The Illusion of ‘Illiberal’ Democracy in Hungary & Russia’s Imperial War in Ukraine, 2010-23.

Welcome Back, Comrades!

‘Farewell, comrades!’ A poster from the first Hungarian free elections in 1990.

When I returned to Hungary in 2011 to live after a gap of fifteen years in the UK (including a year in the South of France), it was as a husband to a Hungarian citizen with family responsibilities back home in Hungary. So I took early retirement from teaching in the UK, something I had saved for even when working in Hungary in 1992-96, running a teachers’ exchange programme for Devon County Council and Baranya County Assembly, based in Pécs. At that time, I worked with politicians and officials of all political persuasions from both counties to bring about the transition to democracy that was then well underway in Hungary under a succession of liberalising governments, local and national, drawing their support from across the political spectrum. These were composed of broad coalitions of parties, and for four years we were careful, especially as ‘outsiders’ to work with all of them, without fear or favour. Moreover, the Councillors from Devon who regularly visited us were drawn from the Conservative, Liberal Democratic and Labour parties, yet demonstrated how local politics in Britain worked at its best. Added to this, we were keen to open up English Language learning to a wide diversity of students and pupils in the state education system, alongside the teaching of other ‘foreign’ languages.

Courting the Western Powers, 1998-2002:

As a ‘Christian socialist’ in British terms, and therefore, in European terms, a centrist Social Democrat, I had never had any difficulty in discussing questions of religious faith and politics in Hungary, even in my earliest ‘sojourns’ in Hungary in 1988-91 during my time working for nonconformist colleges and organisations in the English Midlands. So when I encountered misunderstandings and misinterpretations of these firmly-held beliefs in 2011-14, I was surprised by the growing sectarianism and intolerance that seemed prevalent in Hungarian public life at that time, contrasting sharply with the ‘liberal democratic’ atmosphere of the country in the 1990s, which had led to its accession to the EU and NATO by the early years of this century. My regular family visits to Hungary and my contacts among the growing Hungarian expatriate community in Britain did not suggest that anything fundamental had changed, even during the early Orbán government. But when it lost power in 2002, something did change within Fidesz, though it seemed that those now in power would be able to pick up the torch and run with it.

However, it was clear by 2010 that I was mistaken in this, and that western liberal democratic views were, already, no longer welcome. In particular, the ruling Fidesz Party was no longer the upholder of these views, despite President Bush’s speech in Budapest four years earlier. As a Christian, I supported the social conservatism of the Orbán government but saw no contradiction between ‘secular toleration’ and ‘sacred traditionalism’ in this respect.

‘Fitting in’ with Fidesz:

I had always rejected bigotry and ‘exceptionalism’ of any kind in Britain, but this was what I was now encountering for the first time in Hungary. Even in the churches and church schools, I came up against ‘exclusivist’ mantras and was made to feel that, despite (or perhaps because of) all my experience in bilingual, international and intercultural education, I “simply didn’t fit in”. I have since “shaken the dust from my feet” of those ‘church’ institutions I first served, and have kept my views to myself, except when my homeland has come under unprovoked attack for its multi-cultural and anti-racist values, which have proved to be in conflict with the increasingly monocultural direction of Hungarian society since 2015. Returning to my Anglican roots, however, I continue to be a ‘tolerated’ foreigner in the lower echelons of church-controlled (and therefore Fidesz-controlled) higher education. Here I am now permitted to express, in moderation, my ‘eccentric’ liberal educational views. Others, with similar views and values, have sadly not survived in these institutions.

The Hungarian Basic Law, the new constitution, was brought in by the second Orbán government in 2011.

However, as a British citizen and elector, I believe I have the right to comment on the UK’s relations with other NATO members and on its international relations, including the EU, even though it is no longer a member state of the latter organisation, as Hungary still is, at least for the time being. Since Ukraine is an ally of NATO in its resistance to Russia’s illegal invasions and occupations of its sovereign territory, I feel at liberty to explain and critique Hungary’s recent pro-Russian and therefore anti-NATO stance, especially on the first anniversary of the full-scale war begun on the orders of Vladimir Putin on 24th February 2022. In doing so, I will summarise and quote from Zsuzsanna Szelényi’s recently published (2022) book, Tainted Democracy: Viktor Orbán and the Subversion of Hungary, in which she gives a fuller critique of Hungary’s foreign and domestic policies under Fidesz rule.

