

Following the defeat to West Germany in 1954, Hungarians turned against the national team’s management and against the wider political régime. Its leaders had for years basked in the successes of the country’s footballers, but now the coaches and players also felt the loss of confidence. The World Cup final constituted a turning point in Hungarian football, but its devastating effect was more palpable over a long period rather than in the short term. In the capital, shop windows were smashed and streetcars overturned before finally, the angry masses reached the Magyar Rádió building, where they handed in a petition stating that Gusztav Sebes should not return home after his ignominious failure. The spontaneous demonstration was soon put down, the ringleaders arrested and the press kept silent about the whole event. However, the disturbances were later seen as a precursor to the 1956 Uprising because this was the first time people could experience when they could and should raise their heads above the parapet.

But after the Berne final the national team went on another unbeaten run lasting a year and a half. Apart from a 2-1 defeat in a Moscow ‘friendly’ and the World Cup final, Sebes’ national team were undefeated in six years. The Hungarian Uprising and Soviet invasion in 1956 ended the run of Puskás’s magnificent men in the national team. By February 1956, the more and more anti-football dictatorship began a series of humiliations against the ‘spoilt’ footballers, as it portrayed them. On the 19th they suffered a 3-1 defeat by Turkey in Istanbul. This was followed by other defeats and unacceptable performances, which led to Sebes losing political influence and being ousted in the summer of 1956.

Sebes’s successor was Márton Bukovi, the MTK coach, who produced a five-match winning streak, reactivating Grosics (from scapegoating and house arrest under the previous régime) as goalkeeper while giving Puskás an ultimatum to get fit or lose his place. After victories over Poland, Yugoslavia, the USSR, France and Austria, the national team was preparing for a match against Sweden when the anti-government demonstration began, followed by an armed uprising. Zoltán Czibor (below) was a well-known anti-Communist and he helped Puskás get passports for the squad from the new government of Imre Nagy. On 1st November, Honvéd set off for their European Cup match with Athletico Bilbao, due to take place in Spain three weeks later. Vörös Lobogó (‘Red Banner’) (MTK) had competed for Hungary in the inaugural competition the year before.

However, three days after the team left Hungary, the Soviet tanks streamed across the eastern border to put down the uprising. The Honvéd players did everything they could to get their families out of the country. Puskas’s wife and their four-year-old daughter managed to cross into Austria on 1st December. The first leg of the Athletico Bilbao match had finished 3-2 to the Basques, and the return leg took place on 20th December in Brussels due to the volatile situation in Budapest. It finished 3-3, so Honvéd were out. Understandably, many of the players, including Kocsis and Puskás himself, decided against returning home to Budapest, preferring to ply their trade in the ‘free world’. In December, two years to the day of the Honved match, a benefit match for Hungarian refugees was played at Molineux, again under floodlights, with ‘Red Banner’ (MTK) Budapest as opponents. The team included four internationals, with Hidegkúti at centre-forward, who combined brilliantly with Palotás.

In the Fifties, with the first floodlights.

The home team was not exactly ‘howling’ at the Hungarians’ gates, however, and ‘the Molineux murmur’ of dissatisfaction soon began as the crowd sensed that their team was holding something back. To be fair, they found it difficult to break down the visitors’ defensive system, one of the coolest under pressure ever seen at Molineux to that date. The Magyars took the lead when Palotás whipped the ball past the diving Bert Williams after some world-class footwork by Hidegkúti.

Bert Williams in training.

Wolves drew level from a Hooper corner, which was palmed away by Veres, but only as far as Neil who had drifted outside the goal area and was unmarked. His smartly hit shot passed through the ruck of players and beat Veres on the line. The cool, calculated football of MTK sometimes became over-complicated. They were all too frequently guilty of playing one pass too many. At half-time, the talented Hidegkúti was replaced by Karasz, but the game was far from dull, however, with both goalkeepers acquitting themselves well by making strings of acrobatic saves.

MTK became only the second team to escape floodlit defeat at Wolves’ Molineux ‘lair’. But the 1-1 scoreline was largely irrelevant since the match did not live up to the reputation of Hungarian football, no matter how hard MTK tried. The solemnity of the occasion, set against the Soviet crushing of the Hungarian Uprising, meant that the football served up on the night was not as slick as that of the Honved match of two years earlier. The day after the match, the Hungarian players and officials made their way back to Vienna, unsure of their onward movements, given the course of events in their stricken country. What mattered most to them was that the attendance receipts had raised 2,300 pounds for the Hungarian Relief Fund, and the memorable speech of the Wolves Chairman, James Baker, at the pre-match banquet. He referred to the Wolves’ motto, ‘out of darkness cometh light’ (which is also the motto on the Wolverhampton civic crest, below), and expressed the hope that would soon be proved true in their native land.

The day after the match, the Hungarians were on their way to Vienna, where their onward movements would be dictated by the course of political events in the shape of the continued Soviets’ crushing of the Hungarian Uprising. Meanwhile, the Honvéd team and their relatives were spending Christmas in Milan after being knocked out of the European Cup. By taking their fate into their own hands, the team could now take up the offer of a fairytale tour of South America, starting in Brazil. The offer was lucrative enough for them to be able to ignore the pleading of Guszstáv Sebes, who was sent by the once-again firmly entrenched Hungarian Communist Party to persuade the players, with threats and pleading, to return to Hungary. After their successful tour, which went ahead despite international sanctions, the team returned to Europe and most of the players eventually found their way back to Hungary, knowing that punishments awaited them. The most serious of these would apply to Puskás as team captain, a one-year ban. He was also infuriated by Hungarian newspaper articles obtained in Vienna, which slandered him, and he and his wife were emboldened to remain abroad, together with their daughter, Czibor, Kocsis and most of the touring Hungarian youth team.

Official European Competitors, 1957-60:

Meanwhile, Wolves had not been distracted by their friendly European matches from domestic competition, remaining strong in the League, finishing second in 1954-55, third in 1955-56 and sixth in 1956-57. They took the First Division title for a second time in 1957-58.

Victory also came in the Charity Shield at the end of the 1958-59 season, the only time Wolves have won it outright.

At the end of the 1957-58 season, they were finally able to accept an invitation to play in the European Cup, the Football League having overcome their previous aversion to the competition. Wolves can therefore lay claim to being the pioneers of the European Champions Cup, following their famous floodlit friendlies, though they were not the first English team to play in the competition. That honour fell to the ill-fated Manchester United team, League Champions in the previous season. Tragic scenes accompanied the Munich air crash on 6 February 1958, bringing tears to many football fans’ eyes, not just in Manchester or England. To lose so many young, gifted stars in a single disaster was devastating. Wolves became only the second English team to play in the European Cup in 1958-59, but their debut against FC Schalke at home resulted in a disappointing 2-2 draw; they lost the tie to the West Germans 4-3 on aggregate.

Wolves’ first European Cup tie at Molineux on 17th November 1958.

The first five European Championships were won by Real Madrid, with Puskás playing for them from 1958. Fortunately for Wolves, he hadn’t yet started playing for them In 1957, when they beat the Spanish champions 3-2 in a floodlit friendly at Molineux. Wolves were again crowned League champions in 1958-1959, and FA Cup winners in 1960. They suffered a further loss in the European Cup (Quarter-final) to Barcelona by a staggering 9-2 on aggregate with Sándor Kocsis, the fabulous Hungarian striker, now exiled in Spain, scoring four in the return leg at Molineux in March 1960. The match marked the end of an era as Wolves lost their hard-won and much-coveted record of ‘unbeaten under Molineux lights’.

An unofficial programme which was available on the night.

The Cup Final win over Blackburn meant that, though pipped to post by Burnley in the final round of League games, they qualified for the inaugural European Cup Winners Cup. Besides the defeats to Schalke and Barcelona, Wolves also went behind the ‘iron curtain’ to beat Vorwaerts of East Berlin (3-2 agg.) and Red Star Belgrade (4-2). There were also more famous friendly nights under the lights against Dynamo Moscow, CCA Rumania, Borussia Dortmund and Valencia. These European experiences form a significant part of the impressive and recently revamped displays in the Wolves Museum at Molineux.

The two men who led the Wolves’ ‘Golden team’ of the fifties were Stan Cullis as the Manager and Billy Wright as skipper. The success both had with Wolves is known and recognised by the statues outside Molineux and the two Stands named after them. Cullis, a fine player in his day, managed Wolves in all five-trophy successes. He was, like his manager when playing, Major Buckley, a strong disciplinarian and a coach who insisted on fitness first and foremost. Cullis was undoubtedly the best Wolves manager ever, and most recent and current fans would say that he remains so. But the start of the 1959-60 season was marred for him when the Wolves legend Billy Wright dropped a bombshell by announcing his retirement, aged thirty-five. He reportedly told a reporter;

“Yes, this is it. I have had a wonderful run with a wonderful club and I wanted to finish while I am still at the top.”

Billy in action for Wolves

Stan Cullis was reported to have said that, under no circumstances, would he ask Billy to play in the reserves, but would want him to finish as a first-team player. So Billy played his farewell match at Molineux in Wolves colours in the pre-season charity match on Saturday 8 August 1959. Although Billy’s news was bad for the Wolves it was good for the charity, as a larger-than-usual crowd was expected to turn out in honour of their captain. In fact, twenty thousand fans turned out, twice the usual number for the charity match. In a later interview, Wright acknowledged that he had told reporters the previous April that he was ‘good for another season at least’, but added that since he had got his hundredth England cap, and had been awarded a CBE, he had thought it over and decided that it was time to quit. Cullis wanted Wright to take over as his chief coach, with specific responsibility for the club’s youngsters. Billy hadn’t decided on this but confirmed that he would not move to play for another club. ‘How can I play for anyone else after Wolves?’ he said. He did, however, become Arsenal’s manager in the summer of 1963.

Billy Wright in the 1950s with Johnny Hancocks looking on.

Wright was captain in all Wolves’ trophy triumphs except the second Cup Final success, which came in 1960, eleven years after he had lifted the trophy for the Wolves’ first Wembley triumph. Born in Ironbridge, Shropshire, Billy had joined the groundstaff at Molineux in 1938 and, after initially being turned down by Buckley for being too short, made his debut as a player in 1939 before turning professional in 1941. Wright made a total of 541 appearances for Wolves, scoring sixteen goals. He was the first person in the world to play for his country one hundred times and gained 105 caps in all, the first in 1946, only surpassed by Bobby Charlton (106). On ninety of those occasions, he captained the team, playing in three World Cup finals. In his exemplary twenty-year career, he was never sent off, nor even booked. He was regarded not just as a great player and captain, but as a true gentleman. Voted ‘Footballer of the Year’ for 1951-52 and ‘European Footballer of the Year’ runner-up in 1956-57, Billy won everything and achieved everything in his illustrious career which ended with presenting matches on independent TV in the seventies. As a captain, he was the ‘rock’ around which Stan Cullis built his team.

Some of the other iconic players from this era whose names I heard repeatedly from my father, uncle and cousin were those of the wingers, Hancocks, Deeley and Mullen; forwards Swinbourne, Wilshaw and Murray; defenders Slater and Flowers, and goalkeepers Williams and Finlayson. The only player from the fifties team I personally saw play was Peter Broadbent when I was taken to Molineux by my Dad in the mid-1960s, from the age of eight. He was arguably the best of them all according to those who saw the other great players, and was the reason George Best was a Wolves supporter as a boy. Best had seen him play in the second halves of the floodlit games which were shown on BBC television and tried to copy his style. Broadbent had scored Wolves’ first goal in the 3-2 win against Real Madrid in October 1957, a victory which marked the pinnacle of Wolves’ floodlit fest.

Glory Days, Floodlit Nights:

John Shipley, a lifelong Wolves fan from Bridgnorth, first entered Molineux ‘through the front gate’ as a fourteen-year-old schoolboy for the 1957 match between Wolves and Manchester United at Molineux, three years after Wolves had triumphed over Moscow Spartak and Honved of Budapest in the series of floodlit matches.

John reflected on those experiences in his 2003 book:

‘I adored those magical night games… the lights, satin shirts, the excitement, the fantastic attacking football, the ball swinging wing to wing from the boots of Johnny Hancocks and Jimmy Murray… I reckoned that all my Albion mates were pig-sick with jealousy. They had good reason in spite of their own, not insignificant, success because throughout the 1950s Wolverhampton Wanderers went from strength to strength, competing against, and beating, the best teams in Europe, plus giants from other parts of the world; pioneering in every sense. Wolves spearheaded English football’s European onslaught in those heady days. The team in the distinctive old gold and black won a fearsome reputation, and in the process salvaged the English pride that had been so badly dented by the great Hungarian team of the 1950s.’

Memorabilia of the Wolves v Honvéd match in the Wolves Museum.

John Shipley watched the majority of the floodlit games from a strategic vantage point in the South Bank, not far from where I found during my own viewpoint, in the years 1965 to 1975 when, after settling with my family on the boundary between Birmingham and Smethwick, I regularly went to Wolves matches with my father and his Black Country relatives. Fifty years later, I’m looking forward to revisiting Molineux, this time to see a floodlit match, once the Wolves return to European football. It’s worth remembering that these games were born out of a spirit of friendly rivalry and transcontinental cooperation after decades of violent conflict between European nations. Football, and Sport more generally, is not separate from the rest of human activity; it is an expression of its most creative impulses. This was certainly the case in this early post-war era when nationalism was replaced by idealism and before it in turn was supplanted by materialism.

Ron Flowers with the FA Cup in 1960 and Stan Cullis on the right.

Into the Sixties – Swings & Roundabouts:

It may have seemed to many fans that the Wolves ‘golden era’ was drawing to a close at the end of the decade, but, of course, the great team of the fifties did not suddenly ‘give up the golden ghost’ when the clock struck twelve on 31st December 1959. The new decade began brightly with a fantastic FA Cup win, with Wolves defeating Blackburn Rovers at Wembley in 1960, which meant that they qualified for the inaugural Cup Winners Cup. They were also close to winning the League in 1960, which would have given them three titles in a row, besides winning the double, the first team to do so that century.

Wolves score against Blackburn Rovers in the 1960 FA Cup Final.

From 1949 to 1960 Wolves had won three First Division League Titles and two FA Cups. In 1960-61, the Wolves played in Cup Winners Cup ties against Austria Vienna and Glasgow Rangers. They also finished third in the League but dropped to eighteenth in 1961-62, not far from relegation. However, this turned out to be a temporary dip as in the following season they were back up to fifth. The Old Gold had great victories in the League in 1962-63, thrashing Manchester City 8-1 and West Bromwich Albion 7-0 at Molineux. Although not in official European competition, they once again entertained Honvéd at their home in December 1962. However, this time there was no clamour for tickets like there had been eight years earlier, since Hungarian football had suffered a decline since the Soviet invasion. Gone (to Spain) were the legendary Puskás, Kocsis and many others of the talented Hungarian ‘Golden Team’ of the fifties. The Honvéd team were no longer the pride of Hungary and Europe, but they were currently second in Hungary’s top division, and would still prove excellent opponents for the Wolves.

Flowers, Slater and Broadbent from the class of ’54 were happy to renew old friendships and rivalries with two ‘Mighty Magyars’: József Bozsik was, by then, club president and Gyula Lóránt club coach. The one player they recognised from previous ‘outings’ who lined up against them was goalkeeper, Lajos Farago, who had been understudy to the great Grosics in 1954. He had been almost invincible in his previous Molineux appearance and was now between the sticks again. Farago’s brilliance apart, however, the match bore scant resemblance to the 1954 classic. Then, ten minutes from time, Honvéd’s speedy winger, Vági, broke free but fluffed his chance. With five minutes left, Komara clipped the ball over to Nagy to score what everyone thought was the winner, but Wednesbury’s Alan Hinton crashed home a terrific equaliser past Farago, saving the Wanderers’ blushes. Bozsik announced that he wanted to make the match an annual event, and a year later the teams met again in Budapest. Wolves travelled to Budapest to play a friendly against Honvéd on 6 October 1963, losing 2-1 in the Népstadion (‘People’s Stadium’).

By the end of the 1962-63 season, Wolves had completed ten years of floodlit friendlies. Between September 1953 and December 1962, they played seventeen games, winning thirteen and drawing four, all against continental opposition, except for Glasgow Celtic. In addition, there were six home European ties at Molineux, with the Wolves winning three, drawing four and losing only once, to Barcelona. The following summer, Wolves embarked on a new venture, a tour of North America, playing against Mexican, Canadian, American and Brazilian teams. Also that summer, a new international era began when Alf Ramsay, who was in the England team beaten by the Hungarians in 1953, replaced Walter Winterbottom as England manager. In 1963-64, the fortunes of the Wolves team took a distinct turn for the worse as European qualification became no more than a distant dream. The team’s performance worsened, culminating in relegation at the end of the season. The Chairman, James Marshall, handed over the reins to John Ireland and two months later, Ireland sacked Stan Cullis who had been suffering from a long illness. This was on 15 September 1964, following defeat in the first three league matches, a draw in the fourth and further defeats in the next three. Attendances had dropped significantly. In their eighth match, Wolves managed a 4-3 victory over West Ham at Molineux, but this came too late to rescue Cullis from ‘the axe’ a day later.

The statue of Cullis at Molineux.

For a decade and a half, Stan Cullis was Wolverhampton Wanderers. A proud and dedicated man, he was one of a small breed of footballing ‘giants’ who achieved greatness both as a player and a manager after joining Wolves as the former in February 1934. As a player, he was a tough-tackling centre-half, good in the air and shrewd in passing the ball. A ‘born’ leader, he captained Wolves before his nineteenth birthday and England a few months later. He was a member of Wolves’ 1939 Cup Final team, but hung up his boots in 1947, becoming manager the following year, the youngest to manage any club at this level. His full managerial record over sixteen years included two FA Cups, three First Division Championships, and nine other top-six finishes, three times as runners-up.

In the last of these, he almost won ‘the double’ in 1960, finishing one point behind Burnley. After leaving his belovéd Wolves four years later, he was appointed manager of Birmingham City. Meanwhile, caretaker-manager Andy Beattie, appointed in November 1964, failed to keep Wolves up and they were relegated to the (then) Division Two. Thus ended an unbroken top-flight record of twenty-two seasons, from 1936-37 to 1964-65 (excluding the war break), during which Wolves were Champions three times and runners-up five times, with nine other top-six finishes. They finished lower than this in only five seasons.

Sources:

György Szöllősi (2015), Ferenc Puskás: The Most Famous Hungarian. Budapest: Rézbong Kiadó.

György Szöllősi, Zalán Bodnár (2015), Az Aranycsapat Kinceskönyve (‘The Golden Team Treasure Book’). Budapest: Twister Media.

Bán Tibor & Harmos Zotán (2011), Puskás Ferenc. Budapest: Arena 2000.

John Shipley (2003), Wolves Against the World: European Nights, 1953-1980. Stroud (Glos.): Tempus Publishing.

Molineux Stadium (2024), Wolves Museum Guide, Third Edition.: Wolverhampton: Synaxis Design Consultancy.

Gallery:

Is Hungary’s Appeasement of Putin Justified by its Past Experiences? V

Chapter Five: Hungary under Horthy – In the Eye of the Hurricane:

It was largely the impossibility of reconstructing the order of Europe and the wider world as it was in January 1919 that swept away the ‘pacifist democracy’ that took over Hungary at the end of the First World War. It thwarted the first chance that the country obtained for a transition to democracy in the twentieth century. The democratic experiment was quickly followed by first red, then white terror, and the flaws and shortcomings of the peace treaty system dictated by the Allies lent credibility to the inherent nationalism and revisionism of the conservative régime that came to dominate the following two decades. The war, and to some extent the peace settlement, dealt a mortal blow to the conservative institutions of the multi-national empires of Central-Eastern Europe. Nationalism triumphed in the belief that this was consistent with the cause of liberty and democracy, and very few lamented the fall of the Hohenzollern, Habsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman emperors. The Western Allies, who won the war and made the peace were motivated not just by the ideal of national self-determination, but also by power policy considerations in their disregard of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy; they believed that its ethnic minorities, once liberated from imperial oppression, would automatically emerge as liberal democracies and be able to play the traditional Hapsburg role of ensuring the central-eastern European balance of power.

The Crest of the pre-War Hapsburg Empire (Dual Monarchy).

Both these assumptions proved to be fundamentally wrong. With the partial exception of Czechoslovakia, the democratic credentials of the new states were rather weak. The Peace settlement failed to solve ethnic tensions in the region’s countries and created new ones. Socio-economic backwardness fuelled nationalist sentiments, creating disunity between the potential partners and making them a poor match for the potentially formidable strength of the losers of the peace settlement. These included, besides Germany, Austria and Hungary, Italy and Soviet Russia, which suffered significant territorial losses and were ignored altogether at the peace conference.

After Trianon – Treaties & Alliances:

Szent-Iványi, a diplomat in Chicago in the 1930s.

Domokos Szent-Iványi wrote in the foreword to his (1977) book, The Hungarian Independence Movement, 1939-46:

‘Over the past centuries, Poland and Hungary, arguably the two strongest political units in East Central Europe have played an important historic role by forming a huge bulwark which has allowed Western and Central Europe to develop in its protection.’

‘With the peace treaties of 1919-20, East Central Europe disintegrated, in effect giving both Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia an open invitation to subjugate this huge territory.’…

‘It was not just the authors of the system of the peace treaties of 1919-20 who failed to appreciate what it was they were doing; the blunders were neither fully recognised nor understood during the Second World War. Roosevelt and his advisors were late in grasping the the importance and fatal consequences of Soviet expansion in East Central Europe; Churchill was also late in perceiving the upheaval that was to befall Europe.’

‘But with once historic Europe gone, it was the responsibility of those in power to come up with an effective alternative.’

Szent-Iványi (1977), Budapest: Hungarian Review Books.

The system of peace treaties (1919-21) shattered the economic and political structure and the unity of the Carpathian-Danubian Basin to its core. After more than a thousand years, Hungary was dismembered: It lost over two-thirds (71.4 percent) of its geographical area, almost two-thirds (63.5 percent) of its population, and more than half its waterworks (55.2 percent). Hungary’s political isolation was complete. The reconstruction of Central Europe at the Peace Conference brought into existence new states, mutually suspicious and aggressive, conditions equally ruinous to their development and dangerous to the stability of Europe. The Little Entente was therefore an important diplomatic development, composed of the ‘artificial’ states of Czecho-Slovakia and Yugo-Slavia, in addition to Romania, was created. The economic activity of the Danubian region was doomed to extinction if these newly formed states remained entirely separate. But for the Hungarians, the alliance seemed to exist for the sole purpose of keeping Hungary in check, guaranteeing almost complete political isolation.

Two important factors brought about the formation of that alliance: The active opposition of Hungary to the Peace Settlement and the fear, common to all three states, that Hungary would resist it. The Magyars felt that they had been unjustly treated. Large groups were under the rule of their former subjects. Hungary’s irredentist aspirations threatened the security of the three Little Entente states. They regarded cooperation to frustrate these dangerous activities as essential, and in 1919 they combined to attack Hungary. Czechoslovakian statesmen were chiefly responsible for building up the alliance, and the initiative came from them because the needs of their new country were great. Like post-Trianon Hungary, Czechoslovakia was a landlocked state, but with longer frontiers not easily defended, and therefore dependent for its security and prosperity on good relations with its neighbours. Their statesmen had no easy task in overcoming the mutual distrust of the three states, let alone their mutual hostility with Hungary. The internal problems were similar in all three states; each government had to deal with groups of minorities, and they were faced with the task of reorganising their agriculture and industries and building up their foreign trade; each government met with difficulties in its attempt to organise an internal administration on democratic lines.

Throughout the twenties, Hungary concentrated its efforts on the peaceful revision of the Treaty of Trianon. At the same time, it made various attempts at breaking the iron ring of the Little Entente, which stifled the country both economically and politically. Its efforts in that direction, however, were constantly frustrated by the stiff resistance of the Little Entente states, fully supported by France. As a first step in the in the course of such attempts, Premier Bethlen and his Foreign Minister, Miklós Banffy attempted to negotiate and even made an approach towards Romania. In August and September 1919, Romanian-Hungarian negotiations were conducted with the participation of Bethlen, Pál Teleki, and Banffy.

The Hungarian negotiators tried to link recognition of Transylvanian secession to the status of the Hungarian state in the Dual Monarchy. The idea of a Romanian-Hungarian personal union under Romanian King Ferdinand was also mooted, as it was several times more in the 1920s. To facilitate the negotiations, the services of the Chief Hunt Master to the King were employed, as he had family ties with Bánffy and Bethlen. Bánffy, in a very Hungarian form of ‘appeasement’ even returned home to Transylvania, now part of the newly enlarged Romania, and became a Romanian citizen. But this was all in vain as the Czechoslovak Premier Benes combined with the French politicians to prevent any improvement in the Trianon terms for Hungary.

Three treaties were concluded as steps in the formation of the Little Entente: in 1920, between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia; in 1921, between Yugoslavia and Romania, and between Czechoslovakia and Romania. In 1933, the alliance was strengthened, and a permanent council of ministers was established to conduct a common foreign policy which they took to Geneva with them. By cooperating in this way, The Little Entente Powers were able to exert more influence in international affairs. The three countries had been encouraged to come to a mutual understanding by France, who saw the alliance and its adherence to the Peace Treaties as a strong guarantee of support against possible Hungarian or German aggression. The French government supplied them with arms and money. Alliances concluded in 1921, on the one hand between Poland and Romania, providing for mutual assistance if attacked by Russia, and on the other hand between France and Poland, promising mutual support, completed the grouping of the Powers of Central Europe and France.

Revising the Trianon Peace Treaty:

From the signing of the Peace Treaty at Trianon (1920) onwards, Hungarian public opinion, and therefore Hungarian foreign policy, had been dominated by its consequences. Seen as unjust and harmful by the great majority of Hungarians, revising the terms of the treaty became the primary foreign policy issue. In his last plea before the ‘People’s Tribunal’ that condemned him to death in 1946, the former Premier and Foreign Minister Bárdossy (1941-42), confirmed exactly this. In the decade following Trianon, the Hungarian government inaugurated a policy of revision through peaceful means. The government based its hopes on Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations as well as on the declarations contained in the covering letter of President Millerand, both documents admitting the possibility of a peaceful revision of all treaties signed at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920.

All efforts by Hungary to have the Treaty revised were frustrated by France and Britain and the supporting votes of the Little Entente states which had the majority in the League of Nations. Their vain attempts led many to believe that peaceful attempts at revision were doomed, and by the beginning of the thirties, all hopes of revision had essentially vanished. Yet, at the same time, world events of great economic and political importance gave cause for optimism and a new direction to revisionist hopes and activities. In 1920, war broke out between Poland and Soviet Russia. At the beginning of hostilities, the Red Army made gains and the Polish Army was in retreat. Teleki, the premier at the time, offered Hungarian military help to Poland in return for a French guarantee for the revision of the Treaty. Ammunition, machine guns and other military hardware were on their way to Poland when Czechoslovakia, wanting to ensure a Soviet victory, attempted to block their transit. Yet much of the material had already crossed the territory of Czechoslovakia and arrived in time to be deployed in the Battle of Warsaw. That battle, the ‘Warsaw Miracle’, broke the advance of Tuchatchevsky’s armies and Poland was saved. Many in Poland believed that the Hungarian military hardware had played a decisive role in the outcome of the battle and, by extension, the war. Lenin considered the advance of the Red Army as vital to advancing Bolshevism in Europe. Despite Hungary’s help, France considered all further policies based on cooperation with Hungary as unnecessary. Its pro-Little Entente policy continued as before.

Patriotic design found on a silk scarf, 1926.

In 1926, commemorating the four hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Mohács in which a joint force of Serbs and Magyars were defeated by a massive Ottoman army, Regent Horthy gave a speech on the battlefield in which he called for a rapprochement between Budapest and Belgrade. The speech was well received in the Serbian press, but the Czechoslovak and Romanian governments rejected rapprochement. The friendly tone of the press was also unlikely to please the Italian government. Mussolini was unhappy with the increasingly warm relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia and took steps to bring Hungary into the Italian orbit. Britain’s attitude to a possible Magyar-Italian rapprochement was quite favourable. The British felt that such a development would help to reduce the influence of France in the League of Nations, where France with the supporting votes of the three Little Entente satellites, and sometimes even with those of Belgium, Greece, and Poland was, most of the time, able to push through decisions. It’s important to remember that at that time the three Great Powers, the USA, the Soviet Union and Germany did not participate in the League’s life and activities. Conversations between the Hungarian Premier, Count István Bethlen and the Italian Foreign Minister, Dino Grandi, as well as with the British Foreign Secretary, Austen Chamberlain, encouraged the Hungarian government to adopt a pro-Italian stance.

“I believe in Hungary’s Resurrection.” The ‘quiet prayer’ which began every day in junior school. Postcard & pencil-box.

In 1927, one of Britain’s leading newspaper tycoons, Lord Rothermere had a long conversation with Mussolini concerning the political isolation of Hungary after which he published a long article in The Daily News. The article, appearing shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Friendship (5th April 1927) between Italy and Hungary, voiced the opinion that the Treaty of Trianon was unjust and politically unsound and made a call for its revision. Thus, after eight years of almost complete political isolation, Hungary was once more able to play some role on the great international political stage. During the premierships of Pál Teleki and István Bethlen, several problems facing Hungary were resolved. Hungary’s finances were put on a sound basis with the cooperation of the League of Nations (1924-30) and, by cooperating with Britain and Italy, Hungary was able to break out of its political isolation (1926-27).

Picture: Grandfather and granddaughter share the belief – “It will be great, as it once was, oh Hungary”
Below, the revisionist dream seems to be realised on the different boxes: Upper Hungary and Subcarpathia, Northern Transylvania, and Bácska depicted as already recaptured. The pencil and pen tip boxes
originate from the period following the two Vienna Awards, circa 1940.

By the end of the 1920s, the League of Nations had established itself as a permanent international organisation for the preservation of world peace. Through the Geneva Protocol of 1924, the Powers confirmed their renunciation of war and recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague. By the Locarno Pact of 1926, Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, and Italy guaranteed the new frontiers set up in Europe by the Peace Treaties. Britain and Italy undertook to go to the assistance of any state in Western Europe which suffered any violation of this pledge, i.e. to help France or Belgium if it was attacked by Germany. The Kellogg Pact (1928) was a solemn agreement, subscribed to by all the Powers, undertaking to renounce war except in self-defence.

Before the First World War, the Great Powers had exploited the jealousies which existed among the Balkan States to extend their own influence. From about 1929, a movement towards cooperation began between Yugoslavia, Greece, Romania and their former enemy, Turkey. Their object was to settle their own differences so that the Powers would have no excuse for interfering. During the nineteenth century, the Balkan States had shaken off the oppressive rule of the Turks, but it was not until after the war that they began to realise that the ‘new’ Turkey had no desire to threaten their security. In 1930, Greece and Turkey came to an agreement by which they promised to respect their common frontier. This was an important step towards the formation of the Pact of 1934.

The Balkan States had never been united except in their common opposition to Turkey. The territorial changes after the Second Balkan War (1912) left irreconcilable bitterness between Bulgaria and its neighbours, and the new settlement at Neuilly accentuated it. Bulgaria was not prepared to join any pact to guarantee frontiers with which it was completely dissatisfied. There was also continuing rivalry between Italy and Yugoslavia. Italian influence in Albania alienated Yugoslavia and prevented Italy from joining any Balkan alliance. Greek statesmen persisted in advocating for the alliance, which was concluded in Athens in 1934.

The fall of the two great central European empires, Germany and Austria, and the disruption of Russia by Bolshevism, seemed to augur well for the future of democratic government. After the First World War, democratic governments were established in the new states, whose rulers recognised the wisdom of adopting constitutions modelled on those of the Western Powers. In every European country except Russia, where a new form of government – a Communist dictatorship – was established, the principle of democratic government was accepted. However, the maps below show how soon Fascist parties began to flourish across Europe as they drew strength from the failure of Parliamentary governments to deal with the misery arising from the World Economic Crisis (1929-32).

Dictators came to power in Germany, Austria, Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Even in France, the Netherlands, and Belgium, Fascism created difficulties for Parliamentary leaders. Only in England, Norway (in the early thirties), Denmark, and Sweden was the influence of the Fascist parties negligible. Czechoslovakia maintained her position with difficulty, surrounded from 1934 by a bloc of Fascist neighbours and countries prepared to ‘appease’ them to maintain a measure of independence. Hungary became one of the latter.

After a critical initial period of great bitterness among the losers, and an apparent consolidation in the more favourable climate of the 1920s, the political and moral foundations of the Paris Peace Settlement proved to be too fragile to survive the effects of the economic crisis beginning in 1929. Economic isolationism bred xenophobia, nationalism and political extremism; the successor states of Austria-Hungary were torn even further apart, creating favourable preconditions in the region for the penetration of Nazi Germany.

The seaplane flyer of György Endresz on the occasion of the first Lockheed, 16th July 1931.

Norman Stone (2019) claimed that in the late 1920s, Hungary had been the eye of the hurricane, a period when you could pretend that everything was heading back to 1914. In Budapest, the high aristocracy could show off with grand marriages, and the capital was still putting up interesting buildings, in this period of Art Deco. The recovery period ended in 1931, with the fall of Premier István Bethlen. After ten years he was tired and made misjudgments. Hungary was subject to the international context, and in 1929-30 a great world economic depression started, the second half of the hurricane. American money had financed European recovery. British money had helped as well, but had been lent ‘long’, on the strength of money borrowed ‘short’. The world had gone back to the gold standard, but not to the basics that had made it work in the later nineteenth century; i.e. free trade, including in gold, which the Americans and the French just stored. Germany, Britain, and France clung to gold and subjected their economies to ‘austerity’ to choke back import demand. At the same time, they protected their own industries, so that other countries’ exports suffered. But the banks in central Europe had been lending money on ‘Ponzi Principles’.

In May 1931, some of the largest banks simply failed as foreigners called in loans. International trade fell by two-thirds when the British Cabinet abandoned the Gold Standard in 1931. Every country spent spent less on agricultural imports and this left Hungary vulnerable to economic problems. It lost two-thirds of its wheat exports and half of other agricultural exports. Industrial output fell by a quarter between 1929 and 1933, property auctions were common in the countryside and village shopkeepers went bankrupt. The other was autarky; a self-sufficient economy, with all the tortuous long-way-round attempts to do what was done more successfully elsewhere. Public works, four- and five-year plans, and state boards to buy up surplus produce at guaranteed prices marked the decade (and beyond). This went together with stringent control of foreign exchange: travellers were searched at the borders for Swiss francs and valuables. In Germany, Autarky was the answer, and Hungary depended on it. There were already agreements with Austria and Italy, guaranteeing a quota of agricultural exports at something above the world price, but in 1934 came an agreement with Germany which sent a quarter of Hungary’s exports there. The Germans were stockpiling raw materials and agreed to send industrial goods in return.

The Nazis & Hungarian Revisionism, 1932-1936:

Postcards published by the Hungarian Grand Committee of the National Flag (Országzászló).

Initially, Nazism did not provoke a hostile reaction in the Hungarian population at large. This was because the dominating idea of public opinion was already one of Revisionism before Hitler came to power in Berlin. Then, from 1933, the Nazis had been seen as successfully breaking the shackles put on Germany by the peace treaties of 1919-1920; many thought that perhaps the restoration of Hungary’s territorial integrity could also be realised with help from a Great Power in its neighbourhood. Later, however, disenchantment with the Nazis grew as a consequence of their expansionist policy in East Central Europe.

Hungary was not supposed to have a large army but re-introduced conscription, and by 1936 the atmosphere was again one of the anticipation of war. To appease Berlin, the half-million Hungarian Germans – Swabians – were allowed collective representation, inevitably of a Nazi tendency. There were warnings: the ever-sensible Bethlen warned against the adoption of Nazi tendencies and pointed out that Hungary was losing its independence. It was also clear that in the trade negotiations, Hungary was being degraded to a mere provider of raw materials; the Germans also refused to pay more in hard currency for agricultural imports, although world prices had now recovered somewhat; and there was nowhere else for Hungarian exports to go. There were also Hungarian imitators of Nazism who emerged when the traditional conservatives lost their predominance. The most sinister of them was Ferenc Szalási, who became a member of the general staff towards the end of the First World War. He believed in uniforms, discipline and the inspirational power of the Nation, a Greater Hungary cleansed of Jews and Communists. He also had a sense of personal destiny matching that of Hitler or Mussolini:

“I have been chosen by a higher Divine authority to redeem the Hungarian people.”

From a speech quoted in Cartledge, The Will to Survive, p.371.

There would be a ‘Hungarist’ state, along Fascist lines, and its badge was the crossed arrows that supposedly represented the original Magyar conquest. This gave the National Socialist party the name ‘Arrow Cross’. It made inroads, not just among the lower middle classes, but also among the working classes, where anti-Semitism could mean combating capitalism. Horthy contemptuously refused office to Szalási at this stage, though he was forced to give way to him when abdicating in 1944. In 1938, he appointed Béla Imrédy, a banker and a man well-known to the British, as premier.

Meanwhile, Hitler’s ever more impudent violations of the Versailles Treaty went unpunished. Not only did Nazi Germany become the most important economic partner of most states in central-eastern Europe, but Hitler was also cheered by the crowds in Vienna as the Anschluss took place, and was accepted as an ally in the revision of the Paris Settlement in Hungarian political circles. In addition, he found forces to work with among the disgruntled minor partners in the Czecho-Slovak and South Slav agglomerates and in Romania; using the pretext of the bulky German minorities in the Czech lands, he exploited the attitude of appeasement among the Western powers at the expense of Czechoslovakia. Central Europe as a whole was both a symbolic and operational base for Hitler’s plan to acquire Lebensraum (‘living space’) for the Germans, as outlined in Mein Kampf; from Berlin, Hungary was viewed as a key partner in this strategy to gain control of the Slav lands to the east and south of the Reich. Most historians of interwar Hungary would agree with the view that the dismantling of ‘historic Hungary’ was the product of ‘centrifugal forces’ rather than the result of a conspiracy between rival nationalities and the Western great powers, though they would agree that the way the process took place was fundamentally influenced by the contingencies of war and the peace that concluded it.

Viewing the successes of Hitler, many Hungarians’ revisionary hopes turned toward Germany. If Germany had been able to shake off the military restrictions imposed on it by the Versailles Treaty, they thought, Hungary could, through close collaboration with Berlin and with the help of the League of Nations, realise her revisionist aspirations. As a result of this shift in public opinion, a closer relationship between Hungary and Germany evolved. There were those in Hungarian political and social circles who were alarmed about the growing collaboration with the Nazi régime in Berlin and what it would mean for Hungarian interests and, in particular, for the independence movement. Hungarian domestic politics also underwent a change. Under the pressure of the growing economic difficulties on the one hand, and of steadily increasing right-wing tendencies on the other, Bethlen resigned in 1931 and was followed as Premier by Count Gyula Károlyi. However, his return did not last long and the following year he yielded his place to General Gömbös, an anti-Semite, proto-fascist and pro-Nazi politician. Unsurprisingly, Gömbös’s premiership, backed by various groups, mainly of Swabian origin, some of them of a clandestine character, saw such ideas and sympathies become more widespread.

Top: An ‘anti-Imperialist’ postcard from 1919
Below: Local Hungarians protesting in Temesvár (Timisoara) in Transylvania, March 1919.

The tragedy of Trianon consists of far more than merely putting the seal on an ‘inevitable’ process, in that Hungarian national consciousness was tailored to the reality that Hungary was a medium-sized nation of twenty million people in which Magyar primacy was not determined by a vulgar, statistical majority or on racial identity, but on historical and political achievement. It was bewildered by being forced within the confines of a small country with a population of eight million. Given that the flaws of the settlement gave some justification to the general spirit of outrage and revenge, as compressed in the slogan ‘No, no, never!’, no political party entertaining any hope of success in Hungary could afford to neglect the issue of revision in its agenda in the 1930s and early 1940s.

Hungarian politics were being overshadowed by Austro-German tendencies. Sympathies with Fascism were coming to the fore, parallel to the rise of Dolfuss in Austria rather than that of Hitler, though by 1932 Hitler was on the rise as well. This was more the ‘spirit of Szeged’ from 1919, however; nationalist, anti-Habsburg, anti-magnate, somewhat anti-Semitic, but not violently so. Horthy made Gömbös promise to leave Bethlen’s supporters alone, as a majority in the lower House, to refrain from attacking Jews and to forget about land reform. Gömbös agreed and famously spoke in parliament to renounce his anti-Semitism. But he was an authoritarian who extended censorship and snooping and stuffed the civil service and the army with his supporters.

Then he approached Mussolini for trade pacts and visited Hitler in 1935. In the same year, he staged elections full of violence and corruption, replacing Bethlen’s men with his own, despite his promises to Horthy, who took alarm at these events. Gömbös made things easier for the Regent by dying of kidney disease in October 1936. By then, with German economic recovery, the great question concerned how to handle Hitler. Germany had vastly more to offer than Italy, whether in trade or territory. Also in 1936, Horthy followed the troop of visitors to Berchtesgaden, saying foolish things and pronouncing that the Führer was “a moderate and wise statesman”. Following Hitler’s remilitarisation of the Rhineland, Horthy announced his approval and also supported Mussolini’s invasion of Abyssinia.

A New Year Greetings Card, ‘to a better Hungarian future!‘

The most important of the pro-German groups was the General Staff of the Hungarian Honvédség, the Army, which became a state within a state during the tenure of its Chief of Staff, Werth (October 1938-September 1941). Partly in consequence of his Swabian ethnic origins and partly due to his profession as a staff officer, Werth was overtly pro-German in outlook, believing that Revision in Hungary’s favour should be carried out exclusively through cooperation with Germany and that Hungary had to attach her future to German military power. In one of his situation reports of 1939, Werth went so far as to say that Hungary had to stick to Germany durch Dick und Dünn, under all circumstances, even in the inconceivable case of it losing the war. Szent-Iványi later reflected that the appointment of Werth to Chief of Staff was:

‘A great blunder of the Regent and his advisers, … later proved by the activities of Werth and his intimate circle of collaborators, activities which led to Hungary entering the Second World War and putting her last manpower reserves at Hitler’s disposal in 1944 when the outcome of the war could not be considered in doubt. … Werth and his clique formed the the power behind the curtain that caused Hungary to enter the Second World War as well as – indirectly – to Premier Teleki’s tragic death’.

Szent-Iványi (2013 ed.),The Hungarian Independence Movement p 85.

After Werth was relieved from duty, his beliefs and political and military opinions were sustained by a group of staff officers, whose leading spirit became General Dezső László, who had been brought up in Werth’s principles. While Werth himself had claimed “the glory” for forcing Hungary into the War, it was General László who was instrumental in blocking Hungary’s ‘Third Attempt’ at leaving the Axis Camp in October 1944. For this, he was executed in 1947.

Another pro-German ‘group’ consisted of all those Hungarian citizens of German ‘stock’ who, in consequence of the Nazi successes of 1931-1940, believed in the theory of the supremacy of the German race. When the Hungarian Government was forced by Berlin to allow the organisation of an exclusively German federation, the Volksbund, the ultra-pro-German elements were the first to play an important role in the new association and other pro-German activities. Szent-Iványi recalled a conversation on Petöfi Square in July 1940 with Kalmán Breslmayer, the son of the owner of Hungary’s well-known banking enterprises:

‘Breslmayer, buoyed by the German “Blitzkriege” in Poland, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and France delivered a speech of almost forty minutes. The essence of his speech was that Germany had already conquered Europe; that in a short time England and even Russia would be forced to submit by Hitler; that a great reshaping of the European political map would follow with a new economic-political “order” and finally, that Hungary must attach herself fully to Germany without reservation.‘

Szent-Iványi (2013), p. 86.

The Period of Appeasement, 9 October 1936-11 March 1938:

Alarmed by this increasing Nazi influence, leading moderate circles began exercising pressure on the government to lessen German economic and political power in Hungary. Negotiations followed in Paris and London in the hope of securing financial aid which would reduce Hungary’s reliance on Germany for trade. Among other effects, Hungary tried to have her surplus wheat taken by England and France. These actions proved fruitless since London, on account of the interests of the wheat-producing members of the British Empire, and Paris, in consequence of the protection of her own producers of wheat, took little if any interest in the matter.

A secret Gömbös-Göring agreement was concluded in September 1937 during Gömbös’ visit to Berlin. It included promises by Gömbös that Hungary would introduce a political system along the lines of Nazi Germany. In their discussions, the two men also chose the question of Hungarian revision as their main theme, since Gömbös was willing to make political concessions to Germany to realise the revision of the Peace Treaty of Trianon. In this respect, as Szent-Iványi observed in his note, Gömbős thought and acted no differently from other Hungarian politicians of this era, including even Teleki, in wanting to see the Revision materialise, feeling sure that with Germany’s assistance even full revision might be realised.

Gömbös’s replacement, Kálmán Darányi, gravitated further towards ‘the Axis’, not by slavishly toeing the Nazi line, but through a more coherent policy of ‘all-round appeasement’, approaching the British in vain to gain an understanding. At this point, British ministers also wanted an agreement with Hitler, and would let him remake central-eastern Europe, provided he did so peacefully. Darányi supported the British policy, which gained currency in 1938, following Lord Halifax’s visit to Berlin in November 1937. The Germans indicated that Hungary could recover her lost territories in Czechoslovakia, provided that it helped with Germany’s plans for the destruction of the country. Besides the three million German speakers in western Czechoslovakia, including the Sudetenland, there were another three million Hungarians in Slovakia, who also had many grievances. Austria had already been sucked into Hitler’s orbit and was annexed on 13th March 1938. The Hungarian government was the first to congratulate the Führer. By this time, there was a wave of pro-German sentiment in Hungary, and there were rumours of a right-wing coup in the capital, not least because the officer corps was known to be, in the main, pro-German.

The Period of Appeasement in Hungary covered the period from 9 October 1936, the date of the formation of the first Darányi Cabinet, to 11 March 1938, the date of the formation of both the second Darányi Cabinet and the Austrian Anschluss. The period was the result of the new Hungarian Premier’s overcautious, almost fearful policy which resulted partly from his own timidity and inferiority complex. Darányi was consistently trying to appease, calm, and win over any person with whom he had to thrash out problems of political importance. In such efforts, he was undoubtedly a great success; Darányi was able to create an atmosphere of peace and cooperation, a kind of Pax Romana á la Darányi. He was so rarely attacked in Parliament that some politicians began to worry about his particular brand of peace and cooperation which, in their view, was tending toward a dangerous political dullness and apathy. Darányi had little understanding of foreign policy; his real domain was internal politics and government administration. Yet certain qualities in his personality meant that he became a leading factor in Hungary’s foreign policy, particularly in its relations with the Third Reich. These facets provided a catalyst for the independence and resistance movements. In his widely-known contemporary work, October Fifteenth, The Englishman in Budapest, C. A. Macartney wrote of him:

” Darányi possessed stronger sympathies for the Right Radicals or at any rate less will to oppose them, than either Horthy or Bethlen seems to have suspected in the autumn of 1936. He was nothing approachinmg a Liberal or a Democrat in the western sense of these terms, and so far from being pronounced anti-German that more than once, in after years, he was sent to smooth down Hitler’s plumage when it had been ruffled by other Hungarians. But he was undoubtedly quite innocent of any personal dictatorial ambitions, and there seems to be no reason to doubt that he took office in the knowledge that Horthy expected him to steer Hungary’s course away from the rapids towards which Gömbös had been heading it, and with the sincere intention of doing so. In any case, the impression generally held both inside and outside the country was that it represented an act of resistance, not perhaps defiance, … towards the increasing pressure now being exercised by Germany in both the foreign and domestic fields, …

Macartney, op. cit.

Following the death of General Gömbös and the appointment of Darányi to the premiership, relations between Germany became more strained. But, as Macartney wrote in his October Fifteenth (op.cit.), the new premier could not easily move Hungary away from its close economic and political ties with its longstanding ally and partner, even if he wished to do so:

“Germany’s attitude towards Hungary was of such enormous importance to Hungary’s political life that it is justifiable to give that aspect pride of place in our description of Hungarian history during the period… Furthermore, … the influence of that attitude was, thanks to Hitler’s peculiar method of conducting his foreign relationships, even stronger on Hungary’s internal politics than on her wider foreign policy. … In all these fields, the first year of Darányi’s Minister- presidency forms a distinct chapter of Hungarian history.

“Germany … greeted the news of Darányi’s appointment with an outburst of extreme hostility, which is only comprehensible on the assumption that (it) had attached a … deep importance to the the secret agreement between Gömbös and Göring. It is reported that as soon as he knew that Darányi had been … appointed, the German Minister visited him to ask whather the agreement still hed good. Darányi, who had only just learnt of its existence when going through his predecessor’s most private papers, replied that it did not. From this refusal, … the Germans seem to have drawn conclusions that as to the extent of the change of ‘Richtung’ in Hungary which were far more far-reaching than … its authors warranted. The Germans appear to have believed that a sinister gang of effete aristocrats and rapacious Jews had seized the chance of Gömbös’ illness to intrigue him out of office, for purposes which might even include a Hapsburg restoration.”

Macartney, op. cit.

In May 1937, Regent Horthy’s visit to the King of Italy was reciprocated. While the visit of Miklas had been intended primarily as a courtesy call, which it surpassed, the visit of the King had major political ramifications. First, it was a message of resistance, to demonstrate the strong Magyar-Italian co-operation in the face of Nazi pressure. Furthermore, it was the first time that Hungary, in the course of a military parade, had put on show the military hardware, arms that were prohibited by the Peace Treaties of 1919-20, and arms that were of Italian, not German manufacturing origin. Among these were the small Ansolo tanks delivered by Italy to Hungary in 1937-38. The justifications for this were threefold; Germany had rearmed and was continuing to do so at pace, despite the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles, so why shouldn’t Hungary, with Italy’s help? Italy had already, unofficially, helped Hungary to modernise its Honvédség (national defence force).

It was important for Darányi to appease the supporters of the late General Gömbös by distributing among them key business and administrative posts. He continued to act very cautiously and did not conduct a great purge, as had been hoped for in conservative circles. Instead, he confined himself to clearing out those pro-Gömbös elements that seemed to be too proactive in certain organisations which were overtly supporting Nazism, for example, the EKSZ (X). The General Staff officers who had been transferred to the Premier’s Office by Gömbös were given the choice of returning to the army or being transferred to the State Civil Administration. In foreign policy, however, there was a continuing stress on improving relations with Italy, both in economic and political terms.

This Italo-Hungarian cooperation had the desired effect in Berlin since the Nazi government felt uneasy at the Hungarian government’s efforts to weaken German influence in the Carpatho-Danubian basin and its neighbouring Balkan states. This concern of the German leaders led to the German Hungarians being invited to Berlin for a meeting in November 1937. Before this took place, Hitler had already achieved a certain freedom of action in central-eastern Europe. In the course of his negotiations with the new Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, Hitler had gained an understanding that Britain would have no objections to modifications in the Paris Peace Settlement of 1919-20, in particular with dispositions concerning the frontiers in the Bohemian Basin, i.e. the frontiers of Czechoslovakia. Many Hungarians began to believe that the break-up of the Trianon system was imminent and that the time had come to start to reclaim lost territories, which could only be achieved with German military support. In the meantime, Hungarian military maneuvers were held along the Tisza River in the vicinity of Szolnok which added further fuel to the fire.