Hungary – a Tainted Democracy?:
Cover image from Szelényi’s book: Silhouettes of demonstrators as they form a human chain around the Hungarian Parliament to protest against PM Viktor Orbán’s latest anti-LGBT law in Budapest on 14 June 2021. REUTERS/Marton Monus TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY.

Szelényi, like many former leading figures of Fidesz, was once, in the 1990s, a parliamentary ally of Viktor Orbán who has now become an outspoken political opponent. The book shows, in her terms, how Hungary, once the poster child of liberal democracy, is fast becoming an autocracy under Orbán’s fourth premiership in succession. After winning an absolute majority in 2010, Orbán launched a series of ‘reforms’, abandoning the country’s twenty-year-old, post-Cold War liberal consensus and 1989 Constitution of the second post-World War II Republic (see the picture & caption below).

For domestic supporters and foes alike, the rise of Hungary’s current prime minister is a vivid example of how democracy can be subverted from within. For foreign observers, it is puzzling, given Hungary’s history since 1945, but it seems to mirror the growth of Vladimir Putin’s tsarist autocracy in Russia. Except that Russia never, even briefly, became a true democracy at the end of the Cold War, but remained an autocratic, oligarchic, imperial power. Szelényi was a leading member of Orbán’s Fidesz in its early years after the first free elections took place in 1990. She witnessed first-hand the party’s shift from liberalism to populist nationalism. She explains how the party rose to leadership of the country under Órban to make sweeping legal, political and economic changes to solidify its grip on power – from the tightening of control over the public media to slashing the number of parliamentary seats. She also asks key questions as to why Orbán has been so successful in winning support in Hungary and wielding considerable influence in European politics.

Zsuzsanna Szelényi

After working at the Council of Europe for fifteen years, Zsuzsanna Szelényi returned to politics in 2012, representing the liberal opposition in Parliament from 2014. In the election campaign of that year, She writes:

‘We were filled with excitement as we left behind the city of Kecskemét after a busy day in early March 2014. A large crowd had gathered in the dance hall of ‘Hotel Aranyhomok’ for Együtt’s campaign rally. The town of Kecskemét was a Fidesz stronghold, so even we were surprised at how many people wanted to hear us a few weeks before the 2014 parliamentary elections – at how many people wanted political change.’

Szelényi (2022), p 127.

Together with her fellow party colleagues, she had already attended three hustings a day, and their progress around the country was going full steam ahead. They travelled home feeling positive, dissecting the afternoon’s events and surveying the latest opinion polls. The figures varied, but the trend was encouraging; Fidesz was leading with 30%, but the partial opposition alliance they had created in January of that year stood at 23%. Nevertheless, all the signs pointed to a Fidesz victory. It fought a hostile campaign, portraying the opposition leaders as communists. Gordon Bajnai, the Együtt leader faced a systematic smear campaign, with Fidesz’s paid campaigners marching in front of the Aranyhomok hotel in Kecskemét to slander him. The electoral system formed in 1989 had made it easy for Fidesz to win an absolute majority in parliament, a unique case in Europe. This also made it possible for them to win more than two-thirds of the seats with only 52% of the popular vote despite representing only one-third of the total electorate.

Trianon Tropes – Forming an Elective Dictatorship, 2014-2018:

But in the run-up to the 2014 election, the Fidesz government assisted its own party’s chances by changing the election rules. They justified changing the law by claiming it would be more democratic, making the results more proportionate to the votes cast, but the reverse happened. By abolishing the second round of voting for single-member constituencies, they prevented the smaller parties from collaborating against Fidesz, thus ensuring that they would always secure the ‘central force’. Secondly, the Electoral Act reduced the number of electoral districts from 176 to 106 and redrew all the constituency boundaries. This was a typical form of gerrymandering, the political manipulation of electoral boundaries with the intent of increasing undue advantage for Fidesz. A third change was that whereas previously a form of compensation had existed to boost the parties of individual candidates who were at a disadvantage because of the ‘winner-takes-all’ principle, now even greater rewards were given to the winning party. Moreover, the Constitutional Court, which by 2011 had a majority of Fidesz appointees, found no objection to these changes.

Present-day ‘revisionist’ symbols

What also affected the outcome of the elections was that the Fidesz government amended the Citizenship Act, making it possible for ethnic Hungarians living beyond its borders could obtain Hungarian citizenship even without ever having been domiciled in Hungary. What’s often referred to as the ‘Treason of the Trianon Treaty’ of 1920 has continued to sour relations between Hungary and its Slavic neighbours for more than a century, especially those to the East on the edges of the Carpathians. It was therefore no coincidence that Viktor Orbán chose to make his key speech announcing his policy of illiberal democracy in Transylvania. The government in Budapest actively supported Hungarian language organisations in Romania, Serbia and Ukraine that advocated the simplified naturalisation procedure. This meant that hundreds of thousands of ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring countries were entitled to take part in Hungary’s parliamentary elections in 2014, 96% of them voting for Fidesz.

While these ‘newly minted’ citizens were eligible to cast postal votes, expatriate Hungarians studying or working abroad could only cast their votes abroad in person at Hungarian embassies and consulates. Exchange students living temporarily across the EU, including in the UK, had to travel for hours to their nearest consulate, whereas, in the Romanian region of Szekerland, Hungarians in small villages voted en masse by mail. They also had a vote in Romanian elections, of course, and did not pay taxes in Hungary. It was therefore no surprise when the turnout was far lower among ex-pats than among ethnic Hungarians from neighbouring countries. This discriminatory aspect of the new law was unsuccessfully challenged in the Constitutional Court.

Ethnic Hungarians campaigning for an autonomous homeland in Szekerland, Romania.

With campaigning rules tipped so heavily in favour of Fidesz, it was difficult to predict the extent to which this would distort the result. With less than 45% of the votes, Fidesz once more gained power. In 2010 they had won a two-thirds majority with 52% of the votes; now, in 2014, it gained the same result with less than half the votes, due to the changes in electoral law. Despite having lost a fifth of its supporters over the four years, it still retained its supermajority, if only by one seat. When Zsuzanna Szelényi was sworn into parliament in June 2014, she found herself surrounded by Fidesz politicians, and she felt isolated. Twenty-four years previously, when she had first taken her parliamentary seat bursting with pride, her experience had been completely different:

‘Back then, as members of Fidesz’s small team, we saw ourselves as the anointed representatives of democracy. In the 1990’s, the rule of law was one of Fidesz’s guiding principles, and not once did we critique a law without making reference to democratic norms:

“We responsibly declare that all of Fidesz’s policies in all circumstances are guided by its belief in pluralism, which includes a changing {government}”, we said in 1990 when debating the governmental programme.

Viktor Orbán criticised the government, saying:

“Stable legal principles worked out over millennia cannot be made subservient to short-term political aims”.

It was unacceptable, in our view, for the government to reject the opposition’s criticisms:

“… such scenes bode ill for the future of democracy”.

‘…In 2014, twenty-four years after first being sworn in, I had to ask myself another question: what point was there in working as an opposition member of Parliament? … The leaders of state institutions were chosen by a single person. Though it was difficult to imagine, Fidesz could do whatever it wanted.’

Szelényi, pp. 134-136.

Viktor Orbán in the first ‘liberal’ Fidesz government of 1998-2002.

However, Fidesz lost its supermajority in a by-election the following year and was therefore no longer able to alter the system ahead of the next contest in 2018. At the same time, the governing parties gained considerable influence in the market for billboards and other media. Government propaganda, disguised as public information advertising, flooded both state and commercial broadcasting stations. This further distorted the 2018 parliamentary contest. The Election Observation Mission of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) found that the elections were…

‘… characterised by a pervasive overlap between state and ruling party resource, undermining contestants’ ability to compete on an equal basis’.