Nevertheless, Hungary grew closer to Germany in the summer of 1938. Horthy, the wartime Admiral, was invited to Kiel, to the launch of a German battle cruiser, where he was asked to participate in the partition of Czechoslovakia. Imrédy had signed a non-aggression pact with the three countries of the Little Entente – Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland – who had been the beneficiaries at Trianon, at Bled in Slovenia. Hitler, however, expected Hungary to support his planned attack on Czechoslovakia, but at first, it did not. Instead, he reached an agreement with the British and French at Munich, giving him only a part of what he wanted, but without firing a shot.

At this time, many moderately pro-German Hungarians considered the ‘Bolshevik danger’ to be the greatest menace to Hungary’s independence and integrity; Hungary, they believed, was no match for the Soviet Union. Unlimited cooperation with Germany was seen as the lesser of two evils. Some held that Hungary’s recent troubles had come from powers other than Germany. They argued that the dismemberment of Hungary by the peace treaties of 1919-20 was caused by France and her ‘Little Entente’ states; Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. The dictatorship of Béla Kun, they claimed, was undertaken by men who embraced Communism and its ideas in the Soviet Union and “freemasons of Jewish descent” had played an important role in the dismembering of Austria-Hungary, and that practically all leaders of the Kun’s dictatorship were of Jewish descent. A sizeable minority of anti-Semites became pro-German for no other reason than that they considered the Jews to be ‘enemy number one’. Gentile, religious groups feared Communism, a fear borne of the experiences and lessons drawn from the events of the terror régime of Béla Kun. Goebbels’ propaganda in Hungary utilised this fear to stress the national ‘necessity’ for the country to become a close ‘partner’ of Nazi Germany to escape destruction by Communism, equating this ‘danger’ with the “Jewish-Zionist peril”.

The record and reputation of Horthy’s Hungary was besmirched by its anti-Semitism legislation which enabled the Holocaust of 1944-45, following the German occupation of the country. The first law was passed at the end of 1938, limiting Jewish employment in certain areas. On 4 May 1939 came a second law, to clarify the ‘grey areas’ that the first had created. Also, the quota for Jewish employment was further reduced to six percent. These laws made Imrédy himself look foolish, and he had to resign when journalists dug into his ancestry and found a great-grandmother who had converted. Pál Teleki took office, as he had done in 1920, intending to secure political consolidation by bridling extremism and putting it into the service of conservative nationalist policies. If the auspices had been ambiguous the first time around, now they were distinctly unfavourable. In the last year of increasingly fragile peace in Europe, National Socialism, with its cult of power, the dynamism it radiated, its promise to wipe out ossified social structures, political institutions and cultural habits, and its ideas of racial superiority and Lebensraum, applied to the role of Magyardom in the Danube Basin, exerted an even greater appeal to broad segments of the Hungarian civil servants and the officer corps, the petty bourgeoisie and even the working classes, especially among the younger generation.

Darányi stated several times to Szent-Iványi that he would try to steer a middle course despite the pressure coming from both Left and Right. To understand the Premier’s attitude, we must familiarise ourselves with Hungarian nationalism and adherence to independence as two sides of the same coin. According to Szent-Iványi, true Hungarians had always been nationalistic, irrespective of social or political status. Macartney showed a good understanding of Hungarian national pride when he wrote about the rise of Szálasi’s Hungarism:

“…Szalási – the product of a nation whose ancient State had been dismembered in the name of nationality – always had his eyes fixed on the historic frontiers of his State. As a matter of fact, Szalási’s Hungarism has nothing particularly sensational about it. Any student of Central Europe will recognise in it simply one more of the innumerable Hungarians, from Eötvös and Kossuth, to Jászi, Mihály Károli, Pál Teleki and many others less distinguished, have excogitated for organising the Danube Basin in a way which satisfied their idea of what was due to the past achievements and present virtues of the Magyars.”

Macartney, op.cit.. Vol 1, p.161.

Darányi himself knew that all Hungarians, regardless of their background, held similar views regarding the questions of Revision and independence. While doing his best to uphold the independence of his country, he found nothing objectionable or contradictory to the idea of the revision of the Peace Treaty of Trianon. He was not, as many of his contemporaries believed, anti-German, but simply a Hungarian nationalist; a concept that in his own mind, demanded an independent Hungarian state. But Darányi’s Hungarian character prevented him falling victim to Nazi coaxing and pressure. Despite his rather timid personality, Darányi succeeded in standing firm in difficult situations, like at his meeting with Hitler on 14 October 1938:

“… Hitler, stressing his principle that Aryan peoples should unite against Jewish (and other non-Aryan groups’) aggression, Darányi said that Hungary, not belonging to the Aryan group, could not possibly be interested in such questions. At another point, Hitler made a hint at a possible conflict with Poland in which the case the question of German armies passing through Hungarian territory to reach Poland might arise. Darányi said that in spite of our friendship with Germany, Hungary would never, under any circumstances, turn against Poland or permit a foreign power to attack Poland through Hungarian territory. Hitler’s answer greatly surprised Darányi. The Führer expressed his thanks for having received an open, straightforward answer from the ex-Premier. And smilingly, he added that in no case would the German army need a passage through Hungarian territory: ‘We shall crush Poland in the case of war without any help from any other state or passage given to us by a foreign government.”

Szent-Iványi, op. cit., p. 95, quoting from his own contemporary manuscript.

In Hungary itself, changes in the international scene between 1936 and 1938 also encouraged the growth of fascist organisations. Hitler’s remilitarisation of the Rhineland only evoked consternation and protest, but no action on the part of the Western powers; the German-Italian axis eventually came into existence and rounded off with Japan in the Anti-Comintern Pact; General Franco’s army was gaining the upper hand in the Spanish Civil War. At the same time, Darányi’s foreign minister, Kálmán Kánya, negotiated in vain with his opposite numbers from the Little Entente to secure a non-aggression pact linked to the settlement of the minorities’ problem and the acknowledgment of Hungarian military parity. He also failed to reawaken British interest in Hungary to counter Germany’s growing influence, a move which only served to annoy Hitler who, having decided on action against Austria and Czechoslovakia, assured the Hungarians that he considered their claims against the latter as valid and expected them to cooperate in the execution of his plans.

Darányi had tried to steer a middle course, doing his best to avoid any major changes. He had inherited the pro-Italian policy from Bethlen which mirrored the policy of Anthony Eden, British foreign minister in 1936; with the installation of the Chamberlain government in Britain, non-intervention became the byword for British foreign policy. During his visit to Germany in November 1937, Lord Halifax, replacing Eden, assured Hitler of Britain’s yielding free way to Germany’s position as regarded the revision of the peace treaties in central Europe. From this Hitler concluded that Britain would not put obstacles in the way of the Austrian Anschluss and the incorporation of the Sudetenland into the Reich. Hitler’s meeting with Halifax made the Austrian government very nervous, even though the context for this was already widely known. As the Austrians had already had also been informed about the meeting between Darányi, Kánya and Hitler and other key figures in the Nazi hierarchy, the opening of a Budapest-Vienna dialogue became urgent. Schuschnigg, the Austrian Chancellor and Schmidt drove to Kisbér, a small town close to the Austro-Hungarian frontier on 23rd October 1937 and had talks with their Hungarian hosts, Darányi and Kánya. The Austrians expressed their view that Hitler might shortly start with some action against Austria and the Hungarians promised to clarify everything they could about German plans in connection with Austria.

But Darányi had inherited the government Party from Gömbös in addition to his Cabinet and, in consequence, while putting less emphasis on Germany, he cautiously continued along his chosen ‘independent’ lines. Part of this continuing policy saw Foreign Minister Kánya having talks on the further development of the Rome Protocols with his Austrian and Italian opposite numbers in Vienna. This event was followed by Count Ciano’s visit to Budapest to prepare for the official visit of Regent Horthy to Rome, as well as the official visit of the King of Italy to Budapest. The visit of Regent Horthy took place from 24 to 27 November 1936. Darányi and Kánya accompanied the Regent. The Italian foreign minister was received in Budapest with the ceremony due to a head of state. He was greeted by editorials in the papers, and a central square, the Oktogon, was renamed Mussolini Square, a gesture made in gratitude for Mussolini’s support of Hungarian territorial claims. Ciano, however, never repeated this stand, but in the course of the talks, he emphasised the importance of good relations between Germany and Italy, laying the ground for Italy’s acceptance of the forthcoming annexation of Austria by the Reich, and Italy’s rapprochement with Yugoslavia.

Poster declaring Mussolini’s support for Hungarian Revisionism. ‘Justice to Hungary, the Great Mutilated One!

By 1937, Hungary was sending Germany half of its fruit, vegetables, eggs and bacon, and a fifth of exported flour and beef cattle. By 1939, Germany had 53 percent of Hungary’s trade, and on German terms. However, in the short term, this worked. Hungary recovered from the Depression and by 1937 agricultural and industrial production were both above the levels of 1929. Discovery of oil and gas deposits helped. In Veszprém bauxite was also discovered, which gave the metallurgical industries a new edge; already in 1935, the German Air Force needed aluminum, produced on Csepel Island, one of the great industrial centres of Budapest. New industries – electrical, pharmaceutical – developed, and Hungarian industrial goods made a strong showing. Unemployment dwindled. Of course, as a still chiefly agrarian economy, Hungary was a long way behind the Western countries, but it had done better than its neighbours to the east and south as an independent country.

After the Anschluss, 1938-1940 – Diplomatic Roads to Rome & Berlin:

The Anschluss of 12-13 March 1938 took the Hungarian establishment by surprise, the more so because they were expecting Hitler to cede the Burgenland to Hungary, which he was unwilling to do. It was this that alerted Hungary’s political leaders to Hitler’s true plans. He completely absorbed the Burgenland, which (before Trianon) had been a part of Hungary for a century. The Anschluss, more than his earlier declarations and actions, had revised the peace treaty system of 1919-20, but only to the benefit of the German Reich. The Munich Agreement of the 25th September 1938 simply added to the widespread bitterness in Hungary towards Hitler and his régime. That memorable meeting in Munich of the four heads of government did not settle the Revisionist claims of Hungary and the urge to turn away from Nazi Germany only increased. Moreover, although beneficial to Hungary, the First Vienna Award (2 November 1938) did not meet the expectations of Hungarian public opinion as far as their conception of the revision of the Trianon Peace Treaty was concerned. A popular satirical song of the period used the expression, “… becapcsolt a mázsoló…” (“We have been cheated by the Daubster”, i.e. Hitler, the amateur painter).

As a consequence of the Austrian Anschluss, Germany absorbed Austro-Hungarian trade in full and became Hungary’s main trading partner; up to and over ninety percent of Hungarian exports and imports now depended on Germany. Hungarian trade and business were now, in effect, at the mercy of Germany and were closely followed by the expansion of German cultural and political activities. While Italian-fascist influence on Hungary’s economy was not considered a risk to the country’s independence, plans were being made to ensure that Nazi influence on Hungarian political thought and action did not become overly strong. Even the Gömbös régime had sought a solution by which Hungary could utilise German help in its efforts to have the Trianon Treaty revised while keeping the country safe from a Nazi take-over. It was this desire to maintain independence that led to the Rome and Semmering protocols which were considered as the nucleus of cooperation and alliance between Austria, Hungary, Italy and Poland. Hitler’s political methods and schemes were viewed with horror by leading Hungarian circles who began to look to a four-power alliance as a counter-poise to German supremacy in Central Europe.

However, by the following spring, it was too late for Darányi to work out an agreement with the political extremists within Hungary. The German annexation of Austria was hailed as a great success by the followers of Szalási, who were able to exert formidable pressure through propaganda and agitation. This prompted Darányi to appease the Arrow Cross Party and the broader Hungarist Movement. This was too much for the conservatives as well as for the Regent, and Darányi was dismissed from office by Horthy in May 1938. His replacement was Béla Imrédy, who had the reputation of being an outstanding financial expert and a determined Anglophile. Ironically, however, it was under his premiership that Hungary’s commitment to the German side became complete and irreversible. The anti-Jewish legislation prepared under Darányi was pushed into law, establishing a twenty percent quota of the number of ‘persons of the Israelite faith’ allowed to be employed in business and the professions, depriving about fifteen thousand people of jobs for which they were qualified. Liberals and Social Democrats in Parliament protested, together with prominent figures in cultural life including Bártok, Kodály, and Móricz, but the radical Right found the measure too indulgent.

‘Hitler and Mussolini will decide if Prague and Budapest can’t agree’. Headline, 23 October 1938. The red line on the map shows the proposed adjustment to the Slovak-Hungarian border.

On the 30th of September 1938, there was encouragement for Hungary to deal with her own revisionist claims separately, and a meeting with the Slovaks did occur, fruitlessly, at Komárom. It broke up after four days, and then a Hungarian offer for invasion with German support went to Berlin, for which Hungary offered to join the Anti-Comintern Pact and leave the League of Nations. Hitler and Mussolini agreed to mediate, and in the Belvedere Palace in Vienna on 2nd November the First Vienna Award gave Hungary part of Slovakia, including a strip north of the Danube with a largely Hungarian population and the towns of Kassa, Munkács, and Ungvár in Sub-Carpathia (now part of Ukraine). Horthy rode his white horse again as the territory returned to Hungary, an area of twelve thousand square kilometres, with a million people.

The Return of Kassa to Hungarian rule, following the First Vienna Award of 2nd November 1938.

Early in 1939, under a different foreign minister, István Csáky, Hungary joined the Anti-Comintern Pact and left the League. The Germans were then told that Hungary would do something about ‘the Jewish problem’. But by the beginning of 1939, the Hungarian citizenry had realised that it was futile to rely on Hitler’s promises and high-sounding declarations. The consequence of this realisation was a general disillusionment. There were, however, various groups who were pro-German rather than pro-Nazi.

Similarly, fear of Nazi terrorism made Soviet Russia an attractive prospect in the eyes of many. A greater part of Hungarian Jewry considered it to be their only possible saviour from the Nazi peril. So it was fear that opened the doors to both the Nazis and Communists in central-eastern Europe; Nazi domination and terror was followed by Communist rule. Nonetheless, Throughout most of the thirties, unlike elsewhere in Europe where Fascism rose to power, acts of political violence were scarce and insignificant in Hungary. Nazi influence and dominance in Hungary was rejected by practically all social classes. Admiral Horthy, when in intimate circles, liked to label Hitler as “the daubster”. The Hungarian aristocracy, as a rule, hated Nazism almost as much as Hungarians of Jewish ‘stock’. Hungarian intellectuals were also overwhelmingly anti-Nazi.

The ‘moderates’ pointed out that Hungary had experienced time and time again being squeezed between two great powers, both of whom threatened its independence. In addition, the political ideologies of both current Powers were antithetical to those of moderate Hungarians. At the same time, the aims of the Little Entente, backed by France, were to insist on a policy of oppressing Hungary, forcing it to accept its dismemberment by the Trianon Treaty as irrevocable and unalterable. A policy of rapprochement with either Germany or the Soviet Union, therefore, seemed doomed to failure. However, as all signs and events pointed towards a considerable change in European political affairs, such ‘moderates’ put their faith in a ‘wait-and-see’ policy supported by an increase in military strength. In their opinion, any binding declaration in favour of the three international political directions would have been detrimental to true Hungarian interests.

Cover of Hungarian regional magazine, featuring PM Pál Teleki.

The rejection of collaboration with Germany began with some political leaders, like Bethlen, Teleki and Kereszstes-Fischer as early as 1938, and was continued and developed by those groups which, from 1939, supported the cause of Independence and Revision in tandem; finally, the Hungarian people followed the example of these leaders and rejected Nazi domination. From that moment on it became rather difficult to distinguish between those who were continuing to resist German influence and those who were working for independence.

The growth of fascism naturally worried not only many intellectuals, Jewish professionals, and middle classes, plus the Left, but also the whole of the traditional élite, who feared its social-revolutionary character, and were unhappy about Hitler’s intervention on behalf of the German minority, and had misgivings over the superiority of German arms. For all these reasons, they sought to maintain contacts with the Western democracies. But now they had tasted the first fruits of revisionism, and all Hungarian politicians were willing to subordinate other considerations to the restoration of historic borders, more than ever before. Teleki was no exception to this rule, and while he secretly hoped for the ultimate victory of the Western democracies in the conflict he considered inevitable between them and the fascist dictatorships, in the meantime, he wished to take advantage of the fact that the current domination of the Central European scene by the latter made it possible to redress Hungarian grievances. Historians have rightly blamed this policy as narrow, short-sighted, and ultimately disastrous for the country.

Teleki benefited from the fall of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, when Tiso’s Slovak Fascists, under German pressure, declared independence on 14th March. The next day, Hitler marched into Prague and turned Bohemia and Moravia into a Protectorate of the Reich. That left Sub-Carpathia, the once Hungaro-Ruthene (or Ukrainian) north-eastern corner of Slovakia. Hungarian forces staged a provocation there and occupied twelve thousand square kilometres of thick forest. Many of the local population did not consider themselves Ukrainian, but rather Carpatho-Ruthene, a minority within a minority, and therefore looked to Hungary for protection. This effective revision of the terms of Trianon brought about huge national jubilation across Hungary, which even left-wing poets such as Mihály Babits joined in. Extreme nationalism was now in vogue, and the anti-Jewish laws played into this. By implication, Jewish property could now be ‘confiscated’.

But Teleki’s foreign policy horizons were narrowing. He had scored a distinct success by achieving the long-coveted common border with Poland, thus breaking the encirclement by the Little Entente. But this was just a month after taking office. The occupation of Ruthenia (Carpatho-Ukraine) gave Hungary a territory nearly as large as that acquired under the First Vienna Award, but three-quarters of its population was Ukrainian, so the acquisition had to be justified on strategic and historical grounds, rather than on ethnic ones. The takeover was synchronised with that of Czechoslovakia by Germany on 15th March 1939. Teleki’s initiative to supply Carpatho-Ukraine with broad autonomy came to nothing in the following summer, however, as tensions rose between Hungary and the Slovak satellite state created by Hitler. Revisionist claims by Hungary against Romania were raised at around the same time, which helped Hitler to play his small allies against each other, acting again as an arbiter in central Europe. Nevertheless, this long-hoped-for second step in the ‘augmentation of the country’ earned Teleki and his governing party a great many votes, securing a seventy percent majority for it in parliament, at the elections of 1939. The radical Right also gained twenty percent of the seats and the imprisoned Szalási’s Arrowcross Party was very successful in working-class districts, taking full advantage of the ambiguous policies Teleki pursued regarding ‘augmentation’.

Postscript – Transylvania, 1940-41: ‘The Land of Make-Believe’.
A large crowd gathered in the centre of Marosvásárhely to celebrate its return to Hungary with the Second Vienna Award in August 1940.

The policy of augmentation led to two further stages of appeasement. The Second Vienna Award (30 August 1940) returned parts of Transylvania, including Kolozsvár (below) to Hungary.

Source: István Lázar (see ‘Sources’ below)

The final expansion of Hungarian territory was the result of the German invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece in April 1941. On the 2nd, German troops passed through Hungary on their way to Croatia. The following day Teleki shot himself, ashamed of being forced to renege on the recently signed Treaty of Friendship between Yugoslavia and Hungary (I have also referred to this in my previous chapter). Horthy appointed László Bárdossy, the foreign minister, to the premiership. On the 11th of April, Hungary entered the war when its troops followed the Wehrmacht into Yugoslavia and occupied the town of Bácska. Hungarian-speaking Vojvodina returned to Hungary (see the map below), completing its augmentation programme successfully. At the end of June, Hungary declared war on the USSR when the newly returned city of Kassa in Slovakia was bombed by unidentified airplanes. Three years later, Hungary had once more lost these lands, suffering one defeat after another, concluding with occupations first by the Nazis and then by the Soviets.

Given the extent and nature of the cataclysmic events that followed those described here, over at least four years of war (in Hungary’s case), it is easy to ignore the fact that the Nazi movement in Germany was part of a broader European political shift to the extreme right. That is why Germany was able to exploit this development by supporting puppet fascist governments in occupied areas or winning the active collaboration of quasi-fascist or ultra-nationalist régimes. The powerful anti-communism that fuelled the rise of the ‘radical right’ also produced thousands of volunteers from other European states to fight against the ‘Soviet enemy’. At the outset, therefore, there was an ideological commitment to the conflict on their part, as there had been in the Spanish Civil War which immediately preceded it. Germany’s chief ally was Mussolini’s Italy, and in May 1939 the two régimes entered into the so-called Pact of Steel, a military alliance from which Mussolini extracted himself with some difficulty in September 1939. In June 1940 he joined the war on Germany’s side, and the two allies co-operated in the Balkans and North Africa. Although Hitler kept the Barbarossa campaign a secret from his fellow dictator, Mussolini sent forces to help in the east in 1941. So too did Franco and in October 1941 a division of volunteers from the fascist Falange party went to Russia. Other volunteers came from all over Europe, many of them attracted to the élite SS which recruited honourary ‘Aryans’ for combat in their armed divisions.

Under German pressure, much of Europe had fascist or pro-fascist régimes during the war. In Slovakia, the clerical-fascist Slovak People’s Party under Josef Tiso was installed in power in 1939 and was entirely subordinate to Berlin. Some fifty thousand Slovaks served on the eastern front until the nationalists in Slovakia became increasingly disillusioned with Nazism. Other allies in Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria also sent forces to fight on the eastern front, but they too became lukewarm about the German cause as the war went on. Hungary was occupied by the SS in March 1944, and when it tried to leave the Axis to seek an armistice with the Soviets, Horthy was exiled and replaced with an overtly fascist, pro-German government run by Szalási and the Arrow Cross Party. The numbers of non-German volunteers for the eastern front are given on the map above, including significant forces from Hungarian-occupied Yugoslavia and Slovakia, as well as from Hungary itself. These soldiers were not forced to serve in the Waffen SS and the Wehrmacht; their motivations were ideological, or connected to a sense of prestige and power. Hungarians were not pressed into the service of the Reich, whether direct or indirect; their service, and that of the Hungarian State, was a logical conclusion of the populist policies of revisionism and appeasement, both internal and external, developed throughout the interwar years. These were clear choices made by Hungarian politicians, some in reluctant acquiescence, some more willingly.

The populist policies and disastrous choices of the period 1936-44 in Hungarian history have since become shrouded in collective national amnesia which continues to dampen and distort the discourse regarding Hungary’s past. As for the present, it is difficult to see how the policy of ‘appeasement’ of dictators, as defined and redefined by international historians, can be confused as a strategy with genuine peace-making among politicians and diplomats.

Sources for Chapters IV & V:

Irene Richards, et. al (1938): A Sketch-Map History of the Great War and After, London: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd.

Száraz Miklós György (2019): Fájó Trianon, Budapest: Scolar Kiadó.

Richard Overy (1996): The Penguin Historical Atlas of the Third Reich, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd.

István Lázár (1989), An Illustrated History of Hungary, Budapest: Corvina Books.

Mark Almond, András Bereznay, et. al., (1994, 2002), The Times Atlas of European History. London: Harper Collins Publishers.

Andrew Roberts (2009), The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War. Allen Lane/Penguin Books.

Norman Stone (2019), Hungary: A Short History. London: Profile Books.

Laurence Rees (2008), World War Two: Behind Closed Doors; Stalin, The Nazis and The West. London, BBC Books: Ebury/ Random House.

Domokos Szent-Iványi (2013); Gyula Kodolányi & Nóra Szekér, eds. The Hungarian Independence Movement, 1936-46. Budapest: Hungarian Review Books.

Lászlo Kontler (2009), A History of Hungary. Budapest: Atlantisz Publishing House.

Is Hungary’s Appeasement of Putin Justified by its Past Experiences? IV

Chapter Four: What was/ is Appeasement? – Hungary in The Era of the Two World Wars.

Preface: Present Day ‘appeasers’?

On 8th July 2024, Hungary’s Prime Minister and current President of the European Council paid another visit, on his own initiative, to Vladimir Putin in Moscow. Later the same day, the Kremlin launched yet another missile attack on Eastern Ukraine, killing more than thirty civilians and destroying one of central-eastern Europe’s most renowned specialist children’s hospitals. The following morning, experienced BBC journalists described Orbán’s visit as an act of ‘appeasement’ in the context of these events. How accurate is their application of this term, drawing on its original context of the inter-war period?

Introduction – ‘Horrible Historiography’:

In 1988, on the fiftieth anniversary of the Munich Crisis of 1938, my Professor from Bangor University, my own ‘alma mater’ of a decade earlier, Keith Robbins, published a useful little book on ‘Appeasement’ for the Historical Association. Until then, the fifty-year rule governing access to official papers prevented historians from accessing the British documents of the period, though in 1944 it had been agreed that volumes of selected documents covering the entire inter-war period would appear. Such was the obvious interest in the years immediately leading up to the outbreak of the second war in Europe. These documents were among the first to be published roughly a decade after the events they referred to.

However, it took decades for the series of documents from 1929 onwards to reach the mid-1930s. Indeed, the volume on European affairs from July 1937 to August 1938 did not appear until 1982. Until then, ‘Western’ historians had little documentary knowledge of the problems and issues facing pre-war administrations, forming an essential preliminary to understanding the events of 1938. A particular consequence of publication policy was that it perpetuated an approach to appeasement that was thoroughly Eurocentric and Occidentalist. It could appear that ministers had nothing better to do than to worry about ‘Europe’. As the Cold War became colder in the divided Europe of their day, with Czechoslovakia and Hungary again suffering melancholy fates, Eurocentricity seemed an appropriate response.

However, by the 1950s, decolonisation seemed to be gathering pace, as highlighted by the Suez Crisis of 1956, revealing that if Britain was still a Great Power, it was in eclipse. The crisis had also occasioned an elaborate display of ‘anti-appeasement’ rhetoric which had an appeal across the British party political divide. It was argued that Egypt’s President Nasser was an ambitious, unstable, aggressive dictator. Unless stopped, he would, ‘like Hitler’, develop even more ambitious plans. British politicians claimed to be applying the ‘lessons’ of the 1930s and negatively labelled their opponents as ‘appeasers’.

Against this background, a new generation of British historians, including Keith Robbins, began to wonder whether their world of the 1960s had fresh questions to ask of the policy-makers of the 1930s. The Second World War, which this generation only experienced as infants, did not seem to have settled as much as their parents and teachers appeared to believe. These were also the years when Dean Acheson, the US Secretary of State, remarked that Britain had lost its Empire and not yet found a new role. Maybe the 1930s was a crucial decade in Britain’s Foreign Policy, in a sense never hitherto understood, standing halfway between the signing of agreements with Japan, France, and Russia in 1902-07 and the final dissolution of the Empire in the late 1960s. It might be possible to understand appeasement better if it was seen as a crucial episode in a protracted retreat from an untenable ‘world power’ status. Based on such longer-term contextualisation, Appeasement, as a policy, was a necessary instrument. Robbins continued in the first person:

“Since no historian writes in a vacuum, … I was quite convinced, as an undergraduate, that the policy had been morally wrong and politically disastrous. However, I was taught by A. J. P. Taylor, who published his ‘The Origins of the Second World War’ (1961) in the year I graduated. … I was attracted to the topic partly because I had not even been alive during the appeasement years and wanted to approach the entire topic afresh without the emotions which still so clearly troubled an older generation.”

Keith Robbins (1991, 1997) Appeasement. Oxford: Blackwell.

Certainly, many of that generation continued to apply the term ‘Little Hitler’ to any official who seemed ‘too big for their boots’ well into the sixties. In the mid-1960s, Martin Gilbert wrote:

” ‘Munich’ and ‘Appeasement’ have both become words of disapproval and abuse. For nearly thirty years they have been linked together as the twin symbols of British folly. Together they have been defended as if they were inseperable. Yet ‘Munich’ was a policy, dictated by fear and weakness, which Neville Chamberlain devised as a means not of postponing war but, as he personally believed, of making Anglo-German war unnecessary in the future. Appeasement was quite different; it was a policy of constant concessions based on common sense and strength.”

M. Gilbert (1966), The Roots of Appeasement. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

With Ribbentrop to his left and Sir Arthur Henderson a step behind, Chamberlain walked past a guard of honour at Munich airport in October 1938.

According to Gilbert, appeasement was the guiding philosophy of British foreign policy for ten years. From 1919 to 1929, he wrote, successive British governments sought to influence European affairs toward ameliorating tempers and accepting discussions and negotiations as the best means of ensuring peaceful change. France tended to deny that any change was necessary. Still, British official opinion doubted whether a secure Europe could be based on the Treaties of 1919-20, and had strong hopes of obtaining a serious revision of those aspects that seemed to contain the seeds of future conflict. For ten years those hopes propelled policy forward and important progress was made each year. Appeasement seemed not only morally justifiable, as being clearly preferable to rearmament, conflict and war, but also politically acceptable and diplomatically feasible.

As a guiding policy, appeasement was based on the acceptance of independent nation-states, each in turn based as nearly as possible on Wilson’s principle of self-determination. With the disintegration in 1917-18 of the Russian, Turkish, German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, the final stage had been reached in a process that had begun in Europe during the Napoleonic era – the evolution of a strictly national as opposed to a dynastic or imperial system with defined, strategic frontiers. Post-1918 diplomacy was geared toward securing the final rectification of those frontiers still not conforming to the national principle. Such frontiers were few, most of them the result of Versailles boundaries which had been drawn to the disadvantage of the defeated ‘nations’, Germany, Austria and Hungary. Thus there were German-speaking people outside Germany and Austria, and Magyar-speakers outside Hungary, but contiguous to their frontiers. In addition, Austrians were forbidden union with Germany under Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles, though this could be altered with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Although France was unlikely to make such consent possible, the principle of making territorial adjustments was officially acknowledged.

National inequities other than those of frontiers were also part of the Paris ‘Peace Settlement’, and were equally prone to the egalitarian touch of appeasement. The disarmament of Germany, while France remained, was a German grievance which could be met either by disarming France or allowing Germany to rearm. Both alternatives were considered by British policy-makers, and when the first proved impossible to secure, the second became logically difficult to resist. In pursuing an appeasement policy, the British Government sought to mediate between France and Germany, as an ‘honest broker’. Its aim was to allay mutual suspicions and it depended for its success upon both France and Germany realising that it was a ‘neutral’ policy, designed to provide both with adequate security, under British patronage, and thereby to make rearmament, military alliances, and war-plans unnecessary. The weakness of the policy was that France often felt that it was intended only to weaken it, and Germany that its aim was to keep it weak.

The policy of appeasement, as ‘invented’ in Britain and practised between 1919 and 1929, was, of course, wholly in Britain’s self-interest. It was in no sense intended as an altruistic policy. British policymakers reasoned that the basis of European peace was a flourishing economic situation, unhampered by political bickering, which, would, in turn, promote mutual trade, prosperity and understanding. As Gilbert concluded;

“Only by success in this policy could Britain avoid becoming involved once again in a war rising out of European national ambitions and frustrations: a war which might well prove even more destructive of human life and social order than the 1914-18 war had been. …

“But appeasement was never a coward’s creed. It never signified retreat or surrender from formal pledges. … Appeasement was not only an approach to foreign policy, it was a way of life, a method of human contact and progress.”

Gilbert, loc. cit. pp. 96-97, 177.

But by the mid-1970s, when I was first studying the topic under the tutelage of Professor Robbins, the flood of evidence available after the Public Record Act of 1967 led Gilbert to rethink his earlier views:

“I had not realised the extent to which Neville Chamberlain’s Cabinet were prepared to deceive Parliament. I had not realised the extent to which they chose to ignore the evidence of Hitler’s intention put before them. … And finally, no one had then realised the extent to which, after Munich, far from using the so-called ‘year gained’ to re-arm, Chamberlain had adopted quite a different policy and a quite different attitude, that now the time had come for a real agreement with Hitler which would make massive rearmament unnecessary, and disarmament a possibility. And I document them both from the Cabinet and the Cabinet Committee meetings … and also in Chamberlain’s letters to his sister. …

Keith Robbins was struck by Gilbert’s sudden change of perspective as he wrote his own analysis of the Munich Agreement:

“In retrospect, however, the early 1960s appears as a twilight period. Old preconceptions were still vigorous, though the speed with which Martin Gilbert … altered his emphasis in ‘The Roots of Appeasement’ (1966) from that adopted a few years earlier in ‘The Appeasers’… indicates a changing climate. Even so, it was ‘Munich 1938’ that the publishers supposed that my readers would want… not a general exposition of appeasement.”

Keith Robbins (1991, 1997) Appeasement. Oxford: Blackwell.

On the eve of the publication of Munich 1938, in 1968, the fifty-year rule on access to official documents was changed to a thirty-year one. Many scholars immersed themselves in the official documents this change made available, in addition to newly accessible private papers. This research became truly international, involving British, American, and German scholars. The outcome of these ‘new’ studies was that it became impossible to speak about ‘appeasement’ in simple terms anymore. Instead, historians increasingly referred to a series of policies that were described as forms of appeasement such as ‘economic appeasement’, ‘military appeasement’, ‘political appeasement’, and ‘social appeasement’. It was not easy, however, to determine how they related to each other and which were ‘primary’ and which ‘secondary’. Some argued that appeasement was no longer a term any historian should use since its meaning had become so general. But since it had already become common to speak of appeasement as a policy, it proved impossible to embark on an exhaustive definition. Also, it was evident from the range of sources then available, that the contemporary politicians, diplomats, and military leaders who thought of themselves or others as ‘appeasers’ had referred to the advocacy of a range of policies.

‘Appeasement’ may appear to be a particularly British phenomenon of the twentieth century; a fusion of moral values, political constraints, economic necessities, and military exigencies. Nevertheless, it remains sensible to think of it as a phenomenon of the 1930s and to describe as ‘appeasers’ those who were then responsible for both the formulation and execution of policy. Even if what was being attempted was, in a longer perspective, an elaboration of earlier insights and attitudes, its articulation was novel. After the 1930s, appeasement did not disappear from the lexicon of British foreign policy, as already noted, but eventually, it was called something different. Even in the 1990s, attitudes towards appeasement were affected, in part, by the reconsideration of the significance, for Britain, of the Second World War itself. However, there is a danger in seeing appeasement as something the British invented and controlled. Foreign Policy is always about the complex and constantly changing relations between states. Appeasement, therefore, was both a domestically and an externally generated initiative and response.

Overturning Versailles & Trianon – The Appeasement Debate in the Twenties & Thirties:

The shadow of the First World War and the Versailles Settlement, including the 1920 Trianon Treaty, concerned with Hungary, hung heavily over inter-war Europe, from east to west. The contemporary economist, John Maynard Keynes’ apparently damning indictments of the ‘Peace Settlement’ helped to develop the policy of appeasement, often misunderstood, as Martin Gilbert suggested later, as the policy of fear of 1937-39. In his book The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1924 edition), Keynes was scathing in his criticisms of those who aimed to bring about Central Europe’s impoverishment through vengeance. He claimed that the peace treaties included no provisions for economic solidarity among the allies themselves since no arrangement was reached at Paris for restoring the disordered finances of France and Italy, or to adjust the systems, or to adjust the systems of the old order for the new. The Council of Four (Britain, France, Italy and the USA) paid little attention to these issues. Keynes wrote:

‘It is an extraordinary fact that the fundamental economic problem of a Europe starving and disentegrating before their eyes was a question in which it was impossible to arouse the interest of the four. Reparation was their main excursion into the economic field, and they settled it from every point of view except that of the economic future of the states whose destiny they were handling.’

Edited Extract from The Economic Consequences of the Peace, loc. cit.

Above: Germans pay for entry to a circus with bread, sausage and other groceries after the collapse of the German currency in 1923.

Instead, Keynes argued for what was later referred to as economic appeasement. He went on:

‘Europe consists of the densest aggregation of population in the world. In relation to other continents, it is not self-sufficient; in particular, it cannot feed itself. The danger confronting us, therefore, is the rapid depression of the standard of life of the European populations to a point that will mean actual starvation for some… Men will not always die quietly. For starvation, which brings to some lethargy and a helpless despair, drives other temperaments to the nervous instability of hysteria and to a mad despair. And these in their distress may overturn the remnants of organisation.’

John Maynard Keynes (1924), The Economic Consequences of the Peace, loc. cit.

For his part, on coming to power, Hitler repeatedly made clear his profound hatred of the Peace Settlement and his deep resentment of Germany’s military inferiority and economic subservience. In 1935, he commented:

“A treaty has been ratified which promised peace but which brought in its wake endless bitterness and oppression.”

Adolph Hitler, 1935.

This view he shared with most of his compatriots, so that, during his first three years in power, he was able to defy and overturn many of the central features of the treaty. That Hitler was able to do so owed a good deal to the changing international circumstances after the economic slump. Other states were absorbed with their own domestic difficulties. The economic crisis reduced the willingness of the Western powers to collaborate and discouraged any risks in foreign policy. Reparations had already been suspended in June 1932, well before Hitler came to power, and by agreement between the powers involved rather than through unilateral action on Germany’s part.

The occupation forces in the Rhineland were withdrawn in 1930, five years ahead of schedule. The willingness and ability of the victor powers to continue to enforce the Treaty were already in question. Hitler made it clear no further reparations would be paid, and in doing so asserted Germany’s economic independence.

Hitler’s next priority was military independence. Here, too, the process of undermining the disarmament clauses in the Versailles Treaty had begun before Hitler came to power. The armed forces developed aircraft, submarines and tanks in veiled collaborative projects in the Soviet Union, Sweden and the Netherlands. From 1928, three four-year programmes had formed the basis of Hitler’s rearmament from 1933. In addition, in July 1933 the first plans were laid down for a new German airforce. Rearmament in the first two years of the Nazi régime was relatively modest in scope, though it violated the disarmament clauses of Versailles. Hitler and the armed forces proceeded cautiously, partly from fear of foreign intervention, partly from fear of economic consequences of rapid remilitarisation, but mostly because they wanted a planned, step-by-step development of a military infrastructure that had been largely dismantled in 1919-20. By 1935 Hitler was prepared to go further. On 16 March, he formally announced the re-establishment of Germany’s armed forces and German rearmament. Plans were finalised for an army of 700,000 men in thirty-six divisions, and an air force of more than two hundred squadrons. There was little international protest, and three months later Britain signed a Naval Agreement with Germany, limiting total German tonnage to 35% of the Royal Navy, but endorsing Germany’s right to rearm at sea. The same year the territorial settlement of 1919 was altered in Germany’s favour. As agreed in the treaty, a plebiscite was held in the Saar region to determine its future status. Ninety per cent voted for union with Germany (see the map above). A year later, Hitler gambled that he could re-occupy the demilitarised Rhineland with German forces, and on 7 March 1936 troops crossed the Rhine bridges and Germany fully regained her military independence.

The contemporary map above, showing The Effects of Treaty Repudiation, drawn in 1935 (published in 1938), confirms that, by that time, contemporary historians believed that the Peace Settlement had failed completely to satisfy the needs of Europe as a whole. Not only had the defeated state of Germany openly repudiated the restrictive clauses of the Treaty, but the victor states, recognising that the collective security of the League Covenant was uncertain, reverted to pre-war methods of forming alliances, piling up armaments and, in the case of Italy, undertaking military conquests. The main causes of treaty repudiation were, of course, the rise of Nazi Germany and the growth of militant Fascism in Italy, but these, in turn, were fuelled by the widespread sense of injustice which endured in those countries at the Versailles ‘Settlement’.

Above: 1935 cartoon of Hitler and the League of Nations.

Not only had the defeated state of Germany openly repudiated the restrictive clauses of the Treaty, but the victor states, recognising that the collective security of the League Covenant was uncertain, reverted to pre-war methods of forming alliances and piling up armaments. Two countries, Italy and Japan, had already undertaken military conquests in defiance of solemn treaty promises. But the rapprochement of France and Russia also had a role to play and forty years after Imperial Russia and France came together in their Entente, Soviet Russia and the French Republic, despite their polar opposite constitutions, came together in a new alliance in 1934. Once more, Germany found itself ‘encircled’ by the Western Powers and Russia. France, ever vigilant to guard its security and protect its borders, constructed a strong line of fortifications along its eastern frontier (the Maginot Line).

Britain announced plans in 1937 for rearmament on a scale to make it the strongest Power in Europe, if not, through its empire, the world. The USSR postponed the completion of its second Five Year Plan to concentrate on the manufacture of munitions. The Fascist leaders of Italy and Germany not only increased their armaments but also began to encourage in the minds of their people the idea that war was necessary, inevitable and splendid. One of the most disturbing features of pre-World War One Europe was the Anglo-German rivalry in naval power, and over colonial territory had reappeared. This, fundamentally, was what led to the development of the policy of appeasement by the Baldwin-Chamberlain Cabinet from 1936 to 1939. Writing in 1961, renowned historian A L Rowse condemned both Baldwin and Chamberlain for their development of the policy:

“But where Baldwin’s were sins of omission, Chamberlain’s were sins of deliberate commission. He really meant to come to terms with Hitler, to make concession after concession to the man to buy an agreement. Apart from the immorality of coming to terms with a criminal, it was always sheer nonsense; for no agreement was possible except through submission to Nazi Germany’s domination of Europe and, with her allies and their joint conquests, of the world … “

“Here (in Czechoslovakia) was an intense strain in the centre of Europe which, if it was not to lead from bad to worse, could only be relieved by a concession. There, in a sentence, is the whole psychological misconception. It is no use making concessions to a blackmailer or an aggressor; he will only ask for more. They were all taken back by Hitler’s march on Prague in March 1939, after the swag he had got, with their aid, at Munich. … And anyhow, what are political leaders for? Do we employ them to fall for the enemies of their country, to put across to us the lies they are such fools as to believe?… the proper function of political leaders is precisely not to be taken in, but to warn us.”

Chamberlain knew no history … had no conception of the elementary necessity of keeping the balance of power on one side; no conception of the Grand Alliance, or of its being the only way to contain Hitler and keep Europe safe. …

A. L. Rowse (1961), All Souls and Appeasement, London: Macmillan.

Rowse argued that the total upshot of the appeasers’ efforts was to aid Nazi Germany to achieve a position of brutal ascendancy. This became a threat to everyone else’s security, and only a war could end. This had the very result of letting the Russians into the centre of Europe which the appeasers… wished to prevent. The primary responsibility was all along that of the Germans, the people in the strongest position in Europe, the keystone of the whole European system, but who never knew how to behave, whether up or down, in the ascendant arrogant and brutal, in defeat base and grovelling. The appeasers had no real conception of Germany’s character or ‘malign record’ in modern history. Trevelyan argued that dictatorship and democracy must live side by side in peace, and the English would do well to remember that the Nazi form of government is in large measure the outcome of Allied injustice at Versailles in 1919-20, and the egregious folly of the ‘war guilt’ clause, which acted, as might have been foreseen, as a challenge to the Germans to prove that their Government was not to blame at all.

Throughout the interwar period, the appeasement policy had a coherent intellectual foundation with a high moral tone. Still, the aggressive expansionist policies of Mussolini in Abyssinia and Hitler in Central Europe exposed the absence of force to substantiate its principles. By 1937 there was a bitter ideological debate on appeasement, reflected in the historian G. M. Trevelyan’s letter to The Times (12 August ’37). The following year the policy soured, but not before substantial British and Dominion support for the ‘resolution’ of the Czechoslovak crisis at Munich. The bitterness of comments from France and Czechoslovakia also reflects the continental feeling that Britain’s geography enabled her to see Europe from too detached and moralistic a viewpoint; given France’s internal weaknesses, and the emergence of the Czechoslovak state in 1918 when Germany was weak, these arguments may have less weight in retrospect.

Rearmament, Remilitarisation & Bloodless Conquests 1935-40:

Keith Robbins believed that Hitler was singularly fortunate that the Disarmament Conference was taking place when he came to power. No British government, given public sentiments, could have been seen to scupper it. The German Chancellor could continue the less and less clandestine expansion of the Wehrmacht, which had begun much more modestly before he came to power. Had there been no conference, there might have been a different response from Western powers. Although Hitler did not announce German rearmament until March 1935, it was no secret in the years before. In the first two years of his régime, he had achieved by unilateral action what his predecessors had failed to achieve by negotiation. Some British Foreign Office officials still advised ministers that Germany might be willing to pay a diplomatic price for the international legalisation of this action, but that proved optimistic.

Hitler, on the other hand, could now threaten the use of force as an ingredient in a wider campaign to release Germany from other enduring aspects of the Versailles Treaty. The outlook, according to the British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, was deplorable. Before Hitler acceded to power, the Germans had known that Britain no longer favoured trying to enforce the armaments limitations of Versailles. Their behaviour had revived anxieties about ‘German militarism’. Few members of his government had close relations with their French counterparts at the beginning of the decade but in the new climate of the mid-thirties, greater Franco-British intimacy was desirable. Security remained the major French concern and British ministers were left in no doubt that Britain too would have to commit itself to some specific steps if France was to formally acquiesce to German rearmament. What was under discussion was a British Scheme for Germany to return to the League of Nations with an agreed limitation of German armed forces alongside an eastern pact, a Danubian pact and an air pact, all designed to reassure the French.

Ten days before Sir John Simon’s visit to Berlin came Hitler’s announcement of the reintroduction of conscription and the creation of an army of half a million men. There was a British note of protest, and MacDonald and Simon met their French and Italian counterparts at Stresa. A ‘front’ seemed to be consolidating, motivated by a common anxiety about German intentions. The subsequent British action, however, seemed hardly helpful to such a development, and the inclusion of Mussolini, who was worried about Austria and Hungary, meant that the front could hardly be classified as a grouping of democratic states confronting fascism. That substantial section of British opinion which wanted foreign associations to be limited to the ideologically acceptable wasn’t best pleased with the company MacDonald was keeping.

Moreover, in the meantime, Simon and Eden went ahead with their visit to Berlin, though to no immediate result. Three months later, however, the Anglo-German naval agreement was signed, displeasing the French greatly, both because they were not consulted in advance and because it sanctioned a much larger German navy than was permitted by Versailles. On the other hand, there was disquiet about even a loose association which might convey the impression that Germany was about to be ‘encircled’. Although the sentiment had begun on the left, it was now fairly generally argued that even the semblance of a return to the alliance divisions of pre-1914 Europe would be likely to increase tension rather than promote stability.

Above: Abyssinian natives apparently photographed hailing the likeness of Mussolini. In April 1936,

French ministers, however, were less apprehensive on this score. Attaching great importance to the Italian connection, they were willing to accept the possibility of Italian expansion into Ethiopia, provided that French interests were safeguarded. Mussolini may have thought that the British would be similarly understanding if he offered them something concerning the Italian fleet in the Mediterranean, but that was unlikely. When the Ethiopian crisis erupted, Britain had a new Prime Minister and a new Foreign Secretary: Stanley Baldwin and Samuel Hoare (pictured below). MacDonald had always had a keen interest in Foreign affairs. Baldwin, however, did not share this interest and was not tempted to intervene if it could be avoided. Added to this, Sir Robert Vansittart, Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, did not favour sanctions against Italy and drew up plans for the partition of Ethiopia. When the final scheme was being discussed with Laval, the French Foreign minister, details leaked out, and there was a political storm. Hoare had to resign; Vansittart did not, though some were critical of his role. Following Mussolini’s ‘triumph’ in Ethiopia, there arose a great danger that an ideological axis between Rome and Berlin would be formed, where none had previously existed.

As a regular visitor to Abyssinia from 1930 to 1935, the journalist and author Evelyn Waugh wrote a piece for the Daily Mail reporting on how the Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie, had attempted to win the support of the League of Nations and…

… transmitted to his simpler subjects the assertion that England and France were coming to fight against Italy so that even those who had least love of Abyssinian rule feared to declare themselves against what seemed be the stronger side. … The Italians, in the face of sanctions… felt their national honour to be challenged and their entire national resources committed to what, in its inception, was a minor colonial operation of the kind constantly performed in the recent past by every great power in the world. No one can doubt that an immense amount of avoidable suffering had been caused and that the ultimate consequences may be of worldwide effect.’

Edited extract from Waugh’s Abyssinia. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

On the evening of 9th May, from the balcony of the Palazzo Venezia, the duce spoke to a huge crowd in the square below: “Italy at last has her empire,” he declared,

“… an empire of peace, because Italy wants peace for herself and for all, and goes to war only when forced. It is an empire of civilisation and humanity for the Abyssinian population.”

The shift to large-scale armaments and a strategy of opportunistic expansion altered Germany’s position in Europe. The other driving force behind that change was the Nazi Party’s self-proclaimed foreign policy expert, Joachim von Ribbentrop. He had helped secure the Anglo-German Naval Agreement in 1935 and was sent as Hitler’s special representative to London to try to secure a wider British alliance. His aims, first as special commissioner and from August 1936 as German ambassador were frustrated by his own diplomatic ineptitude, however. A more serious obstacle was the unwillingness of the British government to make any substantial concession to the German position. Ribbentrop, who succeeded in turning Hitler against a British alliance, was also keen to support Japan rather than China and was instrumental in setting up the Anti-Comintern Pact of November 1936. Together with Göring, he wooed Mussolini into the Pact following the Abyssinian War and tension with Britain and France over the Spanish Civil War. No clear political agreement existed between Germany, Italy and Japan. Still, they became identified in the mid-1930s as ‘revisionist’ powers who hoped to alter the existing distribution of territory and international power in their favour.

The Reoccupation of the Rhineland, 1936.

After this, the Rhineland Affair of 1936 has frequently been seen as ‘the last chance’ to stop Hitler without going to war. Subsequently, the crisis has been seen as the first conspicuous failure of appeasement. But the contemporary reaction was characterised by annoyance rather than failure. By 1936, the concept of a demilitarised zone was an anachronism and perpetuated among Germans the sense of inferiority that precluded a deeper and more permanent settlement. In any event, it is important to remember that by the autumn of 1936, there were many other matters preoccupying the British Cabinet, not least the future of Edward VIII. Once the abdication had been achieved, Baldwin’s career was nearly at an end. At the opening of the new parliamentary session in November 1936, he listened to expressions of concern about the country’s defences. Then he stated that in 1933-34 he had felt that he ‘could not have persuaded a pacific democracy in an election to support rearmament.’ It was this remark that led Churchill, years later, to claim that Baldwin had put party before country. In the summer of 1936, he told a parliamentary delegation which included both Winston Churchill and Austen Chamberlain, that he was not going to get Britain into a war with anybody for the League of Nations or for anything else. ‘If there is any fighting in Europe’, he added, ‘I should like to see the Bolshies and the Nazis doing it.’ (Jenkins, 1987, p. 159).

Source: These Tremendous Years 1919-38 (a Picture Post-style publication of 1938)

The ‘Baldwin era’ came to an end in May 1937 when Neville Chamberlain became Prime Minister, a post he held for the last three years of a career which spanned more than two decades and included several senior government posts. The Cabinet was reshuffled from the existing pack. Having replaced Hoare, Eden remained as Foreign Secretary, initially seeming unalarmed by Chamberlain’s obvious intention to take more of an active interest in foreign affairs than Baldwin did. The Spanish Civil War, which began the previous year, prevented any easy accommodation with Rome. The Republican struggle against Franco’s Fascists attracted some enthusiastic support from Britain and France, but the British Cabinet had no enthusiasm for joining the war. A ‘Non-Intervention Agreement’ was in operation, but it didn’t serve as a barrier to German, Italian and Soviet activities. Nevertheless, Chamberlain deprecated the tendency among some of his colleagues to lump Germany and Italy together as ‘fascist powers’ (see the map below). For him, it was Germany that constituted the problem, and by the end of 1937, he had begun to address it directly and personally.

Nevertheless, it was impossible to deny that there was a common ideological thread linking the various far-right movements and repressive régimes that were emerging across Europe. But this thread did not produce identical movements. For example, when Salazar became Prime Minister of Portugal in 1932, at the age of forty-three, and was on the verge of creating an Estado Nova to tear Portugal away from its liberal moorings, he declined to follow the examples of Hitler and Mussolini by establishing a totalitarian party or an intrusive state to indoctrinate the masses. Salazar’s aim was the depolitisation of society, not the mobilisation of the populace.

Salazar was also a supporter of the church and a monarchist, like his neighbour General Franco, but he never considered restoring either to its former position and power, as happened in Spain. Instead, his formula was to create a ruling alliance of conservatives, some moderate liberals and a few nationalist ideologues, guaranteed ultimately by the armed forces. His ability to tap into nationalist feelings helps to explain his durability through to his death in 1970. He earned respect at home and abroad for showing a high degree of skill in foiling various international designs on Portugal which, though small, was strategically located but ill-placed to defend itself from the murderous conflicts of the 1930s and ’40s. Upon the eruption of civil war in Spain in 1936, Salazar backed the nationalists but then worked to keep Franco from throwing in his lot with Hitler after the ‘führer’ unleashed his wave of military conquests in 1939-40.

Lord Halifax touring Berlin with Göring, November 1937.

In mid-November 1937, Lord Halifax was sent to Berlin and Berchtesgaden. Although not altogether happy about this, Eden advised him to ‘leave the Germans guessing’ about British intentions. Halifax and Hitler got down to discussing specific questions concerning Danzig, Austria and Czechoslovakia. Halifax intimated that the ‘status quo’ in Central Europe was not sacrosanct, but that any change could only occur through ‘peaceful evolution’. Chamberlain’s view on these questions was that while Britain could not countenance Europe slipping under German domination, it was evident that, in some shape or form, German influence over central Europe was going to be extended. A dozen years earlier, his half-brother Austen, in negotiating the terms of the Locarno Treaty, had been adamant that Britain could not guarantee Germany’s eastern frontiers (and therefore those of its neighbours) in the same way as it did its western frontiers. The covert message was that these frontiers could be revised – by agreement. There was nothing that Britain could or should do directly to resolve disputes over boundaries or the problems of national minorities. Unlike France, Britain had declined to enter into specific treaty relations with Poland or Czechoslovakia that had been created after the First World War. Central-eastern Europe had never been a major British concern and it would be unwise to be too closely tied to the fortunes of new states with economic, social and political problems of considerable magnitude.

Source: ‘These Tremendous Years’, 1938.

Differences mounted between Chamberlain and Eden, particularly on how to handle approaches to Italy. In the following month, Eden resigned. His resignation cannot be interpreted, however, as a dramatic dissociation from the policy of appeasement. Eden did not seek to make life difficult for his PM by maintaining a running critique of his policy in public. But the initiative in Europe seemed to be held by Germany, perhaps in association with Italy, and by contrast, France seemed bewildered and inert.

In the wake of the Austrian Anschluss, attention now switched to Czechoslovakia. As a result of the events of 12th March 1938, the Czech frontiers had become more vulnerable, as did the Hungarian borders. However, it was likely that the security of the Czechoslovak state would be as much threatened by the disaffection of minorities as by external aggression. The large German minority could be expected to become excited and press for full autonomy within Czechoslovakia or for outright incorporation into the German Reich. There was some sympathy for Czechoslovakia, which was considered to have preserved a liberal constitution more successfully than other central-eastern European states had done. On the other hand, there was doubt about the attitude of Czechs towards the country’s substantial ethnic minorities.

Twenty years after its ‘creation’ at Versailles, was the Czechoslovak state really viable? There was a certain irony in the fact that it appeared to resemble the Habsburg Empire in its population mix, though Czechoslovakia had supposedly been established based on national self-determination. Britain had never gone so far as France in cultivating special relations with Czechoslovakia. The consensus of Cabinet opinion was that no guarantee should be offered. At the Munich conference at the end of September, there was no place for Czechoslovakia itself at the table. Agreement was swiftly reached on the German occupation of the Sudetenland and on an international commission which would supervise the Czech evacuation. In principle, too, there would be a guarantee of the rump state. Chamberlain had allowed himself to be outplayed by Hitler on almost every point. That has been the predominant verdict of posterity; at the time, whether or not the policy could be justified depended on what happened next. While the Conference ‘settled’ the issue of the Sudentenland, it stipulated the need for further negotiations between Hungary and Czechoslovakia on Hungarian claims to Slovak territories. These having proved fruitless, and with the Western powers refraining from ‘interfering’ in the issue, Germany and Italy decided to act as arbiters in the decision on what should happen to Slovakia.

On 24th March, Chamberlain told the Commons that Britain’s vital interests were not involved in the region, though he added that it should not be assumed that the absence of legal obligations meant that Britain had no interest in its future. What followed – the Munich Crisis – has been the subject of many books, pamphlets and articles since. Here, I am more concerned with the Slovak ‘end’ of its consequences and relations with Hungary. It was not Munich itself, but the Czechoslovak Crisis as a whole that began the long descent into war. The British and French were not prepared to allow Hitler a free hand in east-central Europe to build a new German Empire. They were prepared to make what they regarded as reasonable concessions arrived at through negotiation. Hitler agreed and the Sudetenland was granted to him by the Czechs. But six months after Munich on 15 March 1939, German troops occupied Bohemia and Moravia, making it a ‘Protectorate’ of the Reich and leaving Slovakia a fragile independence as a puppet state of the Nazis.

Source: René Cutforth, Later Than We Thought.

Hitler drew a series of lessons from the crisis. First, he was determined not to give way again to what he saw as largely hollow threats from the West. Second, he believed that the concessions made by Chamberlain amounted to a virtual green light to further expansion in the East, showing that the Western powers lacked the willpower to obstruct him further. He developed an obsession with building the political and economic foundation in Central Europe of a German superpower whose military strength would produce a revolution in the European balance of power. The next target of German expansionism was Poland, which would become a protectorate of the Reich voluntarily, like Slovakia or more gradually like Hungary, or involuntarily, by war and occupation.

Horthy & Hungary’s Appeasement of Hitler, 1938-42:

Horthy (left) inspected the German Navy in Kiel in 1938, wearing his Austro-Hungarian Admiral’s uniform. The caption above is by István Lázár.

In his foreign policy, the Hungarian premier in 1938, Béla Imrédy hoped to capitalise on his good personal contacts in Britain, while Kányá, continuing as foreign minister, embarked on another round of negotiations with the Little Entente to secure some of Hungary’s revisionist aims by peaceful means. In return for Hungary’s commitment to non-violence, the Conference of the Little Entente in Bled in August 1938, Hungary’s military parity was recognised, and promises were made to improve the conditions of the Hungarian minorities in neighbouring states. However, the agreement was never ratified. Yet it was against this background that the Regent held his meeting with Hitler at Kiel, at which the Führer offered him the whole of one-time Upper Hungary if his guest was willing to launch an attack on Slovakia. However, Horthy and Imrédy were unwilling to act as agent provocateurs. Instead, they suggested a settlement based on ethnic principles in Slovakia as well as in the German-populated western fringe of Bohemia, the Sudetenland. Having been summoned by Hitler again on 20 September, they were relieved to learn that the Czechoslovak crisis would be resolved at the Munich Conference of the Great Powers.

A month after Munich, on 2nd November 1938, Hitler and Mussolini, acting through their respective foreign ministers, Ribbentrop and Ciano, functioning as a ‘court of arbitration’, supported Hungary’s annexation of southern Slovakia, which took place suddenly and without consultation with Britain and France. Twelve thousand square kilometres with over a million inhabitants (between 57 and 84 per cent of whom were Hungarian, (depending on whether the Hungarian or Czechslovak censuses were used) were awarded to Hungary. This reduced Chamberlain to stating in the House of Commons that, “We never guaranteed the frontiers as they existed. What we did was to guarantee against unprovoked aggression – quite a different thing.” (Cited in Roberts, 2010, p. 9). This first success of revisionism was welcomed in Hungary, even by the Left-Liberal opposition, although there was still some resentment in the establishment and right-wing circles of the award’s failure to recover other parts of Slovakia, and in Ruthenia. A planned operation to occupy Ruthenia at the end of November 1938 was called off due to Hitler’s objections. This First Vienna Award made it clear that any further success in the revision of Trianon would depend on German support. The decision was based chiefly on ethnic considerations, which meant that the boundary line twisted and turned in such a way that for the next few years, every train heading for Kassa (‘Kosice’) had to pass through Slovakian territory before reaching its destination.

A contemporary Italian postcard – ‘Justice for Hungary! – The Great Mutilation! Mussolini as the patron of Hungarian Revisionism.

Europe showed no signs of settling down in the early months of 1939. Justified or not, rumours of further German expansion abounded. However, just six months after the Munich conference and a year after the Anschluss, it was Czechoslovakia that once more held the headlines. German troops entered Prague and established a Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and Slovakia became a nominally independent ‘puppet state’ under German ‘protection’. Alerted at last by Hitler’s occupation of non-German-speaking territory to the real dangers of German expansion, Britain and France pledged to defend Poland, Greece and Romania from similar Nazi aggression and embarked on a crash programme of military spending. Hitler’s aims could no longer be restricted to the inclusion of all Germans in one German state. Both Hungary and Poland found the prospect of grabbing parts of the dying Czechoslovak state lands irresistible. Poland seized Cieszyn (Teschen), while Hungary finally obtained parts of southern Slovakia and Ruthenia, which had substantial Hungarian minorities, previously belonging to the Crown lands of St Stephen.

However, Premier Imrédy’s attempts to demonstrate Hungary’s pro-German commitments by governing the recovered territories by decree led to a vote of no confidence in the National Parliament, unprecedented in the Horthy era. But as his opponents refused to take office in his place, he was allowed to continue and to form a new government, which he thought it essential to pack with pro-German politicians. Kánya was replaced by István Csáky as foreign minister, a firm believer in the need to tie Hungary’s resurrection to the success of German arms, which according to him was beyond reasonable doubt. It was during the subsequent months that the Nazi-style Volksbund became legalised and that Hungary announced its decision to leave the League of Nations and to join the Anti-Commintern Pact. To a considerable extent against his own wishes and because Britain remained apathetic towards Hungary, Imrédy became over-anxious to please the Germans, which led to his dismissal in February 1939, in circumstances quite similar to that of his predecessor, Gömbös.

Hungary’s annexation of Sub-Carpathia demonstrated that the central-eastern frontiers were no longer simply being adjusted, but were being redrawn by force, in the direct interests of Germany and its allies. This helps to explain the decision, after Prague in March 1939, for Britain to give a unilateral guarantee to the Polish government. Britain singled out Poland for this remarkable reversal of the attitude toward central Europe held by all the previous British governments since Versailles. It made it clear that war would result if Germany violated Poland’s sovereignty. France backed up the British declaration, albeit reluctantly, From the point of view of European stability, Poland was therefore the most explosive choice Hitler could have made for the next stage of Nazi expansion. But he simply refused to believe that Britain and France would declare war, asserting to his generals that the allies were bluffing, a view from which he wavered little until 1 September.

This poster from 1939 charts the development of ‘Greater Germany’ A Pan-German state had been the aim of many German nationalists since the period of unification in the mid-nineteenth century. Bismarck, a Prussian, created a small Germany in 1871; Hitler, an Austrian, created a large Germany in 1939. Bismarck’s creation lasted 47 years, Hitler’s only seven.

In reality, Germany was indeed free to attack Poland, especially after the Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed in August. Stalin finally took the bait after he became convinced that Britain and France had little to offer him in exchange for Russian cooperation. This meant that it was not just Germany that invaded Poland on 1 September, but also the Red Army from the east sixteen days later. Franco-British support for Poland was therefore likely to be of little assistance. Stalin simultaneously annexed the three Baltic States; he would also have taken Finland if he could. After the declaration of war with Germany, there was no enthusiasm for protracted conflict. There might still be a place for negotiations but, if so, they could now only be in the context of war. All the steps leading up to the partition of Czechoslovakia had already violated the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. Still, neither France nor Britain did anything to stop Hitler when they could. They had caved in over the Sudetenland, which had never belonged to Germany, and it was only with the invasion of Bohemia and Moravia that Western resolve finally stiffened in 1939.

Hitler had gambled again and won. But he was not a complete gamber, since he had used the pact with Stalin to bolster his conviction about Western bluff. With no prospect of a Soviet alliance and no effective way of helping Poland militarily, Hitler could see no reason for Western intervention. Although Goebbels and Göring tried to convince him that the risk was too great, Ribbentrop, whose own reputation with the Führer depended on his reading of British strategy, spurred Hitler on. Two days after the Blitzkrieg on Poland began, Britain and France declared war to his surprise and consternation. More importantly, he had achieved the exact reverse of his goals in 1933: a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Soviet Russia and a war with Britain and France.

The Western allies had been in no position to offer Stalin inducements to cooperate with them and the Poles had no desire to allow Soviet troops into their country, even to fight the Nazis. Hitler, in contrast, had no compunction about offering Stalin incentives to adopt a benevolent neutrality in the event of a German-Polish war. In fact, the secret protocols to the Non-aggression Pact envisaged the division of the Baltic States and Eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres. Unlike the German conquerors, the Soviet forces went through the motions of organising plebiscites to demonstrate the popular will of the conquered peoples to join the Soviet Union. The following June, as Hitler’s army entered Paris, all three Baltic states ‘voted’ to join the Soviet Union.

Yet historians still remain puzzled as to how this could have led to the carnage involving the deaths of around sixty million people worldwide. In his (2009) essay for The Guardian‘s commemorative supplement on the Origins of the Second World War, Niall Ferguson updated the familiar ‘countdown’ to war from a truly global perspective (guardian.co.uk/readers offers/second world war.) Ferguson pointed out that, far more than the first world war, which was genuinely a European war, fought mainly in Europe by Europeans, the second world war was truly global. Therefore, we can only make sense of its true character by taking a world-historical view of its events. To do that immediately calls into question its ‘advertised’ starting point of 1 September 1939, marked by the invasion of Poland. Ferguson argues that, in reality, it began two years earlier with the full-scale Japanese invasion of Manchuria. Even if we focus on Europe from a global perspective, there was no sense of anything approaching twenty years of peace on the continent before 1939.

Hungary & the Road to War in the East, 1939-41:

For the Hapsburg, Ottoman and Romanov empires, the true losers of the First World War, there was scarcely any peace after 1918.

The so-called “successor states” of Austria-Hungary experienced a series of internal and cross-border conflicts in the early 1920s. Then, by September 1939, there had already been three years of civil war in Spain. Many historians have taken this further in representing the period from 1914 to 1945 as a second Thirty Years’ War or a prolonged ‘European civil war’. Some have even suggested that the entire period, or ‘era’ from 1904 to 1953 represents a ‘Fifty Years’ War’, playing out what was essentially the same conflict across several ‘theatres’ including the European empires in North Africa and the Middle East. The key to understanding these fifty years was the sustainability of Western imperial power over the rest of the world, most importantly over Asia.

The Onset of War in Poland, 1-28 September 1939.

For all these reasons, Ferguson argues, the events of September 1939 look less like the beginning of a world war and more like the escalation of an ongoing global conflict. It was a war, above all, for domination over ‘Eurasia’, and it was not really over until 1953, by which time its most hotly contested zones in central and eastern Europe had been divided in two, with deadly, impassible borders dividing them. Ferguson concludes:

‘That we describe this cataclysmic world war as having begun in Poland on 1 September 1939 is thus merely a trick of the historical light – an illusion caused by our own parochialism.’

Other relevant but awkward questions that Ferguson poses are: Why should the Treaty of Versailles be blamed for so much, when the other post-1918 treaties imposed on Austria-Hungary (St Germain and Trianon) and the Ottoman Empire (Sévres) were, in terms of territory, much harsher? Why, if the arguments for appeasement were so strong in September 1938, did they cease to be so just a year later when the strategic position of the Franco-British alliance had significantly worsened?

Ipolyság became the first village to return to Hungary in 1938.

Hungary’s annexation of southern Slovakia took place suddenly and without consultation with Britain and France. This reduced Chamberlain to stating in the House of Commons that “we never guaranteed the frontiers as they existed. What we did was to guarantee against unprovoked aggression – quite a different thing.” Then, in the early hours of 24 August 1939 a comprehensive Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact was signed in Moscow. Up until that point, Hitler’s treatment of the Austrian President Kurt von Schusnigg, the Czech President Emil Hácha and the British and French leaders had been characterised by trickery, bullying and constant piling on of pressure, to which they had responded with a mixture of gullibility, appeasement and weary resignation. Yet with his lifelong enemies the Bolsheviks, Hitler was attentive and respectful, though no less duplicitous.

At the beginning of 1939, when Hungary joined Japan, Germany and Italy in the Anti-Comintern Pact, the USSR broke off the tenous formal relations which had existed since 1934. But when Stalin decided on his non-aggression pact with Hitler, the Soviets were apprehensive and signalled their preparedness to make additional conciliatory gestures to guarantee their border with Hungary in the Carpathians. At the suggestion of the Soviets, diplomatic relations were restored in the autumn of 1939, and a year later the two countries signed a trade agreement. Then Hungary handed over two Communist leaders sentenced to life imprisonment (the Communist Party was illegal in Hungary in the interwar years), Mátyás Rákosi and Zoltán Vas. As a reciprocal gesture, the Soviets sent a special train with a guard of honour to Budapest, carrying fifty-six flags of the Hungarian Army captured by the Tsar’s forces during the suppression of the 1848-49 War of Independence (the celebration on the Danube is pictured above). However, this turned out to be a fleeting interlude of fraternity in the relations between Hungary and the USSR.

Through his Pact with Stalin, Hitler simply wrong-footed the Western Allies again. Despite his previously unwavering hostility to communism, he neatly sidelined the one country he took to be his most serious enemy. For his part, although Stalin had loudly condemned the Western appeasement of Germany before Munich, Stalin showed less enthusiasm for confronting Hitler once the Anglo-French capitalists had announced their guarantees of Polish, Romanian and Greek sovereignty following the Nazi occupation of Prague. However. such had been the rhetorical animosity between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia that few diplomats or politicians were prepared for the sudden reversal of policy involved in the Non-aggression Pact.

At this point, Hitler seemed invincible. In June 1940 France collapsed and he was master of the continent, though Britain fought on alone. Hungary had to court the Nazis’ favour, though they often did so with misgivings. Hitler might offer a further revision of Trianon, the most coveted of which was regaining Transylvania. Hitler was concerned that Hungary might attack Romania, because he depended on it for oil, and it was already under threat from the Soviet Union now that it had lost French protection. In June 1940, after the fall of France, the Soviet Union moved, demanding the retrocession of north-eastern Romania and offering cooperation to Hungary. Pál Teleki and Horthy both hated the Soviets and ignored the approach, but they did mobilise the army, and public opinion was in an uproar about the possibility of regaining Transylvania. Hitler called Teleki and Csáky to Munich and told them he would find a solution. Again there was arbitration leading to the Second Vienna Award, on 30th August 1940. Transylvania was partitioned, with the northern part returned to Hungary. Admiral Horthy got on his white horse again and rode triumphantly through Kolozsvár and Márosvásárhely, to widespread celebration. This time Hungary obtained 43,000 square kilometres and 2.5 million souls, two-fifths of whom were Romanian, while the Romanians in the south retained 400,000 Hungarians. The ‘bill’ for this was tall; adhesion to the Axis Powers; allowance of German military transports through Hungary; and privileges for the German Hungarians. There would also be further measures against the Jews as well as allowance of extreme right ‘activities’.

The Second Vienna Award was put together in the summer of 1940. This agreement, again arbitrated by Ciano and Ribbentrop, gave a part of Transylvania back to Hungary in such a way that the ethnic ratio of the transferred population was more unfavourable because of the more complex location of the settlements: Hungarians comprised not quite 52%, while Romanians reached 42%.

Hungary’s Territorial Changes, 1938-41

The Soviet Union made use of Hitler’s Western offensive to occupy Finland and the Baltic states. However, the difficulties experienced by the Soviet army in attaining these objectives suggested that it posed no threat to Germany. Stalin’s anxieties about this, occasioned by the swift German conquest of France, showed in the alacrity with which he accepted their invitation in October 1940 for Molotov to visit Berlin for discussion on the way forward for the Pact. Since the summer of that year, Stalin had dared to think that the Germans may be planning to attack the Soviet Union. The coincidence of interests that had permeated the two meetings over the Non-Aggression Pact the previous year had all but evaporated. It had been replaced by suspicion. For the Soviets, anxiety rested on German intentions regarding the ‘buffer states’ – Hungary, Romania and especially Bulgaria. Hitler’s longstanding rhetoric about acquiring Lebensraum for German colonisation seemed to be becoming a reality. Added to this, the Soviets were almost as obsessed with ensuring that their ships had passage through the Dardanelles, the narrow straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, controlled by Turkey.

From 1939 to 1941, Hitler seemed to favour Hungary’s neighbours, i.e. Slovakia, Romania and Croatia, which meant that Germany would no longer support Revisionist claims directed against these states. In the summer of 1939, when Hitler was about to engage in his final aggressive step on Poland’s borders, Hungary faced a conundrum. If it supported him, it would be ratting on an old ally, and a friendly associate. Moreover, Hungary’s annexation of Carpatho-Ruthenia gave the two countries a common border, a change that was celebrated on both sides of it. On the other hand, if Hungary stayed out she might lose the chance of a further revision of the Trianon frontiers; Hitler ranted to this effect on 8th August 1939, and Mussolini pressed the Hungarian government to follow Nazi instructions. Again, Teleki prevaricated, and a letter of his was disavowed by his own foreign minister. A decisive and surprising leap on the road to war in the east occurred on the 23rd of August when Hitler concluded his pact with Stalin. The two decided to partition Poland and by implication divide central-eastern Europe between them into zones of influence or occupation. When Germany attacked Poland on 1st September and Britain and France declared war two days later, Horthy knew that sea power would eventually prevail, and the British would win. However, the immediate German pressure was overwhelming, and Hungary allowed the Wehrmacht to use railways east of Kassa at least for goods. When Poland collapsed, 150,000 Poles took refuge in Hungary, from where most went on to fight in the West.

So, when Molotov left Moscow for Berlin in November 1940, he was tasked by Stalin with asking a series of questions about German intentions towards central-eastern Europe and the Balkans. Hitler, on the other hand, had very different aspirations for the Molotov meeting. Although he had called internally, in July, for an invasion of the USSR, this remained only one possible course of action, even if it was the one he most favoured. He also wanted to see if the Soviet leadership could be persuaded to leave the central-eastern states under German control, instead diverting their attention to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, snatching territory and influence from the British Empire. In later discussions with Ribbentrop on the same visit, however, Molotov continued to ask about German intentions on the partition of Poland as well as its policy towards Hungary and Yugoslavia. Like the Führer, Ribbentrop wanted to return to the ‘decisive’ question as to whether the Soviet Union was prepared to participate in the ‘great liquidation of the British Empire’ compared to which all other issues were considered by the Nazis to be insignificant, to be settled as soon as an overall understanding was reached. However, the Soviets were unwilling simply to leave the whole of central Europe, including the Balkans, to Germany. As a result, the relationship between Germany and the Soviet Union was clearly splitting apart. Hitler became convinced he was right to push forward with plans to conquer the USSR and take what he needed by force. Thus, the final formal directive for the invasion of the Soviet Union, Operation Barbarossa, was given on 18 December.

There remained one item on the revisionist agenda; the partly Hungarian ‘Vojvodina’, where there was also a German minority. It was now in Yugoslavia, which was a complication both Horthy and Hitler wanted to do without. Hitler wanted a Yugoslavia that would be aligned with the Axis and was also preoccupied with Britain. The Hungarians cultivated good relations with Belgrade, and a treaty was signed in December 1940, to the effect that there will be permanent peace and eternal friendship between the two parties. However, Hitler was drawn into the Balkans after all due to Italian blundering. Mussolini had attempted an invasion of Greece which was a disaster: he had to be rescued. Although Yugoslavia had joined the Tripartite Pact on 25th March 1941, there was a pro-British coup, followed by a German invasion. Teleki was informed that by joining this Hungary could have a further revision, and a German army delegation arrived in Budapest to arrange this.

Teleki had promised the British that he would not comply with German demands that were ‘irreconcilable with honour’, but on 1st April he voted for the reannexation of Vojvodina. The minister in London, György Barcza, sent a telegram to the effect that if Hungary went ahead, it would mean war. The British minister in Budapest, Owen O’Malley (pictured above), vigorously accused Horthy of underhand conduct, and Teleki came under tremendous strain. On 3rd April, he shot himself, having scribbled the following note to Horthy:

‘We have become breakers of our word… taken the side of scoundrels… the most rotten of nations.’

The gesture was late politically and ineffective, but absolutely genuine as a personal act. On hearing the news of his death, Winston Churchill said that an empty chair would be kept at the future peace conference for him. This pronouncement belongs among Churchill’s most noble moments, but at the 1946-47 Paris Peace Conference, not a word was spoken about the empty chair that Pál Teleki’s phantom was to occupy.

A Hungarian regional magazine cover featuring Teleki.

At the time of Teleki’s suicide, Horthy was unmoved, appointing the pro-German Bárdossy as his new premier. Hungary joined the invasion of Yugoslavia, which broke up. Horthy was warned that he could expect no favours from ‘a victorious Britain and the United States of America’ by breaking a newly signed treaty of eternal friendship. Out of this, Hungary did get another 11,500 square kilometres with another million inhabitants, just over a third of them Hungarians. By the Spring of 1941, Hungary had taken back about half of its lost territories, some eighty thousand square kilometres with 5.3 million people, of whom forty per cent were Magyar. But there was a considerable price to pay, as the country had now, in effect, surrendered its independence to Germany, long before it declared war in its support.

That same spring of 1941, British policy was suffering one disastrous setback after another. In March, the long-anticipated pro-allied Balkan front crumbled when Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania joined the Axis powers; Turkey, withstanding all pressure, remained neutral. On 6th April, German troops poured into Yugoslavia and Greece, sweeping up the allied armies as they advanced and trapping ten thousand British troops. Three weeks later, the swastika flew over the Acropolis. By the end of May, German paratroops had overrun Crete. This was not a repetition of the ‘Norway fiasco’ that Churchill feared; it was a disaster of even greater magnitude, and it was compounded by the failure to exploit British military successes in North Africa, for on 3rd April Rommel began to drive the British army out of Libya. Churchill’s responsibility for the action was considerable. Later that year, he conceded that Greece had been an ‘error of judgment’. The humiliation of the rout cut deep and criticism was harsh.

In June 1941, the whole orientation of the war changed when the Germans attacked the USSR in ‘Operation Barbarossa’. Hungary was involved, though it had had surprisingly good relations with Moscow during the months of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. On 23 June, József Kristóffy, the envoy to Moscow, announced that Molotov was willing to recognise Hungary’s territorial demands on Romania; but Bárdossy suppressed the report, and took advantage of an unexplained episode when unidentified foreign aircraft dropped bombs on the town of Kassa. Thought by many historians to have been a plot between Hungarian and German staff officers to blame Moscow and declare war, it led to forty thousand men crossing into Galicia to join in the invasion of Soviet Ukraine. Initially, the offensive went well. Hungary also supplied Germany with grain and bauxite, for which it was not paid. By December 1941, however, the Germans were held at Moscow, and in the same week came the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Quite absurdly, Bárdossy declared war on the USA without consulting either Horthy or the cabinet.

On 23 July 1941, the day between the beginning of the treacherous German attack and the severance of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Hungary, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, conversing in a tone uncommon in diplomacy, intimated to the Hungarian ambassador in Moscow and through him to Horthy and his supporters that the Soviet Union had no demands or requests – other than neutrality – to make of Hungary, and stood ready to support its claims to Transylvania. But Hungary was deceived by provocation into entering Hitler’s war with the Soviet Union and, consequently, with the Allied Powers, soon to be joined by the USA.

(to be continued… )

Gallery:

Is Hungary’s Appeasement of Putin Justified by its Past Experiences? III

Chapter Three – From Sarajevo to War & Revolutions, 1914-1919:

Archduke Franz Ferdinand favoured a policy of reconciliation with the Slavs in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Because of this attitude, he was disliked both by the traditional ruling élite in Vienna and the Magyar bourgeois statesmen of Hungary. The Slavs within the empire, seeking union with the Serbs, also opposed him. Nevertheless, the Austrian government seized the opportunity of his assassination to charge the Serbian Government with complicity.

Ultimatums & Mobilisations:

In Viennese political and military circles, the assassination of Franz Ferdinand was mostly seen as a golden opportunity to settle old scores with Serbia and not to re-establish the prestige of the Monarchy. In Berlin, Kaiser Wilhelm II and his generals thought that since an armed confrontation between the Central Powers and the Entente was inevitable, it was better to fight it before Germany’s hard-won advantage in the armament race was completely diminished. They brought pressure on the Common Council of Ministers, especially Tisza, the Hungarian premier, who was worried both by the prospect of a Romanian attack and therefore by the plan for the annexations in the Balkans and elsewhere, urged by the bellicose Austrian Chief of Staff, Conrad von Hötzendorf and several political leaders both in Vienna and Budapest.

By mid-July 1914, a decision of sorts had been made about whether or not Austria-Hungary was going to war: the Austro-Hungarians, or at least the grouping around Berchtold, intended to seek a military resolution of their conflict with Serbia. Yet on all other issues, the policy-makers in Vienna had, as yet, failed to deliver coherent positions. There was still no agreement at the time Count Alexander Hoyos (Berchtold’s chef de cabinet) left for Berlin, on what policy should be pursued in Serbia after an Austrian victory. When he was asked there about Austria-Hungary’s post-war objectives, he responded with a bizarre improvisation: Serbia, he declared, would be partitioned between Austria, Bulgaria, and Romania. In reality, he had no authority to propose such a course of action, and no plan for partition had been agreed upon by his Austrian colleagues. He later explained that he had invented the policy because he feared that the Germans would lose faith in the Austro-Hungarians if they felt ‘that we could not formulate our Serbian policy precisely and had unclear objectives.’ (A. Hoyos, Meine Mission nach Berlin, in Fellner, Die Mission ‘Hoyos’, p.137. ) István Tisza, the Hungarian premier, was furious when he learned of Hoyos’s indiscretion; the Hungarians, even more than the political élite in Vienna, regarded the prospect of yet more angry South Slav Habsburg subjects with unalloyed horror. Vienna subsequently made it clear that no annexation of Serbian territory was intended. But Hoyos’s gaffe conveyed something of the chaotic way in which Austrian policy evolved during the crisis.

To alleviate the problem of the rural areas of the Habsburg lands, where military service in summertime created serious labour shortages at harvest time, the Austrian General Staff had devised a system of harvest ‘exeats’ that allowed men to return to their family farms to help with crops and then rejoin their units in time for their summer maneuvers. On 6th July, it was ascertained that troops serving in units at Agram (Zagreb), Graz, Pressburg (Bratislava), Craców, Temesvár, Innsbruck, and Budapest were currently on harvest leave and would not be returning to service until 25th July. It soon became clear, however, that it would be some time before military action could begin.

On 7th July, following Hoyos’s return from Berlin, it became clear that there was still no agreement among the principal decision-makers about how to proceed. Berchtold opened the Joint Ministerial Council by reminding his colleagues that Bosnia and Hercegovina would only be stabilised if the external threat from Belgrade was dealt with. If no action were taken, the monarchy’s ability to deal with the Russian-sponsored irredentist movements in its southern Slav and Romanian areas would steadily deteriorate. This was an argument calculated to appeal to Count Tisza, for whom the stability of Transylvania was a central concern. Tisza was not convinced, however, and in his reply to Berchtold, he conceded that the attitude of the Serbian press and the results of the police investigation in Sarajevo strengthened the case for a military strike. But first, he asserted, the diplomatic options needed to be exhausted.

There was general agreement that Belgrade had to be presented with an ultimatum, whose stipulations had to be firm, but not unfulfillable. Sufficient forces had to be made available to secure Transylvania against an opportunistic attack by Romania. Then Vienna would have to consolidate its position among the Balkan Powers: Vienna needed to seek closer relations with Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, in the hope of creating a Balkan counterweight to Serbia and ‘forcing Romania to return to the Triple Alliance’. (‘Protocol of the Ministerial Council for Joint Affairs convened on 7 July 1914.’) There was nothing in this to surprise anyone around the table. This was also the familiar view from Budapest, in which Transylvania occupied centre stage. But Tisza faced a solid bloc of colleagues determined to confront Serbia with demands they expected Belgrade to reject.

The Austrian ministers knew that a purely diplomatic success would have no value at all since it would be read as a sign of Vienna’s weakness and irresolution in Belgrade, Bucharest, St Petersburg, and the southern Slav areas of the monarchy. Time was running out for Austria-Hungary as with each passing year, the monarchy’s security position on the Balkan peninsula became increasingly fragile. The ministers agreed to accept Count Tisza’s suggestion that mobilisation against Serbia should occur only after Belgrade had been confronted with an ultimatum. But all of the ministers except Tisza believed that a diplomatic success, even one involving a ‘sensational humiliation’ of Serbia, would be worthless and that the ultimatum must therefore be framed in terms harsh enough to ensure a rejection, ‘so that the way is open to a radical solution by means of military intervention.’ This discussion and decision marked a watershed, washing away any chance of a peaceful outcome. Yet there was still no sign of precipitate action. The option of an immediate surprise attack without a declaration of war was rejected. Tisza, whose agreement was constitutionally necessary for a resolution of such importance, continued to insist that Serbia should first be humiliated diplomatically. Only after a further week did he give way to the majority view, mainly because he became convinced that failure to address the Serbian question would have an unsettling effect on Hungarian Transylvania.

Without positive knowledge of Serbian complicity in the Sarajevo assassination, a harsh ultimatum demanding, among other things, an official denunciation of the movement for Greater Serbia and the free involvement of Austro-Hungarian agents in investigating the case on Serbian territory, was dispatched to Belgrade on 23rd July. It soon turned out that the great powers of the opposite camp were also not anti-war. Serbia rejected the ultimatum two days later not on grounds of innocence, but because it was prompted to do so by her Entente supporters. Within two weeks of the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on Serbia on 28th July, allied obligations combining nationalist and imperialist dreams involved nearly the whole of the European continent, and significant regions of the world, in war.

In the meantime, a measure of unanimity was achieved in Vienna over the course of action to be followed. At a further summit meeting in the city on 14th July, it was agreed that a draft of the ultimatum would be checked and approved by the Council of Ministers on the 19th and the ultimatum would be presented to the Belgrade government only on 23rd July. This date was chosen to avoid a state visit by President Poincaré to St Petersburg in the days before, Berchtold and Tisza agreeing,

‘… that the sending of an ultimatum during this meeting in St Petersburg would be viewed as an affront and that personal discussion between the ambitious President of the Republic and His Majesty the Emperor of Russia… would heighten the likelihood of a military intervention by Russia and France‘.

(Berchtold’s Report to the Emperor, 14 July 1914).

From this moment onwards, secrecy was of the greatest possible importance, both for strategic and diplomatic reasons. It was essential for the Austro-Hungarians to avoid any action that might give the Serbs prior notice of their intentions and thereby give them time to steal a march on the Monarchy’s armies. Recent appraisals of Serbian military strength suggested that the Serbian army would not be a trivial opponent. Secrecy was also essential because it presented Vienna’s only hope of conveying its demands to Belgrade before the Entente powers had the opportunity for joint deliberations on how to respond. Berchtold therefore ordered that the press be firmly instructed to avoid the subject of Serbia. In its official relations with Russia, the Austro-Hungarians went out of their way to avoid even the slightest friction; Szapáry, their ambassador to St Petersburg, was particularly assiduous in his efforts to tranquilise the Russian foreign ministry with assurances that all would be well.

Yet these efforts attempted to disguise the many oddities involved in the Austro-Hungarian decision-making process. Berchtold, disparaged by many of the ‘hawks’ in his administration as a soft touch, incapable of forming clear resolutions, took control of the policy debate after 28th June in a quite impressive way. But he could only do this through an arduous, painstaking, and time-consuming consensus-building process. The puzzling dissonances in the documents that track the formulation of the Austro-Hungarian position to go to war reflect the need to incorporate opposing viewpoints. The momentous possibility of the decision leading to a Russian general mobilisation and the general European war that would undoubtedly follow was certainly glimpsed by the Austro-Hungarian decision-makers, who discussed it on several occasions. However, it was never fully integrated into the process by which the options were weighed and assessed. In particular, no sustained attention was given to the question of whether Austria-Hungary was in any position to wage a war with one or more other great powers.

There are several possible reasons for this myopic vision. One was the extraordinary confidence in the strength of German arms, which, it was assumed, was sufficient to deter, and failing that, to defeat Russia. The second was that the hive-like structure of the Austro-Hungarian political élite was simply not conducive to the formulation of decisions through the careful balancing of contradictory information. The contributors to the debate tended to indulge in rhetorical statements, often sharpened by mutual recrimination, rather than attempting to view the diplomatic and military choices facing the Monarchy in the round. These failings reflected the profound sense of isolation in Vienna and Budapest. The notion that the statement of the twin capitals had ‘a responsibility’ to Europe was nonsense, as one political insider noted,

‘Because there is no Europe. Public opinion in Russia and France … will always maintain that we are the guilty ones, even if the Serbs, in the midst of peace, invade us by the thousands one night, armed with bombs’.

Memorandum by Berthold Molden for the press department in Vienna, cited in Solomon Wank, ‘Desperate Counsel in Vienna in July 1914: Berthold Molden’s Unpublished Memorandum’, Central European History, 26/3 (1993), pp. 281-310.

However, the most important reason for the perplexing narrowness of the Austro-Hungarian policy debate is surely that they were so convinced of the rectitude of their case and of their proposed remedy against Serbia that they could conceive of no alternative to it – even Tisza had accepted by 7th July that Belgrade was implicated in the crimes at Sarajevo and was willing in principle to countenance a military response, provided the timing and diplomatic context were right. Nor is it easy to see how the Austro-Hungarians could have made a less drastic solution work, given the reluctance of the Serbian authorities to meet Austrian expectations, the absence of any international legal bodies capable of arbitrating in such cases, and the impossibility in the current international climate of enforcing the future compliance of Belgrade. Yet at the core of the Austro-Hungarian response was a temperamental, intuitive leap, an act of attrition founded on a shared understanding of what the Habsburg Empire had been, was still, and must be in future, if it were to remain a great power.

Austria-Hungary presented an ultimatum with demands which threatened the very existence of Serbia as an independent state. The Austrian statesmen believed that war with the Serbs would almost certainly lead to a general European war and that the ruin of the Austrian Empire was inevitable if they were defeated. They decided to take the risk. Emperor Franz Josef first sought and obtained the assurance of support from the Kaiser. Although Serbia accepted almost all of the humiliating demands of the ultimatum, Vienna treated the Serbian reply as a rejection. In the end, Tisza gave way because he knew that ‘Greater Hungary’ had only come about due to Bismarck’s intervention. He told the Belgian Minister, ‘Mon Cher, Allemagne est invincible.’

The Uncontrollable Storm of War:

War with Serbia followed on 28th July, and Budapest had paroxysms of enthusiasm. Even Count Apponyi said in Parliament, ‘At last’; ‘végre’. The Russians did protect Serbia, and Germany went to war, provoking trouble with Russia’s ally France and then giving the British no choice by invading Belgium, the neutrality of which Britain had guaranteed. In the last three days of July, a freak storm hit the microclimate of hilly Buda and the plain of Pest, destroying roofs and smashing the plate-glass windows of the cafés on the Danube embankment and the Oktogon, as the recruits marched towards the mobilisation trains. The now ‘late’ Archduke Franz Ferdinand’s main adviser, Count Czernin, said two things: that minority problems were a bore, and that the only difference in Austria was that they had a peculiarly multifarious collection. The main priority, for him, was to avoid a war. In his post-war memoirs, he also said:

‘We were bound to die, we were at liberty to choose the manner of our death and we chose the most terrible.’

Ottokar Czernin, In the World War (1920), p.38.

As noted previously, in 1867 Kossuth had written an open letter to Deák, warning that, without control of her own foreign policy and without her own army, Hungary would be dragged into Austro-German adventures which were not in her interest. Almost half a century later, it seemed that he had been proved right. Yet at the time he was writing, Austria-Hungary’s relations with a not yet unified Germany seemed a far more equal and positive partnership, and Kossuth’s alternative, a Balkan federation, was unattractive. Since then, Germany had become the most successful country in Europe, overtaking Great Britain and even rivaling the USA. Her education system was widely acknowledged as one of the best in the world. German universities attracted Hungarians in great numbers, including István Tisza, who studied Law at Heidelberg. Hungary now belonged firmly in the German orbit, whatever a posthumous ‘protector’ might have said. As early as 1878, Gyula Andrássy had set up Hungary’s Austro-German alliance. By 1914 the German cause had become very popular throughout the country, and very few Hungarians opposed the war: they did not have to be ‘dragged’ to the front.

Indeed, few in Hungary recognised the dilemmas, the tensions, and the traps that the country faced on the eve of the war in all their depth. On one side of the divide, Endre Ady, the poet, was the greatest of those who did, and he singled out with characteristic acuteness his nemesis: István Tisza. In the troublesome summer of 1914, the ‘deranged man of Geszt’, as Ady called the PM, after the seat of the Tisza estate, hesitated for two weeks, but in the end, he gave his sanction to decisions commencing the war which ultimately demolished ‘historic’ Hungary.

There was a universal belief, which seems incomprehensible a century later, that the war, though possibly brutish at times, would be short, involving a cast of Hungarian heroes pulling on their hussar uniforms and galloping off to glories, like in one of Miklós Banffy’s novels. The generals knew differently of course, that with millions of men and thousands of guns in the field, it could be very costly and last a long time, but economists and bankers ruled this out. Few people foresaw how paper money would fuel the war effort, and when the Hungarian Foreign Minister was asked how long the Empire could fight, he estimated three weeks. There had been an exchange of letters between Conrad von Hötzendorf and his opposite number, Helmuth von Moltke since 1909, when the Bosnian Crisis had first put a war with Russia on the table. In these, Moltke had intimated that Germany would send most of its troops against Belgium and France, and the idea was that, at the same time, the Austro-Hungarian army would keep the Russians busy in Galicia (southern Poland). Another romantic illusion was that the cavalry could sweep over the Carpathians led by the Hussars. The Austrians even nominated a governor of Warsaw just as the war broke out. Of course, they recognised that they would also have to deal with Serbia, which would mean them keeping part of the army in the Balkans for the time being.

As Conrad wrote in his correspondence with Moltke, if Austria went to war with Serbia, it would send a large part of the army south. Still, if Russia intervened, Austria-Hungary would need most of its forces in the north-east, in Galicia. But what would happen if the Russians delayed intervention until these forces were committed to the Serbian Front? The Germans do not seem to have worried about this: after all, if Austria-Hungary took a proper role in the great battles to come with France and Russia, Serbia could always be sorted out later. The fact was that the Austro-Hungarians were trying to do too much, but due to imperial vainglory, they were not able to admit it. Their army, with forty-eight infantry divisions, was expecting to take on the Serbians’ fourteen and the Russians’ fifty. Conrad found a way around this by dividing the army into three groups. Group A, half of it, would go to Galicia; a ‘Minimal Balkan Group’, somewhat less than a quarter, would face Serbia; group B, the rest, four army corps in strength, two Hungarian and two Bohemian, would go south if Russia stayed out, north if it did not.

The Eve of the First World War

The truth was that the Austro-Hungarians did not want to fight Russia and found excuses not to do so. Berlin had told them to provoke a war with Serbia, but they delayed the presentation of their ultimatum for a month, and when the Serbians rejected it, took another three days before declaring war on 28th July. This enabled them to deploy Army Group B to the Serbian front, alleging that the Russian response was not clear. In the event, the Russian mobilisation was quite rapid, so when the Germans heard that their ally was proposing to fight a pan-European war by sending a large part of its army to a very secondary theatre, they were outraged, including the military attaché, Chief of the General Staff and the Kaiser himself. When the Austro-Hungarian army corps reached the Serbian border, it sat in tents while the Minimal Balkan Group, too small to do its job, was humiliatingly defeated by the Serbs. It then trundled across Hungary by train to Galicia and arrived just in time to take part in an enormous defeat. This was how poor military planning led to disastrous early outcomes for Austria-Hungary as it entered the war in July 1914.

For their part, the Germans were anxious to confine the war to Austria and Serbia but were surprised by the strength of Russia’s support for Serbia and by the speed of the Tsar’s mobilisation. There were, however, no statesmen left uncommitted to war, and certainly none capable of controlling the situation; Bethman-Hollweg, the German Chancellor, and Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary, both attempted unsuccessfully to stay the hand of Austria. The Kaiser sent a twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia demanding a suspension of mobilisation, but this was not answered in time, so he declared war on Russia immediately. France stood by her ally, Russia, and declared war on Germany. Austria-Hungary’s ambitious war aims were two-fold, neither of which was purely defensive. These were:

‘(a) To crush the Pan-Slav movement, which made the task of controlling the Austrian Slavs more difficult.

(b) To dominate the Balkans and, by crushing Serbia, to control the route to the Aegean port of Salonika.’

Irene Richards, et. al. (1938), A Sketch-Map History of the Great War and After, 1914-1935. London: Harrap., p. 18.

In Hungary, as elsewhere, the initial response to the outbreak of war was an outburst of patriotic enthusiasm. In parliament, which was prorogued and reconvened in November, the opposition Independence Party leader, Count Mihály Károlyi spoke of suspending political debate, hoping for democratic concessions in return for supporting the war effort. A similar motivation resulted in similar attitudes among the extra-parliamentary Social Democrats and even the national minorities, causing few headaches to the belligerent government in the early phases of the war. As in the West, Soldiers set out to the Eastern front amidst cheerful ceremonies, in the hope of returning victorious, as Wilhelm II said, ‘by the time the leaves fall’.

The War on the Eastern Front:

However, the war plans of the Central Powers were thwarted. Germany failed to inflict a decisive defeat on France in a lightning war and was therefore unable to lend sufficient support early enough to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy for the containment of the Russian advance and the breaking of Serbia. Especially given the unexpectedly rapid Russian mobilisation, the forces of the Monarchy were not equal to coping with these tasks simultaneously. Although Belgrade was occupied in December 1914, the Russian army posed a direct threat to Hungarian territory. Over half of the initial Austro-Hungarian fighting force of 1.8 million died, was wounded, or fell into captivity during the first stages of the war on the fronts in Galicia and Serbia.

The Hungarian cavalry, splendidly arrayed, made a magnificent sight as it cantered across the Galician plains, but it soon ran out of fodder and returned with the hussars leading their horses on foot. The only cavalry engagement took place at Jaroslawice) when the two cavalry divisions decided to re-enact the Napoleonic Wars with a lance-and-sabre engagement which ended inconclusively. They were forced to abandon the chief city of Galicia, Lemburg (Lviv) on 3rd September. The old professional Habsburg army was almost destroyed during these first few weeks, losing about half a million men. But conscripts flowed in, and there was enough devotion to the imperial cause to keep the army in the field. This was particularly the case in Hungary, where nationalism was still strong, and there was no trouble among the non-Magyar recruits, who were mainly Croats, but even included some ‘loyal’ Serbs. Gradually, however, Austria-Hungary was being pulled into a bigger German vortex.

Conrad’s pre-war fears were coming true, for there was worse to come on the Eastern Front. It would have made sense if Austria-Hungary had offered to get out of the war following the defeat of Serbia the following autumn. The Western powers had no interest in destroying the Habsburg Monarchy at this point, for its destruction could only profit either Russia or Germany. One prominent figure in the Monarchy did guess how it would all end. This was Professor Tomás Masaryk, the leader of a small Czech progressive party, who in the winter of 1915 tried in vain to persuade the British that Czech independence might help their cause. Hungary did not have a Masyryk, however, and the only prominent figure who might have reacted in this way was Count Mihály Károlyi, who had been in France since the outbreak of the war. Otherwise, Hungary remained solidly behind the war and, with the control of food supplies within the empire, was able to assert itself and state money was being showered on arms factories in Hungary. A new crest was designed for the Empire in 1915, giving more prominence to the Hungarian insignia, and the non-Hungarian half of the empire was officially renamed Austria. Meanwhile, as Austro-Hungarian confidence revived, so did resentment at German domination, in particular in the wrangling between the two powers over the future of Poland, in which Hungary had a clear territorial stake.

By the Spring of 1915, the type of attritional warfare that was becoming typical of the First World War was centred on the foot soldiers in the trenches armed with machine guns, and dependent on heavy artillery bombardment. This was the reality on both fronts. Until the entry of the USA into the war in April 1917, the sides were roughly equal, and the military balance was, if anything, slightly in favour of the Central Powers. Turkey hoped to avenge itself on Russia for losses suffered during the previous century, and Bulgaria was ambitious to expand further into the Balkans. Both joined the Central Powers, Turkey in the autumn of 1914, and Bulgaria in 1915, which finally helped the Monarchy to put down Serbia. By then, the Austro-Hungarian army had somewhat recovered from its earlier losses. With some German assistance, it was capable of significant success against its former allies that had now joined the side of the Entente. These included Italy, which was promised territorial acquisitions in the South Tyrol, the Adriatic, and Africa in the secret treaty of London in 1915, declaring war on the Central Powers in the following month.

At the same time, there was another field of diplomacy in play: besides propaganda directed at the hinterland of hostile countries, which naturally affected the ethnic minorities of Austria-Hungary, the Western allies gave shelter to the national committees of émigré politicians and encouraged their campaigns for the dismemberment of the Monarchy and the creation of ‘national’ states. The Yugoslav Committee, led by the Croatian Frano Supilo and Ante Trumbic, was established in London on 1st May 1915, with the programme of uniting Serbia and the South Slav inhabited territories of the Monarchy in a single, federative state (their Serbian counterparts, meanwhile, envisaged the future of the same territories as a centralised state governed from Belgrade); the leader of the Czech émigrés in Paris, Tomás Masaryk and Eduard Benes urged the creation of a Czecho-Slovak state including Carpatho-Ukraine and linked with a corridor to the future South Slav state to separate the Germans and Hungarians from each other. The Romanians, with claims to Transylvania as well as other parts of Hungary east of the River Tisza, emerged relatively late, founding the Committee of Romanian National Unity in Paris only in the latter stages of the war. A powerful Russian advance in the summer of 1916 on the eastern front prompted Romania to invade Transylvania. However, this offensive had collapsed within weeks, and in December 1916, the Austro-Hungarian army occupied Bucharest.

Until relatively late in the course of the war, the support given by the Entente powers to the high-blown demands of the national committees was largely tactical, and until the Spring of 1918, they contemplated various alternatives to the ‘destruction of Austria-Hungary’, as called for by Masaryk and Benes in 1916. They preferred (as did the representatives of the Czechs, the Ukrainians, and the South Slavs in the Austrian parliament convened in May 1917) a federal reorganisation of the Monarchy with wide-ranging autonomy granted to the nationalities, until it became clear that German influence over Austro-Hungarian policies was too great to negotiate a separate peace with it, and they convinced themselves that it could not be expected to play the traditional role of a counterpoise in the European balance of power any longer.