The report concluded that the media were highly biased towards the ruling party and that any intimidating rhetoric and opaque campaign financing had severely restricted the arena for genuine political debate and limited voters’ ability to make a fully informed decision. For the third of the voters who did not have access to the internet, it was as though the opposition was non-existent. When Fidesz regained its supermajority, it once again altered the Electoral Act. This further restricted the opposition’s room for manoeuvre.

Populism & ‘The Hungarian Fairy Tale’ – The EU’s funding of Fidesz:
Only Fidesz! Orbán the populist in April 2018.

“‘The Hungarian fairy tale’, or the Hungarian example, will be a successful one in a year” asserted György Matolcsy to Richard Quest, a CNN Business presenter, when asked about the quirks of Hungary’s unorthodox economic policy. International markets did not appreciate the Orbán government’s initial steps, and the political battles fought in support of this policy, and for a while, they turned their backs on it. But in 2016 international credit rating authorities raised Hungary’s rating to investment grade and by 2019, the national debt had fallen to 66% of GDP. Economic growth started slowly post-2012, but after 2014 it reached 4%-5% per annum, which was good even by global standards. In 2010, the GDP per capita in Hungary was 65% of the EU average, but by 2019 this had risen 73%. People’s income had risen significantly in ten years and unemployment had fallen to a very low level. Between 2010 and 2017 export revenues poured in from trade with the West. The decade saw a boom in public investments and several thousand kilometres of roads and railways were modernised, hundreds of public buildings, schools and kindergartens were built, and churches were renovated, as were castles and town squares, mostly with funds from the EU. And football stadia, in line with Orbán’s personal interests and priorities, were built in numbers hitherto unseen.

At first glance, the economic achievements of the Orbán government’s economic policies seem striking. Fidesz claimed that a country on the brink of state bankruptcy was saved because of its commitment to national sovereignty and unorthodox policies, breaking with the global liberal order. In reality, one of the fundamental sources for creating macroeconomic stability was the enormous sums flowing in from the EU. In the seven years following 2013, the EU funds arriving in the country were equivalent annually to 4%-6% of Hungary’s GDP. Never before had Hungary had access to such large funds that were not loans. In terms of their scale, these funds can be compared only with the Marshall Plan disbursed to the war-torn countries of Western Europe after the Second World War. Of course, countries in the ‘Soviet sphere of influence’, including Hungary, were prevented from accessing this aid. In exchange for the opening up of EU development funds to the ‘accession states’ of 2004, the Central European states opened up their internal markets, from which Western European companies profited greatly. However, few ‘public servants’ in Hungary benefited from the EU funds, certainly not health workers and teachers.

Many public sector workers benefited from working in other EU countries, including the UK. But, far from losing out from this mass temporary migration, the Hungarian economy benefited from the transfers made by these migrant workers. The sheer scale of this financial resource promoted economic growth and exercised a positive effect on the balance of payments. Paradoxically, the expatriates, many of them escapees from living under the Orbán régime, contributed to its continuity by sending money back home. Salaries and wages in Western countries were worth three times as much in central Europe, and though accommodation costs were concomitantly expensive, there was still a considerable surplus which could be redirected home.

One government-commissioned study showed that without the EU funds, the Hungarian economy would have flatlined and not grown at all. In addition, the second Orbán government came to power after the international financial crisis of 2008-2010, when productivity in EU countries was rising by 8% after the worldwide slump; in Germany, this figure was 14%. Since the Hungarian economy was already heavily dependent on German manufacturing, primarily through automotive, machine and electronics manufacturing, growth in Germany had a knock-on effect on Hungary. Finally, in 2014 oil prices on the world market fell, which also had a favourable impact on economic growth, with much of the country’s energy supplies coming cheaply from Russia. These fortunate circumstances naturally not only benefited Hungary but the whole of Central Europe. In fact, after 2008, Hungary’s achievements lagged behind those of its neighbours by 1% to 1.5%.