In the bloody battles fought on the slopes of the Alps and along the River Isonzo, the forces of the Monarchy fought with great determination and inflicted a decisive setback on the Italians at Carporetto in November 1917. However, the Congress of Oppressed Nations held in Rome in April 1918 served to weaken the cohesion of the Central Powers, with the recognition of the Czecho-Slovak and South Slav claims to sovereignty. Then, in the period between Russia’s falling out of the war, sealed by the Peace of Brest-Litovsk on 3rd March and the arrival of American troops on the western front in the summer, the military balance seemed, temporarily, to turn back in favour of the Central Powers. In reality, however, the multinational empire was on the brink of utter exhaustion by this time. Its economic and military resources had been under great strain since the first setbacks on the eastern front, which had also undermined the morale of the civilian population. In four years, Hungary sent somewhat over a third of the nine million soldiers of the monarchy to the eastern front, but among the casualties, half of the more than one million dead and nearly half of the two million prisoners came from the Hungarian half of the empire. Soldiers sent home increasingly exasperated letters, and in 1917 desertion, disobedience, and even mutiny were already endemic in the army.

A battlefield scene – painting by László Mednvánszky (1852-1919). Like all European countries, Hungary welcomed World War One with almost wholehearted enthusiasm. Its people became aware only slowly of the savagery of modern mechanised warfare. In their poems, Endre Ady and Géza Gyóni from up close, being on the fronts, began to stir up sentiment with the authenticity of the horrible events experienced personally against the war.

From behind the lines, the soldiers received reports of food shortages, inflation, requisitions, rationing, black marketeering, and general unrest. The general strike of 1918 involved half a million workers in all the major cities of Hungary. By this time, the traditional means of police, gendarmerie, and censorship were increasingly ineffective in suppressing the growing pacifist sentiment and the demands for social and political reform. The majority of the government party realised what the consequences of defeat would be for Hungary, whatever policies were adopted by that time. A moderate opposition, led by the younger Andrássy and Apponyi agreed that the war aims and the alliance policy ought to be maintained, but thought that well-considered reforms, instead of repression, would ensure the much-needed internal consolidation. Finally, a secessionist group of the Independence Party led by the increasingly influential Károlyi, from mid-1917 closely cooperating with radical democrats like Jászi, the Social Democratic Party, and a group of Christian Socialists, campaigning for universal suffrage and ‘peace without annexations’. Even amidst all the domestic turmoil, the military solution looked deceptively good until a few months before the end of the war: Austro-Hungarian armies were still deep in enemy lands, with the war aims apparently accomplished. It was only after the last great German offensive in the West had collapsed in August 1918, that the Entente counter-offensive started there as well as in the Balkans, that the Monarchy’s positions on all fronts became untenable. On 28th September, the Common Council of Ministers heard Foreign Minister István Burián’s brief and unequivocal verdict: ‘That is the end of it.’

Endings & Beginnings:

On 2nd October, the Monarchy solicited the Entente for an armistice and peace negotiations, based on Wilson’s fourteen points. But having recognised the Czecho-Slovak and South Slav claims, Wilson was no longer in a position to negotiate based on granting the ethnic minorities autonomy within an empire whose integrity would be maintained. By this time, the Monarchy was collapsing into chaos. By the first half of October, all the nationalities had their national councils, which proclaimed their independence, a move which now enjoyed the official sanction of the Entente; on 11th October, the Poles, and between the 28th and the 31st the Czechs, the Slovaks, the Croats, and the Ruthenes seceded, followed on 20th November by the Romanians. Finally, the provisional assembly in Vienna declared Austria an independent state. This, in turn, changed the face of Hungary beyond all recognition. Paradoxically, the dissolution of the historic Kingdom of Hungary, one of the greatest shocks the country suffered in terms of its economic resources, political influence, and self-confidence, also created the opportunity for a new beginning. The situation held out the promise of overhauling the ossified social and political structures and institutions that were partly responsible for the dissolution.

The election of Mihály Károlyi as president of the republic (16th November, 1918). Károlyi was a landowner and liberal, then a Social Democrat. He was the leader of the nation after the collapse of the nation during the transitional period after the fall of the monarchy. towards the end of 1918; he had received very limited powers from Habsburgs and handed them over to the Communists.

When 300,000 Hungarian former prisoners of war returned home in 1918, having seen what the Bolsheviks could do firsthand, their minds turned to the possibility of beginning a Red Revolution in their own country. At the beginning of November, they were joined by comrades from the Italian front where they had been given a humiliating armistice at the Villa Giusti near Padua. In Budapest, after brief resistance and a few casualties, great demonstrations caused a change in government. Tisza had already admitted on 24th October that the war was lost, and his rival, Mihály Károlyi, came to the fore, as the obvious opposition candidate. On 25th October, a National Council was set up, and when a crowd of its supporters moved on the Vár, there was a shooting, leaving three dead and seventy wounded. The new King/Emperor (since his uncle’s death on 21st November 1916), prevaricated, and the Palatine Archduke József appointed Károlyi as Prime Minister on 31st October. For a time, the atmosphere in Budapest was euphoric in what became known as the Aster Revolution, coming on All Saints’ Eve, when the custom was to wear a button-hole, which now became a revolutionary symbol. The Astoria Hotel became its centre, from where some soldiers drove to the house of István Tisza and shot him in front of his wife and niece. With an epidemic of Spanish influenza striking the capital and order breaking down, a deputation of high aristocrats, including an Eszterházy and a Szechényi, went to the King and asked him to abdicate. On 13th November, he stepped down from public affairs.

Lines of Demarcation – Neutral zones (November 1918-March 1919)

Károlyi faced another, immediate problem of an allied invasion. On the last days of the war, Romania had again invaded and was advancing into Transylvania, where it was met by local Romanians who intended to unite the country with those in Moldovia and Wallachia. In the southern provinces, there was similar disaffection among the Serbs and the Croats, aiming to set up the new Slav state (‘Yugoslavia’) under the Serbian king. Károlyi was unable to establish armistice lines because he had allowed the army to demobilise and disintegrate. So he went to see the Entente commander in Belgrade, Louis Franchet d’Esperey, announcing himself as head of the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council, which drew the famous response, “You’ve fallen that low, have you?” The only force offering resistance to the Romanians was the Székely Division, but it got no support from Budapest since it was viewed as counter-revolutionary. Only one Hungarian success was achieved, at Balassagyarmat, and that was despite Károlyi’s orders for the Széklers to stand down. By the following March, the Allied occupation had taken more Hungarian land, and the shrunken borders of post-Trianon Hungary were already beginning to take shape. Károlyi had hoped that long overdue radical reforms might stabilise the situation and that his nationalities’ secretary, Oszkár Jászi would be able, through federalisation, to retain the loyalty of the non-Magyar minorities. But the Czecho-Slovaks and Serbs were already establishing their own independent states, and Jászi got nowhere. Károlyi was discredited and forced to resign, and his government was replaced, from March to July 1919, by Béla Kun’s Soviet-style Republic.

Left: Baross tér, 1st May 1919: The pyramid erected over the Baross Statue – A watercolour by Albert Baky (1868-1944). Right: Don’t hesitate! – A poster by Jenő Erbits (1893-?). When the Soviet Republic recruited a new army to face the assault of intervening Czech and Romanian forces, mobilisation posters were created in the distinctive graphic style that developed within the workers’ movement, which later became known as ‘socialist realism’.

Aside from the insurmountable domestic hurdles Kun faced, he had great problems with the allies. In April, General Smuts, the South African member of the British War Cabinet, steamed into the Eastern Station in Budapest and stayed for twenty-four hours. Harold Nicolson, his Foreign Office aid, observed the city he had known before the war as a child in his father’s cramped accommodation on Andrássy Boulevard when his father had been posted there by the FO. The cramped nature of the apartment, he said, had robbed it of the ‘stately ease’ of its environs.

Harold Nicolson and Vita Sackville-West at a flower show in Sevenoaks, Kent, 1914.

On 3rd April, Harold woke up to find their train resting in a siding at the Keleti Palyaudvár, encircled by Red Guards with ‘fixed bayonets and scarlet brassards’. Smuts insisted on conducting the negotiations from the wagon-lit, as to have done otherwise would have implied recognition of the new régime. Harold had last visited the city in 1912 when it was still in its heyday. It rained continuously throughout the day, and – to add to the gloom – there was also an energy crisis – with supplies of gas and electricity at a premium. The negotiations centred on whether or not the Bolsheviks would accept the Allies’ armistice proposals, lines that would commit them to considerable territorial losses, particularly to the Romanians. They hesitated all day, and in the interval, Harold decided to reacquaint himself with Pest. Later in his diary, he wrote: ‘The whole place is wretched – sad – unkempt.’ The Communists laid on scenes for him, tableaux such as the gathering of middle-class figures in the Hungaria Hotel, Budapest’s leading hotel, supposedly taking tea undisturbed. He was not deceived, however, especially since the Red’s own headquarters were in the hotel on the Danube Embankment. Red Guards with bayonets patrolled the hall, but in the foyer what remained of Budapest society ‘huddled sadly together with anxious eyes and in complete, ghastly silence,’ sipping their lemonade ‘while the band played.’ They left ‘as soon as possible … silent eyes search out at us as we go.’

Later that evening Kun returned to the train’s dining car and handed Smuts his answer. Smuts responded, ‘No gentlemen, this is a Note which I cannot accept. There must be no reservations.’ Although prepared to offer minor concessions, Smuts’ terms of reference were uncompromising. Kun had first to agree to the occupation by the Allies of a neutral zone separating the Bolsheviks from the Romanian army; if he complied, the Allies would be prepared to raise the blockade strangling their régime. He desperately needed allied recognition of his government, but he inserted a clause into Smuts’s draft agreement that the Romanian forces should withdraw to a line east of the neutral zone, in effect to evacuate Transylvania. Smuts would not countenance such a deal. He made a final appeal to reason. But the Bolsheviks, ‘silent and sullen’, proved obdurate. Smuts, behaving with ‘exquisite courtesy’, bid the Bolshevik leaders ‘goodbye’.

Smuts had formed the opinion that the Kun episode was ‘just an incident and not worth taking seriously’. On the day after he completed his account, The Allies authorised the Romanians and Czechoslovaks to move forward, whereupon Kun organised a ‘Red Army’ of his own, which did retake towns in Slovakia, including Kassa (Kosice), but his forces were eventually overwhelmed and in late July he had to resign in failure. On 1st August, Béla Kun fled the capital in the face of the invading Romanian armies. Central Hungary, and even Győr in the west, remained occupied by the Romanians, who looted comprehensively and were only stopped when they threatened the precious exhibits of the National Museum. The Romanians eventually left when a provisional government was established in Budapest, with the help of the British and a counter-revolutionary organisation led by ‘White’ officers that met at the Britannia Hotel in Pest. This comprised representatives of the old ruling cliques including Count Gyula Károlyi, Count István Bethlen, and Admiral Horthy, the latter becoming ‘Regent’.

For the world’s leaders gathered in Paris, the spectre of Bolshevism was truly haunting Europe: it threatened widespread starvation, social chaos, economic ruin, anarchy, and a violent, shocking end to the old order. It was small wonder, then, that Béla Kun’s strike for communism triggered many anxious moments for the Supreme Council at the Paris Conference, but this was not as much of a ‘trump card’ as it was for Germany when it came to securing good terms at Paris, as the difference between the two treaties proved. In Germany, by the end of 1918, the Communist revolution had been stopped, and a parliamentary republic was soon proclaimed at Weimar. The key to this was that the Social Democrats were in charge, and used the Freikorps on their own terms. In Hungary, the reactionaries made the running, leading to Admiral Horthy’s ‘white horse putsch’ of November 1919. By the time of Trianon, Béla Kun’s brief experiment was long over, but Hungary was paying the price for his brief but violent insurrection, in blood and land. In 1927, Harold Nicolson refused a posting to Budapest on the grounds that he had been too involved in defining Hungary’s frontiers at Paris, and, more jokingly, on the ‘social’ grounds that he could ‘neither shoot nor dance’ (Norman Rose, 2005; Harold Nicolson, pp. 6, 96-98, 153; extracts from letters and diaries).

Harold & Vita at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919

Conclusion: To what extent was Hungary ‘dragged into’ the War by her allies?

Germany was anxious to confine the war to Austria and Serbia, and Italy did not become an active member of the Triple Alliance until 1915 when it declared war on France. Apparently, there were, however, no statesmen in either Austria-Hungary or Germany who were capable of controlling the situation, either before or during the July Crisis; Bethman-Holweg, the German Chancellor tried to stay the hand of Austria, without success, and the Prime Minister of Hungary, István Tisza, prevaricated as long as he could, before giving in to the pressure from the Imperial Council to back the ultimatum against Serbia. There were also longer-term causes going back to the 1870s, like the treatment of the minority nationalities, which were determined by the imperial partners, of whom Hungary took the hardest line with Serbia, Romania, and the other Slav nations. Hungary, of course, had more to lose from the growth of Pan-Slav nationalism. Clearly, however, the Alliance as a whole underestimated the speed and strength with which Russia would come to the aid of its ally, Serbia, turning a regional conflict into a world war. So while Hungary became tangled up in a complex web of Balkan rivalries, it was not a victim of Great Power machinations, but rather of its own sins of omission and commission.

Appendix: Maps of Hungary & The Great War:

1. Austria-Hungary – Ethnic Diversity & Divisions:

Franz Josef’s empire was a denial of the fashionable 19th-century doctrine of national self-determination. His subjects spoke at least twelve languages and adhered to four major religions – Catholicism, Protestantism, Orthodoxy, and Judaism. The Habsburgs had long recognised that ‘nationalism’ was their deadly enemy, but even an enemy based on loyalty to a dynasty rather than a national ideal could not avoid the issue of language rights. Although some Habsburg dominions possessed clear linguistic majorities, such as the overwhelmingly German-speaking provinces in the Alpine West or the Hungarian-speaking villages of the plains, most parts of the empire contained a mixture of peoples and faiths.

This was particularly the case in the counties in the Southern Danubian countries from the Danube’s bend in Hungary to its delta on the Black Sea. The inset map above illustrates the close relation between the relief of the Carpathian Basin and the distribution of the ethnic groups. The Magyars occupied the Hungarian Plain, the Germans were in the Alpine lands, and the Slavs were in the highlands surrounding the Plain. Further south, on the Macedonian Plain, there was a confused ethnic mix. The River Danube was interwoven with the lives of all these ethnic groups. Complicated as the main map above appears, it is only a simplified representation of the mixture of ‘races’ inhabiting the Danubian area. In each area were peoples other than those shown; only the majorities are shown, and in the case of Macedonia and part of Transylvania even this becomes impossible. In 1789 these peoples were grouped into two empires, either the Austrian (Habsburg) Empire or the Turkish (Ottoman) Empire.

In the Austrian Empire, Germans were predominant in Austria, where the rise of Habsburg power in the German lands had been due to the strategic importance of Vienna, the guard of the Danube gateway into Western Europe against the Turks. When the Habsburgs built up their empire, the other natural routes of expansion were through the Moravian Gate into Poland (Galicia), over the low Alpine passes into Italy; down the Danube through Hungary to the Black Sea, with offshoots towards Salonika and the Aegean, and towards Constantinople (Istanbul) and the Bosphorus. The Magyars to the east of Vienna were only second in importance to the Germans and were given many concessions, including their own Diet. The Northern Slavs consisted of Czechs, who had once been independent in the Kingdom of Bohemia and Moravia, the Slovaks, Ruthenians (Ukrainians), and Poles (in Galicia and Besarrabia, acquired at the first partition of Poland in 1772); the Southern Slavs consisted of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Romanians were also Slavs, but originally of Western European origin.

As the 19th century progressed, the Habsburgs’ Slav subjects began asserting their identity through new national literature, music, and political organisations. Vienna’s difficulties with Budapest over Hungarian rights to self-rule made dealing with other peoples still more complicated. Although Hungarian liberals demanded that the ‘crownlands of St Stephen’ should enjoy autonomy within the empire, they were not happy to extend equal political and linguistic rights to their large Slovak, Romanian, or Serb minorities.

2. The Habsburg Empire, 1849-68:

It has been said that if the Austrian Empire had not existed it would have been necessary to invent it. The Austrian control of this great area brought together many peoples whose interests were bound together by the Danube, including many Jewish people and some Muslims. Communities of Turks were scattered throughout the empire, and Macedonia contained Greeks, Bulgars, Albanians, Serbs, and Turks. Throughout the nineteenth century, the various Slavic peoples sought to challenge or overthrow the Austrian authorities and set up separate national states. The weakness of Austria after the 1866 war with Prussia compelled Vienna to give ‘equality’ to the Magyars, but left the Slavs unsatisfied. The Serbs and Romanians within the Austrian empire wished to join those without. For the rise of the nations in the Balkans, see the maps below.

3. Southern Hungary – the Dissolution of the Military Frontier, 1873-82:

In 1789, the Mohammedan Turks had possessed loose control over a range of Christian peoples – Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbians (more numerous than in Austria), Romanians, and Albanians. The border between Christian Europe and the Muslim Ottoman Empire – the Military Frontier – was one of the great political fault lines of Europe. It was established by the Habsburgs in Croatia in the mid-16th century to guard the Habsburg lands against Ottoman incursion and then greatly expanded after 1699 following the expulsion of the Ottomans from most of Hungary by Prince Eugene. By the mid-19th century, with the Ottoman Empire in terminal decline, Hungarian demands for the return of the frontier lands to civilian administration increased and from 1873 the Military Frontier was accordingly parcelled out to Hungary and Croatia-Slavonia.

By 1882, the “Military Frontier” had been put under civilian administration. Mutual fear of disintegration kept Vienna and Budapest together after 1867, despite petty disputes about the title of the common army (Imperial or Royal according to where it was stationed) and the language of command.

4. Sketch-Map Histories – The Armed Camps:

By the last decade of the nineteenth century, dynastic ties and fear of unrest had served to draw together the Great Powers to promote an essentially stable order across Europe through a multifaceted series of diplomatic alliances and alignments. This was the apogee of the European nation-state system. But whatever its apparent stability, the system was permanently threatened by Germany’s growing primacy among the Continental powers and by instability in the Balkans. One of the most striking characteristics of pre-world war Europe was its division into two rival alliances of opposing powers.

By 1914, Austria-Hungary was Germany’s only reliable ally. In the crisis after the murder of Archduke Ferdinand, Germany could not afford to abandon her even at the risk of a general European War. Furthermore, if war did come, the Kaiser’s generals wanted it sooner rather than later: the German army was increasingly certain that could defeat both France and Russia simultaneously.

The Dual Entente of 1894 between France and Russia came about after Russia and France found themselves isolated while Central Europe was united in the Triple Alliance. By then, Germany’s expanding military strength caused France and Russia to become nervous allies. Overcoming a dislike for each other’s forms of government, they came closer together between 1894-1904 for mutual defence against their common rivals.

THE ALLIANCE SYSTEMS AFTER 1892

The Entente Cordiále of 1904 marked a dramatic shift in Great Britain’s thirty-year policy of splendid isolation from continental conflicts and alliances: at the beginning of the twentieth century, it appeared dangerous to remain friendless in Europe in the light of the rapid growth in Germany’s naval power. Imperial issues had added to Britain’s estrangement from both Russia and France for a century or more. At first, the obvious partner for Britain had seemed to be Germany, but the Kaiser’s ‘Great Navy’ policy posed a threat to Britain as a naval power. This forced the British into the arms of France. Imperial issues were settled amicably and an understanding with both France and Russia, The Triple Entente was reached in 1907. This guaranteed mutual defence in the case of a German attack. In Berlin, these measures of alleged self-defence were viewed more as a strategy of ‘encirclement’ of Germany. Facing declared enemies to the west and the east, Germany drew closer to Austria, whose strained relations with Russia finally cracked with the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1908.

These alliances, though defensive in aim, created suspicion and uneasiness and led to the piling up of armaments. Moreover, a quarrel between any two states involved the rest; the dispute between Russia and Austria-Hungary tended to bring about a dispute between France and Germany. Meanwhile, no one could agree on the fate of the Christian populations of the Balkans beyond a pious regret that they should have to remain under Muslim rule. However understandable the failure to grasp the Balkan nettle at Berlin in 1878, the problems of the region’s numerous ethnic, nationalist, religious, and imperial rivalries were to fester unchecked into the twentieth century to everyone’s disadvantage.

After 1901, when Germany had finally rejected British ‘overtures’, successive crises arose which heralded the approaching Great Power struggle. The crises concerned the Franco-German rivalry in North Africa and the Russo-Austrian rivalry in the Balkans. The chief storm centre in Europe was in the Turkish Empire, growing steadily weaker and forced to rely more and more upon Germany, the Sultan’s new ally. The Kaiser had shown his interest in Turkey in 1898 by his visit to the Sultan when all of Europe was horrified by the massacre of its Armenian subjects and by his announcement to extend German protection to the Muslim peoples of the Middle East. He had gained concessions for railway development under German direction – a prelude to his dream of a Berlin-Baghdad railway. This Drang Nach Osten conflicted with the aspiration of the Balkan peoples who endeavoured to secure their independence.

5.) The Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913:

The ‘new’ Balkan states were united only by their hostility towards the Ottoman Empire, which in 1912 still held Albania and Macedonia. Taking advantage of its weakness, Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria formed a ‘Balkan League’ which attacked and defeated Turkey. This First Balkan War of 1912 gravely threatened the interests of Germany and Austria-Hungary, but the Great Powers agreed that the war should be kept localised. The anti-Ottoman alliance hoped to divide the Sultan’s European territories between them, and a conference was summoned in London in 1913 to settle the division of the territory which Turkey had been forced to surrender. It was mediated by the Great Powers and chaired by Britain, but it left everyone dissatisfied. The map above (left) shows the conflicting claims of the successful Balkan allies.

The great Aegean port of Salonica was coveted by all three victors. In the event, the Greek army had reached it just hours before the Bulgarians, who were left resentful when the London Conference confirmed that it as a Greek possession. But Bulgaria was compensated with a large tract of land from the Black Sea to the Kavala on the Aegean, including Adrianople. The province of Macedonia, with a mixed population of Slavs, Turks, Jews, and Greeks, was claimed by all three states, each with varying degrees of justice and all indifferent to the wishes of its inhabitants. The conquest by the three nations confirmed its division between Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece. The Treaty of London also confirmed the creation of the independent principality of Albania, a development resented by both Greece and Serbia. Serbia wanted a port on the Adriatic at Albania’s expense and feared moreover that an independent Albania would make her substantial Albanian minorities in Kosovo and Macedonia restive. Greece laid claim to northern Epirus (i.e. southern Albania), basing its claim on the Greek Orthodox community there. Threatened by hostile neighbours, Albania was pushed into looking first to Austria-Hungary and then to Italy for protection. Austria, supported by Germany, intervened to prevent Serbia from securing access to the sea through Albania. This was the second successful attempt by Austria to curb the Pan-Slav movement. War was averted only through the influence of Germany and Britain.

However, resentment at the Treaty of London quickly developed into a new war. Serbia was compensated by accession to territories in Macedonia at the expense of Bulgaria, who objected and reopened the war, this time against her former allies and a ‘new’ rival to the north, Romania. Determined to right the wrongs done to it in London, Bulgaria attacked its erstwhile allies, Greece and Serbia. Bulgarian military optimism was soon shown to be misplaced. The Greeks and Serbians, aided by Romania and Turkey, who swiftly realised the opportunity the Bulgarian offensive presented, had little difficulty in repulsing it. Bulgaria was overwhelmingly defeated by the new alliance against it, and Serbia annexed large territories at her expense. The greatly enlarged and strengthened Serbia aroused the deep resentment of Austria. Greece kept Salonica and took western Thrace. Resentful Bulgaria was confined to a barren stretch of the Aegean coast while Turkey recovered Adrianople in Thrace, maintaining a foothold in Europe. Romania, a non-combattant in the first Balkan War, received southern Dobruja for her efforts in the second. Once again, only Germany’s restraining influence, combined with Italy’s refusal to cooperate prevented an immediate attack. Instead, the Central Powers waited for a better reason to intervene to curb Serbia’s ambition.

6.) The Eve of the First World War – a Summary:

The boundaries between the Great Powers changed little in the century after the Congress of Vienna (1815). Germany, although now unified, Austria-Hungary, and Russia still shared largely the same frontiers established at Vienna, and most contemporary observers could be forgiven for regarding them as permanent. But, in practice, the emergence of small states on the periphery of the Powers, allied to tensions created by conflicting aspirations for autonomy and independence on the part of the many ethnic groups within the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires, marked the beginning of a process that threatened the territorial integrity of these empires.

Whatever its problems with nationalism, Russia at least had a majority ethnic group. Austria-Hungary lacked even this. The ‘Magyars’ made up half the population of the Kingdom of Hungary, the other half were Slovaks, Romanians, Serbs, and Croats as well as two million Germans. In the Austrian part of the empire, Germans amounted to only 35% of the population. Czechs, Poles, Slovenes, Italians, and several smaller groups made up the remainder. The very principle of national self-determination which had justified the unification of Germany was a threat to its Habsburg ally.

It was in the Balkans that nationalist aspirations were to prove the most volatile. Newly independent Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece all saw the decline of the Ottoman Empire as an opportunity to extend their territories at the expense of the Turks. At the same time, Austria-Hungary and Russia both sought to increase their influence in the region. With Britain’s abandonment of its role as the protector of the Ottoman Sultan, a policy originally intended to contain Russian ambitions, the way was left open for Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece in 1912 to attack the Turks. Dividing the spoils proved harder, as the maps above have demonstrated. More threateningly still, however, was the involvement of Austria-Hungary and Russia. While the former feared the destabilising effect Serbia might have on its large South Slav population, especially in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the latter was determined to resume her role as protector of Orthodox Christians in the region – if necessary against Catholic Austria-Hungary rather than Muslim Turkey.

With Austria-Hungary and Russia members of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente respectively, their rivalry in the Balkans increasingly threatened to suck the whole of Europe into conflict. Austria-Hungary’s declaration of war against Serbia in July 1914 following the Serbian-sponsored assassination in Sarajevo the previous month was the spark that lit the conflagration. Russia ordered a general mobilisation, and Germany responded in kind on 1st August, then declared war on Russia and France three days later. The following day, the Germans invaded Belgium, determined to smash the Triple Entente by drawing Britain into the war.

The Aftermath of the First World War:
Source; Norman Stone (2019)

Despite the defeat of Germany and her allies in the autumn of 1918 and the signing of a string of peace treaties in Paris between the victorious allies and the defeated states in 1919 and 1920, it was several years before the boundaries of the new Europe were clearly established. Revolution and civil war plunged Russia, Germany, and much of what had been Austria-Hungary into chaos. The Europe that emerged was radically different. Russia and Germany had shrunk dramatically; the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires had disappeared, and a host of smaller states had appeared. In Russia, a communist government now ruled in place of the Tsar. The civil war that followed the 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia found counterparts in Hungary (1919), as well as in Germany. The Paris Peace Settlement of 1919-20 left every post-war in central Europe with internal problems and potential border disputes. It proved easier to break up multi-national empires than to replace them with ethnically homogeneous states. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia both had substantial Hungarian minorities, and Romania too had a large Magyar population, concentrated in Transylvania.

Central-Eastern Europe in 1925

Sources:

Christopher Clark (2012), The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914. London: Penguin Books.

Norman Stone (2019), Hungary: A Short History. London: Profile Books.

László Kontler (2009), A History of Hungary. Budapest: Atlantisz Publishing House.

Martyn Rady (2020), The Habsburgs: The Rise and Fall of a World Power. London: Allen Lane/ Penguin Random House.

István Lazar (1990), An Illustrated History of Hungary. Budapest: Corvina Books.

Norman Rose (2005), Harold Nicolson. London: Jonathan Cape/ Pimlico.

George Taylor (1936), A Sketch-Map History of Europe, 1789-1914. London: George G. Harrap.

Irene Richards (1938), A Sketch-Map History of the Great War and After, 1914-1935. London: George G. Harrap.

András Bereznay, et. al. (2001), The Times History of Europe: Three Thousand Years of History in Maps. London: HarperCollins.

Is Hungary’s Appeasement of Putin Justified by its Past Experiences? II

Chapter Two: All Roads Led to Sarajevo – How Austria-Hungary Went to War in 1914:

The Trigger:

On 28th June 1914, the heir to the Austrian and Hungarian thrones, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, paid a visit to Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, which had been occupied by Austria-Hungary in 1878, and annexed by Emperor Franz Josef in 1908. The visit was intended to display grandeur to the citizenry of the province, but Franz Ferdinand was not on good terms with its Governor, Oskar Potiorek, of Slovene origin, who had been given the job as consolation for not being Chief of the General Staff because the archduke had preferred Conrad von Hötzendorf in that role. Potierok disliked social events and loathed his own chief of staff, Colonel Böltz, and hardly communicated with him. Security for the visit was handed over to a firm of Budapest private detectives. Seven young Serb conspirators picked up training and weapons in Belgrade, and one of them, Gavrilo Princip, succeeded in assassinating the archduke. Although the object and victim of the attack, together with his wife, Franz Ferdinand himself was one of the few men in the empire who foresaw what disasters would come from a Great War and had he survived, he would certainly have refused to take the empire in one. But killed he was, in an extraordinary chapter of accidents which have been pawed over repeatedly ever since.

Princip, too young to be executed, was imprisoned in the fortress of Theresienstadt, where he died before the war ended. The prison psychiatrist asked him if he had any regrets. He answered, ‘If I had not done it, the Germans would have found another excuse.’ He was probably right in this judgment. Looking back through the prism of two world wars, we may judge that both began with ridiculously disproportionate causes, or rather ‘catalysts’. The tensions that had evolved over four or five decades were released by a trigger. Still, by then Franz Josef and his ministers and advisors in Vienna could see no other answer to the South Slav problem than a demonstration of might against the radical nationalists. Only Franz Ferdinand and his staff disagreed, but ironically, the assassin’s bullets at Sarajevo removed that particular objector to war.

Chess-players & Sleep-walkers:

A British Delegation in Paris. Britain became linked to the Franco-Russian Alliance through the Entente Cordiale (1904).

To properly contextualise the causes and catalysts of 1914, it is necessary to retrace the steps of all the participants over half a century or more. After the ejection of the Austrians from Italy in 1859 and Germany in 1866, the Balkan region became by default the pre-eminent focus of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy. This narrowing of focus coincided with an era of growing volatility across the Balkan peninsula. The underlying problem was the waning of Ottoman authority in south-eastern Europe which created and exposed a zone of tension between the two remaining great powers with an interest in the region. Russia and Austria-Hungary felt historically entitled to exercise hegemony in areas where the Ottomans withdrew. The House of Habsburg had traditionally been the guardian of Europe’s eastern gate against the Turks. In Russia, the ideology of pan-Slavism asserted a natural commonality of interest between the emergent Slavic (especially Eastern Orthodox) nations of the Balkan peninsula and the patronage of St Petersburg. The Ottoman retreat also raised questions about the future control of the straits controlling the access to and from the Black Sea, an issue of acute strategic importance to Russian diplomats. At the same time, the emerging Balkan states had conflicting interests and objectives of their own. Christopher Clark (2011) has characterised the Austro-Russian rivalry as like chess players hoping with each move to cancel out or diminish the opponent’s advantage (p. 78).

Until 1908, cooperation, self-restraint, and the demarcation of informal spheres of influence ensured that the dangers implicit in this state of affairs were contained. In the revised Three Emperors’ League treaty of 1881 between Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany, Russia undertook to ‘respect’ the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina authorised in the 1878 Treaty of Berlin and the three signatories agreed to ‘take account’ of each other’s ‘interests in the Balkan peninsula’. Further Austro-Russian understandings in 1897 and 1903 reaffirmed the joint commitment to the Balkan status quo. The complexity of Balkan politics was such, however, that maintaining good relations with Austria-Hungary was not enough to ensure tranquillity. During the reign of the Austrophile, Milan Obrenovíc, Serbia remained a docile partner in Vienna’s designs, acquiescing in its claims to regional hegemony. Vienna, in return, supported Belgrade’s claim to be recognised as a kingdom in 1882 and promised diplomatic support if Serbia chose to expand south into Ottoman Macedonia. As the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, Count Gustav Kálnoky von Köröspatak, informed his Russian counterpart in the summer of 1883, that good relations with Serbia were essential to the success of the empire’s Balkan policy.

In 1883, the King of Serbia created a commotion in Vienna by proposing to abdicate and allow the empire to annex his kingdom. At a meeting in the Austrian capital, he was dissuaded from this course of action and sent back to Belgrade. Kálnoky later explained to President Taaffe that a flourishing and independent Serbia suits our intentions… better than the possession of an unruly province. (Memorandum cited in Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo, p. 149.) Only months later, however, King Milan suddenly and unexpectedly invaded neighbouring Bulgaria, Russia’s client state. The resulting conflict was shortlived because the Serbian army was easily beaten back by the Bulgarians, but great power diplomacy was required to prevent this temporary incursion from ruffling the feathers of the Austro-Russian détente. Milan’s son, however, declared intemperately and publicly in 1899 that the enemies of Serbia are the enemies of Austria-Hungary, raising eyebrows in St Petersburg and causing considerable embarrassment in Vienna. But he was also tempted by the advantages of a Russophile policy; by 1902, after the death of his father, King Alexandar was energetically suing for Russian support; he even declared to a journalist in St Petersburg that the Habsburg monarchy was ‘the arch enemy of Serbia’. There was therefore little regret in Vienna at the news of Alexandar’s premature death, although the politicians there were as shocked as everyone else by the brutality with which he and his line were exterminated.

Only gradually did it become clear to the Austrians that the regicide of June 1903 marked a real break. The foreign ministry in Vienna hastened to establish good relations with the usurper, Petar Karadjordjevic, whom they mistakenly viewed as an Austrophile. Austria-Hungary became the first foreign state to formally recognise the new Serbian régime. But it soon became clear that the foundations no longer existed for a harmonious relationship between the two neighbours. The management of political affairs passed into the hands of men openly hostile to the dual monarchy and the policy-makers in Vienna studied with growing concern the nationalist statements of the Belgrade press, now freed from government restraints. In September 1903, the Austrian minister in Belgrade reported that relations between the two countries were ‘as bad as possible’. Vienna rediscovered its moral outrage at the regicide and joined the British in imposing sanctions on the Karadjordjevic court. Hoping to profit from this loosening of the Austro-Serbian bond, the Russians moved in, assuring the Belgrade government that Serbia’s future lay in the west, on the Adriatic coastline, and urging them not to renew their long-standing commercial treaty with Vienna.

At the end of 1905, these tensions broke out into open conflict with the discovery in Vienna that Serbia and Bulgaria had agreed on a ‘secret’ customs union. Austria-Hungary’s demand early in 1906 that Belgrade repudiate the union proved counter-productive; among other things, it transformed the Bulgarian union, which had been a matter of indifference to most Serbs, into a major platform of Serbian national opinion. The general outlines of the 1906 Crisis have been set out above. Still, it is worth noting here that what worried the politicians in Vienna was not so much the commercial significance of the customs union, but the political logic underlying it. What if the Serbo-Bulgarian trade alliance were merely the first step in the direction of a ‘league’ of Balkan states hostile to the empire and receptive to promptings from St Petersburg? It is easy to write this question off as prompted by Austro-Hungarian paranoia, but the policy-makers of the dual monarchy were not far off the mark: the customs union was, in fact, the third of a sequence of secret alliances between Serbia and Bulgaria, of which the first two were already clearly anti-imperial in orientation; a Treaty of Friendship and a Treaty of Alliance, signed in Belgrade in 1904. Vienna’s fear of Russian involvement in these was well-founded, as it turned out. St Petersburg was now clearly working towards a Balkan alliance, notwithstanding the Austro-Russian détente and the disastrous war with Japan. On 15 September 1904, the Russian ambassadors in Belgrade and Sofia were secretly and simultaneously presented with copies of the Treaty of Alliance by the foreign ministers of Serbia and Bulgaria respectively.

One difficult aspect of the Austro-Hungarian Balkan policy was the deepening inter-penetration of domestic and foreign issues. These issues were most likely to become entangled in the case of those minorities for whom there was an independent ‘motherland’ outside the boundaries of the empire. This included the three million Romanians in the Duchy of Transylvania. Due to the nature of the dual monarchy, there was little Vienna could do to prevent the oppressive Hungarian cultural policies from alienating the neighbouring Romanian kingdom, a political partner of great strategic value in the region. Yet it proved possible, at least until 1910, to insulate the empire’s relations with the kingdom from the impact of domestic tensions. The government of the kingdom, an ally of Austria and Germany, made no effort to foment or exploit ethnic discord in Transylvania. However, this could not be said for the Kingdom of Serbia after 1903 and its relations with the disparate Serbs within the empire. Just over forty per cent of the population of Bosnia-Hercegovina were Serbs, and there were large areas of Serbian settlement in Vojvodina in southern Hungary and smaller ones in Croatia-Slavonia. However, no such sovereign external nation-state existed for the Czechs, Slovenes, Poles, Slovaks, and Croats.

After the regicide of 1903, Belgrade stepped up the pace of irredentist activity within the empire, focusing particularly on Bosnia-Hercegovina. In February 1906, the Austrian military attaché in Belgrade, Pomiankowski, summarised the problem in a letter to the chief of the General Staff. He declared that it was certain that Serbia would number among the empire’s enemies in a future military conflict. The problem was less the attitude of the Serbian government and more the ultra-nationalist orientation of the political culture as a whole. even if a ‘sensible’ government were in control, Pomiankowski warned, it would be in no position to prevent the all-powerful radical chauvinists from launching ‘an adventure’. More important than Serbia’s ‘miserable army’ however, was:

“The fifth-column work of the Radicals in peacetime, which systematically poisons the attitude of our South Slav population and could, if the worst came to the worst, create very serious difficulties for our amy”

Pomiankowski to Beck, Belgrade, 17 February 1906, cited in Günther Kronenbitter, Krieg im Frieden, Die Führung der k.u.k. Armee und die Grossmachtpolitik Österreich-Ungarns 1906-14 (Munich, 2003), p.327.

The ‘chauvinist’ irredentism of the Serbian political forces came to occupy a central place in Vienna’s assessments of its relations with Belgrade. By the summer of 1907, the Austrian Foreign Minister, von Aehrenthal conveyed a sense of how relations had deteriorated since the regicide. Under King Milan, the Serbian crown had been strong enough to counteract any ‘public Bosnian agitation’, but since the events of 1903, everything had changed. It was not just that King Petar was too weak to oppose the forces of ultra-nationalism, but rather that he had begun to exploit the national movement to consolidate his own position. For their part, the empire’s diplomats left the king in no doubt that Austria-Hungary regarded its occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina as ‘definitive’. In the summer of 1907, the Foreign Minister instructed his envoy to Belgrade not to be put off by the usual official denials, such as:

‘The Serbian Government strives to maintain correct and blameless relations, but it is in no position to hold back the sentiment of the nation, which demands action, etc. etc.’

Cited in Solomon Wank (ed.), Aus dem Nachlaus Aehrenthal, 1885-1912, Graz, 1994.

This official instruction captures the salient features of Vienna’s attitude to Belgrade: a belief in the primordial power of Serbian nationalism, a visceral distrust of its leading statesmen, and a deepening anxiety over the future of Bosnia, concealed behind its natural air of imperial superiority.

Thus, the stage was set for the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina in 1908. There had never been any doubt, either in Vienna and Budapest or in the capitals of the other great powers, that the occupation of 1878 was intended to be permanent. In one of the secret articles of the renewed Three Emperors’ Alliance of 1881, there had been an explicit statement that Austria-Hungary had the right to annex these provinces at whatever moment she shall deem opportune and this claim was repeated at intervals in the Austro-Russian diplomatic agreements. Nor was it contested in principle by Russia, though St Petersburg reserved the right to impose conditions when the moment for a change of status arrived. The advantages of a formal annexation were obvious enough: It would allow Bosnia and Hercegovina to be integrated more fully into the political fabric of a provincial parliament. It would create a more stable environment for inward investment and, most importantly, would signal to Belgrade and the empire’s minority Serbs the permanence of Austria-Hungary’s possessions.

Yet, in 1905 the empire found itself dogged by bitter infighting between the Austrian and Hungarian political élites over the administration of the armed forces. By 1907, Aehrenthal had begun to favour a tripartite solution to the monarchy’s problems; the two dominant power centres within it would be supplemented by a third entity incorporating the southern Slavs (Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs). This was a proposal that enjoyed a considerable following among the southern Slav élites, especially the Croats, who resented being divided between Cisleithania, the Kingdom of Hungary, and the province of Croatia-Slavonia, also ruled from Budapest. If only Bosnia-Hercegovina were fully incorporated into the structure of a reformed trialist monarchy, Aehrenthal’s hope was that this third entity would provide an internal counterweight to the irredentist activities of Belgrade.

The clinching argument for annexation was the Young Turk Revolution that broke out in Ottoman Macedonia in the summer of 1908. The Young Turks forced the Sultan in Constantinople (Istanbul) to proclaim a constitution and the establishment of a parliament. They planned to subject the Ottoman imperial system to a root-and-branch reform. Rumours circulated to the effect that the new Turkish leadership would shortly call general elections throughout the Ottoman Empire, including the areas occupied by Austria-Hungary, which currently possessed no representative organs of their own. Hoping to capitalise on the uncertainties created by these rumours, an opportunist Serb-Muslim coalition emerged in Bosnia calling for autonomy under Turkish suzerainty. The danger was now that an ethnic alliance within the province might join forces with the Turks to push the Austro-Hungarians out.

To forestall such complications, Aehrenthal moved quickly to prepare the ground for annexation. The Ottomans were bought out of their nominal sovereignty, and the Russians had no objection to the formalisation of Austria-Hungary’s status in Bosnia-Hercegovina provided St Petersburg received something in return. The Russian foreign minister, Alexandr Izvolsky, supported by Tsar Nicholas II, proposed that the annexation should occur in exchange for Austria-Hungary’s support for improved Russian access to the Turkish straits. Izvolsky and Aehrenthal were both after the same thing: gains that would be secured through secret negotiations at the expense of the Ottoman Empire and in contravention of the Treaty of Berlin. Despite these preparations, Aehrenthal’s announcement of the annexation on 5th October 1908 triggered a major European Crisis. Izvolsky denied ever having reached an agreement at Schloss Buchlau in Moravia and subsequently denied that he had been advised in advance of their September meeting. He demanded a formal conference to clarify the status of Bosnia-Hercegovina, but Aehrenthal continued to evade this demand while the crisis dragged on for months and escalated as Serbia, Russia and Austria-Hungary mobilised and counter-mobilised their armies. The situation was only resolved by the ‘St Petersburg Note’ of March 1909, in which the Germans demanded that the Russians at least recognise the annexation and urge Serbia to do likewise. Chancellor Bülow warned that if they did not do this, events would ‘take their course’. This hinted not just at the possibility of an Austrian war on Serbia, but, more importantly, at the possibility that the Germans would release the documents proving Izvolsky’s complicity in the original annexation deal. Izvolsky immediately backed down.

Aehrenthal has traditionally carried much of the blame for the annexation crisis, but this may not be an accurate assessment. Certainly, the foreign minister’s manoeuvres lacked transparency. He used the tools of the old diplomacy; confidential meetings, the exchange of pledges and secret bilateral agreements, rather than attempting to resolve the annexation issue through a round table conference involving all the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin. This made it easier for Izvolsky to claim that he, and by extension Russia, had been hoodwinked by the ‘slippery’ Austro-Hungarian minister. Yet the evidence suggests that the crisis took the course that it did because Izvolsky lied most extravagantly to save his job and reputation.

Russian & Turkish Dimensions:

The Russian foreign minister had made two serious errors of judgement. He had assumed, firstly, that London would support his demand for the opening of the Turkish Straits to Russian warships. He had also greatly underestimated the impact of the annexation on Russian nationalist opinion. According to one account, he was initially perfectly calm about the annexation when the news came through to Paris on 8th October. It was only during his stay in London a few days later, when the British proved uncooperative and he heard of the press response in St Petersburg, that he realised his error, panicked, and began to reconstruct himself as Aehrenthal’s dupe.

In any case, the Bosnian crisis represented a significant turning point in Balkan geopolitics. It devastated what remained of Austro-Russian readiness to collaborate on resolving Balkan questions; from this moment onwards, it would be much more difficult to contain the negative energies generated by the internecine conflicts among the Balkan states. It also alienated its closest neighbour and ally, the Kingdom of Italy. There had long been friction between the kingdoms, especially over minority rights in Dalmatia and Croatia-Slavonia, and political rivalry in the Adriatic was a further bone of contention. The annexation prompted calls for Italy to be compensated, kindling Italian resentments to a heightened pitch of intensity. In the last years before the outbreak of the Great War, it became increasingly difficult to reconcile Austro-Hungarian and Italian objectives along the Adriatic coast. The Germans were initially noncommital on the annexation question, but they soon rallied to Austria-Hungary’s support, which had the desired effect of dissuading the Russian government from attempting to extract further capital out of the annexation crisis. However, in the longer run, it reinforced the sense in both St Petersburg and London that Austria was the satellite of Berlin, a perception that would play a dangerous role in the crisis of 1914.

In Russia, both the government and public opinion interpreted the annexation as a brutal betrayal of the understanding between the two powers, an unforgivable humiliation and an unacceptable provocation in a sphere of vital interest. In the years that followed the crisis, the Russians launched a programme of military investment so substantial that it sparked a European arms race. There were also signs of a deeper Russian political involvement with Serbia. In the autumn of 1909, the Russian foreign ministry appointed Nikolai Hartwig, a fiery fanatic in the old Slavophile tradition, to the Russian embassy in Belgrade. Once in office, Hartwig worked hard to push Belgrade into taking up a more assertive position against Vienna, sometimes exceeding the instructions of his managers in St Petersburg. Therefore, The annexation crisis further worsened the relations between Vienna and Belgrade, exacerbated by political conditions inside the dual monarchy. For several years, the Austro-Hungarian authorities had been observing the activities of the Serbo-Croat coalition, a political faction that had been emerging from within the Croat Diet at Agram (Zagreb), capital of Hungarian-ruled Croatia-Slavonia, in 1905. After the diet elections in 1906, the coalition secured control of the Agram administration, embracing a ‘Yugoslav’ agenda seeking a closer union of the South Slav peoples within the empire, and fought long battles with the Hungarian authorities over issues such as the requirement that all state railway officials should be able to speak Magyar. What really worried the Austro-Hungarians was the suspicion that some or all of the deputies of the Agram administration might be operating as a fifth column for Belgrade.

Escalating Eastern Tensions & Equilibrium:

During the crisis of 1908-9, these apprehensions escalated to the point of paranoia. In March 1909, just as Russia was backing down from a potential confrontation over Bosnia, the Habsburg administration launched an astonishingly inept judicial assault on the Serbo-Croat coalition, charging fifty-three mainly Serb activists with treason for plotting to detach the South Slav lands from Austria-Hungary and join them to Serbia. The treason trial at Agram dragged on for eight months, quickly collapsing into an unmitigated public relations disaster for the government. All thirty-one convictions handed down were subsequently crushed on appeal in Vienna. Quite naturally, these events led to a worsening of diplomatic relations between Vienna, Belgrade and St Petersburg during 1910-1912. Aehrenthal died suddenly from leukaemia in 1912, leaving behind a legacy of bitter personal animosity, especially with Izvolsky, which was identified by the quality press in Vienna, in the aftermath of the Bosnian crisis, as an impediment to the improvement of relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia. After Aehrenthal’s death, Forgách left Belgrade a staunch Serbophobe, remaining on the scene as one of a cohort of officials who helped shape the policies of the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry. Miroslav Spalajkovic served as the Serbian minister in Sofia and was subsequently transferred to the Serbian legation in St Petersburg. Here his task would be to interpret the intentions of the Tsar and his ministers to the government in Belgrade. Nikolai Hartwig, the new Russian minister, had become Spalajkovic’s close personal friend during his time in Belgrade and subsequently developed an intimate relationship with the Serbian Prime Minister, Nikola Pasic. It was a key factor in the July Crisis of 1914 that so many of its individual actors had known each other for so long. Beneath the surface of many of the key rivalries lurked long-term personal antipathies.

Vienna could, in theory, offset Serbian hostility by seeking better relations with Bulgaria. But pursuing this option also involved finding a way around the border dispute between Bulgaria and Romania. Cosying up to Sofia brought the risk of alienating Bucharest, which was undesirable due to the large Romanian minority in Hungarian Transylvania. If Romania were to turn away from Vienna towards St Petersburg, the minority issue might become a question of regional security. Hungarian politicians and diplomats warned that a ‘Greater Romania’ would pose as great a threat to the dual monarchy as a ‘Greater Serbia’. However, in March 1909, Serbia formally pledged that it would desist from further covert operations against Austro-Hungarian territory and maintain good neighbourly relations with the empire. In 1910, Vienna and Belgrade even agreed on a trade treaty ending the Austro-Serbian commercial conflict. A twenty-four per cent rise in Serbian imports during that year bore witness to improving economic conditions. Austro-Hungarian goods began to reappear on the shelves of shops in Belgrade, and by 1912, the dual monarchy was once again the main buyer and supplier of Serbia. But despite assurances of goodwill on both sides, a deep mistrust continued to affect relations which was difficult to dispel. Although there was talk of an official visit by King Petar to Vienna, it never happened. Citing royal ill-health, the Serbian government moved the visit from Vienna to Budapest, then postponed it and then put it off indefinitely in April 1911. Yet later the same year they pulled off a highly successful visit to Paris.

Behind the scenes, the work to redeem Bosnia-Hercegovina continued. Narodna Odbrana, a Serb cultural organisation, proliferated after 1909 and spilt over into the two provinces. The Austrians stepped up their monitoring of Serbian agents crossing the border while Dragomir Djordjevic, a reserve lieutenant in the Serbian army, combined his ‘cultural work’ with the management of a covert network of Serb informants. He was spotted returning to Serbia for weapons training in October 1910. In a report filed on 12 November 1911, Forgách’s successor in Belgrade as Austro-Hungarian minister, Stefan von Ugron zu Abránfalva, notified Vienna of the existence of an association supposedly existing in officer circles that was currently the subject of press comment in Serbia. At this point, ‘nothing positive’ was known about the organisation, except that it called itself the Black Hand and was chiefly concerned with regaining the influence over national policies that the army had previously enjoyed. Press rumours to the effect that the Black Hand had drawn up a hit list of politicians to be assassinated in the event of a coup against the current government. It appeared that the conspirators planned to use legal means to remove the ‘inner enemies of Serbdom’, and ‘turn with unified force against its external foes’. The Austro-Hungarians recognised that Narodna Odbrana aimed at the subversion of Habsburg rule in Bosnia and ran networks of activists in the Habsburg lands. They presumed that the roots of all Serbian irredentist activity within the empire led back to the pan-Serbian propaganda of the Belgrade-based patriotic networks, but their understanding of the precise nature of the links between these networks and the Black Hand was poor. Nevertheless, the key elements that would shape Austro-Hungarian thought and action following the events at Sarajevo were all in place by the spring of 1914.

The Balkan Wars destroyed Austria-Hungary’s security position on the Balkan peninsula and created a bigger and stronger Serbia. The kingdom’s territory expanded by over eighty per cent. During the Second Balkan War, the Serbian armed forces under their supreme commander General Putnik displayed impressive discipline and initiative. The Habsburg government had often adopted a dismissive tone in its discussions of the military threat posed by Belgrade. In a telling metaphor, Aehrenthal had once described Serbia as a ‘rascally boy’ pinching apples from the Austrian orchard. A General Staff report of 9th November 1912 expressed surprise at the dramatic growth in Serbia’s striking power. Improvements to the railway network, the modernisation of weaponry and a massive increase in the number of front-line units, all financed by French loans, had transformed Serbia into a formidable combatant. Moreover, Serbia’s strength could only be strengthened by the 1.6 million who lived in the territories conquered in the two Balkan Wars. In a report of October 1913, the empire’s military attaché in Belgrade, Otto Gellinek observed that while there was no need for immediate alarm, no one should underestimate the kingdom’s military prowess. Henceforth, it would be necessary when calculating the dual monarchy’s defence needs to match all Serbian front-line units man-for-man with Austro-Hungarian troops.

The question of how to respond to the deteriorating security situation in the Balkans divided the key decision-makers in Vienna and Budapest. Should Austria-Hungary seek some sort of accommodation with Serbia, or contain it by diplomatic means? Should Vienna strive to mend the ruined entente with St Petersburg? Or did the solution lie in military conflict? It was difficult to extract unequivocal answers from the multi-layered networks of the Austro-Hungarian state. The dualist constitution required that the Hungarian prime minister be consulted on questions of imperial foreign policy and the intimate connection between domestic and foreign problems ensured that other ministers and senior officials also laid claim to a role in resolving specific issues. So open was the texture of the imperial system that even quite junior figures – diplomats, for example, or section heads within the foreign ministry – might seek to shape imperial policy by submitting unsolicited memoranda that could on occasion play an important role in focusing attitudes within the policy-making élite. Presiding over it all was the Emperor, whose power to approve or block the initiatives of his ministers was still absolute. But this was a largely passive rather than a proactive role – he responded to, and mediated between the loosely assembled power-centres of the political élite. Against the background of this polycratic system, three figures were especially influential: the chief of the Austrian General Staff, Fieldmarshal Lieutenant Franz Baron Conrad von Hötzendorf; the heir to the Habsburg throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and the joint foreign minister from 1912, Count Leopold von Berchtold.

Under the energetic supervision of a gifted head of personal staff, Major Alexander Brosch von Aarenau, the Military Chancellor was reorganised along military lines; its military information channels served as a cover for political data-gathering and a network of friendly journalists pummeled political opponents and attempted to shape public debates. Processing ten thousand pieces of correspondence per year, the Chancellory matured into a political ‘think tank’, a power centre within the system that some saw as a ‘shadow government’. An internal study of the operations of this ‘think tank’, concluded that its chief political objective was to hinder any ‘possible mishaps’ that could accelerate the ‘national federal fragmentation’ of the Habsburg Empire. At the heart of this concern about political fragmentation was a deep-seated hostility to the Hungarian élites who controlled the eastern half of the empire. The Archduke and his advisers were outspoken critics of the dualist political system forged in the aftermath of Austria’s defeat at the hands of Prussia in 1866. This arrangement had, in Franz Ferdinand’s eyes, one fatal flaw: it concentrated power in the hands of an arrogant and politically disloyal Magyar élite, while at the same time marginalizing and alienating the other nine Habsburg nationalities. Once installed with his staff at the Lower Belvedere, Captain Brosch von Aarenau built up a network of disaffected non-Magyar intellectuals and experts, and the Military Chancellery became a clearing house for Slav and Romanian opposition to the oppressive minority policies of the Kingdom of Hungary.

The archduke made no secret that he intended to restructure the imperial system after he acceded to the throne. His key objective was to break or diminish Hungary’s hegemony in the eastern part of the monarchy. For a time, Franz Ferdinand favoured strengthening the Slavic element in the monarchy by creating a Croat-dominated (and Catholic) ‘Yugoslavia’ within the empire. It was his association with this idea that aroused the hatred of his Orthodox Serbian enemies. By 1914, however, it appears he had dropped this plan in favour of a far-reaching transformation by which the empire would become a ‘United States of Great Austria’, comprising fifteen member states, many of which would have Slav majorities. By diminishing the status of the Hungarians, the archduke and his advisers hoped to reinforce the authority of the Habsburg dynasty while at the same time rekindling the loyalties of the lesser nationalities. Whatever one thought of this programme, and obviously Hungarians didn’t think much of it, it did identify the archduke as a man of radical intentions whose accession to the throne would bring an end to the habit of muddling through that seemed to paralyse Austrian policy in the last decades before 1914. It also placed the heir to the throne in direct political opposition to the reigning sovereign. The Emperor refused to countenance any tampering with the dualist Compromise of 1867, which he regarded as the most enduring achievement of his own early years in office.

Franz Ferdinand’s most influential ally was the new Habsburg foreign minister, Leopold Count Berchtold von und Ungarschitz, Fratting und Pullitz. Berchtold was a nobleman of immense wealth, an urbane, patrician representative of the landed class that still held sway in the upper reaches of the Austro-Hungarian administration. By temperament cautious, even fearful, he was not an instinctive politician. His willingness to follow a diplomatic career had more to do with his loyalty to the Emperor and to Foreign Minister Aehrenthal than with an appetite for personal power or renown. His reluctance when invited to accept posts of increasing seniority and responsibility was unquestionably genuine. He believed that harmonious relations with Russia, founded on cooperation in areas of potential conflict such as the Balkans, were crucial to the empire’s security and maintaining peace in Europe. He derived great personal pride from being able to play a crucial role in St Petersburg in the consolidation of good relations between the two powers. When Aehrenthal departed for Vienna, Berchtold gladly accepted the post of ambassador, confident in the knowledge that his own views of the Austro-Russian relationship were entirely in step with those of the new minister in Vienna. It was a shock to his system, therefore, to find himself on the front line when Austro-Russian relations took a drastic turn for the worse in 1908.

The Bosnian Crisis & Balkan Wars, 1908-13:

The first eighteen months of Berchtold’s new posting had been relatively harmonious, but the Bosnian Crisis destroyed any prospect of further collaboration with the Russian foreign minister and undermined the policy of détente. Berchtold deeply regretted Aehrenthal’s willingness to risk Russian goodwill for the sake of Austro-Hungarian prestige. In a letter to the minister of 19th November 1908, Berchtold offered an implicit critique of his former mentor’s policy. In light of the pathological escalation of pan-Slav-influenced Russian national sentiment, he wrote, the continuation of the Austro-Hungarian Balkan policy would inevitably have a further negative impact on our relationship with Russia. Recent events had made his work in St Petersburg ‘extremely difficult’, so he closed his letter with a request to be recalled once the situation returned to normal. He remained in St Petersburg until April 1911, but his spell of recuperation was to last only ten months. On 19th February 1912, the Emperor summoned him to Vienna and appointed him Aehrenthal’s successor as minister for foreign affairs. His policy, announced to the Hungarian delegation on 30th April 1912, would be ‘a policy of stability and peace, the conservation of what exists, and the avoidance of entanglements and shocks.’

The Balkan Wars of 1912-13 would test this commitment to breaking point. In the attempt of the Serbian government to secure a swathe of territory connecting their country’s heartland with the Adriatic coast. Successive Serbian assaults on northern Albania triggered a sequence of international crises. The result was a marked deterioration in Austro-Serbian relations. This hostility was reinforced in the autumn of 1913 by dark tidings from the areas conquered by Serbian forces. The Austrian Consul-General Jehlitschka in Skopje submitted reports of atrocities against the Muslim populations of ten villages. These were not spontaneous acts of brutality, he concluded, but rather a cold-blooded and systematic elimination or annihilation operation that appeared to have been carried out on orders from above. Austria-Hungary’s minister in Belgrade was amused to see leader articles in the Viennese press advising the Serbian government to go easy on the minorities and win them over with a policy of conciliation. Such advice, he observed in a letter to Berchtold, might well be heeded in ‘civilised states’. But Serbia was a state where ‘murder and killing have been raised to a system.’ At the very least, these reports underscored in Vienna’s eyes the political illegitimacy of Serbian territorial expansion.

Nevertheless, even a local war between Austria and Serbia did not appear likely in the spring and summer of 1914. The mood in Belgrade was relatively calm that spring, reflecting the exhaustion following the Balkan Wars. The instability of the newly conquered areas and the civil-military crisis that racked Serbia during May gave grounds to suspect that the Belgrade government would be focusing mainly on tasks of domestic consolidation for the foreseeable future. In a report sent on 24th May 1914, the Austro-Hungarian minister in Belgrade, Baron Giesl, observed that although Serbian troop numbers along the Albanian border remained high, there seemed little reason to fear further incursions. Three weeks later, on 16 June, a dispatch from Gellinek, military attaché in Belgrade, struck a similarly placid note. Although the Serbian army was being kept at a heightened state of readiness, there were no signs of aggressive intentions towards either Austria-Hungary or Albania. All was quiet on the southern front.

Yet, on the diplomatic front, the Matscheko Memorandum, drawn up by a senior Foreign Office section chief in consultation with Forgách and Berchtold and passed to the foreign minister’s desk on 24th June, was not an optimistic document. Matscheko notes only two positive Balkan developments: signs of a rapprochement between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, which had finally awoken from the Russian hypnosis, and the creation of an independent Albania. Everything else was negative. Serbia, enlarged and strengthened by the Balkan Wars, represented a greater threat than ever before, Romanian public opinion had shifted in Russia’s favour, raising the question as to whether it would break formally with the Triple Alliance and align itself with Russia, and Austria was confronted at every turn by a pro-Russian policy – in Paris, for example. Now that Turkey was no longer a European power, the only purpose behind a Russian-backed Balkan League could be the ultimate dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire itself, at least in its eastern and southern parts.

The memorandum focused on four key diplomatic objectives. First, the Germans must be brought into line with Austrian Balkan policy – Berlin had consistently failed to understand the gravity of the challenges Vienna faced on the Balkan peninsula and would have to be educated towards a more supportive attitude. Secondly, Romania should be pressed to declare where its allegiances lay. The Russians had been courting Romania, hoping to gain a new ally against Austria-Hungary. If the Romanians intended to ally themselves with the Entente, Austria-Hungary needed to know as soon as possible, so that arrangements could be made for the defence of Transylvania and eastern Hungary. Thirdly, an effort should be made to expedite the conclusion of an alliance with Bulgaria to counter the deepening relationship between St Petersburg and Belgrade. Finally, attempts should be made to woo Serbia away from its confrontation policy using economic concessions. However, Matscheko was sceptical as to whether these would be enough to overcome Belgrade’s antipathy.

There was an edgy note of paranoia in the memorandum, in keeping with the mood and cultural style of the early twentieth-century Habsburg empire. But there was no hint in it that any of the imperial diplomats regarded war as imminent, necessary or desirable. On the contrary, the focus was firmly on diplomacy following Vienna’s self-image as the exponent of a ‘conservative policy of peace’. Only Conrad, who had been recalled to the post of chief of staff in December 1912, remained committed to a war policy. But his authority was on the wane and he soon became implicated in a military spy scandal which threatened to end his career. Franz Ferdinand was still the most formidable obstacle to a war policy. The archduke, Conrad was informed, would countenance ‘under no circumstance a war with Russia’; he wanted ‘not a single plum tree, not a single sheep from Serbia, nothing was further from his mind.’ After further angry exchanges at the Bosnian summer manoeuvres of 1914, Franz Ferdinand resolved to rid himself of his troublesome chief of staff. Had the archduke survived his visit to Sarajevo, Conrad would have been dismissed from his post. The ‘hawks’ would have lost their most resolute and consistent spokesman.

In the meantime, there were signs of an improvement in diplomatic relations with Belgrade. The Austro-Hungarian government owned a 51 per cent share of the Oriental Railway Company, an international concern operating on an initially Turkish concession in Macedonia. Now that most of its track had passed under Serbian control, Vienna and Belgrade needed to agree on who owned the track, and who should be responsible for the cost of repairing war damage. Since Belgrade insisted on full Serbian ownership, negotiations began in the spring of 1914 to agree on a price and conditions of transfer. They were still ongoing when the archduke travelled to Sarajevo.

Ten forty-five a.m., 28 June 1914. Franz Ferdinand and Sophie leave the Sarajevo Town Hall, He is wearing a plume of green ostrich feathers, and it’s their wedding anniversary. Five minutes later they were both dead.

The Widening Circles of Mistrust:

Meanwhile, a transition of profound significance was taking place in the big picture of the European alliance systems: Britain was gradually withdrawing from its century-long commitment to bottle the Russians back into the Black Sea by sustaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. To be sure, British suspicion of Russia was still too intense to permit a complete relaxation of vigilance on the Straits. Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary, refused in 1908 to accede to Izvolsky’s request for a loosening of the restrictions of Russian access to the Straits, notwithstanding the Anglo-Russian Convention signed the previous year. Meanwhile, underlying the disarray of the Triple Alliance was a development of far more fundamental importance. In the 1850s, a concert of powers had emerged to contain Russian designs on the Ottoman Empire – the result had been the Crimean War. This group had reconstituted itself in a different form after the Russo-Turkish War at the Conference of Berlin in 1878 and had regrouped during the Bulgarian crises of the mid-1880s, In the opening phase of the Italian war, the Ottoman Empire had sought a British alliance, but London, reluctant to alienate Italy, did not respond. The two Balkan Wars that followed then broke the concert beyond repair.

Right up until 1914, the Ottoman fleet on the Bosphorus was still commanded by a Briton, Admiral Sir Henry Limpus. But the gradual loosening of the British commitment to the Ottoman Empire created by degrees a geopolitical vacuum, into which Germany equally gradually slipped. In 1887, Bismarck had assured the Russian ambassador in Berlin that Germany had no objection to seeing the Russians as ‘masters of the Straits, possessors of the entrance to the Bosphorus and of Constantinople itself.’ However, after the departure of Bismarck in 1890 and the slackening of the traditional tie to Russia, Germany’s leaders sought closer links with Constantinople. Kaiser Wilhelm II made lavishly publicised journeys to the Ottoman Empire, and from the 1890s German finance was deeply involved in Ottoman railway construction, first in the Anatolian Railway, later in the famous Baghdad Railway, begun in 1903, which was supposed to connect Berlin via Constantinople to Iraq. The gradual replacement of Britain by Germany as the guardian of the Straits at this particular pre-war juncture was of momentous importance because it happened to coincide with the sundering of Europe into two alliance blocs. The question of the Turkish Straits, which had once helped to unify the European concert, was now ever more deeply implicated in the antagonisms of the bipolar system.

By the time the Ottomans sued for peace with the Italians in the autumn of 1912, the preparations for a major Balkan conflict were already well underway. At the time of the second Serbian invasion of northern Albania, with Conrad arguing, as usual, for war, Berchtold again agreed in general terms for a policy of military confrontation as did, unusually, Franz Josef. At this point, Franz Ferdinand and Tisza, for widely differing reasons, remained the only doves among the senior Austro-Hungarian decision-makers. The success of the ultimatum in securing the withdrawal of Serbian troops from Albania was itself seen as vindicating a more military style of diplomacy. This more militant attitude coincided with a growing awareness of the extent to which economic restraints were starting to limit Austro-Hungary’s strategic options. The partial mobilisations of the Balkan Wars had imposed immense financial strains on the monarchy. The extra costs for 1912-13 came to 390 million crowns, as much as the entire yearly budget for the Austro-Hungarian army, a serious amount at a time when the economy was entering a recession. Generally, the empire spent very little on its army; of the great powers, only Italy spent less. Austria-Hungary called up a smaller proportion of its population each year (0.27 per cent) than France (0.63 per cent) or Germany (0.46 per cent).

The years 1906-12 had been boom years for the empire’s economy, but very little of this wealth had been siphoned into the military budgets. The empire fielded fewer infantry battalions in 1912 than it had done in 1866, when its armies had faced the Prussians and Italians, despite a twofold increase in population over the same period. ‘Dualism’ was one reason for this, since the Hungarians consistently blocked military expansion, and the pressure to placate the minority nationalities with expensive infrastructural projects was another. To make matters worse, mobilisations in summer and/or early autumn seriously disrupted the agrarian economy, since they removed a large number of the rural workforce from harvest work. In 1912-13, the critics of the government could argue that peacetime mobilisations had incurred huge costs and disrupted the economy without doing much to enhance the empire’s security. Such tactical mobilisations were no longer an instrument the monarchy could afford to deploy. Hence the government’s flexibility in handling crises on the Balkan periphery was gravely diminished. Without the intermediate option of purely tactical mobilisations, decisions to advance would simply become matters of war or peace along extensive fronts.

A crucial precondition for these calculations was the refusal of the other powers – whether explicit or implicit – to allow Austria-Hungary to exercise its right to defend its close-range interests as a great power. The French and British were vague about the precise conditions under which a quarrel between Austria-Hungary and Serbia might arise. French foreign minister, Poincaré, made no effort to define such criteria in his discussions with Ivzolsky, yet pressed for aggressive action in the winter of 1912-13, despite there as yet being no Austrian assault on Serbia. The British foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, was a little more ambivalent and sought to differentiate: in a note to ‘Bertie’ in Paris, written on 4th December 1912, the same day as he issued a warning to Lichnowsky, the Russian foreign minister, Grey suggested that British reaction would depend upon ‘how the war broke out’:

‘If Servia provoked Austria and gave her just cause of resentment, feeling would be different from what it would if Austria were clearly aggressive.’

Grey to Bertie, London, 4th December 1912.

However, in an environment as polarised as central Europe in 1912-14, it was difficult to agree on what degree of provocation justified an armed response. The reluctance to integrate Austro-Hungarian security imperatives into the calculation was further evidence of how indifferent the other powers had become to the future integrity of the Dual Monarchy, possibly because they viewed it as the lapdog of Germany with no autonomous geopolitical identity, or because they suspected it of aggressive designs on the Balkan peninsula, or because they accepted the view that the monarchy had run out of time and must soon make way for younger and better successor states. One irony of this situation was that it made no difference whether the Habsburg foreign minister was a forceful character like Aehrenthal or a more emollient figure like Berchtold. The former was aggressive, the latter seemed subservient to Berlin. There was also a rose-tinted ‘Western’ view of Serbia as a nation of freedom fighters to whom the future had already been vouchsafed. In particular, the long-standing policy of French financial assistance continued. In January 1914, another large French loan, amounting to twice the Serbian state budget in 1912, arrived in Belgrade to cover Belgrade’s immense military expenditures. Pasic, simultaneously, negotiated a substantial military aid package with St. Petersburg, claiming (falsely) that Austria-Hungary was delivering similar goods to Bulgaria.

Grey adopted a latently pro-Serbian policy in the negotiations at the London Conference of 1913, favouring Belgrade’s claims over those of the new Albanian state, not because he supported the cause of a Greater Serbia but because he viewed the appeasement of Serbia as a key to the durability of the Entente. The resulting borders isolated half of the Albanian population outside the newly created Kingdom of Albania. Many of those who fell under Serb rule suffered persecution, deportation, mistreatment and massacres. Yet British ministers with links to the Serbian political élite at first suppressed and then downplayed the news of atrocities in the newly conquered areas. When this evidence mounted up, there were intermittent internal expressions of disgust, but nothing strong enough to modify a policy oriented towards ‘keeping the Russians on board’.

Eve of War – The Balkan ‘Trigger’:

Two further factors heightened the sensitivity of the ‘Balkan trigger’. The first was Austria-Hungary’s growing determination to check Serbian territorial ambitions. As already noted, decision-makers in Vienna gravitated towards more hawkish solutions as the situation in the Balkans deteriorated. The mood continued to fluctuate as crises came and went, but there was a cumulative effect: at each point, more key policy-makers aligned themselves with aggressive positions. The politicians also faced financial issues and the challenge of declining domestic morale. As the money ran out for peacetime mobilisations and anxieties grew about their effects on minority national recruits, Austria-Hungary’s repertoire of options narrowed, and its political outlook became less elastic. The last pre-war strategic review, the Matscheko Memorandum, prepared for Berchtold in June 1914, made no mention of military action as a means of resolving the many problems Austria faced on the peninsula.

The Second factor was Germany’s dependency on, and pursuit of, a ‘policy of strength’. This antagonised its neighbours and alienated potential allies, but as long as the policy continued to generate a deterrent effect to exclude the possibility of a combined assault by the opposing camp, the threat of isolation, though serious, was not overwhelming. By 1912, the massive scaling up of Entente military preparedness undermined the long-term feasibility of this approach. But if we conclude that Russia was looking for a preventative war with Germany, then the arguments for avoiding one in 1912, through politically costly concessions would have appeared much weaker. If there was no question of avoiding war, but only of postponing it, then it made sense to accept the war being offered by the antagonist at this point, rather than wait for a repetition of the same scenario under what would probably be much less advantageous circumstances. These thoughts weighed heavily on the German decision-makers during the ‘July Crisis’ that followed the assassinations at Sarajevo.

In the New Year of 1914, the Russian military journal Razvechik, widely viewed as the organ of the Imperial General Staff, offered a bloodcurdling projection of the coming war with Germany:

‘Not just the troops, but the entire Russian people must get used to the fact that we are arming ourselves for the war of extermination against the Germans and that the German empires must be destroyed, even if it costs us hundreds of thousands of lives.’

Cited in Hermann von Kuhl, Der deutsche Generalstab in Vorbereitung und Durchführung der Weltkrieges (Berlin, 1920), p. 72.

Semi-official verbal belligerence of this kind continued into the summer. What particularly alarmed policy-makers in Berlin was that this rhetoric was inspired by the Russian minister of war, Vladimir Sukhomlinov. A further article, We Are Ready, France Must Be Ready Too, appeared in the daily Birzheviia Vedmosti on 13th June and was widely reprinted in the French and German press. It sketched an impressive scenario of the immense military machine that would fall upon Germany in the event of war: the Russian army, it boasted, would soon number 2.3 million men, whereas Germany and Austria-Hungary would have only 1.8 million between them. In addition, thanks to the rapidly expanding strategic railway network, mobilisation times were plummeting. However, Sukhomlinov’s primary purpose was not to terrify the Germans, but to persuade the French government of the scale of Russia’s military commitment to the alliance and to remind his French counterparts that they too must carry their weight. All the same, its effect on German readers was disconcerting. One of these was the Kaiser, who splattered his translation with the usual spontaneous jottings, including the following:

‘Ha! At last the Russians have placed their cards on the table! Anyone in Germany who still doesn’t believe that Russo-Gaul is working towards an imminent war with us … belongs in the Dalldorf asylum!’

Wilhelm II, marginal notes to the translation of the same article, ibid., doc. 2, p. 3.

The German Foreign Secretary, Gottlieb von Jagow, believed that although Russia was not yet ready for war, it could soon ‘overwhelm’ Germany with its vast armies, Baltic Fleet and strategic railway programme. General Staff reports from 27th November 1913 to 7th July 1914 provided updated analyses of the Russian strategic railway programme, accompanied by a map on which the new arterial lines, most with numerous parallel rails, reaching deep into the Russian interior and converging on the German and Austro-Hungarian frontiers, were marked in stripes with brightly coloured ink. Intertwined with these concerns about Russia were doubts about the strength and reliability of Germany’s alliance with Austria-Hungary.

But then, at the end of June, came news of the events in Sarajevo, which were bound to have serious implications for Serbia. The independent kingdom was protected by Russia, and only Germany could help Austria-Hungary in that case. On the 5th of July, the Germans urged their allies to mobilise. They did so because they saw this as the last moment at which they could deal with Russia, and the diary of the German Chancellor’s secretary spells it out: if war now, we will win; if later, not. These diaries of the diplomat and philosopher, Kurt Riezler, Chancellor Bethmann’s closest advisor and confidant, convey the Chancellor’s thinking on 6th July 1914:

‘Russia’s military power growing swiftly, strategic reinforcement of the Polish salient will make the situation untenable. Austria steadily weaker and less mobile…

‘The Chancellor speaks of weighty decisions. The murder of Franz Ferdinand. Official Serbia involved. Austria wants to pull itself together. Letter from Franz Joseph with enquiry regarding the readiness of the alliance to act.

‘It’s our old dilemma with every Austrian action in the Balkans. If we encourage them, they will say we pushed them into it. If we counsel against it, they will say we left them in the lurch. Then they will approach the western powers, whose arms are open, and we lose our last reasonable ally.’

Karl Dietrich Erdmann (ed), Kurt Riezler; Tagbücher, Aufsatze, Dokumente (Göttingen,1972), diary entry, 7 July 1914, pp. 182-3. See also Clark’s note, p. 643.

During a conversation with Riezler the following day, Bethmann remarked that Austria-Hungary was incapable of ‘entering a war as our ally on behalf of a German cause’. (ibid., p. 182) By contrast, ‘war from the east’, born of a Balkan conflict and driven by, in the first instance, Austro-Hungarian interests, would ensure that Vienna’s interests were fully engaged. ‘If war comes from the east, so that we enter the field for Austria-Hungary and not Austria-Hungary for us, we have some prospect of success’. (ibid., diary for 8 July, p. 184). This argument mirrored exactly that of the French policy-makers, that a war of Balkan origin would engage Russia fully in a joint enterprise against Germany. Neither the French nor the German policy-makers trusted their respective allies to commit fully to a struggle in which their own country’s interests were not principally at stake. Now the Germans felt able to tell the Austrians to provoke a war. The Austrian Crown Council deliberated, and the Hungarian premier, István Tisza, alone, spoke against it. The Romanians, he said, would come in, and, in any case, the Empire did not need any more Slavs, such as would accrue if Serbia were crushed.

To be continued…(sources to be listed at the end of the next chapter/appendix).

Is Hungary’s Appeasement of Putin Justified by its Past Experiences?

Introduction:

The recent attempted assassination of the Slovak Prime Minister, Robert Fico, reminded many Hungarians, along with other Central Europeans, of the events leading to the outbreak of the First World War which ended with the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Hungary’s loss of two-thirds of its 1914 territories (as part of the ‘Dual Monarchy’ of Austria-Hungary) by the terms of the Treaty of Trianon (1920). Hungary’s Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, wasted little time in blaming this assassination attempt on what he has called ‘the EU’s war strategy’ of supporting Ukraine in its defensive war against Putin’s aggressive invasion of the country. Both Fico and Orbán have consistently opposed NATO sending weapons and armaments to Ukraine, and have prevented those from member countries from transiting through Hungary and Slovakia. Orbán has also consistently resisted the EU’s imposition of economic sanctions on Russia. He has referred to those within Hungary and the rest of Europe who support the EU and NATO in these policies as ‘warmongers’: He has accused European leaders like Macron, Schulz, and Ursula von der Leyen of forming a ‘European War Party’ ahead of the EU elections in June and failing to learn the lessons of ‘the drift to war’ before the two world wars of the last century. My father was born in 1914 and my maternal grandfather in 1900; he was one of only a handful of recruits who survived the 1917 influenza epidemic in camp at Catterick and never made it to Flanders before the war ended. His uncle and elder brother, both named Alfred, joined the Navy. Uncle Alfred died on HMS Vanguard at Scapa Flow in 1916 and Brother Alfred survived, returning to service in the second war, training naval gunners. My wife’s family members survived the Second World War, the Nazi occupation of Hungary and the Holocaust. I was therefore keen to discover more about Hungary’s role in the origins and outbreak of these wars and to make an informed judgment as to whether these events can be described as a ‘drift’ to war and whether the leaders can be accurately described as ‘Sleepwalkers’.

Chapter One: The Dual Monarchy & the Origins of World War I

The Habsburg Empire before & after The Compromise of 1867:

Two military disasters defined the trajectory of the Habsburg Empire in the half-century to its demise. At Solferino in 1859, French and Piedmontese forces prevailed over a hundred thousand imperial troops. Then, at Köningratz on 3rd July 1866, the Prussians destroyed an Austrian army of 240,000 soldiers, ejecting the empire from the ambit of the emergent German nation-state. As a result, Austria became excluded from the German Confederation, which it had hoped to dominate. To the Hungarian premier, Ferenc Deák and his followers this, at first, seemed an undesirable outcome: they had calculated that if Austria had become preoccupied with its ‘Western mission’ again, Hungary would have acquired a better chance to recover its full autonomy within the Monarchy. However, on the other hand, they did not intend to weaken Habsburg power, from which they expected protection against German and Russian expansionism. Without the Austro-Germans, they would find themselves in a rump of the empire in which they were the most numerous ethnic group, but constituting less than half of the whole population. They therefore came to accept the idea that they would be better off in a two-state empire in which the western half would be transformed into a state, like Hungary, under one nation’s leadership. Then the positions of both leading nations in both halves of the empire would be consolidated by lending each other mutual support.

Ferenc Deák – a painting by Bertalan Székely, 1869. Déák (1803-1876) was a descendant of a family of medium estate owners in Transdanubia (Western Hungary) and a law graduate. He was a matchless figure both as a politician. He sought the framework, form, and formula for the compromises he served. Hundreds of anecdotes preserved his moral integrity and character; he was a witty conversationalist and debater. His published writings were on law and public life, but the many volumes represent a small fraction of the tremendous intellectual activity he displayed in his political life.

Gradually, Franz Josef himself started to prefer constitutional dualism to the alternatives of retaining the centralised structure and the federal reorganisation of the empire, as suggested by Slav national leaders and Prime Minister Count Richard Belcredi. In addition to Queen Elisabeth, whose pro-Hungarian sentiments have been subject to romantic exaggerations in Hungarian national legends, but were real enough, it was Baron Ferdinand Buest, Imperial Foreign Minister in 1866 and then Prime Minister (February 1867) who finally convinced the Emperor that the domestic precondition of revanche in Germany was compromise with the Hungarians. Thus, the cumulative effect of the military disasters transformed the inner life of the Austro-Hungarian lands as the absolutist Austrian Empire transformed into the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Under the Compromise hammered out in 1867, power was shared between the two dominant nationalities. As Clark has described it,

‘What emerged was a unique polity, like an egg with two yolks, in which the Kingdom of Hungary and a territory centred on the Austrian lands and often called Cisleithania (meaning ‘the lands on this side of the River Leithe’) lived side by side within the translucent envelope of the Habsburg dual monarchy.’

Clark (2012), p. 65.

But first, Buest needed a Hungarian partner to negotiate with. Deák paved the way to the Compromise and had a party in the Hungarian Parliament to push it through, but was determined to remain an eminence grise at most in the new era. The Hungarian delegation that negotiated the Compromise in January and February 1867 was headed by Count Gyula Andrássy, who enjoyed the complete confidence of Deák and the Hungarian liberals, as well as the royal couple, even though he was on the list of émigrés hanged in effigy in 1849. Having returned to Hungary in 1857, he was an experienced politician with an instinctive skill for brilliant improvisations. Andrássy was appointed Prime Minister on 17th February. Besides him, the most important member of the delegation was Eötvös, who represented continuity with 1848 and became Minister of Education and Ecclesiastical Affairs. Liberal commoners as well as aristocratic magnates were represented in Hungary’s third responsible ministry.

Devised by Ferenc Deák, the Compromise gave Hungary independence while keeping it in the Habsburg Empire; it also gave the kingdom its own government and parliament, with an upper house of dignatories and an elected Lower House, but the emperor as the king of Hungary appointed the government. To satisfy Hungarian demands, Transylvania was also fully absorbed into Hungary, and Hungarian law replaced the Austrian civil code. In June 1867, Franz Josef and Elisabeth were crowned king and queen of Hungary, and she too was invested with the royal sceptre and orb, an honour never before given to a queen of Hungary. That same year, Franz Josef published constitutions for both halves of the empire. From this point onwards, the Habsburg empire comprised two equal parts – a Hungarian part and a part for all the rest, which included the Austrian lands, Bohemia, Polish Galicia, the Adriatic coastline, and so on. The second had no obvious name and was officially known as the Lands and Kingdoms represented in the Imperial Council, and unofficially as ‘this side of Leitha’ (Cisleitha: the River marked Hungary’s western border).

Franz Josef and his family at Gödöllő, A lithograph, 1871. Elisabeth’s first journey to Hungary turned tragic. Her first-born daughter Sophia became ill in Debrecen and died suddenly. But the otherwise very sensitive queen stayed ever more gladly in Buda after the Compromise and coronation in 1867, especially at the palace in Gödöllő, which had been rebuilt as a royal summer residence. Later, as Elisabeth became increasingly estranged from her husband, she preferred to go to the Mediterranean in the summer, especially to the island of Corfu.

Predictably, Lajos Kossúth, the former Protector of Hungary, in exile since 1849, wrote an open letter, known as the Cassandra letter, to Ferenc Deák, his old associate, in which he claimed that the Dual Monarchy represented a sham independence. Kossúth was one of a minority who were unimpressed by the Compromise. In a series of open letters addressed by ‘the hermit of Turin’ to his countrymen, published on 26th May in a Pest journal, he argued that Deák’s policy culminated in abandoning Hungary’s claim to be an independent state, at a time when the 1866 crisis created the most auspicious circumstances to obtain independence. Köningrátz demonstrated that Austria was a dilapidated structure bound together merely by the Habsburg dynasty and doomed to collapse in the age of the nation-state. The Compromise involved a trap. Hungarian self-determination suffered irreparably from involvement in foreign policies that might be contrary to the nation’s interests, and might also throw it into conflict with the two Great Powers against which Deák sought protection and her neighbouring peoples whose friendship was essential for Hungary’s own wellbeing. Hungary lost the ‘mastery over her future’ and it would never be able to take advantage of the ever more frequently arising occasions to gain complete independence.

Kossuth was right in a very profound and prophetic sense, namely that Hungary’s twentieth-century history rather fatefully verified some of his predictions. At the same time, Deák was undoubtedly also right in pointing out that the ‘expected event’ (that is, the ultimate collapse of Austria) might not occur before it was too late ‘for our harrowed nation’ to take advantage of it. Deák never pretended that the Compromise was the best of all solutions, but he was convinced that it was the best of all possible ones. It corresponded to the social and national relations of power in 1867 and laid the foundations of a political establishment that was to last for half a century. On 8th June, Franz Josef I took the coronation oath on a mound constructed at the Pest side of the Chain Bridge from pieces of earth from all over the country, before being crowned on the Buda side in the Mátyás Cathedral, which had once been a Mosque under Ottoman occupation. It had been restored, and Franz Liszt (see the picture below) composed a Mass for the Coronation; the great aristocracy was present, in ornate national costume, and the master of ceremonies was Count Andrássy, trusted both by the Court and and the Habsburg politicians. Together with the Cardinal Archbishop, he was responsible for placing King István’s Crown on Franz Josef’s head. The Emperor sanctioned the sixty-nine Articles of Compromise four days later. A rebellious nation and an autocratic ruler seemed to have been reconciled and its status had been restored.

Ferenc Liszt giving a concert before the royal family in Buda Castle. A whole series of Central European artists, mainly musicians, and painters, were often identified as being of Austrian or German identity when they were really of Hungarian nationality and birth. Ferenc (or ‘Franz’) Liszt (1811-86) constantly claimed that he was Hungarian, albeit in broken Magyar. His virtuosity as a pianist made him internationally famous, a friend to Richard Wagner. Many Viennese Hungarian artists, together with Croatians and Czechs, used German as their common language. Liszt’s compositions were both startlingly modernistic and full of traditional Hungarian motifs, his real heir being Béla Bartók.

In one sense, and in retrospect, the coronation might seem like an act of decolonisation, the first of modern times, with all the pageantry of flags and anthems. At the time it was not thought likely to last. Without an army of its own, Kossuth argued, Hungary would be caught up in the interests of Germany. This was true, but if the new Monarchy could be made to work, it would protect Hungary. The existence of a united imperial army, under dynastic insignia and with German as the language of command, evoked resentment, and was only suffered because a separate Honvéd (along with the Austrian Landwehr) was also set up. The other delicate issue between Vienna and Budapest was the ‘economic compromise’: the customs union, commercial agreement, common currency, postal service, transport system, and the share of the two halves of the empire in the expenditure for common affairs, known as ‘the quota’ (30% in 1867; revised to 36.4% in 1907). To be renegotiated every ten years, the economic compromise was the only flexible element in what was otherwise a politically rigid settlement, one which held out the promise of redressing the supposedly unfavourable aspects of 1867 for both partners. The language of command in the armed forces and the quota system were constant causes for grumbling about the ‘constitutional issue’ (the relationship between the emperor and Hungary), which supplied the terms in which the rather shallow patriotism of the parliamentary opposition to the shape, though not the essence of the Compromise, was expressed through most of the fifty-one years of the Dual Monarchy.

Hungary was now the fourth European country, after Romania, Italy, and Germany, to get a form of national unification between 1859 and 1871. This development ended French hegemony as the new countries became, implicitly at first, part of a German one. In the two generations that followed, Hungary flourished. Where the Compromise went wrong was in Austria, which had been saddled with a centralising parliament with a rigged German majority, and all local grievances could be raised there. Bureaucratic rules were drawn up in such detail that only lawyers could handle them. There were seven thousand of them in the Austrian Empire, compared with 162 in late Victorian Britain. Hungary also developed a workable parliament and a programme of national modernisation.

Nevertheless, the two halves of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the new official name of the new state in 1868, remained, ‘inseparable and indivisible’. Foreign policy and the army were regarded as ‘common matters’ and were overseen by ‘common ministries’ of foreign affairs and war, to which was added a third ministry of finance, with responsibility for funding the other two. In all other respects, the two governments were separate, with the prime minister of Hungary regarding his counterpart as a ‘distinguished foreigner’. Since Hungary now had its own government, the name of the empire changed from the Austrian Empire to the Austro-Hungarian Empire (or Austria-Hungary for short). This came about, with symbolic significance, because in trade treaties the term ‘Austro-Hungarian Monarchy’ had to be used. The ‘Austro’ referred to all the Habsburg lands, including Hungary, and all imperial officials bore the title kaiserlich-königlich (‘imperial-royal’), referring to all the ‘kingdoms’, including Bohemia and Croatia, later changed to Kaiserlich und königlich, which recognised the special status of the Kingdom of Hungary.

Above the ministries sat the Crown Council, made up of three common ministers, the prime ministers of Hungary and Cisleithania, and whomever Franz Josef chose to invite. The Crown Council was the emperor’s instrument for keeping control of foreign policy and the army. The new ‘dual monarchy’ had parliaments and Cisleithia also had elected diets, but its governance was not parliamentary. The emperor conducted his own foreign policy and military deployments, with minimal parliamentary oversight. Franz Josef also retained the right to legislate by decree, again with few constraints, which meant that he could bypass or substitute for the parliamentary process. He also had the power to dissolve the Vienna parliament, though not the one in Budapest, and to impose ministries without parliamentary approval. To that extent, absolutism survived.

Queen Elisabeth – A painting by Gyula Benczúr, 1861. She was one of the most beautiful women of her time, and her enigmatic sadness only served to enhance her sex appeal. Her love-marriage could not possibly succeed, at least not for the other party. Her husband was ultra-conservative, and although a dual monarch, petty bourgeois in his outlook on life, pedantic and small-minded, contrasting sharply with the sensitive and freedom-loving nature of the accomplished Elisabeth. In addition, she was somewhat neurotic, a temperament she transmitted to her son Rudolph, the heir to the throne. Although liberal in outlook and open to modernisation, it was her temperament and disposition to suicide that Rudolph inherited, with tragic consequences.

More importantly, the empire survived, but it was not just a matter of finding a constitutional formula to satisfy Hungarian aspirations. Franz Josef was unloved in Hungary, not least for killing the kingdom’s generals, but ‘Sisi’ had the glamour and passion for Hungary that reconciled Hungarians to Habsburg rule. She was their queen, who spoke their language, wore their national dress, and went to hunt in their fields. Back in 1866, she had asked Franz Josef to buy her Gödöllő Palace, to the east of the capital. He had grumpily refused, explaining that ‘in these hard times, we must save mightily.’ The following year, the newly installed Hungarian government led by Count Andrássy bought it for her, as the nation’s gift on her coronation. Andrássy had no doubt of Sisi’s contribution to the 1867 settlement between the monarch and Hungary. However, for the other nationalities of the new Austro-Hungarian Empire, Sisi showed little empathy, being particularly disdainful of Czechs and Italians. However, her inconsistencies and eccentricities should not conceal how her intervention in Hungarian affairs fitted into a larger pattern of queenly conduct. Despite recollections of Maria Theresa and the example of Queen Victoria (1837-1901), there were fewer regnant queens than in previous centuries, and females had been expressly barred from succession in France, Spain, Sweden, and Prussia. Instead, it was as consorts that queens became influential, particularly in rebuilding the monarchy’s image. The closest parallel to Sisi was Queen Alexandra, the consort of Britain’s Edward VII (1901-1910), who was elegant, striking in appearance, and a meddler in politics.

The dualist compromise had many detractors at the time and has had many critics since. In the eyes of ‘hardline’ Magyar nationalists, it was a sell-out that denied Hungarians the full independence they had fought for. At the time, some claimed that Austria was still exploiting Hungary as an agricultural colony. Moreover, Vienna’s refusal to relinquish control over the armed forces and permit the creation of a separate and equal Hungarian army was particularly contentious, with a constitutional crisis over this in 1905 leading to the political paralysis of the Empire. On the other hand, Austrians argued that the Hungarians were freeloading on the more advanced economy of the Austrian lands, and ought to pay a higher share of the empire’s running costs. This conflict was now built into the dual monarchy because the Compromise required the two halves of the imperial system to renegotiate the customs union by which revenues and taxation were shared between them. The Hungarians’ demands increased with every review of the union until there was little left in it to continue to recommend it to the political élites of the other national minorities, who had in effect been placed under the domination of the two ‘master races’. The first post-Compromise prime minister, Gyula Andrássy, captured this aspect of settlement when he commented to his Austrian counterpart, “You look after your Slavs and we’ll look after ours.” (Cited in Alan Sked, The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire, 1815-1914. New York, 1991: p. 190.)

Ethnic Minorities within the Austro-Hungarian Empire of 1868:

The Court wanted revenge against Prussia and looked for alliance with the south German states; a former Prime Minister of Saxony, Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust, who detested Bismarck, was now in charge of foreign affairs. He had pushed for the Compromise because his programme needed taxes and recruits and wanted the Hungarian problem out of the way. The German liberals, thanks to the electoral system, could now dominate a purely Austrian parliament that would not include Hungarian deputies. They were now free to realise their programme, to ignore the Bohemian grandees with their ‘claptrap’ about Bohemian state rights, to put Czech nationalists back in their box, and to cut back the powers of the Church. They meant to create a progressive state, as their counterparts were doing elsewhere, together with the centralising bureaucracy, schools, inheritance taxes, laws, law degrees, and lawyers. The Hungarians, on their side, also wanted wide autonomy so that they could remake the nation in their way, without reference to Austrian centralisers, who were always encouraging the non-Magyar peoples of Hungary to demand rights. Laws were passed from 1867 to 1869 in both parliaments to further establish the new arrangements.

It was well understood in Austria that the Compromise was arguably the only way to preserve the great power status of the Habsburg Monarchy and that in Hungary it not only increased the chances of national survival but also offered a means to partake of that great power status. Though none of the defence ministers, and few in the high command of the armed forces of the Dual Monarchy were Hungarian, thirty percent of the diplomatic corps and four out of ten foreign ministers were subjects of the Hungarian Crown. It is therefore not surprising that, in an age when nationalism was dominant in the attitudes and ambitions of powers great and small, Hungarian nationalists became dazzled by the prospect of governing a demi-empire, whose economic and demographic dynamism might soon shift the intra-imperial balance of power in their favour and even compel the Habsburg dynasty to remove its residence from Vienna to Budapest. On the domestic front, there was certainly a convincing argument in favour of the Compromise that for the two leading nations of the Habsburg monarchy, it did represent a shift from absolutist to liberal representative government, albeit with shortcomings, and for the bulk of the Hungarian liberals some of these made it more attractive than potential alternatives. The strong personal power of the ruler was not one of these, however, and the discretionary powers reserved for Franz Josef maintained his influence in the domestic affairs of both states, whereas his Cabinet and Military bureaus played roles equal to that of the joint ministries in common affairs. Relying on a broad network of unofficial advisors, whose loyalty he could rely on, he exerted a personal influence across a wide range of policy matters.

At the time, Hungary had a population of some thirteen million, mostly either illiterate or literate in a language other than Magyar. There was a country to build, and there was a formula at hand as to how this should be done: it was the ‘Age of Progress’ and classical liberalism, and an accompanying optimism dominated thinking in the 1860s. The British example was plain for travelers to see; Gladstonian liberalism, emphasising the rule of law through parliament was in its heyday and so was the Gold Standard, controlled by an independent central bank. Mass education was important, and the schools of that era were built along Greek and Roman lines. Town planning and public health and hygiene were developing, and doctors were being fully consulted. The ‘limited company’ was becoming increasingly important for commerce, encouraging competition and free trade. Classical liberalism could develop more easily in the framework of nation-states in a decade that started with national unification in Italy and ended with Bismarck’s ceremony at Versailles setting up the German Empire.

At its inception, liberalism in Hungary was the creation of noblemen, largely directed to offset, moderate, or exploit the effects of capitalist development in a predominantly rural society. After the waning of the enthusiasm of the Age of Reform and the Revolution of 1848, the dismantling of feudalism took place. Relations of dependence and hierarchy and the traditional respect for authority were preserved in attitudes. Liberal equality remained a fiction even within the political élite. The Compromise was, after all, a conservative step, checking whatever emancipationalist momentum Hungarian liberalism could still muster. Instead, it became increasingly confined to the espousal of free enterprise, the introduction of modern infrastructure, and, with considerable delay, the secularisation of the public sphere and the regulation of state-church relations. Political remained in the hands of the traditional élite, with which newcomers were assimilated, with roughly eighty percent of MPs permanently drawn from the landowning classes. The franchise, extending to about six percent of the population throughout the period, was acceptable at its beginning, but grossly anachronistic by its end in comparison with much of the rest of Europe. Since most rural districts fell under the patrimony of local magnates and their groups, elections were, as a rule, ‘managed’ and there was large-scale patronage at all levels of administration. Hungary’s political liberalism during the time of Kalman Tisza’s premiership from 1875 to 1890 resembled that of England during Walpole’s ‘whig oligarchy’ of a century and a half earlier. Yet, since the Hungarian parliament was largely independent of the crown, it was ‘more free’ than any other east of the Rhine.

The development of European nation-states required strong national armies, and the example for building these was Prussian. Instead of taking recruits on an indenture of twenty-five years, Prussia had instituted a system of conscription, giving peasant boys three or more years’ training, after which they went into a reserve that could be called up in wartime. This had the great advantage of making the conscripts feel part of the nation. Austria-Hungary introduced conscription in 1868, and Russia in 1874. The Habsburg Empire still counted as a great power with a large and newly reformed army, which also enabled it to cooperate to keep the peace.

It was in these circumstances that the Hungarians took their place within the Habsburg state; Gyula Andrássy became Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1871, and Hungarians had more than their due share of ambassadors and ministers. In 1867 there was an air of euphoria in Budapest as a cabinet of magnates took office. At this time many of the great aristocrats took their national role very seriously, following the example of the British House of Lords, which produced many experts in economics and social reform. In Hungary, Count Lónyay turned out to be an excellent Finance Minister. The English journalist Henry Wickham Steed, who wrote a classic on the Habsburg Monarchy, had reservations about Hungary, but he did notice the rise in intelligence that occurred as the Danube steamer moved from Vienna, with its smug aristocracy, to Budapest.

Gyula Andrássy was the first Prime Minister, and among his first tasks was to make a new capital. The Chain Bridge had linked Buda and Pest, and these two, with Óbuda, were conjoined in 1873 as Budapest, with a powerful mayor, strongly supported by commercial interests. The new Hungary was self-consciously liberal and adopted various arrangements accordingly. Now that there was a proper Hungarian finance ministry, and now that laws and courts guaranteed investment, Austrian capital flowed in. The city’s situation, with the hills of Buda on one side of the Danube, and the plain of Pest on the other, was magnificent, and the roads were laid out sensibly with two concentric rings of boulevards, Andrássy and Rákóczi, cutting across them. The intersection of the great boulevard (Teréz) and Andrássy Avenue was an eight-sided square, the Oktogon, with fashionable cafés, and beyond it the avenue was studded with enormous villas, often occupied by embassies. The opera house was added in 1884, and there were endless theatres, as the city’s cultural life showed much vigour. In the earlier period, the architecture tended to copy the Austrian styles, but after 1890a distinctly Hungarian note was struck as both Budapest and several provincial cities were given ‘Secessionist’ (Art Nouveau) makeovers. By 1900, Budapest was heading to become a million-strong city, and much of it was a building site. As the country’s showcase capital, it was a dramatic triumph.

Ethnic Minorities in Imperial Hungary in the Nineteenth Century:

The particular engine of growth was the railway, which eventually made the fortunes of the estate holders. If they had a station near their lands, they could load agricultural produce, mainly grain, and sell it to the ‘captive’ Austrian markets. Proto-industrialisation meant food processing, particularly flour production, and distilling; then came true industrialisation with the growth of textiles and machinery. Austrian Germans and Czechs made up a quarter of the skilled artisans and railwaymen, while the overwhelming majority of Magyars were peasants. In 1900, five million of them were without land, seven million had some land, a third of whom had less than the seven acres needed for subsistence. The new Hungary was therefore dominated by estate owners, magnates of the Eszterházy-Károlyi class in the Upper House, or gentry with middling-sized estates who occupied most parliamentary seats. This was a gentlemen’s parliament, with clubs where men could meet informally. In the first years, under Andrássy, enlightened laws were passed like those of 1868 concerning the non-Magyar minorities, providing them with schools and law courts, which were rewards for the way they had accepted the Compromise. József Eötvös did much for education, especially teacher training. An attempt was made to curb the power of the counties: now that Austrian interference was no longer to be expected, that autonomy, so often associated with pig-headed provincialism, would just be a nuisance for governments.

Besides the many-sided tensions involved in the settlement of Austro-Hungarian relations, others arose from the limited blessings of constitutionalism and did not satisfy those citizens of Austria and Hungary who did not belong to either of the two leading nations. In the Austrian sphere, ‘dualism’ was unacceptable to the Czechs, who either demanded the federal reorganisation of the empire, or hoped for ‘trialism’, and could not be placated by the mere transfer of the Czech coronation insignia from Vienna to Prague. The less ambitious claim of autonomy voiced by the Poles of Galicia was refused, lest it should provoke Russian resentment. Austro-German hegemony was thus preserved in Austria, just as Hungarian supremacy survived in Hungary.

The Royal Habsburg Coat of Arms, from the Biblioteque Nationale de France.

The case of the Croats was unique, similar to that of the Czechs beyond the Leitha on account of the ‘historical legitimacy’ of their claims of self-government. After the Compromise, their status was put on a new footing in the Hungarian-Croat constitutional agreement (Nagodha) of 1868. Like the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, it was a treaty of union, but unlike its counterpart, this was a union of unequal partners. Croatia was acknowledged as a ‘political nation with a separate territory, and an independent legislature and government in its domestic affairs.’ However, the latter were confined to internal administration, the judiciary, and educational and ecclesiastical affairs. As regards the common affairs of the empire as a whole, Croats were represented by six members of the Hungarian delegation. In the common affairs of Hungary and Croatia, the forty-two deputies of the Croatian Sabor in the Hungarian parliament constituted a minority that could be easily outvoted. Also, while the Ban of Croatia was responsible for the state sabor, his appointment by the monarch required the Hungarian government’s approval, thus restricting Croatian autonomy. Although the agreement secured important elements of statehood and a broad range of opportunities to develop national cultural and political institutions, it is little wonder that the Croatian Sabor had to be dissolved repeatedly before a pro-Hungarian majority could be secured to get the Nagodba voted through.

This was still far more than the other nationalities felt they received in what was at that time, ironically, the only comprehensive piece of legislation in Europe apart from Switzerland that addressed the respective status of ethnic groups within the polity, and a remarkably liberal one. Although the endeavour to satisfy the ‘reasonable’ demands of the nationalities was a frequent theme in public discourse on the eve of the Compromise. Law XLIV of 1868 became established on the principle that ‘all Hungarian citizens constitute a nation in the political sense, the one and indivisible Hungarian nation’, that is, on the fiction of a Magyar nation-state on the Western European model. It denied the political existence, and thus the claims to collective rights and political institutions, of the national minorities, for whom the assertion that ‘every citizen of the fatherland … enjoys equal rights, regardless of the national group to which he belongs’ was meager compensation. At the same time, in granting individual rights the law was thoroughly liberal, even surpassing in some respects the demands of the nationalities themselves. It gave extensive opportunities for the use of their native tongues in the administration, at courts, in education, and in religious life; the right of association made it possible to establish cultural, educational, artistic, or economic societies and schools using any language; and the law even required the state to promote primary and secondary schooling in the mother tongue and the participation of the ethnic minorities in public service.

The Repolarisation of Europe, 1887-1907:

By comparing the diagrammatic maps above and below for 1887 and 1907, the outlines of a transformation can be discerned. The first map shows a multi-polar system, in which a plurality of forces and interests balance each other in a precarious equilibrium. The conflicting interests in the Balkans gave rise to tensions between Russia and Austria-Hungary, Italy and Austria were rivals in the Adriatic and quarreled intermittently over the status of Italophone communities within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. There were also rivalries and tensions between Britain, France, Italy, and Germany over northern Africa. These pressures were held in check by the patchwork of the 1887 System. The Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy (20th May 1882) prevented the tensions between Rome and Vienna from breaking into open conflict. The (defensive) Reinsurance Treaty between Germany and Russia (18th June 1887) contained articles deterring either power from seeking its fortunes in war with another continental state and insulated the Russo-German relationship against the fallout from Austro-Russian tensions. However, both also agreed that neutrality would not apply if Germany attacked France or Russia attacked Austria-Hungary. The Russo-German link also ensured that France would be unable to build an anti-German coalition with Russia. Britain was loosely tied into the continental system by the Mediterranean Agreement of 1887 with Italy and Austria – an exchange of notes rather than a treaty, whose purpose was to thwart French challenges in the Mediterranean and Russian ones in the Balkans or Turkish Straits.

By 1907, the picture had changed utterly into one of a bipolar Europe organised around two alliance systems. The Triple Alliance was still in place, though Italy’s commitment to it had weakened considerably. France and Russia were conjoined in the Franco-Russian Alliance (drafted in 1892 and ratified in 1894), which stipulated that if any member of the Triple Alliance should mobilise, the two signatories would ‘at the first news of this event and without any previous agreement being necessary,’ mobilise immediately the whole of their forces and deploy them ‘with such speed that Germany shall be forced to fight simultaneously on the East and on the West’. It would be some years before these loose alignments tauten into the coalitions that would fight the First World War in Europe, but the profiles of two armed camps were already visible by 1908.

The polarisation of Europe’s geopolitical system was a crucial pre-condition for the war that broke out in 1914. At the same time, though, it is almost impossible to see how a crisis in Austro-Serbian relations, however grave, could have dragged all the major powers into a continental war. The bifurcation into two alliance blocs did not cause the war; indeed, it did as much to mute as to escalate the conflict in the pre-war years. Yet without the two blocs, the war could not have broken out in the way it did. The bipolar system structured the environment in which crucial decisions were made. To understand how that polarisation took place, it is necessary to answer four interlinked questions: Why did Russia and France form an alliance against Germany in the 1890s? Why did Britain decide to throw in its lot with that alliance? What role did Germany play in bringing about its own encirclement by a hostile condition? To what extent can the structural transformation of the alliance system account for the events that brought war to Europe and the world in 1914?

Looking after the Slavs:

At first, the opponents of the Nationalities’ Law (XLIV) of 1868 criticised its shortcomings, but later they mainly complained because it was increasingly neglected by the Hungarian authorities. Its major drawback was that it contained no guarantees. Contrary to the spirit of Eötvös and Deák, their successors interpreted the concept of the equality of all Hungarian citizens meant that all non-Magyars who assimilated with Magyars would be considered as equal. From the 1880s on, Magyarisation was no longer merely ‘encouraged with all legally permissible means’, but also enforced with some means that evaded or violated the law of 1868. The relationship between the two halves of the empire, the archaisms of the political system, and the nationalities’ question were ‘time bombs’ that the Compromise had placed in the structure of dualist Hungary. Nevertheless, it took a long time, and the effect of international events, for these bombs to explode. Dualism in Hungary is generally reckoned to have been in a crisis during the whole of the second half of the period of the Monarchy, yet the stirrings on the ‘constitutional issue’ were not sufficient to shake it, and the dynamism of economic and cultural progress did much to blunt the edge of the social and the nationality issues from the 1890s through to the 1910s. As a result, the inertia of the peculiarly- modernised Magyar old régime lasted only until its military defeat in the First World War. For these reasons, the tension-ridden era also had an atmosphere of ‘perma-crisis’.

The most significant international events of the period revolved around the independent Balkan states, especially Serbia, and their impact on the Slav nationalities in the southern and eastern parts of the dual monarchy. Debates on internal economic issues in Austria-Hungary took place against a background of seemingly permanent unrest in the Balkans. In 1873, urged by Bismarck who wanted to surmount the diplomatic isolation of Germany resulting from its previous wars, and contrary to the personal intentions of Andrássy who had hoped to use the Habsburg Monarchy to prevent the expansion of Russia, the Three Emperors League was concluded. Not even after the outbreak of an anti-Ottoman uprising in Hercegovina and Bulgaria in 1875 brought the conflicting interests of Russia and Austria-Hungary to the surface. After the defeats of the revolts and the intervention of Serbia and Montenegro in their favour by the Turks, the two powers defined and separated their interests in protracted negotiations, as a result of which Russia could also count on the neutrality of Austria-Hungary in the war it declared on the Ottoman Empire in 1877. However, Russian arms proved too successful, and the Russians were deterred from marching on Constantinople by the appearance of the British fleet. In March 1878 they concluded the Peace of San Stefano, practically ending Ottoman rule in the Balkans and creating Greater Bulgaria, which was unacceptable to any of the Great Powers.

It was on the insistence of Andrássy that the Berlin Congress convened in July 1878 to revise the settlement in the Balkans. Russia was forced to make concessions: Bulgaria’s growth was checked, while the full independence of Romania, Serbia and Montenegro was acknowledged, and Austria-Hungary was entrusted with the occupation and administration of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The diplomatic gain could only be made real on the ground by a three-month campaign with several thousand casualties. This gave rise to intense debate in Austria-Hungary, with some politicians demanding annexation rather than mere occupation and others being concerned about a further increase in the Slav element in the population of the Dual Monarchy. Although in 1881, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia signed a secret agreement guaranteeing the status quo in the Balkans, Russia no longer figured in the diplomatic imperial schemes. The cornerstone of its foreign policy was the Dual Alliance with Germany in 1879, expanded to the Triple Alliance with the inclusion of Italy in 1882. There was also a network of Russian agreements with the Balkan states (Serbia in 1881 and Romania in 1883) that ensured the Monarchy’s hegemony in the peninsula. As for Bosnia-Hercegovina, it was relegated to the status as the province of the Common finance minister and was pacified in the early 1880s when that post was occupied by the Hungarian Béni Kállay, an expert in southern Slav relations. However, through its expansion in the Balkans, the empire got entangled in a web from which it was never to escape. The occupation was immediately and immensely unpopular in Hungary and, in the face of uproar in parliament, PM Kalman Tisza’s cabinet resigned, though Tisza himself was retained in office by the monarch until 1890.

As Christopher Clark has written in his recent book Sleepwalkers (2012), Serbia’s commitment to the redemption of its lands, coupled with the predicaments of its exposed location between two land empires, endowed the foreign policy of the Serbian state with… distinctive features (Sleepwalkers: 24). The first of these was the indeterminacy of geographical focus, by which Cook meant that the principle of commitment to a Greater Serbia did not indicate where exactly the process of redemption should begin. There were various alternatives: Vojvodina, in the Kingdom of Hungary; Ottoman-controlled Kosovo; Bosnia and Hercegovina, never part of Serbia’s empire but containing a large Serbian minority (43 percent of the 1878 population), or Macedonia in the south, also still under Ottoman rule. The mismatch between the vision of ‘unification’ and the meager resources available to the Serbian state meant that Belgrade policy-makers could only respond opportunistically to rapidly changing conditions on the Balkan peninsula. As a result, Serbian foreign policy swung like a compass needle between 1844 and 1914, from one point on the state’s periphery to another.

The logic of these opportunistic oscillations was, as often as not, reactive. In 1848, when the Serbs of Vojvodina rose up against the Magyarising policies of the Hungarian revolutionary government, the Serbian government chose to assist them with volunteer forces. In 1875, all eyes were on Hercegovina, where Serbs had risen against the Ottomans under their military commander and future king Petar Karadjordjevic. After 1903, following an abortive local uprising against the Turks, there began intensified interest in ‘liberating’ the Serbs of Macedonia. In 1908, when the Austrians formally annexed Bosnia and Hercegovina, having occupied them since 1878, these annexed territories became the main priority for Serbian nationalists. Still, by 1912-13, Macedonia once more topped their agenda.

Serbian foreign policy had to struggle with the gap between the visionary nationalism that dominated the country’s political culture and the complex ethnopolitical realities of the Balkans. Kosovo was, and still is, at the centre of Serbian mythology, but it was not, in ethnic terms, a purely or even mainly Serb territory. Muslim Albanian speakers have been in the majority there since at least the eighteenth century, although the exact population of ‘Old Serbia’ (comprising Kosovo, Metohija, Sandzak, and Bujanovac) is unknown. Many of the Serbs whom Vuk Karadzic counted in Dalmatia and Istria were, in fact, Croats, who had no wish to join a greater Serbia. Bosnia and Hercegovina, two provinces under Hungarian occupation, contained a combined majority of Catholic Croats (20%) and Bosnian Muslims (33%). The mismatch between national visions and ethnic realities made it highly likely that realising Serbian objectives would be a violent process. Some statesmen met this challenge by trying to package these within a more generous ‘Serbo-Croat’ political vision encompassing the idea of multi-ethnic collaboration.

The last decades before the outbreak of the Great War were increasingly dominated by the struggle for national rights among the empire’s eleven official nationalities. Besides the Germans, Hungarians, and indigenous Slav minorities, these also included Poles and Italians. How these challenges were met varied between the two halves of the empire. The Hungarians dealt with nationalities’ problems as if they didn’t exist. The result was that the Magyar deputies, although representing just over 48 per cent of the population, controlled over 90 percent of the parliamentary seats. The three million Romanians in Transylvania, the largest of the kingdom’s national minorities, comprising fifteen percent of its population, held only five of its four hundred seats. Furthermore, as already noted, from the late 1870s, the Hungarian government pursued a campaign of aggressive Magyarisation through which education laws imposed the use of the Magyar language on all state and church schools and even kindergartens. Teachers were required to be fluent in Magyar and could be dismissed if they were found to be ‘hostile to the state’. This degradation of language rights was underwritten by harsh measures against ethnic minority activists. As also already noted, Serbs from Vojvodina in the south, Slovaks from the northern counties, and Romanians from Transylvania did occasionally collaborate in pursuit of minority objectives, but with little effect, since they could muster only a few mandates.

In the Austrian lands, by contrast, successive administrations tampered endlessly with the political system to accommodate minority demands. Franchise reforms in 1882 and 1907 (when virtually universal male suffrage was introduced) went some way towards leveling the political playing field. At the same time, however, these democratising measures merely heightened the potential for national conflict, especially over the sensitive question of language use in public institutions such as schools, courts, and administrative bodies. So intense did the nationalities’ conflict become that in 1912-14 multiple parliamentary crises crippled the legislative life of the monarchy. The Bohemian Diet had become so difficult for the Austrians that in 1913 their prime minister, Count Karl Stürgkh, dissolved it, installing an imperial commission to run the province. Czech protests against this brought the imperial (Cisleithanian) diet to its knees in March 1914, so Stürgkh dismissed this too, and it was still suspended when Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia in July so that Cisleithania’s was in effect being run by an absolutist administration when war broke out. Meanwhile, in Hungary in 1912, following protests in Zagreb and other southern Slav cities against an unpopular governor, the Croatian Diet and constitution were suspended; in Budapest itself, the last pre-war years witnessed the advent of a kind of parliamentary absolutism focused on protecting Magyar hegemony against the challenge posed by minority national opposition and the demand for franchise reform.

Clark has argued, however, that while the apparent chaos in the Austro-Hungarian Empire might appear to support the view that it was a moribund polity, whose disappearance from the political map was merely a matter of time, in reality, the roots of Austro-Hungary’s political turbulence (Clark, 2012: p. 68) were less deep than those appearances suggested. Certainly, there was intermittent inter-ethnic conflict – riots in Ljubliana in 1908 and Czech-German brawls in Prague – but it never came to the levels of violence experienced in the contemporary Russian Empire. And, despite the obvious political turmoil, the Habsburg lands also passed through a last pre-war decade of strong economic growth with a corresponding rise in general prosperity, an important point of contrast with the contemporary Ottoman Empire. Free markets and competition across the empire’s vast customs union stimulated technical progress and the introduction of new products. The scale and diversity of the dual monarchy meant that new industrial plants benefited from sophisticated networks of cooperating industries underpinned by an effective transport infrastructure and a high-quality service and support sector. These economic effects were particularly evident in Hungary. In the 1840s, Hungary had been the ‘larder’ of the empire – 90 percent of its exports to Austria were agricultural products. But by the years 1909-13, Hungarian industrial exports had risen to 44 percent, while the constantly growing demand for cheap foodstuffs from the Austro-Bohemian industrial region ensured that the Hungarian agricultural sector survived in the best of health, protected by the ‘Habsburg common market’ from Romanian, Russian, Ukrainian and American competition.

For the Monarchy as a whole, most economic historians agree that the period 1887-1913 saw an ‘industrial revolution’, or at least a ‘take-off’ into self-sustaining growth, with the usual indices of expansion. In the last years before the world war, Austria-Hungary in general, and Hungary in particular, with an average growth rate of 4.8 percent, was one of the fastest-growing economies in Europe. Even a critical observer like the Times correspondent in Vienna, Henry Wickham Steed, recognised in 1913 that the “race struggle” in Austria was, in essence, a competition for shares within the existing system:

“The essence of the language struggle is that it is a struggle for bureaucratic influence. Similarly, the demands for new Universities or High Schools put forward by Czechs, Ruthenes, Slovenes, and Italians but resisted by the Germans, Poles or other races, … are the demands for the creation of new machines to turn out potential officials whom the political influence of Parliamentary parties may then be trusted to hoist into bureaucratic appointments.”

Henry Wickham Steed, The Hapsburg Monarchy (London, 1919), p. 77.

Each of the two territories had its own parliament, but there was no common prime minister or cabinet. Only foreign affairs and defence were handled by ‘joint ministers’ who were answerable directly to the Emperor. Matters of common interest could not be discussed in a common parliamentary session because that would have implied the inferiority of the Kingdom of Hungary within the ‘dual monarchy’. Instead, an exchange of views took place between ‘delegations’ of thirty deputies from each parliament meeting alternately in Vienna and Budapest.

There was, moreover, slow but discernable progress towards a more equitable policy on nationality rights. The equality of all the subject nationalities and languages in Austria was formally recognised in the Basic Law of 1867. Throughout the last peacetime years of the empire’s existence, the Cisleithian authorities continued to adjust the system in response to national minority demands. The Galician Compromise agreed in the Galician Diet in Lemburg (now Lviv in western Ukraine) in January 1914, for example, ensured a fixed proportion of mandates in an enlarged regional legislature to the under-represented Ruthenes (Ukrainians) and promised the imminent establishment of a Ukrainian university. After that, even the Hungarian administration was showing signs of a change in attitude towards minorities as the international climate worsened. The southern Slavs of Croatia-Slavonia were promised the abolition of extraordinary powers by the Hungarian state and a guarantee of freedom of the press, while a message went out to Transylvania that the government in Budapest intended to grant many of the demands of the Romanian majority in the province.

These case-by-case adjustments to specific demands suggested that the system might eventually produce a comprehensive framework of guaranteed nationality rights. There were signs that the administrations of the dual monarchy were getting better at responding to the material demands of their minorities. Of course, it was the Habsburg state that performed this role, not the beleaguered parliaments. The proliferation of school boards, town councils, county commissions, and mayoral elections ensured that the state intersected with the life of ‘ordinary’ citizens more intimately and consistently than political parties and legislative assemblies. It slowly metamorphosed from a constant instrument of repression into a broker among manifold social, economic, and cultural interests. But most of the empire’s subjects still associated the state primarily as the provider of good government: public education, welfare, sanitation, the rule of law, and the maintenance of a sophisticated infrastructure. This meant that the Habsburg bureaucracy was costly to maintain – expenditure for domestic administration rose by 336 percent during the years 1890-1911. Nevertheless, the memories of this period of civic pride and apparent prosperity lingered long after the empire’s demise and well into the 1920s, when the writer and engineer looked back on the empire in the last peaceful year of its existence as one of …

… white, broad, prosperous streets … that stretched like rivers of order, like ribbons of bright military serge, embracing the lands with the paper-white arm of administration.

Robert Musil, Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften. Hamburg, 1978, pp. 32-3.

Finally, Clark points out that most minority activists acknowledged the value of their Habsburg commonwealth as a system of collective security. The bitterness of inter-ethnic conflicts between minority nationalities – Croats and Serbs in Croatia-Slavonia, for example, or Poles and Ruthenians in Galicia, suggested that the creation of separate national entities might cause more problems than it resolved. Moreover, it was difficult to envisage how a patchwork of nation-states would survive without the empire’s protection. In 1848, Czech nationalist historian Palacky had warned that dismantling the Habsburg Empire, far from liberating the Czechs, might provide the basis for ‘Russian universal monarchy’. This argument was echoed in 1891 by Prince Charles Schwarzenberg when he asked a young Czech nationalist:

“If you and yours hate this state, … what will you do with your country, which is too small to stand alone? Will you give it to Germany, or to Russia, for you have no other choice if you abandon the Austrian union.”

Cited in May, Hapsburg Monarchy, loc.cit., p. 199.

Radical Nationalists & Habsburg Patriots:

Until 1914, radical nationalists seeking full separation from the empire were few and far between. In many areas, nationalist political groups were counterbalanced by networks of associations – veterans’ clubs, religious and charitable groups, associations of bersaglieri (sharp-shooters) – nurturing various forms of ‘Habsburg patriotism’. The sense of the monarchy’s permanence was personified in the imperturbable, bewhiskered figure of Emperor Franz Josef. But his family had suffered many private tragedies. The Emperor’s son Rudolf had killed himself in a double suicide with his mistress at the family hunting lodge at Mayerling in the Vienna Woods. His wife, Elisabeth (‘Sisi’), much beloved of Hungarians, had been stabbed to death by an Italian anarchist on the shores of Lake Geneva, his brother Maximilian had been executed by Mexican insurgents and his favourite niece had burned to death when her dress caught fire. Throughout all of these, the Emperor remained stoical. He also demonstrated great skill in managing the complex machinery of state, balancing opposing families to maintain an equilibrium of well-tempered dissatisfaction. He involved himself in every phase of constitutional reform, yet by 1914 he had become a force for inertia, backing the Magyar premier, István Tisza, against minority demands for franchise reform. As long as the Kingdom of Hungary continued to deliver the funds and votes Vienna needed, Franz Josef was prepared to accept the hegemony of the Magyar élite in all the lands of its kingdom.

Whatever the concerns about his age (eighty-three) and increasing detachment from the contemporary life of his subjects, the Emperor remained the focus of powerful political and emotional attachments. By 1914, he had been on the throne for longer than most of his subjects had been alive, but it was widely acknowledged that his popularity was anchored outside of his constitutional role in widely shared popular emotions. He even made regular appearances in the dreams of those subjects, especially because his portrait was hung in hundreds of thousands of public buildings, offices, taverns, and railway stations. Prosperous and well-administered, the empire, like its elderly sovereign, exhibited a curious stability amid growing turmoil. Crises had come and gone without threatening the existence of the system as such.

The treatment of the national minorities within Hungary before the First World War could be described as ‘relatively tolerable’, especially compared with contemporary Eastern and South-eastern Europe as a whole. The security of the law was provided to all who were prepared to observe the principle of the ‘unitary Hungarian political nation’. Nevertheless, in the pursuit of grandeur, the impatience of Hungarian nationalism led to the imposition of an even greater number of Hungarian lessons in schools and the vigorous promotion of Magyar in all areas of public life. While about ninety percent of civil servants spoke the language as their first language, only a quarter of the country’s non-Magyar inhabitants could use it. There was also legislation Magyarising the names of localities, and individuals were encouraged to do the same with their own family names. Administrative and juridical action was taken against those leaders of the nationalities who not only protested against the breaches of the 1868 law, but also criticised it for its failure to recognise the rights of non-Magyar peoples, and who campaigned for national recognition and territorial autonomy.

Franz Josef, circa 1885, by Carl Pietzner.

From 1881, a united Hungarian and Transylvanian Romanian National Party demanded a separation of Transylvania from Hungary and a reinstatement of its former autonomous status. In 1892, with the support of the Romanian King Charles I, the Party addressed a Memorandum to Franz Josef listing its grievances and claims. The ruler forwarded the letter, unread, to the Hungarian government, and it was also made public by its authors, providing a pretext for the authorities to raise a lawsuit against them on the basis that they were spreading subversive propaganda, resulting in harsh sentences. Libel suits and police harassment afflicted many activists from the national minorities after the Congress of Nationalities in Budapest in 1895, which also rejected the concept of the Hungarian nation-state and demanded territorial autonomy.

The dimensions of ‘forced Magyarisation’ have often been exaggerated, even though the ratio of Magyars within the population of Hungary (excluding Croatia) climbed from 41% to 54% between 1848 and 1910; and nationalism was as intense among the the non-Magyars as among Hungarians. The difference was that the latter had the state machinery at their disposal to promote the realisation of the Hungarian nation-state. The school law of 1907 known as the ‘Lex Apponyi’ obliged non-Hungarian schools to ensure that by the end of the fourth form (at age ten), their pupils could use Hungarian. In the same year, gendarmes killed twelve Slovak protesters in the village of Csernova in northern Hungary who wanted to prevent their new church from being consecrated by a priest other than their own Slovak speaker. News of the ‘massacre’ spread across the West, doing great damage to Hungary’s reputation. There was also agitation among the Serbian minority: The Serbian PM, Novikovic, claimed in February 1909 that the Serbian nation included the seven million Serbs who lived ‘against their will’ in the Habsburg Monarchy. This was an angry response, shared by Russia, to the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The Anomalous Case of Bosnia-Hercegovina:

The Western Balkans, 1878-1908.

Bosnia-Hercegovina posed a special and anomalous case. Still under Ottoman suzerainty in 1878, the Austrians had occupied it on the authorisation of the Treaty of Berlin and had formally annexed it thirty years later. It was a land of harsh terrain and virtually non-existent infrastructure. The condition of these two Balkan provinces under Habsburg rule had long been the subject of controversy. There the population was made up of ten percent Catholic Croats, fifty percent Orthodox Serbs, and the rest Muslim, a legacy from Ottoman times, though speaking Serbo-Croat. The Bosnian Muslims still looked to Ottoman Turkey but were otherwise content with the status quo. The Austro-Hungarians looked to the Balkans and the ports of the former Ottoman Empire, with railway projects already in mind. These involved Bosnia, but in any case, existing Habsburg rule over the South Slavs also implied expansion into the territory. In 1878 Austria-Hungary occupied it, making it a colony with a military governor.

Thirty years later, Habsburg Foreign Minister Alois Aerenthal, who wanted to rival the power policy of Germany, the Monarchy’s ally, in the only region suited for Austria-Hungary’s purpose, the Balkans, cheated Russia. He had concluded a deal with his Russian counterpart Alexander Ivolsky regarding the annexation in return for supporting Russia’s claim for free access to the Turkish Straits. He had announced the annexation without waiting for Russia to prepare the ground with the other great powers. Despite some Hungarian hopes that, due to medieval precedents of overlordship, Bosnia-Hercegovina would be placed under Hungarian jurisdiction, it became an imperial province.

Serb nationalists still regarded it as Serbia, however, and wanted it to be taken into union with Serbia. In 1908 Franz Josef formally annexed the territory in defiance of the nationalists. Croats also continued to dream of a Greater Croatia or ‘Yugoslavia’ with its capital at Zagreb, and Franz Ferdinand was inclined to agree with this solution. However, he never had the chance to put these plans into action. The young Serb terrorists who traveled to Sarajevo to kill the heir to the Imperial throne in the summer of 1914 defended their actions by referring to the oppression of their brothers in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Historians have sometimes suggested that the Austro-Hungarians themselves were to blame for driving the Bosnian Serbs into the arms of Belgrade by a combination of oppression and maladministration. The Habsburg administration bore down hard on anything that smelled like nationalist mobilisation against the empire, sometimes with a heavy and discriminating hand. In 1913, Oskar Potoriek, military governor of the two provinces, suspended most of the Bosnian constitution of 1910, tightened government controls of the school system, banned the circulation of newspapers from Serbia, and closed down many Bosnian Serb cultural organisations, in response to an escalation in Serbian ultra-nationalist militancy. Another vexing factor was the political frustrations of both Serbs and Croats just across the borders to the west and north in Croatia-Slavonia, and to the east in Vojvodina, both ruled from Budapest under the restrictive Hungarian franchise.

One great question mark remains over why Hungary blocked the creation of a Habsburg Yugoslavia and continued to do so until the end of the Monarchy in 1918. Croats and Serbs had enough in common for it to work and Bosnia was already providing evidence for a Triune Kingdom. However, the Hungarian government did not want a co-partner, and its PM, István Tisza angrily reiterated his opposition to this solution in September 1918 when, in Sarajevo, a South Slav delegation asked for unification. His response was:

“… impertinent … Do they think Hungary will collapse? We might but before that we will still be strong enough to crush her enemies.”

Cited by Gábor Vermes, István Tisza (New York, 1985), pp.436-7.

Finally, at the very end of the Monarchy, when most Croats were still adhering to the idea of Yugoslavia, Catholic loyalists managed to get the Hungarian government to agree to the Triune Kingdom, but by then it was too late to save the empire.

However, this was, all in all, a relatively fair and efficient administration informed by a pragmatic respect for the diverse traditions of the ethnic groups in the provinces. With hindsight, though there were many severe critics of the Habsburg state, these included contemporaries like Steed, who had defended it on the eve of the July Crisis leading to the Great War. He wrote in 1913 that he had been unable in ten years of constant observation and experience to perceive any sufficient reason why the Habsburg monarchy should not retain its rightful place in the European Community. He concluded that its internal crises are often crises of growth rather than crises of decay. It was only during the War that Steed became a propagandist for the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and then an ardent defender of the post-war settlement in Central Europe. In 1927 he wrote that …

“… the name ‘Austria’ (was synonymous with) every device that could kill the soul of a people, corrupt it with a modicum of material wellbeing, deprive it of freedom of conscience and of thought, undermine its sturdiness, sap its steadfastness and turn it from the pursuit of its ideal.”

Tomás G. Masaryk, The Making of a State, Memories and Observations, 1914-18. London, 1927 (Czech and German editions appeared in 1925). Preface.

By contrast, the Hungarian scholar Oszkár Jászi, one of the foremost experts on the Habsburg Empire, was originally highly critical of the dual monarchy. In 1929, he wrote that the World War was not the cause, but only the final liquidation of the deep hatred and distrust of the various nations. Yet twenty years later, after a further world war and a calamitous period of dictatorship and genocide in his home country, and having been in exile in the US since 1919, Jászi struck a different note. He wrote that in the old Habsburg monarchy, …

… the rule of law was tolerably secure; individual liberties were more and more recognised; political rights continuously extended; the principle of national autonomy growingly respected. The free flow of persons and goods extended its benefits to the remotest parts of the monarchy.

Oskár Jászi, Danubia: Old and New; Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 93/1. 1949, pp. 1-31.

While the euphoria of national independence encouraged some who had once been loyal Habsburg citizens to impugn the old dual monarchy, others who were vigorous dissenters before 1914 later fell prey to nostalgia. In 1939, reflecting on the collapse of the monarchy, the Hungarian poet Mihály Babits wrote:

“We now regret the loss and weep for the return of what we once hated. We are independent, but instead of feeling joy, we can only tremble.”

Mihály Babits, Kerész életemen. Budapest, 1939.

War, Peace & Justice in Judaism: Epilogue – Three Faiths, Two States & One World.

Hope for a Future without Children Dying:

The prospect of a better future like that in Isaiah’s vision can tempt us to lose sight of the tasks of the present. Hope for a future in which no more children die can be a sin if we meanwhile neglect to do our duty for children dying in the current violent conflict in Israel and Palestine, either from bombing, shelling and gunfire or from being hopelessly undernourished or brutally terrorised in body and/or in mind. A world in which ‘peace’ reigns in each and every conceivable sense of the word, a ruler representing the quintessence of justice is a ‘vision’ which seems anything but ‘radical’, but some consider it simply a product of naive and wishful thinking. This vision has never caused any of the powerful of the world, whose loss of power is (at least) implied here, one sleepless hour. Perhaps this is true, because, as Karl Marx suggested, religion is the opium of the people.

Yet, the Old Testament prophets fought for the enforcement of justice in this world long before Marx and his followers did. But Jews and Christians still await a just society they believe God will create without their active involvement. The effect of religion in the Middle East today seems far from that of an opiate, however. Rather it seems to be used to fuel ethnic discord across the region and into North Africa, so much so that many see it as a large part of the problem rather than contributing to the solution. Are those who wait for a future in which Jews, Christians and Muslims – the people of ‘the book’ – can live together on the same piece of earth, prepared to ‘fight’ for the shared humanitarian conditions that would make this attainable?

The future awaited by the majority of Judaeo-Christians seems to have meant that, for the last fifty years or more, they have been prepared to ‘reconcile’ themselves to the continuation of this present imperfect world. They have not ‘quarrelled’ with that immediate destiny, preferring to simply settle down in the world as it is and await the solution of all its problems on ‘Judgement Day’. But those who think that way are simply turning the hope of the divine into no more than a shabby pacifier. But whether we are Jews, Muslims or Christians, the message of the Kingdom of God should activate not only our hope but all our energies; we are called upon to build the world we inhabit now into the awaited future, toward the promised final condition of mankind and the whole created order. It is in this spirit that, in 1974, Rabbi Hirsch ended his study for the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, with a slightly paraphrased version of the Sam Shalom, the traditional prayer for peace:

Grant us peace, thy most precious gift, O thou eternal source of peace, and enable Israel to be its messenger to the peoples of the earth. Bless our country that it may ever be a stronhold of peace, and its advocate in the council of nations. May contentment reign within its borders, health and happiness within its homes. Strengthen the bonds of friendship and fellowship among the inhabitants of all lands. Plant virtue in every soul, and may the love of thy name hallow every home and every heart. Praised be thou, O Lord, Giver of peace.

R. G. Hirsch (1974), Thy Most Precious Gift: Peace in the Jewish Tradition. New York: UAHC.

Israel, Gaza, and the Christian Communities in Crisis:

Even before the Hamas attacks on Israel on the 7th of October, the massive demonstrations in Israel and the seeming breakdown of national cohesion had captured headlines in Israel and around the world. What began as protests against the Judicial Reform legislation evolved into broader confrontations between religious and secular Israeli Jews as well as a wave of attacks on minority communities. One highly publicized aspect of this crisis had been a wave of attacks on Christians, including churchmen, religious leaders, and foreign pilgrims. The government’s response to these attacks had been ineffective as the attacks continued in several Israeli cities. As this internal drama was unfolding, Hamas took the opportunity to launch its savage terrorist strike inside Israel that has led to mass casualties, both Israeli and later Palestinian. It is worth reminding ourselves, in seeking a resolution to the current conflict – that in religious terms – there are three faiths involved, although it is not in any sense a religious war.

‘Islamism’ is not a religion; it is an ideology based on distorted interpretations of the doctrine of ‘Jihad’. The Israeli Government is fighting a defensive war to protect all its citizens, regardless of their religion. Besides Islam and Judaism, there are also significant minority groups of both Israeli and Palestinian Christians. In addition to the innocent civilian victims of the bombing, missile and mortar fire, mosques, churches, schools and hospitals run by Christian charities operating in Gaza have been destroyed or damaged. Some of this destruction, resulting from IDF’s indiscriminate actions, clearly falls outside what is permissible in the Torah and Talmud, never mind in international humanitarian law. However, that remains to be tested and, if necessary and appropriate, in international courts of law. The charge of genocide against Israel in the sense of a premeditated act of ethnic cleansing does not seem appropriate in this situation, but there are clearly charges of war crimes that will need to be brought, certainly against Hamas and its associated terror groups, and also perhaps against the IDF.

Conclusion – Restoring Religion & Humanity:

Certainly, Hamas’s attack on Israel was completely outside any religion’s teaching on war. It was unjustifiable in any terms, religious or secular. It was nothing more than an act of terrorism, and as such beyond the bounds of any concept of humanity. In response, Israel’s leaders referred to its bestiality and were criticised for doing so. It was the critics who were wrong, however, since no species of animal kills its own by inflicting pain and suffering or seeks to gain pleasure from doing so. The evidence received so far suggests that this was what the Hamas terrorists set out to do. Not satisfied with causing terror, they also tortured and raped their victims before killing them and dismembering their bodies. In particular, the horrific sexual violence against women has gone without condemnation from international women’s rights groups and UN organisations.

No animal known to mankind behaves like this. Israel’s initial response was entirely justifiable and proportionate and was supported by many nations. It was not an act of revenge, but one of an obligatory, defensive war, fought under strict rules of engagement based on the Hebrew scriptures and doctrines as well as on international law. However, the ‘slaughter of the innocents’ which has followed, and especially the indiscriminate aerial bombing and shelling of civilian areas, cannot be justified in these terms. The means are never justified by the ends; they are always inherent in them. The war can only be brought to an end by a comprehensive armistice (not a ‘sustainable ceasefire’) beginning with the release of all the hostages and leading to a diplomatic peace process ensuring the long-term security of the state of Israel and the international recognition of an independent, sovereign state of Palestine.

That said, and having returned to both Muslim and Judaistic juridical texts in detail since 7th October, it can also be said that the Israeli forces have tried, at least in their ground combat, to remain within their ‘rules of engagement’, based on the ethics of the Torah and the Talmud. Israel claims that its Defence Force is just that, a force designed to provide security for its people, not an aggressive force. Its role is, therefore, to fight defensively, not to launch incursions and invasions, like it did in 1956. Neither is it supposed to fight ‘preventative wars’, except in purely defensive situations. It is also claimed to be ‘the most moral force’ in the world since its strategies and tactics are guided by a ‘military rabbinate’ of ‘chaplains’. On the other ‘side’, it is difficult to understand which doctrine of ‘Jihad’ is being applied by Muslim countries and Palestinian Muslims to the current situation in Palestine, and why the ‘mullahs’ and imams are not calling for Hamas to lay down arms and face justice for their crimes against humanity, if not against Islam itself. Instead, Hamas and other Islamist groups seem to be able to conduct themselves as Islamic State did in Syria and Iraq, with impunity.

Neither do I understand why many among my feminist and humanist friends of many years, and even some of my fellow Christians, were so slow to condemn Hamas and so quick to produce ‘apologies’ and justifications for its actions, some erroneously quoting the Bible in applying its texts to the current situation. Their sympathies for the violated Israeli families were synthetic and rang hollow, and they remain so, despite the horrific details we now know about the Hamas attacks of ten weeks ago. With the end of Hannukah, we were told today that there will be no lights in Manger Square this Christmas, and no tree. The Light seems to have gone out of this world: But, as the Carol ‘Little Town of Bethlehem’ suggests, there may yet be enough ‘meek souls’ to rekindle it.

War, Peace & Justice in Judaism: Part Two – ‘Shalom’ & Resistance:

Traditions of Shalom:

Emerging from the Judaistic readings of the Hebrew Bible, which I dealt with in part one of this two-part article, there was a strong biblical tradition, both in the Psalms and among the prophets, from the earliest to the latest times of the kingdoms of Israel, that the Lord is a god who puts an end to war:

From end to end of the earth, he stamps out war:

he breaks the bow, he snaps the spear

and burns the shield in the fire.

Ps. 46: 9

I will break bow and sword and weapon of war

and sweep them off the earth,

so that all living creatures may lie down without fear.

Hos. 2: 18

There is also a strong biblical tradition, especially in the Psalms, that the people of God should rely on him rather than on military power:

Some boast of chariots and some of horses,

but our boast is in the name of the Lord our God.

They totter and fall,

but we rise up and are full of courage.

Ps. 20: 7-8.

A King is not saved by a great army,

nor a warrior delivered by great strength.

A man cannot trust his horse to save him,

nor can it deliver him for all its strength.

The Lord’s eyes are turned towards those who fear him.

Ps. 33: 16-18.

The Lord sets no store by the strength of a horse

and takes no pleasure in a runner’s legs,

his pleasure is in those who fear him,

who wait for his true love

Ps. 147: 10-11.

There is, in fact, among both the prophets and psalmists, a strong commitment to peace, the Hebrew word for which is shalom. It does not just mean an absence of war: Jeremiah fulminates against those who cry ‘Peace! Peace!’ where there is no real peace to be found. The Hebrew word comes from a root meaning ‘wholeness’; it indicates a total condition of well-being. So, for instance, Micah (4: 3) spells out the state where swords shall be beaten into ‘mattocks’. The exaltation of this form of comprehensive, universal peace runs throughout the Hebrew scriptures. The psalmist calls on his people to turn from evil and do good, seek peace and pursue it (Ps. 34: 14). This exhortation for Israel to make peace is repeated in subsequent psalms:

Let me hear the words of the Lord:

are they not words of peace,

peace to his people and his loyal servants

and to all who turn and trust in him?

Deliverance is near to those who worship him,

so that glory may dwell in our land.

Love and fidelity have come together;

Justice and peace join hands.

Psalm 85: 8-10.

Pray for the peace of Jerusalem:

“May those who love you prosper;

peace be within your ramparts

and prosperity in your palaces.”

For the sake of these my brothers and my friends,

I will say “Peace be with you.”

For the sake of the house of the Lord our God

I will pray for your good.

Psalm 122: 6-9.

‘Peace be upon Israel’ is a refrain from some of the later psalms, and there is no more astonishing passage than the messianic vision of Isaiah (9: 6-7). His ‘Prince of Peace’ is almost an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms. Plenty of idealised heroes were ‘God-like’ in battle, but a ‘prince of peace’ was something entirely new. A vision of permanent peace had crept up on a previously warlike, conquering but small developing nation with a primary concern for its territorial integrity and security at a time of increasing power and competition between the various empires of the region.

Allegorical Interpretations of the ‘Old Testament’:

Most modern theologians have been careful not to read their beliefs back into the texts of the Hebrew Bible. But some early Christian writers, from the writers of the gospels, acts and letters in the first century to Origen, writing in the third century CE, thought of the texts of the Old Testament as containing veiled allusions to the sacrifice of Christ. This is just as the Letter to the Hebrews implies: The ‘old covenant’ in its mundane form had ceased to be, but it lived on in the realm of symbol. For these writers, especially Origen, Judaism had ceased to have any independent validity, and Christianity had taken over its texts and read them as foreshadowing the true reality, that of Jesus Christ. That was what most of the ‘Christian Fathers’ believed, and it presents a problem today for Christians who wish to affirm the continuing importance of Judaism, and/or to reject the idea that it has been superseded by Christianity. What Origen calls the ‘spiritual’ reading of the Old Testament, decontextualises it as far as John Barton is concerned. He points particularly to a striking instance of this in Origen’s discussion of Psalm 137:

O daughter Babylon, you devastator,

Happy they shall be who pay you back

what you have done to us!

Happy shall they be who take your little ones

and dash them against the rock!

Psalm 137. 8-9.

Origen sought to interpret this seemingly brutal verbal attack by the psalmist in symbolic terms:

Blessed is the one who seizes … the little ones of Babylon, which are understood to be nothing else but these ‘evil thoughts’ that confound and disturb our heart. For this is what Babylon means. While these thoughts are small and just beginning, they must be seized and dashed against the ‘rock’ who is Christ (1: Corinthians 10: 4), and by his order, they must be slain, so that nothing in us ‘may remain to draw breath’ (Joshua 11: 14).

Origen, Homily on Joshua, 15: 3.

‘Allegorisation’ removes a scandalous aspect of this psalm, its apparent encouragement of killing babies in times of war. Still, the price is that the psalm is lifted out of its ancient Israelite context and brought into the Christian ambit with its concentration on ‘spiritual’ matters. There were those contemporaries of Origen who opposed allegorising readings of the Old Testament and making some passages less offensive to Christian sensibilities. Still, they lost the debate and Origen was able to build on their defeat and undertake a systematically allegorical reading of the Old Testament texts. However, as Barton points out, Rabbinic interpretation of the Psalms is seldom as allegorical as Origen’s, though it rests on the desire to see the whole as containing a religiously acceptable meaning. While killing babies was, and is, clearly unacceptable, the psalm does offer a counter-weight to the metaphors of peace in other later psalms. Despite the promises of Isaiah, the psalmist’s hateful language about Babylon demonstrates that the people of Israel were still weeping bitter tears by its waters, or rising up in Judah.

Peace, Justice & Prophetic Visions:

The call of the Prophets for social justice remained largely unheard in their own times. Political and economic ‘necessities’ prevailed, although they were not to avert catastrophe. Both Jeremiah and Amos pointed out how the nation of Israel would be punished for their sins of commission and omission:

“Their houses shall be turned over to others,

Proclaim to the strongholds in Assyria

and to the strongholds in the land of Egypt, and say,

“Assemble yourselves upon the mountains of Samaria,

and see the great tumults within her,

and the oppressions in her midst.”

“They do not know how to do right,” says the Lord,

“those who store up violence and robbery in their strongholds.”

Therefore thus says the Lord God:

“An adversary shall surround the land,

and bring down your defences from you,

and your strongholds shall be plundered.”

Amos 3: 9-11.

Did God’s purpose for his people fail? Is brotherhood as a standard of relationships among people an unattainable ideal? In the following passages from Psalm 72, the Psalmist looked to a future in which justice and politics would no longer be irreconcilable. He could hope for this future because he trusted God to carry out his intention. But when he prayed for the just king, was this any more than simply a pious wish? Or did he know that God would achieve his purpose through his people:

Give the king thy justice, O God,

and thy righteousness to the royal son!

May he judge thy people with righteousness,

and thy poor with justice!

Let the mountains bear prosperity for the people,

and the hills, in righteousness!

May he defend the cause of the poor of the people,

give deliverance to the needy,

and crush the oppressor! …

May all kings fall down before him,

and all nations serve him!

For he delivers the needy when he calls,

the poor and him who has no helper.

He has pity on the weak and the needy,

and saves the lives of the needy.

From oppression and violence, he redeems their life;

and precious is their blood in his sight. …

May his name endure forever,

and his fame continue as long as the sun!

May men bless themselves by him,

all nations call him blessed!

Psalm 72: 1-4, 11-14, 17.

In the well-known prophetic vision of a ‘new world’ in Isaiah, the God of Israel becomes the guarantor of human hope. The expectation of a better future could fill the suffering with consolation and confidence:

“For behold, I create new heavens and a new earth;

and the former things shall not be remembered or come into mind.

But be glad and rejoice for ever in that which I create. …

No more shall there be in it an infant

that lives but a few days,

or an old man who does not fill out his days,

for the child shall die a hundred years old,

and the sinner a hundred years old shall be accursed.

They shall build houses and inhabit them;

they shall plant vineyards and eat their fruit.

They shall not build and another inhabit;

they shall not plant and another eat;

for like the days of a tree shall the days of my people be,

and my chosen shall long enjoy the work of their hands.

They shall not labour in vain,

or bear children for calamity;

for they shall be the offspring of the blessed of the Lord,

and their children with them.

Before they call I will answer,

while they are yet speaking I will hear.

The wolf and the lamb shall feed together,

the lion shall eat straw like the ox;

and the dust shall be the serpent’s food.

They shall not hurt or destroy in all my holy mountain,

says the Lord.”

Isaiah 65: 17-18, 20-25.

A similar passage earlier in Isaiah (11: 1-9) ends poetically with: for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord as the waters cover the sea. Isaiah’s vision of peace thus connects closely with God’s reconciliation with the whole of his ‘created order’, his oikoumene in Greek.

Warfare in Ancient Israel:

The first standing army in Israel was established by David. Before this, the different tribes contributed their levy of soldiers when the need arose. In command of the whole army was the Captain of the host, and there were captains each in charge of divisions of a thousand men, and further divisions of hundreds, fifties and tens. The army consisted only of infantry until Solomon introduced chariots. In New Testament times, Roman soldiers were stationed in Palestine as in all other parts of the empire. Four legions, including the famous Tenth Legion, were stationed in the province of Syria, which included Palestine (see the map below). Local men from the provinces might also serve in the Roman army. A Centurion was in command of a ‘century’, or a hundred soldiers, six of whom made a ‘cohort’ or ‘band’ of which there were ten of these in a legion. A Quaternion was a guard of four soldiers.

The Temple Guard was a small force of Levites under the control of the Captain of the Temple. It was effectively a Jewish police force which carried out guard duties at the temple, but could also be used by the Jewish authorities to make arrests (as in the case of Jesus of Nazareth, outside Jerusalem as well as within) and to execute punishments. Weapons included slings, darts and javelins, bronze or iron-tipped spears; short, dagger-like swords with iron blades (sometimes two-edged); bows and arrows, strung with ox-gut and battle-axes, clubs of hard wood studded with iron spikes. Until the Romans, the armour of ordinary soldiers, including coats of mail, helmets and shields was made of leather and wood (senior officers had bronze).

Siege weapons included battering rams, catapults and other artillery. Josephus, the Jewish historian, describes the Romans as catapulting stone missiles weighing half a hundredweight over a distance of four hundred yards. Building a ramp of earth to the height of the walls of fortifications or, as at Masada, Herod the Great’s palace on the rock fortress in the wilderness by the Dead Sea, constructing a wooden tower on which to mount siege engines were two other methods of siege warfare that developed in later centuries. In Masada, Herod’s aqueducts enabled huge underground cisterns to be stored for the hundreds of people living at his palace and later by the Zealot resistance. Fortifications were an important factor in the siting and construction of every city, town and large village. Cities in key positions, like Megiddo, commanding the pass in the Carmel Range, would have extra strong fortifications. Fortified cities often had double walls with projecting bastions and angled entrances. The walls were usually constructed of stone (occasionally brick), while the gates were wooden, though sometimes covered with bronze.

Resistance to Greece & Rome – Model ‘Freedom Fighters’?:

Judas Maccabeus, facing the Greek armies, exhorted his men:

“Do not be afraid of their great of their great numbers or panic when they charge. Remember how our fathers were saved at the Red Sea, when Pharaoh and his army were pursuing them. Let us cry now to Heaven to favour our cause, to remember the covenant made with our fathers, and to crush this army before us today. Then all the Gentiles will know that there is One who saves and liberates Israel.”

1 Macc. 4: 8-11.

The resistance of the Maccabees to Antiochus Epiphanes and their attempt to establish Greek culture and override Jewish religious susceptibilities provides a standard testimony for those who seek examples of the Jewish religion’s involvement in the military forces of that time. While recognising this, observing other aspects of the resistance at the time of Maccabees is also important. Undoubtedly, there was active resistance, but there was also passive resistance by flight. Many went into the wilderness with ‘their sons, and their wives, and their cattle’, not as an act of ‘guerilla warfare’, but as an act of withdrawal; they lived ‘after the manner of wild beasts in the mountains’. The result was a fall-off in tax revenues, the active policy of the government in seeking to bring them back, and eventually an amnesty. Secondly, those who turned to violence became violent. Judas Maccabees actually fell into a civil war against his own people, and, significantly, he is never mentioned in the Talmud. It has been supposed by some that this was due to Roman disapproval of the guerillas. But it may equally have had to do with the rabbinic emphasis on shalom. The festival of Hannukah celebrates the Maccabean deliverance. Today it is sometimes an occasion occasion of nationalistic and militaristic fervour. But the passage for reading on the Sabbath of Hannukah is from Zechariah: ‘Not by might and not by power but my spirit, saith the Lord of Hosts.’

A ‘menorah’.

As Israel fell under Roman power, what kind of future did the Jews hope for? And how did they expect that it would come about? Some thought of a better time to come, and of the means of its achievement, in ordinary, this-worldly terms, while others indulged in hopes of a more supernatural kind. Often the two ways of looking at the future merge and intermingle. The Zealots cherished this-worldly hopes, looking for a time when God alone would rule Israel, and this meant that his holy land must be taken out of the hands of the Romans. Nor were they the only people to hope for the end of Roman rule in Palestine. In one of the Psalms of Solomon, composed in Pharisaic circles after the first conquest of Jerusalem by the Romans in 63 BC, we find the following prayer for the expected messianic king:

‘ And gird him with strength, that he may shatter unrighteous rulers, And that he may purge Jerusalem from nations that trample her down to destruction’

Ps. Sol. 17: 24.

The conquest of Israel’s enemies was a necessary prelude to the betterment of her situation. And high hopes were entertained of her future glory. In another first-century work, the Assumption of Moses, we have this description of Israel after the punishment of the Gentiles:

And God will exalt thee,

And he will cause thee to approach to the

heaven of the stars,

in the place of their habitation.

And thou shalt look from on high and shalt

see thy enemies in Gehenna.

Ass. Moses, 10: 11.

This testifies to Israel having reached ‘the height of national, political and spiritual success’. In addition, it is expected by the author that the Jews of the Dispersion will return to Palestine and that all ‘God’s People’ will be endowed with the gift of the Holy Spirit and purified from evil. How did the Jews suppose that a better future would be brought about? They took it for granted that, fundamentally, it would be God’s doing. There were, however, differing views as to how he would choose to act. The Zealots believed in initiating and precipitating political and military action themselves. But they were also convinced that if they took the initiative in provoking a revolt against Rome, then God would fight with them and for them, and would win them a miraculous victory. Had they not believed this, they would would never have taken up arms at all. Nevertheless, a realistic appraisal of the military situation would have made it obvious to them that a small subject nation such as Israel could not possibly hope to stand up to the organised might of imperial Rome.

In the Psalms of Solomon, however, a human agent of the divine will enters the narrative. He is to be a king chosen and endowed with authority by God, and a descendent of the royal house of David. He is often called the Messiah or ‘the anointed one’, who will secure both the political and spiritual well-being of the nation of Israel. There is an impressive description of such a Messiah in the Psalms of Solomon. It describes him driving the Gentiles from Jerusalem and setting up a great kingdom which would be the centre of the whole world, and all the heathen peoples are to serve him. All this suggests that it will be a kingdom of military might, but yet the Psalm clearly states that he will not put his trust in weapons of war but in God. There is also a suggestion that he asserts his supremacy using moral and spiritual force:

‘For he shall not put his trust

in horse and rider and bow,

nor shall he multiply for himself

gold and silver for war.

… …

The Lord himself is his king, the hope of him

that is mighty through his hope in God.

All nations shall be in fear before him.

For he will smite the earth with

the word of his mouth for ever.

… …

He will rebuke rulers, and remove sinners

by the might of his word’

Ps. Sol. 17: 37-39, 41.

The Messiah, the Psalm claims, will be righteous and holy, ruling justly and caring for his people as a shepherd for his flock. But he will do all this because God has endowed him with the power of his Spirit. The Qumran sect also believed in a Davidic messiah who would conquer the heathen, a military leader of the community in the final war against their enemies. This war, however, had a twofold character. It is certainly a war against earthly foes, the heathen nations, and here the Messiah, also called the prince of the congregation, has his his part to play. But at the same time, it is a war on the supernatural plane, between the prince of light and the angel of darkness. It is the archangel Michael who fights against Belial on behalf of God’s elect and the Messiah himself begins to take on a supernatural personality, as he appears to be closely connected with the angelic hosts. This reveals that there did exist in some Jewish circles, the idea of a transcendent messiah who would appear at the end of time and take part in the judgment, and with whom the blessed elect would dwell eternally. In the book of Enoch, this supernatural being is called ‘the Elect One’ and also ‘the Son of Man’ (1 Enoch 46: 1). He is enthroned in glory and he will judge all the nations and their rulers (1 Enoch 62: 14).

This eschatological discussion of Jewish hopes gives the impression that they were chiefly concerned with their own national misfortunes and obsessed with dreams of future bliss for themselves as God’s elect. But what their best Hebrew theological minds were concerned with was a genuine problem which is also with us two thousand years later: if God is Lord of the whole world, why is the present state of the world so obviously contrary to his will? The fundamental hope was that, in the end times, he would fully establish his authority over his creation and demonstrate his absolute sovereignty. This is what is meant in the New Testament by the coming of the Kingdom of God.

Chronologically, however, in the first and second centuries CE the people of Judaea did indeed rise against Rome. The Jewish scene in the New Testament period was a continually changing one, hardly surprising given the earth-shaking events which took place in the period. In AD 70 the Temple in Jerusalem, the central symbol and focal point of Judaism, was destroyed, with many far-reaching consequences. During the first century, the foundation of a new form of Judaism began with the emergence of the Rabbis, their codification of the religious traditions and their approval of an authorised canon of Jewish Scripture. There was constant conflict with Rome, the occupying imperial power, to the point of savage battles; and there was an increasing conflict with the followers of The Way, or ‘Christianity’ as it later became known, which arose from the heart of Judaism and whose growing success posed a great many urgent questions. The Judaism that emerged from this turbulence was as united as it ever had been.

Politically, the Pharisees were ‘quietists’; they were advocates of non-resistance to Rome. The chief characteristic of the Zealots, who had much in common with the Pharisees, was their approval of violence in defence of their faith. There were probably connections between the Zealot movement and the Maccabees, but its beginning is usually taken to be a revolt against the census of Quirinius in 6AD. Judas, the leader of the revolt, was a Galilean, the son of Eleazar who was executed by Herod; his son led the last stand of the Zealots at Masada. The Zealots refused to pay Roman taxes, but they took their name from their zeal for the temple and the Law, which is amply illustrated in the writings of Josephus. He wrote very disapprovingly of them and labelled them sicaríí (assassins).

Nazareth in the 1960s.

When we come to the story of Jesus of Nazareth contained in the first four books of the Christian New Testament, the Gospels, we encounter a narrative we shall never understand unless we place it firmly against the background of the time in which he lived, in a country occupied by Roman troops whose presence provoked not only a general feeling of resentment and frustration but also the bitter activities of a resistance movement, the Zealots. Jesus was not a rootless individual; he grew up in Galilee where the Resistance Movement was very much alive. Therefore, Jesus likely grew up in a strong atmosphere of resistance. We have learned much in our own last two centuries about resistance movements, from Ireland to Africa and the Middle East. Most recently, this is how ‘Hamas’ sees itself, though many ‘western’ countries regard it as a ‘terrorist’ organisation. We have learned, through painful and often first-hand experience, how they come to dominate and determine the mind and mood of a people under the apparent calm of ordinary life, giving them an indisputable authority over the lives of ordinary people. Their clandestine, violent character only becomes apparent and acute when full-scale fighting breaks out.

It is against such a background that the ministry of Jesus must be seen; his sayings and actions take on new meaning when set against it; the brevity of his ministry and his extra-judicial execution outside Jerusalem become intelligible. His criticism of the common assumptions of his day, arising as they did from his own experience and meditation on the history and scriptures of his people, made him suspect, when his beliefs and attitudes became clear, with the Resistance and the Jewish government alike, as well as with many of his former friends (John 6: 66). Jesus’ ministry falls midway in the three hundred years’ Jewish war for religious and political freedom. It began with the Maccabaean rebellion of 168 BC and ended with Bar Kochba’s revolt in AD 132. Its story Is the theme of Josephus’ The Jewish War, in which we may find,

‘… set down both clearly and accurately the main course of events … the long-drawn agony of the war (AD 66-70) and the happenings which preceded it, with such a wealth of detail that his work is a major contribution to the history of a critical century.’

Quoted in Walton (ed.), p. 266.
Source: The History of Christianity (A Lion Handbook)

The Gospels were church books, written for the guidance of the early Christian communities and concerned with their religious life. These communities, after AD70, were predominantly non-Jewish in their membership; for many Christians, the incidents in Palestine from AD 30 to 70, were mere episodes in a far-off province of the Roman Empire. But the story of what had happened pushes through these religious records. It is the critical context against which the meaningfulness of Jesus’ ‘Good News’ is to be grasped - even his phrase ‘the kingdom of God’ may have been the watchword of the Zealots. What he did and said were meant for men and women there and then; only because this was so could it also have a meaning for all mankind. In the following passage, Josephus tells a story which gives us a feeling of what it was like to live under Roman rule in Palestine in the middle of the first century AD:

As procurator of Judaea, Tiberius sent Pilate, who during the night secretly conveyed to Jerusalem the images of Caesar known as ‘signa’. When day dawned this caused great excitement among the Jews; for those who were near were amazed at the sight, which meant that their laws had been trampled on – they do not permit any graven images to be set up in the City – and the angry city mob were joined by a huge influx of people from the country. They rushed off to Pilate in Caesaria, and begged him to remove the signa from Jerusalem and to respect their ancient customs. When Pilate refused, they fell prone all around his house and remained motionless for five days and nights.

The next day, Pilate took his seat on the tribunal in the Great Stadium and summoned the mob on the pretext that he was ready to give them an answer. Instead he gave a pre-arranged signal to the soldiers to surround the Jews in full armour, and the troops formed a ring three deep … Pilate, declaring that he would cut them to pieces unless they accepted the the images of Caesar, nodded to the soldiers to bare their swords. At this the Jews as though by agreement fell to ground in a body and bent their necks, shouting that they were ready to be killed rather than transgress the Law. Amazed at the intensity of their religious fervour, Pilate ordered the signa to be removed from Jerusalem forthwith.

Josephus; Quoted in Walton (ed.), p. 267.

This story underlines the fierce anger and resentment against the occupying forces which groups like the Zealots were able to exploit. The political divisions within and throughout the nation fed on a social climate of hatred and suspicion. Yet Jesus was not afraid to take risks to demonstrate the inclusivity of his mission and its purpose of reconciliation. Luke’s list of Jesus’ twelve apostles includes Simon Zealotes, ‘the Zealot’ (Luke 6: 15; Acts 1: 13); the parallel passages in Mark (3. 18) and Matthew (10: 4) call him ‘the Cananaean’, which is the Aramaic form of the same word. The presence of a Zealot among Jesus’ followers, coupled with recorded actions of Jesus like the cleansing of the temple and the fact that he was crucified by the Romans on a quasi-political charge has prompted elaborate theories about his connection with the sect. In his book, Portrait of Jesus, Alan T. Dale uses his literary imagination combined with knowledge of the contemporary Jewish context to interpret some of these theories in a parallel narrative to the gospels:

” ‘Fighters from Childhood:

‘The villages in the Galilean hills seemed … to be quiet sleepy places. But behind the quietness there was a very different story to tell – as we soon have found out if we had joined in the conversation, on a Saturday morning, after worship in the synagogue or sat talking in the evening with some of the villagers. We would have quickly learned that there was trouble afoot – and dangerous trouble at that – in this northern border province. …

‘We soon begin to understand why the name ‘Galilean’ meant, to the people in the south, something like ‘rebel’ or ‘anarchist’, why Galilee was a home of the Zealots or freedom fighters, and why the Galileans were called ‘born fighters’. The war with the Romans broke out thirty years later. The Tenth Legion marked down Japha town – and nearby Jotapata – and destroyed it in some of the bloodiest fight of the war.

‘Incident in the hills:

‘From early light the streets of the small lakeside fishing port – Capernaum – were crowded with men and loud with gossip and argument. The soldiers at the small Roman outpost in the town were wondering what was afoot. Somebody suddenly noticed a small boat putting out. … The boat was making heavy weather – an onshore wind was blowing.

‘Jesus climbed out. He knew the crowd: farmers from hill villages, fishermen from the lakeside towns. They were the men of the Resistance Movement – ‘Zealots’, nationalists -farmers or fishermen by day, ‘freedom fighters’ whenever the chance came. … a leaderless mob, an army without a general.

‘He went with them into the hills, to a lonely spot out of sight and reach of the Roman garrison. The talk went on and on. They wanted him to be their leader – their ‘king’. Jesus would have no part in their plans. … He got everybody to share a common meal together, a meal in which they promised again to live as God’s people.

‘The men – under command – sat down in sat down in compliance in companies of fifty and a hundred each, rank by rank. He got his friends to go back in the boat and across the Lake. He then said goodbye to the men and got them to go home. He himself, under the darkening sky, climbed the hillside. He wanted to think things out alone in God’s presence – alone.

‘The Issue at Stake:

‘There were almost as many points of view as men arguing about them. But all would agree that their people – the Jewish people – were a special people called by God to take a special part in the history of the world. Jesus would have no quarrel with that. But everything turned on what was meant by the words being used… by the words ‘God’s People’. It wasn’t enough just to use the words, as though it was quite plain what they meant. It wasn’t plain and they didn’t agree. This was what the great debate was about. They were using the same words, but making them mean very different things.

‘Everybody knew, however, that things could not go on as they were. The situation in which the Jewish people found themselves – subjects of a foreign empire – was really intolerable. The only people who thought it wasn’t were members of the aristocratic government in Jerusalem -they owed their very existence to their Roman overlords. The common people and their leaders – and, most of all, the best among them – longed for a great change. They felt that the root of the problem was that they were an occupied country; if only they were free and independent, the ‘good time’ they all longed for would come. It was the presence of unbelieving foreigners – Roman soldiers, Greek citizens, foreign landlords – that made living as ‘God’s People’ impossible.

‘Most people believed in… keeping themselves ‘separate’, having nothing to do, as far as possible, with foreigners. Lots of ordinary people, of course, simply could not avoid meeting foreigners and having to deal with them – using their money with its hated image of the emperor on it, carrying army baggage, working on foreign estates, selling market produce in Greek cities. Religious people, like Pharisees and Zealots, had as little to do with foreigners as possible. They would not enter a house owned by a foreigner and they certainly wouldn’t have a meal with him. The word ‘Pharisee’ was believed to mean ‘separatist’.

Foreigners, however, were not the only trouble. Living as ‘God’s People’, the Pharisees and Zealots believed, meant keeping God’s laws. … Many people believed that it was because they had not kept God’s laws that God had allowed the Romans to occupy their country. … The Zealots wanted to go much further. They believed that things could only be put right by a Holy War, the violent overthrow of the Romans. They could point to many stories in the Bible to prove it. … Something had to be done. Somebody had to take a stand. The leadership of the Jewish people was at stake. Who was to lead them in this crucial moment in their history? The Pharisees? The Zealots? John (the Baptist)? Who?…

‘Freedom Fighters:

‘Galilee was a home to many of the freedom fighters, and Japha, the mother town of Nazareth (hamlet) – only two miles away – was probably a Zealot town. There were many good men among the Zealots, men who were driven by desperation to believe that violence was the was the only way God’s People would win their proper freedom. There were among them, of course, as in any extreme movement, many who were no more than thugs and gangsters, hiding their bloodthirstiness behind the fine language of religion; but most were sincere men.

‘The memory of what had happened in 63 BCE was still vivid and bitter. … But the Zealots looked further back than the sack of Jerusalem by the Romans … The Old Testament itself – their Bible – was full of stories of wars against foreigners. They were described as God’s Wars. This was surely enough to prove that this was God’s way. Was not God called ‘God of the armies of Israel’? The war against Rome was a ‘Holy War’. The ‘Holy Land’ was not the private property of the emperor … ; it was God’s – he alone was king there.

‘The Zealots cared for social justice too. When … they actually captured Jerusalem in AD 66 in the war with Rome, one of the first things they did was to destroy all the legal documents there, abolishing Jewish debts to Rome, breaking up the great landed estates and setting all slaves free. They were ‘thugs’ and ‘murderers’ in the eyes of the Roman authorities and the aristocratic Jewish government in Jerusalem, they were patriots to their own people.

‘But Jesus had come to believe that violence was not God’s way – especially the rough violence of the Zealots. He was bound to be their critic and the critic of all those who sympathised with them. Many of his stories were aimed at them as well as the Pharisees. It needed a brave man to be as outspoken as Jesus, if he was to be true to himself and his convictions. It took some courage to talk like this in an occupied country:

“If a Roman soldier forces you to carry his baggage for a mile along the road, go two miles along the road with him” (Matthew 5: 41)

Dale, pp. 5-8, 11-13, 17-19.

The Resistance Movement was not a bid for mere political freedom. Politics and religion were, for Jews, two sides of the same coin. Hence among the people of the country, many different religious movements made a bid for their allegiance – Pharisees who were popular with the common people, groups such as those in Qumran (in the Jordan Valley), Sadducees (wealthy priestly families) in Jerusalem, and followers of John the Hermit on the west bank of the Jordan. The common people had their own varying, ambiguous and changing attitudes. But it was the political situation that gave all these movements their focus. The Zealot rising which began in AD66, was disastrous, as Jesus of Nazareth prophesied that it would be (Matthew’s Gospel, 24: 1-2), along with other voices. Jesus had predicted that it would result in the destruction of the temple, as it did four years after the Rising began. As he shared a common meal with the Resistance leaders in the Galilean hills, he had made it clear that he could play no part in it, that its ideals and methods had no meeting place with his own. He was already looking beyond the parochialism of his people to the wider world of God’s mission to the Gentiles. The Fourth Gospel tells us that from that point on, ‘many of his disciples withdrew and no longer went about with him’ (Jn. 6: 66).

The nature of Jesus’ entry into Jerusalem (Mt. 21: 1-9) is of some importance to our understanding of how he saw his mission in respect of nonviolence. He quietly accepted his disciples’ recognition of him as the Messiah, but immediately went on to teach about a new way, that of suffering. His triumphal entry into the city was the entry of a king; the clothes spread along the road were a sign of homage; the title ‘Son of David’ is a royal title; the palm branches (Jn. 12, 13) recalled the rising of the Maccabees. Indeed, the attitude of the crowd recalls a passage from The Psalms of Solomon:

‘Behold, O Lord, and raise up their King, the son of David,

at the time thou hast appointed, O God,

to reign over Israel thy servant.

Gird him with strength to shatter wicked rulers.

Cleanse Jerusalem from the Gentiles who trample it and destroy.

‘In wisdom, in justice, may he thrust out sinners from God’s heritage,

crush the arrogance of the sinner like a potter’s crocks,

crush his whole substance with an iron mace;

blot out the lawless Gentiles with a word,

put the Gentiles to flight with his threats.’

The Psalms of Solomon, 17: 23-7.

The relevant Gentiles were the Romans, and possibly the Greeks. But Jesus rejected that part of the scriptural tradition that depicted the Messiah as buckling on his sword and riding out to war on a white charger. He chose that part of the prophecy from Zechariah which depicts the Messiah coming to Jerusalem humbly, mounted on an ass. The next verse runs:

‘He shall banish chariots from Ephraim

and war-horses from Jerusalem;

the warrior’s bow shall be banished,

He shall speak peaceably to every nation,

and his rule shall extend from sea to sea,

from the River to the ends of the earth.’  

Zechariah, 9: 9-10.

Jesus was a different kind of Messiah, standing not for war and military victory but for disarmament and peace. Only a handful of them remained loyal, and when he was taken captive by the Chief Priest’s guards, even they took flight and abandoned him. The following passage from the gospel depicts the moment when Jesus fulfilled the choice he had laid before his disciples at Caesarea Philippi:

‘At that moment one of those with Jesus reached for his sword and drew it, and he struck at the High Priest’s servant and cut off his ear. But Jesus said to him, “Put up your sword: All who take the sword die by the sword.” ‘

Matthew 26, 51-2.

At this moment in the Garden of Gethsemane, he could have raised the standard of violent revolt: He did not do so, but chose the way of suffering and of the cross. In the end, he cut a lonely figure and, when he died alone save for two ‘bandits’ (possibly Zealots), it seemed his ‘movement’ had died with him.

There were collaborators as well as guerillas among the resistance groups, including the followers of Jesus of Nazareth, though most of them supported his way of passive resistance. There has been interesting speculation among scholars about the motivations of Judas Iscariot. The meaning of the name ‘Iscariot’ is uncertain, but some have supposed it to be a corruption of the Latin ‘Sicarius’, or ‘dagger-man’, a member of the violent resistance. We have noted that Jesus attracted some members of this group, including Simon the Zealot, who hoped they had found the nationalist leader for whom they had been seeking. The betrayal of Jesus by Judas has always been a puzzle since the sum of thirty silver pieces seems paltry for such an act. Some have speculated that Judas was expecting the revolt to come following the triumphal entry at the Autumn festival of Tabernacles, or perhaps after the Cleansing of the Temple the following spring, just before Passover. When Jesus showed no signs of taking a truly insurrectionary initiative, however, Judas decided to try to force his hand. But Jesus accepted arrest and death rather than embark on a violent crusade which he believed was not God’s will or way. Of course, this is pure speculation, but it does make some sense.

But in this passage, Jesus is making a simple statement of fact that violence provokes counter-violence, and the violence provoked often exceeds the initial violence in scope and scale. In other words, violence tends to escalate uncontrollably. This is neither a justification nor condemnation of those provoked, just a simple statement of historical fact. Nonetheless, these words are not spoken to the aggressor in this situation, but to a loyal follower who misguidedly seeks to defend an innocent man from wrongful arrest and violence. They are a clear warning against all wars, however ‘defensive’ or ‘just’. This was how the early church understood these words of Jesus. Tertullian in his treatise On Patience declared that at this moment Jesus cursed the works of the sword forever after. In another treatise, On Idolatry, he spells out the meaning of this more fully:

‘How shall the Christian wage war, how indeed shall he even be a soldier in peacetime, without the sword which the Lord has taken away? For although soldiers had come to John and received the form of their rule, although even a centurion had believed, the Lord afterwards in disarming Peter unbuckled every soldier.’

Tertullian, On Idolatry.

Here, Tertullian comes close to a statement of Christian Pacifism. In his letter to the Jewish Christians (‘Hebrews’), for whom the suffering of Jesus was a ‘stumbling block’, the writer makes clear that the way of Jesus is the way of love, nonviolence and redemptive suffering. His readers had not yet come to equate the Messiah with the Suffering Servant about whom the prophets had written.

Johanan ben Zakkai is an important figure in the debate between the supporters of violent and nonviolent resistance among the early rabbinic writers. He belongs to the period of the fall of Jerusalem in AD70. One story tells how, in despair at the spirit of contention between different partisan groups, he had himself carried out of the city in a coffin to the Roman camp. Certainly, he became persuaded that violent resistance merely contained the seeds of destruction within it. He was given permission by the Romans to establish a new centre at Jabneh Jamnia for the study of the Torah, together with a court of justice. A council of rabbis, meeting at Jamnia in about AD90 managed to successfully reorganise the chaos with which they were confronted. Their measures led to the eventual elimination of competing forms of Judaism and the predominance of a single version, Rabbinic Judaism, the Judaism of today. Johanan’s genius was to turn the leaders of Judaism from politics and acts of war to scholarship, piety and the things of peace, and to show that in so doing they were fulfilling rather than abandoning the central tenets of the faith. The School of Jabneh came to hold an authority comparable to that held earlier by the Sanhedrin.

Division, ‘Diaspora’ & the Development of Rabbinic Judaism:

Throughout the first century, however, these competitors were very much in evidence, so as well as reckoning with a changing historical situation, it is important to bear in mind that there were variations in Judaism from group to group and place to place. First, a geographical distinction has to be drawn between Palestinian Judaism and the Judaism of the Diaspora (the dispersion of Jews throughout the Roman Empire), with its greater contact with the Hellenistic atmosphere of the Mediterranean world. The distinction is by no means a clear-cut one, however, especially in linguistic terms, for Palestine had also been heavily influenced by the Greek language and culture. But since the diasporic Jews lived at great distances from Jerusalem and the temple, and were able to read the Torah in its Greek translation, the Septuagint and not the original Hebrew, they were able to maintain greater diversity in their religion. Secondly, within the two broad categories, there were more specific groupings. In Palestinian Judaism, as noted already, there were Pharisees, Sadducees, Essenes and Zealots to name but a few of the better-known; and there was the obvious split between the educated, bilingual classes and the illiterate monoglot masses. Divisions existed in Hellenistic Judaism, especially in terms of philosophical influences, but they are more difficult to trace.

So thoroughly did Rabbinic Judaism carry out its work of unification that it is often almost impossible to see the views of the movements it replaced, particularly those with which it did not agree. The Rabbinic writings fall, roughly speaking, into four main groups. The Mishna is a compilation of legal requirements, written down at the end of the second century, in the form of legal opinions; the Gemara is a discussion of the Mishna. The two together form the Talmud, of which there are two versions, Babylonian and Palestinian, completed at the end of the fourth century. The third is the Tosefta, which collects sayings which failed to be included in the Mishna, and the Midrash is a term referring to commentaries on the Scriptures, sometimes legal, sometimes theological. However, these sources are lacking in historical context. They contain early material, handed down orally. Still, since they were compiled into compendia later than the council of Jamnia, their view of the material is selective, often hazy and sometimes partisan. For example, nothing in it can be connected with the Maccabaean revolt or the temple’s destruction. The clues they do offer are in the realm of Jewish religious thought and institutions.

For our knowledge of the history of the period, we depend on the Jewish historian Josephus, who lived between 37 and 100 AD (CE), and his two major works, the History of the Jewish War and the Jewish Antiquities. These present a fuller picture of developments in the first three quarters of the century. These books do, however, have their drawbacks. Josephus was a client of the Flavian emperors and therefore had to be diplomatic in his presentation of Judaism; he also had to come to terms with his own position, which other Jews regarded as treacherous not just to the nation but also to Judaism. We therefore have to allow for some bias. Josephus is also silent about Judaism after the end of the war of AD66 and so leaves us completely in the dark about the developments which led to the council of Jamnia. For much of our knowledge of first-century Judaism, we are dependent on the New Testament texts of Christianity. In addition, our knowledge of Hellenistic Judaism is the result of the fact that the early churches preserved the writings of Josephus and of Philo of Alexandria. Otherwise, they would have remained unknown, as would the Jewish books which go to form the Apocrypha. Christianity also preserved the apocalyptic literature between the testaments, as noted above; the Rabbinic writings are essentially non-eschatological.

Christian sources tell us much about Judaism, and chief among them is the New Testament itself. It is often the sole source offering evidence of the details of Roman administration, though historical authenticity and reliability are sometimes difficult to surmise. In the Gospels, we have to allow for both bias and omission of information. In the letters of Paul, we have evidence of the thinking of a first-century Jew, but we know that he was from the eastern Mediterranean and, according to Luke, spent limited time in Jerusalem, Damascus and Antioch before and during his missions in Asia Minor and Greece. Both Luke and Paul himself report controversies between him and both Jews and Christians in Jerusalem and on his missions.

Finally, Palestinian archaeology provided two spectacular finds: the site of the Qumran community and its literature, and the citadel of Masada. Qumran and the Dead Sea Scrolls have given us an extensive view of the life of a sect previously known only from occasional textual references. Masada illustrates two greatly contrasting times, the luxury of the desert palace at the time of Herod at the beginning of the century and the tragedy of the last stand of the Zealots in AD73; it has also provided the lost original Hebrew text of the book of Ecclesiasticus (previously preserved only in Greek) together with a fragment from the Dead Sea Scrolls. However, we cannot assume any direct connection between these two sites. Due to the difficulties with all these sources, the brief pictures of first-century Jewish society and religion they give us must be regarded as very approximate reconstructions. Nevertheless, these must be attempted if we are to try to understand the background of the extracts that follow. When we speak of Pharisees, Sadducees and scribes, we must remember that the reliable evidence we have about them is, in reality, quite small. The caricatures of them that have developed since their times do not further our understanding of Judaism in New Testament times and have tended to prejudice Christian relations with Jews to this day.

A scribe at work.

The Rabbinic Tradition – Temple, Torah & Talmud:

After the council of Jamnia, Judaism became known as Rabbinic Judaism, as opposed to the Pharisaic Judaism which existed before in the context of the Sanhedrin. The two are closely connected, however, and it is almost impossible to say where one ended and the other began. At the beginning of the first century, ‘Rabbi’ was not a formal title, but a mode of address meaning ‘my master’, used as a mark of respect. It is used several times in this way in the ‘fourth’ gospel, in remarks to Jesus of Nazareth (Jn. 1: 49, 6: 25). By the end of the first century, however, it had taken on a more formal significance, as is indicated by Matt. 23: 7f., a passage which dates from the time of the early church rather than that of Jesus and his immediate disciples. In the second century, it became firmly established, which is how it is used in Rabbinic literature and synagogues. It was this development which shaped the future of Judaism; the heightened prominence of the Law after the fall of the Temple was accompanied by the growing importance of the institution of the local synagogue as a place of worship and learning, which had been increasing for some time before AD70.

The Temple and its priesthood may have been the most strikingly visible symbols of Judaism until the end of the first century but had they they been its exclusive centre, Judaism could not have survived their fall. The way it adjusted to the situation after AD70 shows that there were other strengths; these strengths had as their common basis the Law and the differing interpretations of it which were brought together in the Talmud. Even while the temple still stood, within Judaea there seems to have been an increasing preoccupation with the scriptures and their implications, and this preoccupation will have been even more characteristic of the Jews of the Diaspora. A movement like that found at Qumran is unthinkable without this development, which comes to full effect in Rabbinic Judaism. The beginnings of this trend are to be found in the Babylonian exile and the period after the return. During this period the Pentateuch took final form and was accorded its place in the Torah, the Law; the Prophets had taken a place beside it by the beginning of the second century BC (BCE) and the writings were recognised during the first century AD (CE).

The Hebrew word ‘Torah’ means ‘instruction’ or ‘doctrine’ rather than ‘law’ and the Pentateuch is more than simply a collection of books of ‘Law’, or laws. Nevertheless, that is what it became as it was made the object of evermore intensive study. As well as considering the parties within Judaism in this process, it needs to be remembered that the New Testament ‘Gospels’, Acts and Paul’s letters present only one picture of first-century Judaism. The other side of ‘the Law’ also requires sympathetic treatment in the context of Hebraic texts which were being edited contemporaneously with the Greek texts of the Christian New Testament and interpreted in the writings of the Talmud. Concerning issues of war and peace, for example, ‘Seek peace and pursue it’ became a central tenet of later Judaism. The first verb is often translated as ‘propose’, emphasising the active state of peacemaking. On the other hand, ‘an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth’ was not, however, related to war, but to civil disputes between citizens, and though it is featured in the NT, it is not found in Rabbinic literature. Instead, the rabbinic expositions defined peace as part of God’s original purpose for mankind. The Talmud points out how many of the commandments of the Law begin with a conditional ‘if’ or ‘when’. If the situation arises, the believer’s duty is clear, but he need not go out of his way to find the situation. Two of the rabbis wrote:

‘If the heavenly beings who are free from envy, rivalry and hatred are in need of peace, how much more are the lower beings, who are subject to hatred, rivalry and envy, in need of peace.’

Deut. Rabbah 5, 12. Bar Kapparah

‘Great is peace, because peace is to the earth what yeast is to the dough. If the Holy One, blessed be He, had not given peace to the earth, the sword and wild beasts would desolate the world.’

Baraíta de Perek ha Shalom.

For these rabbis, peace also takes priority over one of the most solemn and basic of all the commandments, condemning idolatry. This is effectively a condemnation of Jehu, who massacred the Baal-worshippers, and of the Maccabees, for rising in violence against Greek idolatry. In general, peace is said to bring together all the blessings that God would heap on Israel. So too the rabbis liked to put a peaceable interpretation upon stories of violence. So, Nebuchadnezzar’s prisoners of war are reinterpreted as scholars (2 Kings 24: 16) and David is remembered as a poet, musician and scholar rather than as a warrior king. Equally of interest is the treatment of the eight-day festival celebrating the rededication of the altar in Jerusalem after the Maccabean victories (1 Macc. 4: 59; 2 Macc. 10: 6). The rabbis say nothing about the military triumph, stressing that it is a Festival of Lights, recording a legend that eight iron spears into an eight-branched candlestick, the Menorah and that the altar was a symbol of reconciliation between God and mankind, and between Israel and its neighbours.

The rabbis also condemned destructive action and praised constructive transformation. Forgiveness is better than revenge. As the Talmud says, ‘He who avenges himself or bears a grudge against acts as one who has one hand cut by a knife, and then sticks it into the other hand for revenge.’ There is an awareness of the solidarity of mankind and its tendency to escalate violence. But if violence escalates so does goodness, kindness and friendliness. Another general principle is that destructive action must be avoided if a less destructive action will suffice for the good end desired:

If one is able to save a victim at the cost of only a limb of the pursuer and does not take the trouble to do so, but saves the victim at the cost of the pursuer’s life by killing him, he is deemed a shedder of blood and he deserves to be put to death. He may not, however, be put to death by the court because his true intention was to save life; he must be punished rather than put to death.

Mishneh Torah: Hilchot Rozeach 1: 13.

That ‘legislation’ is doubly notable in its humanity. All human life is sacred and whoever sheds blood diminishes God’s presence in the world (Gen. Rabbah 34: 14). In Hebrew hymnody there is a famous refrain: Give thanks to the Lord, for it is good, for his mercy endures forever (Ps. 107: 1). The phrase occurs in the account of a muster for battle before King Jehoshaphat (2 Chron. 20: 21), but without the words, for it is good. Why are they omitted? Because the destruction of human beings is not good, because the Holy One, blessed be he, does not rejoice in the downfall of the wicked.

War and the destruction of enemy soldiers are thus regarded by the rabbinical interpreters as in some circumstances a ‘cruel necessity’. But rather than set down a set of rules, the rabbis were concerned to provide an ethical framework for the conduct of war. They distinguished between two kinds of war, milchemet reshut, optional war, and milchemet chovah, obligatory war, also called milchemet mitzvah, religious war. This latter type included the war against the seven tribes of Canaan (Deut. 20: 16-18), the war against Amalek, who had been guilty of unprovoked aggression (Deut. 25: 17-19), and defensive war generally. The seven tribes no longer exist: as Maimonides put it, writing in the second century on the Principles of War, ‘their memory has long perished’, though some were found to argue that this justified military measures in establishing the modern state of Israel. The Amalekites have also disappeared, but all tyrants, dictators and oppressors have been considered to be ‘the seed of Amalek’: ‘The Lord will have war with Amalek from generation to generation’ (Exodus 17: 16), and many Jews later justified action against Hitler on these grounds. But the main grounds for a just war rest in attack from outside, and such a war is obligatory. There was much discussion among the rabbis as to whether preventative war fell into this category. The majority view was that it did not:

Opinion is divided only when they engage their enemies in war because they are afraid that they will attack them, or if it is known that they are preparing to attack. According to Rabbi Judah it is obligatory and according to the sages it is optional.

Sotah, 44b.

Optional wars are much less clear morally, and the rabbis, though justifying those recorded in Scripture, have been far less ready to extend that justification to later wars. Their standard examples are the conquest of Canaan as an obligatory war and the expansion of the whole kingdom by David and his house as an optional war. Maimonides sums up the whole doctrine concisely:

The primary war which the King wages is a ‘religious war’ Which may be denominated as a religious war? It includes the war against the seven tribes, the war against Amalek, and a war to deliver Israel from enemy aggression. Thereafter he may engage in an ‘optional war’, that is, a war against neighbouring nations to extend the borders of Israel and to enhance his greatness and prestige.

Mishneh Torah: Hilchot Melachim 5: 1.

Maimonides’ Principles of War:

Maimonides was born in 1138 (or 1135) in Córdoba, Andalusia, in the Muslim-ruled Almoravid Empire, during what some scholars consider to be the end of the golden age of Jewish culture in the Iberian Peninsula, after the first centuries of the Moorish rule. His father Maimon ben Joseph, was a Spanish dayyan (Jewish judge). Aaron ha-Kohen later wrote that he had traced Maimonides’ descent back to Simeon ben Judah ha-Nasi from the Davidic line. Maimonides studied the Torah under his father, who had in turn studied under Rabbi Joseph ibn Migash, a student of Isaac Alfasi. At an early age, Maimonides developed an interest in sciences and philosophy. He read those Greek philosophers accessible in Arabic translations and was deeply immersed in the sciences and learning of Islamic culture.

Plaque of Maimonides at Rambam Medical Center, Haifa

In early first century (AD/CE) Judaism, while the King could take full responsibility for declaring a religious war, an optional war required the consent of the Sanhedrin. The Rabbinic tradition thus picked out the elements in the Torah which pointed to mercy and stressed these in their laws of war. Maimonides offered a convenient compendium. For example, there was to be no wanton destruction:

‘It is forbidden to cut down fruit-bearing trees outside a city, nor may a water channel be deflected from them so that they wither, as it is said: “Thou shalt not destroy the trees thereof.” (Deut. 20: 19). Whoever cuts down a fruit-bearing tree is flogged. This penalty is imposed not only for cutting it down during a siege; whenever a fruit-yielding tree is cut down with destructive intent, flogging is incurred. … The law forbids only wanton destruction.’

Ibid. 6: 8.

‘Not only one who cuts down trees, but also one who smashes household goods, tears clothes, demolishes a building, stops up a spring, or destroys articles of food with destructive intent, transgresses the command: “Thou shat not destroy.” He is not flogged, but is administered a disciplinary beating imposed by the rabbis.’

Ibid. 6, 10.

So too a woman prisoner is to be treated as a human being. If she has been widowed or bereaved, she is to be allowed a period of mourning, during which she will appear less desirable. Only then may her captor cohabit with her. But if she is converted to Judaism, then she will be ceremonially purified, and entitled to a legal (re)marriage. And if her new husband, her captor, tires of her, he must let her go freely and is not entitled to enslave her or to sell her (ibid. 8: 5-6). Sometimes the Rabbis went beyond the Torah, as shown in an instructive passage in Maimonides:

‘When siege is laid to a city for the purpose of capture, it may not be surrounded on all four sides but only three in order to give an opportunity for escape to those who would flee to save their lives, as it is said: “And they warred against Midian, as the Lord commanded Moses” (Num. 31: 7). It has been learned by tradition that that was the instruction given to Moses.

ibid. 6, 7.

We do not know where the tradition came from, but it is clearly not in the Book of Numbers. Again, whereas the Bible decrees destruction without remission against Amalek and the seven tribes, the Rabbis dare to contradict the clear word of the Torah:

‘No war is declared against any nation before peace offers are made to it. This obtains both in an optional war and a religious war.’

ibid. 6: 1.

The other party to the conflict are given the option of accepting the ‘seven commandments enjoined upon the descendants of Noah’. These were: to avoid idolatry; avoid blasphemy against the name of God; establish courts of justice; avoid murder, adultery, and theft; and not eat flesh cut from a living animal. As in Jewish tradition, the whole human race was descended from Noah, these commandments were regarded as a code of universal morality, and anyone who would not accept them was seen as subhuman. But any people suing for peace, willing to pay tribute, accept a subject status and accept these commandments must be left in peace:

‘Once they make peace and take upon themselves the seven commandments, it is forbidden to deceive them and prove false to the covenant made with them.’

ibid. 6: 3.

Military service was in principle universal and compulsory, and in a religious war, this applied even to newlyweds. But in optional wars, some exemptions were permitted on compassionate grounds and the three principal grounds were biblically based (Deut. 20: 5-8). They were for those who had built a house, but not yet occupied it; who had planted a vineyard but not yet enjoyed its first fruit, and those who were engaged to be married. Judas Maccabaeus re-established these principles (1 Macc. 3: 56) despite the desperate military needs. Maimonides’ compendium also reasserts them, but in such a way that they cannot be trumped-up excuses.

Interestingly, the rabbis added a further compassionate ground, that the death of one member of a family on military service would exempt all other sons and brothers. However, they might be required for non-combatant duties. More radical than all these exemptions, however, is the Deuteronomic precept that the ‘fearful and fainthearted’ should be allowed to return home (20: 8), since fear is infectious. The words, Rach halevav have been interpreted as a ‘tender conscience’, or a hyper-sensitivity to suffering in others, rather than as simply cowardice. Rabbi Jose the Galilean took the whole phrase to refer to those who were fearful because of their own misdeeds: it was better not to have ‘serious offenders’ in the army. But the more usual view was that taken by Rabbi Akiba:

‘Our rabbis taught: If he heard the sound of trumpets and was panic-stricken, or beheld the brandishing of swords and the urine discharged itself upon his knees, he returns home.’

Sotah, 44ab.

This was a more humane concession to human weakness than military discipline had generally allowed in the ancient world. This was extended even to obligatory wars, where the other exemptions were disallowed. Further, some commentators claim that the priest anointed for war (the ‘chaplain’) was there precisely to assert the rights of this group. Sabbath observance was another circumscription of military activity. It was one of the chief reasons why Jews were exempted from military service by the Romans (Josephus, Ant. 14: 10, 11-19). The strict Jews would not bear arms on the Sabbath and in the reign of Antiochus Epiphanes allowed themselves to be massacred rather than profane the Sabbath even in self-defence (1 Macc. 2: 29-38). Once these scruples were known, military commanders opposed to the Jews took advantage of them (2 Macc. 5: 25-6; 15: 1; Jos. Ap. 1, 22: Ant. 13, 12, 4: 18, 9, 2). The Maccabaean guerrillas therefore decided that there was no military future in strict observance of this point and that they would fight defensively on the Sabbath, though they would not initiate battle (1 Macc. 2: 41; 9: 34-49; 2 Macc. 8: 21-8; c.f. Jos. BJ 2, 18, 2). This last remained a severe restriction: for example, the Jewish troops would not destroy siegeworks on the Sabbath, which enabled Pompey to complete his preparations against Jerusalem in BCE 63 (Jos. Ant. 14: 4, 2). Rabbinic tradition did not go much further than prohibiting the declaration of an optional war on the Sabbath.

The title page of The Guide for the Perplexed.

In general, while war was permitted, the rabbis did not allow their disciples to forget that war was justified only if directed to constructive ends, which would be lost if standards of behaviour were allowed to slide. Maimonides put it clearly in his Guide to the Perplexed:

‘It will thus be confirmed in the heart of every one of the Israelites that their camp must be like a sanctuary of the Lord, and it must not be like the camps of the heathen, whose sole object is corruption and sin, and who seek only to cause injury to others and to take their property, whilst our object is to lead mankind to the service of God and to a good sound order.’

Guide to the Perplexed, (3: 41)

One further point in Jewish traditions is that there is a general obligation for the individual to be actively involved on the side of good against evil. He is invited to regard the world as delicately balanced between the two. His action may tip the scale:

‘He who commits a good deed may incline the balance with regard to himself and all mankind towards the side of the good: and he who commits a sin may incline the balance with regard to himself and all mankind towards the side of guilt.’

Tosefta Kiddushin 1: 13.

Therefore, as the Sanhedrin announced, the individual within Judaism has a responsibility to ‘protest’ for peace:

‘Whoever is able to protest against the transgressions of the people of his community and does not do so is punished for the sins of his community. Whoever is able to protest against the transgressions of the entire world and does not do so is punished for the transgressions of the entire world.’

Sanhedrin, 54b.

Judaism thus does not countenance quietism or passivism but fosters active involvement and pacifism:

‘If the man of learning participates in public affairs and serves as judge or arbitrator, he gives stability to the land. But if he sits in his home and says to himself, ‘What have the affairs of society to do with me?… Why should I trouble myself with the people’s voices of protest? Let my soul dwell in peace! – if he does this, he overthrows the world.

Tanhuma Mishpatim.

The Vocation to Suffering:

Across the centuries since the twelfth, when Maimonides was writing, the Jewish people in the diaspora have suffered intensely from persecution. From this has come the idea of a vocation to suffering, of the acceptance of suffering, as a means of changing the world. One great rabbinic dictum was, Be of the persecuted rather than the persecutors (Baba Kamma: 93a). Rabbi Joshua ben Levi said, ‘He who gladly accepts the sufferings of this world brings salvation to the world.’ Judah Ha Levi in al Khuzari (11: 44) in the twelfth century wrote that Israel had a mission of suffering. Israel, the heart of humanity, the suffering servant, bears the ills of all, and by this very fact allows God to reveal himself on earth. Simon ben Yochai said: ‘The best which God gave Israel, he gave through suffering.’ Sholem Asch cried:

‘God be thanked that the nations have not given my people the opportunity to commit against others the crimes which have been committed against it.’

(to be concluded)

Sources (for both parts):

John Barton (2019), A History of the Bible: The Book and Its Faiths. London: Allen Lane.

Alan T Dale (1979), Portrait of Jesus. Oxford: OUP.

Tim Dowley (ed.) (1977), The History of Christianity. Berkhamsted: Lion Publishing.

John Ferguson (1977), War and Peace in The World’s Religions. London: Sheldon Press.

John Ferguson (1973), The Politics of Love: The New Testament and Non-Violent Revolution. Cambridge: James Clarke & Co.

Robert C Walton (ed.) (1970), A Source Book of the Bible for Teachers. London: SCM Press.

War, Peace & Justice in Judaism: Part One – The Hebrew Bible.

Prologue – A Time for Every Purpose:

For everything there is a season,

and a time for every purpose under heaven;

a time to be born, a time to die;

a time to plant, and a time to pluck up what has been planted;

a time to kill, and a time to heal;

a time to break down, and a time to build up;

a time to weep, and a time to laugh;

a time to mourn, and a time to dance;

a time to throw stones, and a time to gather stones together;

a time to embrace and a time to refrain from embracing;

… a time to tear, and a time to sew;

a time to keep silence, and a time to speak;

a time to love, and a time to hate;

a time for war, and a time for peace.

Ecclesiastes 3: 1-9.

This famous passage from one of the ‘Books of Wisdom’ of the Old Testament was popularised in my generation by the American folk-rock group The Byrds in the 1960s, having been earlier turned into a song by Pete Seeger. Before the first Israeli counter-offence began in the week following the Hamas-led pogrom against the kibbutzim and villages of southern Israel on 7th October, the beleaguered Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, quoted the passage in a press conference. The bombardment which followed certainly represented Israel’s ‘time for war’, but was criticised for its lack of proportion by some of Israel’s ‘Western’ allies, not to mention its regional Arab neighbours.

Therefore, as Israel continues to conduct its ‘counter-offensive’ against Hamas following the week-long truce which enabled the exchange of Jewish hostages for Palestinian Arab prisoners and the importation of humanitarian aid to the Gaza strip, in this, my fourth article on the religious and historical background to the current conflict, I want to reflect and focus on whether or not there is a Biblical basis for the Israeli strategy to defeat, degrade and dismantle Hamas’ network of terror. Certainly, the ‘secular’ basis for the support of Israel’s ‘right to self-defence’ remains clear, but in what sense can the bombing of Gaza, with its consequent civilian deaths, be justified in Judaistic terms?

John Barton’s recent book, A History of the Bible, has shown how the narratives of the Hebrew Bible (the ‘Old Testament’ to Christians) only occasionally provide direct advice on how people should live moral lives. The Bible does, however, contain material that gives advice or even instructions in a much more unequivocal way. Two of its other genres can be seen to do this: wisdom and law. It has long been traditional to group certain books in the ‘OT’ under the heading ‘wisdom’: Proverbs, Ecclesiastes and Job, as well as those in the Apocrypha like the Wisdom of Solomon. These, like the passage quoted above, contain many short sayings or aphorisms, summing up the Hebrew experience or giving explicit advice on how to behave. Many seem to reflect life in a village community and draw ‘morals’ from its daily activities. But some sayings seem better suited to the royal court than the Israelite village:

Wise warriors are mightier than strong ones,

and those who have knowledge than those who have strength;

for by wise guidance you can wage war,

and in abundance of counsellors there is victory.

Proverbs 24: 5-6.

This has led to a consensus among biblical scholars that the collection of proverbs into books probably occurred at the king’s court in Jerusalem, rather than in rural communities, and the books were most likely the work of scribes who made a living in royal employment. Assuming this context, E. W. Heaton paints a portrait of the person described in Proverbs as an early practitioner of ‘non-violence’:

‘The man of Proverbs is an open, cheerful character, who speaks his mind and does everything in his power to promote neighbourliness in the community at large… The way to deal with enemies, he believes, is not by revenge but by the same sort of generosity a man ought to show to everybody in need. … ‘

Heaton, Solomon’s New Men, pp. 124-6.

Ecclesiastes is even more the product of a kind of Hebrew scepticism than Job, often considered the most typical book of that genre. Overall, the book is concerned with the possibility of finding a profound meaning in life, denying that any can be found. Like Job, the book often quotes proverbs which suggest that there is order and worth in what happens on earth, only to point out the futility of human striving. Because it is attributed to a ‘son of David’ it is often thought to have been authored by Solomon, but this could simply mean that it was written by a king of the Davidic line. Ecclesiastes contains a few short stories to illustrate how human affairs turn out badly and make no ultimate sense:

‘There was a little city with few people in it. A great king came against it and besieged it, building great siege-works against it. Now there was found in it a poor, wise man, and he by his wisdom delivered the city. Yet no one remembered that poor man. So I said, “Wisdom is better than might; yet the poor man’s wisdom is despised, and his words are not heeded.”

Ecclesiastes 9: 14-16.

It seems that some of these tales contain veiled references to events in the history of Israel, but they are anonymized to make them appear typical of the vanity of human wishes. An editor has added an epilogue to the book to wrench its teaching back into line with biblical orthodoxy:

‘The end of the matter: all has been heard. Fear God and keep his commandments; for that is the whole duty of everyone. For God will bring every deed into judgement, including every secret thing, whether good or evil.’

Ecclesiastes 12: 13-14.

Wisdom literature invites the reader into a dialogue about human life and its patterns, rather than ‘laying down the law.’ It tends to be open-ended rather than dogmatic: if it offers insight into the human condition, proposing proverbs and wise sayings to ponder, not rigid diktats to be adhered to. Proverbs 30: 29-31 refers to three things that are stately in their stride, including a king striding before his people. It does not tell us whether it is a good thing for a king to stride ahead of his people, though we may assume that this means that this is better than him standing behind them in battle. But the statement itself is simply an observation to be registered. We do not know who the authors of the books of wisdom were, though the Proverbs may derive from court scribes who collected both folk and professional wise sayings. But the writers of Ecclesiastes seem to be sophisticated individuals, even though we do not know their names. Their social context is tantalizingly obscure to us, but there must have been some setting in which such works could be read and discussed, but there is no evidence of philosophical schools such as existed in ancient Greece. We only have the evidence of the works themselves.

Deliverance – The People of the Lord & their Laws:

John Ferguson, writing in the 1970s as a theologian on the place of Judaism among the world religions on the questions of war and peace, took a historical view of the religion in this respect. He argues that Judaism began with the ‘deliverance’ of the Israelites from Egypt under the leadership of Moses and the subsequent covenant at Mount Sinai. In the Psalms, it is one of the constant praises of the Lord that he brought his people up from Egypt. This was a military deliverance:

The Lord is a warrior: the Lord is his name.

The chariots of Pharaoh and his army

he has cast into the sea;

the flower of his officers

are engulfed in the Red Sea.

The watery abyss has covered them,

they sank in the depths like a stone.

Thy right hand, O Lord, is majestic in strength:

thy right hand, O Lord, shattered the enemy.

Exodus 15: 3-6.

So, too, with the entry into Canaan. Joshua puts an extended historical narrative into the mouth of the Lord. He records the deliverance from Egypt and continues to describe the Israelites’ conquest of Canaan:

“Then I brought you into the land of the Amorites who lived east of the Jordan; they fought against you but I delivered them into your hands: you took possession of their country and I destroyed them for your sake. The King of Moab, Balak son of Zippor, took the field against Israel. He sent for Balaam son of Boor to lay a curse on you, but I would not listen to him. Instead of that he blessed you: and so I saved you from the power of Balak. Then you crossed the Jordan and came to Jericho. The citizens of Jericho fought against you, but I delivered them into your hands. I spread panic before you, and it was this, not your sword or your bow, that drove out the two kings of the Amorites. I gave you land on which you had not laboured, cities which you had never built; you have lived in those cities and you eat the produce of vineyards and olive-groves which you did not plant.”

Josh. 24: 8-13.

The ‘historical’ books of the Hebrew Bible are full of such battles in which the Ark of the Covenant represents the very presence of the Lord in the campaign (1 Samuel 4: 1-11). The Israelites were undoubtedly a military people at that time; they believed in all the mystical powers of The Almighty. If Pharoah’s heart was hardened, God had hardened it: if God had not hardened it, it could not have been hardened. If Israel conquered in battle, it was through the will of the Lord. So he is ‘the Lord mighty in battle’ (Ps. 24: 8). He is the Lord of Hosts. David is sent out to challenge Goliath ‘in the name of the Lord of Hosts, the God of the army of Israel which you have defiled’ (1 Sam. 17: 45). David becomes, in many ways, the heroic soldier-king, despite the corrupting effects of power which led, for example, to the elimination of Uriah so that the king could enjoy his wife. As the culmination of his career, he hoped to ‘build a house as a resting place for the Ark of the Covenant of the Lord which might serve as a footstool for the feet of our God’. He made preparations to build it, but God put an abrupt stop to his plans by telling him:

“You shall not build a house in honour of my name, for you have been a fighting man and you have shed blood.”

1 Chron. 28: 2-3.

The prohibition here arises not from David’s unjust acts, but simply from the fact that he has been a soldier. The far less admirable and attractive Solomon, ruler of a heavily armed state, but not himself on the front line, as other kings beside David had been, is granted the privilege of building the first temple. Clearly, while warfare was regarded as justifiable, if not inevitable, it was not something that could be rewarded or combined with building houses of worship, emphasising that it was not something to be entered into lightly and certainly not wantonly. Even more telling of God’s attitude to ‘massacres’, is the story of Jehu, the renowned chariot-riding warrior king of Israel, who with the apparent support of the prophet Elisha, massacres the apostate house of Ahab and the Baal-worshippers (2 Kings 9-10). The prophet Hosea denounces these same actions as a crime to be punished by God, who tells him:

“Call him Jezreel: for in a little while I will punish the line of Jehu for the blood shed in Jezreel and put an end to the kingdom of Israel.”

Hos. 1: 4.

Elisha, as shown by this story, was not always the most compassionate of God’s servants. The Aramaeans tried to capture him, no doubt to exact revenge for his role in Jehu’s atrocity against the House of Ahab. But they were deluded and led into Samaria. However, when the King of Israel cried out “My father, shall I smite them?”, Elisha told him to let them eat and drink before returning to their master. After that, the raids on Israel ceased. So, alongside the military fervour there developed a rich compassion for the penitent nations. It is notable that at the end of the book of Jonah when Jonah has denounced Nineveh, and proclaimed its destruction, the people repent and the Lord withholds the threatened disaster, for he is…

… ‘a god compassionate and gracious, long-suffering, ever constant and true, maintaining constancy to thousands, forgiving iniquity, rebellion and sin, and not sweeping the guilty clean away’

Exodus 34: 6.

Jonah is not pleased with this, but the Lord asks him,

“Should not I be sorry for the great city of Nineveh, with its hundred and twenty thousand who cannot tell their right hand from their left, and also much cattle?”

Jonah 4: 11.

The classic example of the Lord’s power is the destruction of Sannacherib’s army (2 Kings 19: 1-36; 2 Chron. 32: 1-23; Isa. 37: 1-38). Hezekiah says of Sennacherib, ‘He has human strength, but we have the Lord our God to help us and to fight our battles’ (2 Chron. 37: 8). Here there was ‘deliverance’, but a very violent one. At the same time, however, most of the references in the historical books are to specific battles and campaigns. They were not part of a general divine plan for the Israelites to drive the native ethnicities of Canaan into the Mediterranean Sea.

Contrary to the popular view of ‘the Ten Commandments’ as given in Exodus 20: 2-17 and Deuteronomy 5: 1-21, there is no reference to collective acts of violence, including warfare, in either version of the Decalogue. In fact, the often mistakenly quoted ‘thou shalt not kill’ as the sixth commandment, should correctly be translated as ‘thou shalt not murder’. Warfare may be justified, as the narrative and prophetic books of the Old Testament amply demonstrate, while murder is never sanctioned by Yahweh. In fact, the murder-adultery-theft section reflects older prophetic texts such as Hosea 4:2 and Jeremiah 7: 9. In the following explanatory text in Exodus 21: 12-14; … if someone wilfully attacks and kills another by treachery, you shall take the killer from my altar for execution. In this passage, there are four characters: the ‘slayer’, the ‘slain’, the ‘lawgiver’, who reveals himself through the reference to ‘my altar’ and the addressee, who is drawn in as a participant via the command, ‘you shall take…’

Some experts have stressed that legal reflection is therefore more like reading and musing on narrative than it is like enforcing a rule. But in the Book of the Law (Deuteronomy 20: 3-4) we do find instructions for what the priest should say before battle:

“Hear, O Israel, this day you are joining battle with the enemy; do not lose heart or give way to panic in the face of them; for the the Lord your God will go with you to fight your enemy for you and give you the victory.”

When Nehemiah restores the walls of Jerusalem, with half the men building and half standing to arms, and himself keeping hold of his sword, he tells his people, ‘Wherever the trumpet sounds, rally to us there and God will fight for us’ (Neh. 4: 16-23). The Israelites differed from the surrounding peoples because, in the first place, they were linked to Yahweh, the Lord, by a covenant. He was not a mere projection of their image onto the infinite but was an independent and all-powerful being. Chemosh was the god of Moab; if Moab ceased to exist, Chemosh ceased to exist (apparently). But the God of Israel was indissolubly linked to the nation. If Israel ceased to exist, Yahweh did not, for his relation to the nation was covenanted, not organic. If Israel was defeated that was due to the Lord’s (temporary) withdrawal of support from his ‘chosen people’; He was not defeated. This further meant that what he was to Israel he could also be to all people. The covenant bore with it the seeds of universalism. Therefore, Amos proclaims the judgement of the Lord on Moab for atrocities committed not against Israel but against Edom (Amos 2: 1-3) and cries:

“Are not you Israelites like Cushites to me? says the Lord.

Did I not bring Israel up from Egypt,

the Philistines from Caphtor, the Aramaeans from Kir?

Amos 9: 7.

Non-Jews in the Old Testament periods often regarded the Jews with suspicion, particularly because they did not revere the same gods, but insisted on their own, single God to the exclusion of all others. This made them singular and peculiar in the eyes of other nations. The reaction of the Jews was to insist that they were the truly universal ones since they acknowledged a set of norms that surpassed all the ideas of other nations, and in these norms, set out in the Torah, true wisdom could be found. This second difference, the association of the covenant with a moral code, simple but exalted, the Ten Commandments, demonstrated how the Lord made moral demands on his people. As the prophets interpreted the word of the Lord to his people, those moral claims became more profound and more demanding. So while the way of warfare existed constantly in relations between ancient Israel and its neighbours, it stood under judgement.

Wisdom and Law in the Hebrew Bible combined thus came nearest to providing the guidance for how to live that many people still turn to. Yet neither of these types of books supplies a timeless code; both are deeply rooted in the institutional life of ancient Israel. Nevertheless, both exemplify moral principles that were shared with other peoples of the Near and Middle East at that time, including those set down in Mesopotamia. These principles can often be seen to inform modern discussions of ethics and can be applied to modern warfare. However, the rootedness of these books in ancient times does make any direct application of biblical teachings difficult and suggests the need for a more nuanced relationship between them and the modern Jewish and Christian faiths in the region as well as further afield.

For example, in the light of the New Testament, Christians understand that ‘God’s people’ of the Old Testament were a model: Israel was not chosen from all the peoples of the earth for its own sake but for the salvation of the world. Being chosen means receiving, and expecting, one’s life solely from God. It is not meant for the individual or the individual nation, in isolation. It is meant for the whole community, and the individual as part of that community. The social character of Israelite law is based on this communal ‘election’. The right to life that God bestows on his people is meant for all, without distinction, not for the privileged few. Where God alone is Lord, people become brothers and sisters of the same ‘Father’. That is the fundamental law of brotherhood, justice and equity that lies behind the following specific statements of ‘law’ from Leviticus 19:

‘When you reap the harvest of your land, you shall not reap your field to its very border, neither shall you gather the gleanings after your harvest. And you shall not strip your vineyard bare, neither shall you gather the fallen grapes of your vineyard; you shall leave them for the poor and for the sojourner: I am the Lord your God. You shall not steal, nor deal falsely, nor lie to one another …’ (vv 9-11)

‘You shall not oppress your neighbour or rob him. The wages of a hired servant shall not remain with you all night until the morning. … You shall do no injustice in judgement; you shall not be partial to the poor or defer to the great, but in righteousness shall judge your neighbour. …’ (vv 13-15)

‘You shall not take vengeance or bear any grudge against the sons of your own people, but you shall love your neighbour as yourself; I am the Lord. …’ (v 18)

The Law told Israel what God’s choice of them must mean in the life of the people, but what was the reality of how this was upheld? For an answer to that question, we need to turn to the prophets, who unanimously complained about serious social abuses: according to the evidence contained in their many books, the rich and powerful oppressed and mercilessly exploited the poor, the ‘meek’ sought their rights in vain before judges who themselves belonged to or were dependent on the propertied classes. Those responsible could assert in response to these reproaches that they were acting under the force of political and economic necessity. Actually, it was not only a moral problem, but also a question of the constantly endangered existence of Israel as a state. The introduction of kingship was an attempt to protect the people more effectively against enemies. But it led to the creation of a military and administrative hierarchy and – with the introduction of a money economy – those conditions against which the prophets protested.

Prophets of Doom, Destruction and Restoration:

My beloved had a vineyard

on a very fertile hill.

He digged it and cleared it of stones,

and planted it with choice vines;

… and he looked for it to yield grapes,

but it yielded wild grapes.

And now, O inhabitants of Jerusalem

and men of Judah,

judge, I pray you,

between me and my vineyard.

What more was there to do for my vineyard,

that I have not done in it?

When I looked for it to yield grapes,

why did it yield wild grapes?

And now I will tell you what I will do to my vineyard.

I will remove its hedge, and it shall be devoured;

I will break down its wall,

and it shall be trampled down. …

For the vineyard of the Lord of hosts

is the house of Israel,

and the men of Judah

are his pleasant planting;

and he looked for justice,

but behold, bloodshed;

for righteousness,

but behold, a cry!

Isaiah 5: 1-7.

Prophecy as a social phenomenon existed throughout ancient Mesopotamia, and there are many texts about people we would identify as prophets. A prophet is a person (man or woman) who has ‘privileged access’ to the gods because of special psychic powers, and who is consulted by rulers when planning some major undertaking, such as a military campaign, for example. They often took the role of warning or exhorting them either to engage or abstain from warfare. Few, however, went so far as to oppose their king outright, as was the case in Israel and Judah. Prophets in Israel, whom we encounter in the narrative books of Samuel and Kings, match the patterns found in other books from the Middle East, like the texts found at Mari on the Euphrates. Letter Seven from Mari has a prophet opposing the making of a peace treaty by King Zimri-Lim with Eshunna. The Israelite texts, however, differ in two important ways. First, their prophets sometimes talk not of the outcome of one particular battle or campaign, but of the future of the nation or of the ruling dynasty as a whole:

‘Samuel said to him (Saul), “The LORD hath torn the kingdom of Israel from you this very day, and has given it to a neighbour of yours (David), who is better than you”.‘

1 Samuel 15: 28.

In this way, the text explains the fateful division of Judah and Israel. But more significant still, the Hebrew prophets sometimes step out of their role as political advisers to comment on the morals and general behaviour of the kings of the two kingdoms in a manner unparalleled anywhere else in the ancient Near East. Elijah uses his privileged position as a prophet to denounce and condemn King Ahab and his wife, Jezebel, anoints Jehu as king over Israel and even consecrates another prophet, Elisha, whose task is to help eliminate Ahab’s dynasty (1 Kings 21: 20-24; 1 Kings 19: 15-17). These accounts may be greatly exaggerated: our knowledge of the dynastic struggles in ninth-century BCE Israel and Judah is sketchy. But they have seemed plausible to later readers, implying that such actions were credible where important prophets were concerned. Other prophetic figures, such as the earliest of the Minor Prophets, Amos, in the eighth century BCE were also social critics and foretellers of disaster in the entire nation. He appears to have prophesied just as a period of relative prosperity for Israel was about to end, with the rise of Assyria. Far from being consulted by kings, Amos spoke entirely unbidden, denouncing the king of the northern kingdom of Israel, Jeroboam II, and predicting the downfall of his dynasty, or royal ‘house’:

Then Amaziah, the priest of Bethel, sent to King Jeroboam of Israel, saying, ‘Amos has conspired against you in the very centre of the house of Israel; the land is not able to bear all his words. For thus Amos has said,

“Jeroboam shall die by the sword,

and Israel must go into exile

away from his land.”

Amos 7: 10-11.

Amos also denounces not only a sequence of foreign nations (1: 3 – 2: 3) – a standard prophetic task – but also Israel itself (2: 6-8; 3: 10; 5: 21-4). He presents the social misdeeds in Israel (oppressing the poor by various ‘legal’ ruses) as the moral equivalent of the war crimes committed by surrounding nations, and foretells the complete collapse of Israel (Amos 2: 6-8). A similar message can be found in Amos’ younger contemporaries, Hosea (who also worked in the north), in Micah and Isaiah, prophets in Judah, and from the next century in Jeremiah, Zephaniah and Ezekiel. All criticise the corrupt and debased conduct they see around them and prophesy the fall of the nation under the onslaught of the Assyrians and later, the Babylonians. During and after the sixth century (BCE) exile, we find prophets foretelling restoration and peace for the Jews. This is part of the message of later oracles in Jeremiah and Ezekiel, both of whom lived through the disaster of the destruction of Jerusalem and the deportation of the king and ruling classes. This is at its clearest in Zechariah, who worked around 520 BCE when the first few steps were being taken to rebuild the ruined Temple, and who predicted blessings from God upon the renewed nation:

‘Thus says the LORD, I have returned to Jerusalem with compassion; my house shall be built in it, says the LORD of hosts, and the measuring line shall be stretched out over Jerusalem. Proclaim further: Thus says the LORD of hosts: My cities shall again overflow with prosperity; the Lord will again comfort Zion and again choose Jerusalem.’

Zechariah 1: 16-17.

‘Thus says the LORD of hosts: Old men and old women shall again sit in the streets of Jerusalem, each with staff in hand because of their great age. And the streets of the city shall be full of boys and girls playing in the streets.’

Zechariah 8: 4-5.

Most scholars believe that the early Old Testament prophets were ‘prophets of doom’, especially Amos, Isaiah and Micah, whose message was later lightened by later editors. In a passage from Jeremiah 4: 27 we can see this process very clearly:

‘For thus says the LORD: The whole land shall be a desolation; yet I will not make a full end.‘ (my emphasis).

The tendency of prophets to teach ‘good tidings of great joy’ is, in reality, a post-exilic development, read back into earlier prophecy. This has influenced some modern uses of the words ‘prophet’ and ‘prophetic’ to refer not to prognosticators but to those who provide a critique of the ‘sins of society’ in the present. The great prophets of Israel were probably not so far removed from the normal role of the ancient prophets of Mesopotamia. Rather, they were politically better informed than most of their contemporaries and therefore able to foresee potentially dangerous events ahead and explain these impending ‘troubles’ as the result of national sin. Whether the prophets thought disaster could be averted is a moot point. Amos seems to hold out little hope for any national salvation, while Hosea predicts at least some kind of restoration after disaster even if not before it. Isaiah is so complex a book that it is almost impossible to know which way the prophet’s own teaching went. With Jeremiah, at least, we can feel sure that he spoke in terms of contingent results from the siege of Jerusalem by the Babylonians: if Judah surrendered they would surely escape actual destruction, whereas if they did not, inevitable carnage would ensue – as it did.

The Book of Isaiah is probably the work whose composition spans the longest time among the prophetic texts. There is no reason to doubt that parts of it genuinely go back to the prophet Isaiah, who worked in Jerusalem in the days of the Kings Jotham, Ahaz and Hezekiah, beginning in 742 BCE and continuing until at least 701, when Jerusalem was besieged by the Assyrian King Sennacherib. The siege is described in Isaiah 36-39, and this narrative was also exported into 2 Kings 18-19. There were several political crises in which Isaiah seems to have been involved, doubling as a prophet and a royal counsellor or civil servant. The first crisis was in the 730s when there was an alliance forged between the northern kingdom of Israel and the Aramaeans of Damascus, which Judah was pressured to join. This is the background of Israel, where we find King Ahaz of Judah tempted to appeal to the Assyrians themselves to resist the threats from the north and Isaiah strongly opposing such a move. Apparently, he argued that the coalition would be snuffed out by the Assyrians anyway, without any need for Judah to draw attention to itself through diplomatic interventions. In the event, Ahaz did not listen to the prophet and approached the Assyrians and the alliance was duly defeated. During the first crisis, at the time of the coalition, he is reported as telling Ahaz:

‘Take heed, be quiet, do not fear, and do not let your heart be faint because of these two smouldering stumps of firebrands, because of the fierce anger of Rezin and Aram and the son of Remaliah. Because Aram – with Ephraim and the son of Remaliah – has plotted evil against you, saying “Let us go up against Judah and cut off Jerusalem and conquer it for ourselves and make the son of Tabeel king in it”; therefore thus says the LORD GOD:

“It shall not stand,

and it shall not come to pass …

“If you do not stand firm in faith,

you shall not stand at all.”

Isaiah 7: 3-7, 9b.

From then on, the Assyrians took an interest in Judah. Following the collapse of northern Israel in the 720s, during the years after circa 710, the remaining small states around Judah were enticed into anti-Assyrian politicking, involving the Philistines and the Egyptians. Isaiah advised King Hezekiah against getting drawn into this, telling him Egypt was ‘a broken reed’ and could do its eastern allies no good. But his words fell on deaf ears, and by 701 the Assyrians had invaded and were at the gates of Jerusalem itself. The details of what happened are obscure. On the one hand, Hezekiah had to pay tribute to King Sennacherib and lost a considerable measure of his independence (2 Kings 18: 13-16). On the other hand, Jerusalem was not sacked, and the Assyrian army withdrew. Stories grew up that God had intervened, slaughtering the Assyrian army, a story retold in the poem ‘The Destruction of Sennacherib’ by Lord Byron (1788-1824), beginning with the line, The Assyrian came down like the wolf on the fold:

For the Angel of Death spread his wings on the blast,

And breathed in the face of the foe as he passed,

And the eyes of the sleepers waxed deadly and chill,

And their hearts but once heaved, and for ever grew still!

And the widows of Ashur are loud in their wail,

And the idols are broke in the temples of Baal;

And the might of the Gentile, unsmote by the sword,

Hath melted like snow in the glance of the LORD!

But Isaiah’s part in all this is unclear: did he counsel capitulation and predict disaster if the king did not listen, or did he (rightly) foretell a great deliverance? Was he a prophet of doom, as many Old Testament scholars have believed, or was he a ‘normal’ ancient Middle Eastern prophet of salvation? The answers to these questions depend on their decisions as to which of the sayings attributed to him in the Assyrian crises are his own words, and which are the work of later editors with theories of their own. The text of Isaiah is a muddle. The name he gave to his son, Shear-jashub, meaning ‘a remnant will remain’, often taken to be a positive prophecy, could also be interpreted as an ill omen. If the people of Judah thought that Ahaz’s policy of appeasing Assyria was likely to result in peace and prosperity, then his prophecy could be heard or read as ‘only a remnant of the nation will continue to exist’. In Isaiah 6: 13, we read:

Even if a tenth part remains in it, it will be burned again, like a terebinth or an oak whose stump remains standing when it is felled.

But if there was indeed a general fear and dread, then it is possible that Isaiah was trying to offer a crumb of comfort by prophesying that at least a remnant would survive, though the comfort at its best would still be somewhat cold. Indeed, in Isaiah 10: 20-23, the two possibilities are juxtaposed, firstly expressing Hope and Comfort, and the second adopting a more threatening tone:

‘On that day the remnant of Israel and the survivors of the house of Jacob will no more lean on the one who struck them, but will lean on the LORD, the Holy One of Israel, in truth. A remnant will return, the remnant of Jacob, to the mighty God.‘

‘For though your people Israel were like the sand of the sea, only a remnant of them will return. Destruction is decreed, overflowing with righteousness. For the LORD GOD of hosts will make a full end, as decreed, in all the earth.’

Taken all together, there would appear to be real sayings of Isaiah in chapters 1-8 and 28-31. But the book seems to have been largely written by scribes who edited and embellished the book, sometimes by writing continuations of the prophet’s own words; sometimes by adding whole blocks of sayings that are anonymous in origin. The extensions belong to the verses added to give Isaiah’s originally negative message a more positive ‘spin’, as with the other, older prophetic books. For example, in Isaiah (2: 2), there is an ‘oracle’ about the universal salvation of the nations:

‘In days to come

the mountain of the Lord’s house

shall be set over all other mountains,

lifted high above the hills.

All the nations shall come streaming to it.

Further additions take the form of several collections of oracles that amount to more than two-thirds of the book. These are of various kinds, the first of which are oracles against foreign nations, also found among the works of other prophets, for example, in Amos 1-2. But in the book of Isaiah, they stretch beyond Israel’s immediate neighbours to Babylon, which was not a power that emerged as a threat until the late seventh century, many days after the death of the prophet. Babylon was important in later thought, containing the taunt that the king of Babylon is like the god of the morning star (Lucifer), who fell from heaven which, combined with other Old Testament and later material about Satan and various demons, resulted in the Christian idea of fall of the devil. The prediction of the fall of Babylon in chapters 13-14 is thus very unlikely to go back to Isaiah himself. The book is therefore a heterogeneous collection of oracles, most reflecting later circumstances.

Secondly, chapters 24-7 have long been recognised as a collection of passages with an apocalyptic tone, dubbed ‘The Isaiah Apocalypse’. These could be as late as the third century or even the second century BCE: they reflect the sorts of ideas found in the Book of Daniel, with judgement in heaven as well as on earth, and even hints of an afterlife, a late arrival in Israel’s literature:

On that day the LORD will punish…

on earth the kings of the earth…

For the LORD of hosts will reign

on Mount Zion and in Jerusalem,

and before his elders he will manifest his glory.

Your dead shall live, their corpses shall rise…

For your dew is a radiant dew,

and the earth will give birth to those long dead.

Isaiah 24: 21, 23; 26: 19.

The prophecy of a literal resurrection may be a symbolic way of talking about the revival of the nation, but there are parallels to be drawn with Ezekiel’s famous ‘valley of dry bones’ (Ezekiel 37) and Daniel’s prophecy that ‘Many of those who sleep in the dust of the earth will awake’ (12: 2). Later in Isaiah, there is a looking forward to the restoration of Israel:

These are the words of the Lord God the Holy One of Israel;

Come back, keep peace, and you will be safe;

in stillness and in staying quiet, there lies your strength.

Isaiah 30: 15-16.

Thirdly, everything in the Book of Isaiah after chapter 40 makes sense only in the period when the Jews in exile looked to the arrival of Cyrus II, the Persian king, to overcome Babylon and give the Hebrews permission for a resettlement of their own Land. Cyrus is referred to by name in 44: 28, and 45:1, and chapters 46-7 present a lengthy taunt against the Babylonians, deriding their gods as nothing but objects of wood and stone that have to be carried around on ‘weary animals’ and contrasting them with Yahweh who, on the contrary, carries Israel (Isaiah 46: 1-4). ‘Second Isaiah’ is a significant section of the Hebrew Bible for several reasons, one of which is that it speaks almost exclusively of the blessings that will come to Israel, and so represents a new departure after the essentially gloomy message of the pre-exilic prophets up to and including Jeremiah. While it does not play down the prophetic idea that the exile had been a punishment for Israel’s sins, it regards that as now lying in the past:

Rouse yourself, rouse yourself!

Stand up, O Jerusalem,

you who have drunk at the hand of the LORD

the cup of his wrath,

who have drunk the dregs

the bowl of staggering…

These two things have befallen you…

– who will grieve with you? –

devastation and destruction, famine and sword –

who will comfort you?…

Thus says your Sovereign, the LORD,

your God who pleads the cause of his people…

you shall drink no more

from the bowl of my wrath.

Isaiah, 51: 17, 19, 22.

Second Isaiah predicts not only a return of the exiles from Babylonia but a ‘gathering-in’ of Jews from all points of the compass, an influx so great that the walls of Jerusalem cannot contain the new inhabitants. This can be called the first manifestation of Zionism in the Bible:

Enlarge the site of your tent,

and let the curtains of your habitations be stretched out;

do not hold back; lengthen your cords

and strengthen your stakes.

For you will spread out to the right and to the left,

and your descendants will possess the nations

and will settle the desolate towns.

Isaiah 54: 2-3

Critical for later Jewish and Christian theological thinking, Second Isaiah contains the first explicit formulations of Jewish monotheism, the belief that the God of Israel is the one true God and that all other pretended gods are nothing at all: not rivals, not even impotent rivals, but simply non-existent:

Thus says the LORD, the King of Israel

and his Redeemer, the LORD of hosts:

I am the first and I am the last;

besides me there is no god.

Isaiah 44: 6

This was a remarkable claim: Yahweh, who might have been thought to have been defeated by the gods of Babylon, is, in reality, the only God, and actually controls both the Babylonians and Cyrus, their eventual conqueror. It became the bedrock for later thinking about the nature of God in both Judaism and Christianity. All the prophets are implicitly monotheistic, in that they do not reckon with any effective power in the universe other than that of the God of Israel, but Second Isaiah is the first to articulate this so overtly and unambiguously. Third Isaiah is a less unified body of oracles than Second Isaiah and can be divided into several smaller collections. Some of these, for example, 57: 1-13, revert to the older prophetic style of denunciation of the disfiguring of Judaism soon after the resettlement of ‘the Land’ in the 530s BCE. Others, for example, chapters 60-62, continue and even enhance the rapturous tone of the Second Isaiah, speaking of not only exiled Jews but even foreigners streaming into Jerusalem and initiating a new Israelite empire of peace and prosperity for all. This echoes a famous passage from First Isaiah which is probably also from this later period:

In days to come

the mountain of the LORD’s house

shall be established as the highest of the mountains,

and shall be raised above the hills;

all the nations shall stream to it…

He shall judge between the nations,

and shall arbitrate for many peoples;

they shall beat their swords into ploughshares,

and their spears into pruning-hooks;

nation shall not lift up sword against nation.

Isaiah 2: 2-3, 4.

Zion (Jerusalem) as a focus for salvation to the whole world is a particular vision of this early post-exilic period, when hopes were buoyant and the mundane reality of everyday life in a minor province of the Persian empire had not yet asserted itself. Looked at as a whole, the Book of Isaiah is primarily about Judah and Jerusalem in their history, their disasters and triumphs, and only an allegorical interpretation which transforms Jerusalem into the heavenly city of God can remove this impression, for example in Chapter 15. It can be made into either messianic prediction or ethical instruction, but only by doing a kind of violence to the impression it makes on the reader. But the prophecies of the return of the exiles and the ‘gathering-in’ of foreigners do mesh with later ‘Judaeo-Christian’ ideas of the messianic age, even though a singular Messiah is not mentioned. It could also be argued that, as it stands, the Book presents many ethical teachings that are still relevant for later religious readers: from Isaiah’s denunciations of individual and collective sins, corresponding virtues may be derived:

‘Ah, you … who acquit the guilty for a bribe,

and deprive the innocent of their rights!’

Isaiah 5: 23

The prophetic books, like the pieces of which they are composed, are for the most part subversive entities, undercutting the foundations of established religion, especially the state religious cults of the Hebrew kingdoms in pre-exilic times, and the political machinations of the times just before the exile. When the books are read in their entirety, a clear condemnation of what passed for religion in the national communities the prophets addressed emerges. Their predictions of disasters have been mitigated but not cancelled out by the addition of oracles of hope, which speak of how God will ‘comfort his people, in Isaiah 40: 1, but only after divine retribution has fallen on them, but hardly ever suggest that this can be averted. Their condemnations of the collective sin of the nation are never tempered with any sympathetic understanding of what may have led people to behave so badly but remain stark and clear. The prophets were not helpful to the sinning nations: they do not say ‘Peace, peace’ when there is no peace or justice (Jeremiah 6: 14).

Jeremiah received his call to prophesy in 626 BCE, three-quarters of a century after the great Assyrian crisis at the end of Isaiah’s ministry. The book of Jeremiah is formed from large collections of material which reflect the history of the preservation of the people of Judah. Of first importance is the collection of prophecies in chapters 1-25, which contain the most characteristic of the prophet’s oracles, and in chapters 31-33, there is a collection of ‘assurances’ about Israel’s future, which is often called ‘the Book of Consolation’. Most of the remaining chapters contain prophecies against foreign nations. During the long period of political survival as a vassal state of the Assyrian empire, Judah was sustained by a mixture of patriotic pride and religious fervour. In consequence, the belief was encouraged among its people that God could be relied upon to maintain the protection of his temple and of the city in which it stood.

Jeremiah’s first prophecies were warnings that military and political disasters would soon overtake the land. Jerusalem would be besieged and destruction would come at the hands of a mysterious ‘foe from the north.’ But this did not come about and the prophet openly accused God of having deceived him and made him into a laughing-stock. The passing of the Assyrian empire in 612 BCE, with its reputation for brutality and violence, did not go uncelebrated in Judah, but it did not result in any lessening in foreign domination of Judah, as Egypt asserted its overlordship and in 605 BCE control passed to Babylonia. Jeremiah, now debarred from entering the temple, dictated a scroll to be read out by Baruch, his scribe, in which he interpreted his earlier warning of the ‘foe from the north’ as referring to Babylon. In 601 BCE, King Jehoiakim rebelled against the king of Babylon, inviting severe retaliation. This came in 598 when Jerusalem was besieged and forced to capitulate. Jehoiakim died and was replaced by his son, Jehoiachin, who was taken hostage to Babylon, along with several thousand of his leading citizens. Zedekiah, his uncle, was placed on the throne as a puppet ruler.

Jeremiah regarded it as the ‘will of God’ that ‘all the nations’ should serve the king of Babylon (Jer. 27: 1-11). He proclaimed that it was God’s purpose that Nebuchadnezzar should be a ‘world ruler’ and that Judah should submit to him. The alternative was destruction: Serve the king of Babylon and save your lives. Why should this city become a ruin? (Jer. 27: 17). Although it might seem a matter of pragmatic calculation, Jeremiah proclaims it to be religious obedience. In general, we can trace the view put by Zechariah: Not by might, nor by power, but by my spirit, says the Lord of Hosts (Zech. 4: 6). However, the nationalistic prophets raised their voices to encourage further rebellion against Babylon, but Jeremiah received a prophetic message from God that reassured him of the folly of such hopes. (28: 12-17).

Zedekiah paid attention to the prophet’s preaching but then allowed himself to be persuaded into supporting the revolt. In 589 BCE, retribution came and two years later, Jerusalem was besieged and destroyed and Zedekiah was forced to witness the execution of his sons before being blinded and exiled. After the fall of the city, Jeremiah was given the choice of going to Babylon with the exiles or remaining in Judah. He chose the latter and became convinced of the coming restoration of Israel under divine grace which would bring about a new covenant with both kingdoms of Israel and Judah (Jer. 30-31). With the final fall of Jerusalem in 587, the last surviving entity of the old nation of Israel broke up. Many of its people were in exile in Babylon, and some had fled to Egypt and other nations.

A large number of Judaeans remained in the land of Judah to face the pitiful sufferings of the devastated Land and to seek to build up afresh the conditions and means of a stable social and economic life. The appalling conditions are well described in the book of Lamentations, which is not from Jeremiah, but from an anonymous poet, or group of poets, who lived in Judah during the period following Jerusalem’s destruction. Aside from the horror of famine and disease, brought about by the ravages of war, there was the theological problem of finding some divine meaning or explanation for catastrophe. Only by accepting the interpretation given by the great prophets that it was divine punishment for Israel’s sins could sense be made out of the dire situation. But other texts in the Hebrew Bible are more optimistic and encouraging. Later Judaism took to heart the warnings of the prophets, just as Christianity heard their critical messages but saw them as heralds of good tidings, proclaiming a coming new dispensation.

Nevertheless, the prophets in all their original harshness have a distinctive witness to provide, and it does not feed easily into either of the two religions that claim them as part of their Scriptures. Prophecy, as we noted at the beginning of this section, was not unique to the nation of Israel, but no other nation seems ever to have been so deeply indebted to them as Israel. Although many prophets were active during the two centuries stretching from the mid-eighth to the mid-sixth centuries BCE, only a few individuals from them had a lasting influence upon human history. By these few, a significant transformation of the religion of Israel was brought about. They laid great stress on upon their ‘divine call’, and so looked beyond their own intuitions and desires, reflecting on the character and destiny of the society in which they lived. They were not looking for intrinsic laws of cause and effect operating in the affairs of men and states. They were threatening direct divine intervention in judgement of his ‘elect’ people and ascribed their message to divine inspiration, and not to their own thoughts and reflections. It was this awareness of divine authority and commission that enabled them to face rejection, opposition and persecution from their compatriots. It also freed them from any self-interested ‘professionalism’ and from any accountability to the religious and political institutions of Israel.

The prophets stand out for their remarkably detailed knowledge of international affairs and for their awareness of the policies and diplomacy of the Judaean and Samarian courts. They displayed a political interest which assumed from the start that God was deeply concerned about the social and economic realities of life in Israel. They argued that God was exercising a controlling influence upon international affairs and that the two kingdoms of Israel and Judah were being brought face to face with God’s judgments in the form of disaster and defeat. They also prophesied eventual deliverance and victory, but it is the negative aspect of judgment which looms largest in their preaching, making their threats a continued series of rebukes against political pride and military arrogance, and sharply condemning Israel’s complacency. The prophets were convinced that no politics could avert the catastrophe which they had to announce as God’s judgment over his people. They believed that the very conditions necessary to guarantee Israel’s continued existence as a state were indeed the cause of the destruction of the state. Only a people completely dependent upon the God who chose them and obedient to the divine election would still have a chance for survival.

In their descriptions of the coming divine judgments upon Israel, the prophets’ widely used imagery of battle and defeat naturally drew on their knowledge of contemporary military practice. Essentially, however, it was the certainty of judgment, rather than its precise details, that the prophets foretold. Nahum could describe the violent overthrow of Nineveh, although in the event the capture of the city by the Babylonian armies was virtually unopposed in 612 BCE. The moral significance was of far greater importance than the military details of the fulfilment of prophecy so such a situation in no way lessens the religious ‘truth’ of what the prophets said. It was not simply their ability to predict the future, but their power to interpret it, which gave the prophets their greatness. They related past, present and future in a consistent story of God’s concern for his chosen people Israel, and they interpreted this story in keeping with the moral purpose for which Israel was called. They did not therefore exclude other nations from their field of vision. Jeremiah was specifically called to be a ‘prophet to the nations’ (Jer. 1: 5), and this was certainly also true of Amos and Isaiah.

The prophets interpreted Israel’s history from a universal purpose of God for which Israel’s election had meaning. The very notion that Israel should be judged received significance in the context of God’s wider concern for the welfare of all nations, and Israel’s responsibility to be a light and a witness to them. The spiritual fruits of the prophetic interpretation in terms of humility in the face of suffering and a passionate concern for social justice, encourage us to believe that the prophets did preach ‘truth’. This truth is not only applicable to ancient Israel but to a longer chronology and a broader social history. Humanity is continuously concerned with issues of nationalism, social injustice and widespread beliefs in the ‘divinely given’ supremacy of certain nations and ethnicities. By their moral interpretation of the belief in Israel’s national ‘election’, the prophets warned against any selfish or material conception of it. The ‘truth’ of prophecy can speak to us in our own generations, with our national hopes, social needs and problems, and our personal responsibilities to one another. A latter-day ‘prophet’, Martin Luther King, put it like this in his speech when accepting the Nobel Peace Prize:

I believe that what self-centred men have torn down, other-centred can build up. I still believe that one day mankind will bow before the altars of God and be crowned triumphant over war and bloodshed, and nonviolent redemptive goodwill proclaim the rule of the land: “And the lion shall lie down together and every man shall sit under his own vine and fig tree and none shall be afraid.” I still believe that we shall overcome.

Hebrew ‘War Poetry’ & The Psalms:

The ‘historical books’ of the Hebrew Bible are almost entirely in prose, but sometimes the prose narratives contain what seem to be older poems embedded in the story. A famous example is David’s lament over the death of King Saul and his son Jonathan in battle with the Philistines on Mount Gilboa, in 2 Samuel 1: 19-27, with its refrain, How are the might fallen! (this is a statement, an exclamation, for in the previous verse, Samuel has already told us that the king was killed by ‘the bow’):

Your glory, O Israel, lies slain upon your high places!

How the mighty have fallen!

Tell it not in Gath,

proclaim it not in the streets of Ashkelon;

or the daughters of the Philistines will rejoice, …

From the blood of the slain,

from the fat of the mighty,

the bow of Jonathan did not turn back,

nor the sword of Jonathan return empty.

Saul and Jonathan, beloved and lovely!

In life and in death they were not divided;

they were swifter than eagles,

they were stronger than lions. …

How the mighty have fallen

in the midst of the battle!

Jonathan lies slain upon your high places.

I am distressed for you, my brother Jonathan;

greatly beloved were you to me;

your love to me was wonderful,

passing the love of women.

How the mighty have fallen,

and the weapons of war perished!

Besides this being recorded in the book of Jashar (Joshua 10: 13) and in the second book of Samuel, there was also the Book of the Wars of the LORD’ (Numbers 21: 14), a book that no longer exists. In addition, some songs have no name or title assigned to them in the text but are regarded by many as likely to be among the older sections of the Hebrew Bible. The major collections of verse in the Bible include the books of wisdom, especially Job and Proverbs, but the classic examples of Hebrew poetry are, of course, the Psalms.

As poetic pieces generally intoned or chanted in worship, Psalms often reflect ceremonies which they accompanied, and even more, the thoughts and beliefs which filled the minds of worshippers. While the setting of many psalms in festal worship is clear, the exact contexts and sequences remain uncertain. However, the psalms do reveal the main ingredients of the festal experience, especially those relating to the autumnal festival in royal Jerusalem. The chief feature of the poetry is called ‘parallelism’; most verses fall into two parts (sometimes three) which are parallel in thought and expression. The wording of the Hebrew poetry is unpretentious since they are ‘lyrics’ set to a specific ‘metre’ or rhythm. Prominent in the experience of Israelite worshippers was the journey, often long, to the central sanctuary in Jerusalem. Hardship was offset by the fellowship along the way and above all by the anticipation of a festival so rich in meaning. There are several psalms which scholars think may have been sung on the journey. Although their place may have been primarily within the festival, such psalms certainly tell us something about the pilgrimage and arrival in Jerusalem.

Underlying all the joyful songs which were sung in God’s honour at the festival was the thought that he was appearing fresh from a victory. The battle he had waged was a poetic reconstruction, serving to commemorate and renew God’s mighty work of creation and ancient salvation. The poetic drama of the festival imagined that all the forces which would harm life had risen up together to make chaos and misery prevail, but God had routed them. This poetic vision embraced both ‘Nature’ and ‘History’. It presented the battle as the mighty deeds of the Creator against dragon-led chaos and a dark and raging ocean, but also as God’s victory over raging nations. Thus, every year the worshippers dramatically reassert the basis of their hope in all aspects of life – the power and goodness of God, the king of all. The symbolic victory was further celebrated by an uphill procession into the temple like the victory march of a warrior king leading captives and spoil, heralded by messengers, and greeted by dancing and singing women (Ps. 68).

Qualifying adjectives in the original Hebrew form are rare: a genitive form is preferred, as in ‘king of glory’, ‘fountain of life’, ‘oil of gladness’ and ‘beasts of the forest’. Traditional vocabulary is often ‘borrowed’ and repeated, and ‘moral’ terms are common, revolving around the notion of covenants and bonds, e.g. ‘steadfast(ness)’, ‘love’, ‘mercy’, ‘truth’, ‘peace’, ‘righteous(ness)’, ‘upright’, ‘saints’ etc. The various ‘moral’ qualities usually refer to faithfulness to covenantal promises or loyalty to a particular partner. The words for states of happiness and well-being also refer to the harmony arising from a sound covenant relationship. A difficulty in translation is that, in themselves, the verbs are ambiguous in time reference; the choice of past, present or future in English depends on the interpretation of the whole context, and sometimes uncertainty persists.

The biblical Psalms do not form a separate genre, as do wisdom, narrative and prophecy, but are a miscellaneous collection of poems of many sorts. The majority are prayers to God either by an individual or a group (or both) and are often classified as laments, though in some cases ‘petitions’ might be a better term. The prayer in the psalm may be made in the name of an individual or the collective interest of Israel. Consequently, it is usual to speak of ‘individual laments’ and ‘communal laments’. But personal laments sometimes transmuted into communal ones with a focus, for example, on the destruction of Jerusalem:

You will rise up and have compassion on Zion,

for it is time to favour it;

the appointed time has come.

For your servants hold it stones dear,

and have pity on its dust.

The children of your servants shall live secure;

their offspring shall be established in your presence.

Psalm 102: 13-14, 28.

In this and in other psalms we are dealing with a personification of Israel, an identification of the needs of the individual with those of the nation. The speaker in Psalm 102 identifies his own calamity with that of his people, and vice versa, and sees no incongruity in referring first to one and then the other. Thus, some psalms have a strong sense of unity between individual and communal suffering, such as Psalm 130:

Out of the depths I cry to you, O LORD.

Lord, hear my voice!

Let your ears be attentive

to the voice of my supplications!

If you, O LORD, should mark iniquities,

Lord, who could stand?

But there is forgiveness with you,

so that you may be revered.

I wait for the LORD, my soul waits,

and in his word I hope;

my soul waits for the Lord

more than those who watch for the morning …

Oh Israel, hope in the LORD!

For with the LORD there is steadfast love,

and with him there is great power to redeem.

It is he who will redeem Israel

from all its iniquities.

Psalm 130: 1-3, 5-8.

It seems that an individual prayer for forgiveness has here been augmented with two verses addressed to the nation. A similar pattern can be seen in Psalms 125 and 128, where blessings are pronounced on righteous individuals and their families, but both psalms end, ‘Peace be upon Israel!’ (125: 5, 128: 6). This oscillation between a corporate and an individual focus becomes more complex when we consider how the Psalms were used in ancient Israel. For example, a careful reading shows that some psalms combine both lament or petition and thanksgiving, such as in Psalm 20: 1-6, which petitions for victory in a coming battle:

The LORD answer you in the day of trouble! …

May he grant you you your heart’s desire,

and fulfil all your plans.

May we shout for joy over your victory,

and in the name of our God set up our banners.

May the LORD fulfil all your petitions.

Now I know that the LORD will help his anointed;

He will answer him from his holy heaven

With mighty victories by his right hand.

Interpreted liturgically, this psalm might actually be two psalms, and between the two there might have been an oracle or blessing from a priest or prophetic figure, assuring the worshippers of a succesful outcome.

Psalm 89 speaks of the humiliation of the king of Judah, in apparent contravention of Yahweh’s promises to him (verses 38-45). This is traditionally interpreted as a reflection on the experience of the exile, with the king in question being Jehoiachan or conceivably Zedekiah, both exiled in the sixth century when Jerusalem fell to the Babylonians. But it may be that no particular Judaean monarch is referred to, but rather that what is meant is the institution of monarchy itself. They would have been humiliated at every New Year Festival under Babylonian occupation, just as they were in Mesopotamia at the akitu festival.There is no reference to any identifiable enemies in the psalm; nothing in the text provides evidence for a specific dating, so that it cannot be read as a reaction to a specific historical event, but may be a reusable text applied to the king in every year. The liturgical texts in the psalms belong in concrete contexts of worship, and may offer us hints for reconstructing those contexts.

The Psalms deal with a wide range of religious issues that are also found throughout the Old Testament. Many of them reflect on the special relationship between God and Israel, recalling the covenants made through Abraham and Moses and celebrating Israel’s status as God’s ‘chosen’ people. Psalm 74 concludes with a plea for God to remember the covenant and equates Israel’s enemies with the hostile forces he overcame in in the creation:

You divided the sea by your mighty arm;

you broke the heads of the dragons in the waters.

You crushed the heads of Leviathan …

Have regard for your covenant,

for the dark places of the land are full of the haunts of violence.

Do not let the downtrodden be put to shame;

let the poor and needy praise your name …

Do not forget the clamour of your foes,

the uproar of your adversaries that goes up continually.



Psalm 74: 16-17, 20-21, 23.

Psalm 136 records all the great deeds of God on Israel’s behalf, listing the death of the firstborn in Egypt, the exodus, the parting of the Red Sea and the overthrow of Pharaoh and his army, the conquest of Canaanite kings such as Sihon and Og, and the settlement of Israel in the Land. And in Psalm 115 we hear of God will bless Israel and its component parts, such as the house of Aaron (Psalm 115: 12-13). Throughout the Psalter there is an assumption that Israel is the people of God and that its enemies are the enemies of God:

O that you would kill the wicked, O God,

And that the bloodthirsty would depart from me …

Do not I hate those who hate you, O LORD?

And do not I loathe those who rise up against you?

I hate them with a perfect hatred;

I count them my enemies.

Psalm 139: 19, 21-22.

This equation of the speaker’s own enemies with God’s is one of the major problems for modern Jews and some Christians in using the Psalms. It rests on the idea that God has a ‘favourite’ people whom he fosters and protects, but this belief can make God appear indifferent or even hostile towards other nationalities. In both Judaism and Christianity, there have been strains that have accentuated the theme of divine hostility to outsiders, but also others in which the ‘special relationship’ of God with Israel (or, later, with the Christian community) has been seen as a means for extending that relationship to all humanity, in other words, that Israel has been chosen for service, not for privilege. Despite their sometimes vindictive tone towards other nations, this universalist theme is present even in the Psalms. For example, Psalm 148 runs through all the aspects of creation that are called upon to praise God, including:

Kings of the earth and all peoples,

princes and all rulers of the earth!

Psalm 148: 14.

Evidently, there is no sense here that foreigners are excluded from the possibility of praising God. Nevertheless, the psalm still ends:

He has raised up a horn for his people,

praise for all his faithful,

for the people of Israel who are close to him.

Psalm 148: 14.

Although the primary relationship of God in most of the Hebrew Bible is with the people of Israel collectively, many laments and thanksgivings in the Psalter seem to imply a close relationship with the individual even though, as noted above, the ‘I’ in the Psalms can sometimes stand for the group. Psalm 55 (12-13) seems to reflect a situation that can only be that of an individual:

It is not enemies who taunt me –

I could bear that;

it is not adversaries who deal insolently with me –

I could hide from them.

But it is you, my equal,

my companion, my familiar friend.

It might be expected that the individual in distress would link his own suffering to God’s relationship with Israel as a whole, but there is virtually no evidence of this. Except for Psalm 77, the individual laments seldom contain any reflection on what God has done for the nation. The individual is not seen as a subset of the nation but has a relationship with God unconnected to national fortunes. God is therefore not simply concerned with Israel as a collective entity, but but is also concerned for the welfare of individuals. God is pictured as keeping an account of the sufferings of his worshipper, and there is no suggestion that it is part of any larger national ‘ledger’. Many psalms are pleas to be delivered from suffering by a person who believes in his own goodness, just as there are penitential psalms that ask for forgiveness of sins committed. There are traditionally said to be seven penitential psalms, one for each of the seven deadly sins. But Psalm 6 is an individual lament that makes no mention of anything the Psalmist has done wrong and instead asks for deliverance from attacks by enemies. In fact, the Psalms contain relatively little about the sins of the individual who is cast as the one praying, but far more about the iniquity of his ill-natured enemies.

The God of the Psalms is certainly vengeful, but he is also merciful and forgiving to those who pray for forgiveness of sins. Above all, he is thought to be worthy of ceaseless praise, as the many psalms of praise and thanksgiving bear witness. Several psalms offer extended reflections on God’s character, providence and splendour:

Bless the Lord, O my Soul, and do not forget all his benefits –

who forgives all your iniquity, …

who crowns you with steadfast love and mercy …

Psalm 103: 2-4.

The LORD is gracious and merciful,

slow to anger and abounding in steadfast love.

The LORD is good to all,

and his compassion is over all that he has made …

Psalm 145: 8-9.

There is here no distinction between the God of creation and providence, who directs the course of the whole world, giving ‘food to all flesh’ (Psalm 136: 25), the God who chooses and protects Israel and the God who cares for the individual worshipper. These functions are not shared among different Gods, as they might be in a polytheist’s pantheon, but all are aspects of the one and only God. In this way, the Psalms are practically and poetically monotheistic without any need for theoretical discourse or dogma.

Two Psalms – 89 and 132 – are explicitly concerned with God’s promises to David, God’s ‘Warrior King’ and the supposed author of many of them. The first psalm recalls God’s promise to the monarch that he would never forsake his line, but then complains, in verses 38-51, that he appears to have done so. Presumably this reference is to the exile and the loss of the monarchy although, as previously noted, some scholars believe that it is connected to an annual ritual humiliation of the king. Other psalms allude more obliquely to David. Psalms 2 and 110 both played a major role in early Christian writing because their references were thought to be messianic, and the New Testament applies them to Jesus of Nazareth:

The LORD says to my lord,

“Sit at my right hand

until I make your enemies your footstool.’ …

Psalm 110: 1, 4.

Here the king is addressed by God and assured of an exalted, almost semi-divine status. The psalm goes on to refer to Melchizedek, the ancient priest-king of Jerusalem (Genesis 14: 18-20), a reference that is probably meant to signal that the kings of David’s line have inherited all the rights held by the kings of Jerusalem before the Israelites annexed it. The monarch therefore has a high status in the Psalms, and none of them is critical of the institution or those holding the office, in contrast to the books of the Prophets. Closely linked to it is the position of Jerusalem, the ‘city of David’. A number of the psalms glorify it as the citadel of the kingdom, and several refer to the tradition of its impregnability due to God’s permanent protection of it, a belief that is connected to Isaiah’s prophecies. Psalm 48 is the classic exposition of this theme, usually referred to in Old Testament scholarship as the inviolability of Zion:

Then the kings assembled,

they came on together.

As soon as they saw it, they were astounded;

they were in panic, they took to flight.

Psalm 48: 1-2, 4-5.

Psalm 76 refers to Jerusalem more specifically as the place where God broke the flashing arrows, the shield, the sword and the weapons of war (verse 3). We can imagine these psalms being recited just before a battle, or perhaps regularly to reinforce confidence in the royal city. One scholar suggested that there was an annual ‘royal Zion festival’ at which they were sung. The theme of the sacrosanctity and consequent safety of Jerusalem certainly entered the thought of many readers of the Psalms, and this is nowhere more strongly stressed than in Psalm 46, the model for Martin Luther’s famous hymn ‘Ein feste Burg ist unser Gott’; ‘A Safe Stronghold our God is Still’:

God is our refuge and strength,

a very present help in trouble …

God is in the midst of the city; it shall not be moved;

God will help it when morning dawns.

The nations are in an uproar, the kingdoms totter;

he utters his voice, the earth melts.

Psalm 46: 1, 5-6.

These themes cannot be added together as if there were a unified theology of the Psalms, but they overlap a significant number of the themes throughout the Hebrew Bible as a whole. In this respect, we can view the Psalter as the Hebrew Bible in miniature. Christians have tended to read the Psalms, like the other books of what to them is their Old Testament as prophecy, and David, the supposed author of the ‘book’, is often referred to in the New Testament as ‘prophet’. (Acts 2: 25-36; 4: 23-8), and individual verses are singled out as examples of his prophetic powers to foretell the coming of the Messiah in the person of Jesus:

Since (David) was a prophet, he knew that God had sworn with an oath to him that he would put one of his descendants on his throne. Foreseeing this, David spoke of the resurrection of the Messiah saying, ‘He was not abandoned to Hades, nor did his flesh experience corruption’

Acts 2: 30-31 (the quotation is from Psalm 16)

Jews, on the other hand, have tended to assimilate the Psalms to the model of Torah, regarding even verses that address God as essentially divine instruction to Israel. For a modern reader, whether Christian or Jew or neither, the value of the Psalms does not lie obviously in either of these different approaches to their interpretation, but in their coverage of so many biblical themes. They may not be part of a direct divine revelation, but they are deeply revealing about many different aspects of the God of the Bible and of the divine-human relationship, especially concerning the themes of war, justice and peace.

(to be continued…)