The unique ‘unorthodox economic policy’ called ‘the Hungarian Way’ by the Orbán government brought no special success to Hungary at all. The Hungarian National Bank kept interest rates even lower than other European banks so that the government’s so-called unorthodox actually merged into liberal European trends they liked to attack. It kept the budget deficit below 3% and reduced government debt until 2020. Its main trading partners continued to be in the EU, so a radically different economic policy would have been inconceivable. But government propaganda glossed over the reality that the good results were not only due to the performance of the Hungarian economy but to favourable external conditions and EU subsidies.

The funds that were disbursed did something to raise living standards and soften indignation at the enormous wealth amassed by political leaders. Szelényi maintains that the long-term interests of the country would have been better served if the government had reduced the deficit more significantly, improved the competitiveness of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), invested in developing a knowledge-based economy and the diversification of Hungary’s energy sources. Economists warned in vain that the Hungarian economy, beset by structural problems, was in no position to ride out an unexpected crisis. In the event, it faced two in quick succession, created by the Covid pandemic and then by Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Blood or Oil? – The 2022 Hungarian Election, Propaganda & Putin’s War:

When the Russian all-out invasion of Ukraine occurred in February 2022, Hungary was at the height of its General Election campaign, with Fidesz and Orbán looking for a fourth successive term in office. The war revealed Orbán to be on the side of the aggressor, Vladimir Putin, but Fidesz’s by now well-developed communications apparatus was able to construct a narrative and reach every household within days. Government propaganda spun the opposition’s message to stand by Ukraine and with the rest of the West, claiming that they were dangerous warmongers whereas Orbán was a man of peace and stability. Billions of forints were spent on a billboard and social media campaign, and the news outlets, controlled by Fidesz, diluted the natural desire of Hungarians to help their stricken neighbour. Orbán’s message as his country’s leader was simple: Do you want blood or oil?

Millions were persuaded that they did not want the former, associated with the opposition and that neither did they want an oil embargo which would shut off their direct, cheap supplies from Russia by pipeline, ironically through Ukraine. People voted for the ruling party en masse, turning what had seemed like a highly unfavourable political position into another triumph for the Orbán propaganda machine. In his victory speech, Orbán went on to include President Zelensky as among his ‘opponents’, implying that Putin was his ally. When the Ukrainian leader expressed his objection to this and disappointment with Hungary for its refusal to back its NATO allies, Foreign Secretary Szíjjártó called in the Ukrainian Ambassador in Budapest for a severe reprimand.

Of course, every country has its communication institutions serving the aims of its government, exploiting these resources to gain an upper hand, and Ukraine’s, exemplified by its President’s speeches, has been an outstanding success over the past year, but in Orbán’s Hungary, the communications apparatus of government and Fidesz were, and are, one and the same. This has become most apparent in the use of ‘government’ questionnaires to bypass parliamentary debate and decision-making and to ignore EU solidarity. One recent such official ‘poll’ was widely advertised as showing that 97% of Hungarians were opposed to ‘Brussels’ sanctions on Russia. It was reminiscent of the Nazi plebiscite of 1938 in Austria (below), conducted with German tanks in occupation, except the tanks are now Russian, camped on Ukrainian territory.

The penultimate page of ‘These Tremendous Years, 1918-38’, a journalistic album. Below, are an article and the cartoon from The Moscow Times from 2014 showing the similarities between Hitler’s occupation of Austria and Putin’s initial invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine.

Only a tiny minority of Hungarians return these questionnaires, whose usefulness seems mainly to be in expanding the Fidesz Party database. Tax databases were also used to send a letter from the government telling taxpayers that they would receive tax rebates, but only the return of the current government would guarantee these. Even expatriate taxpayers living and working in Hungary received these, even though most don’t have a vote. Besides these, there were a host of conspiracy theories spread through these Fidesz-controlled outlets. In any country with a free, diverse and balanced media, the government would have countered these. But in Hungary, they were allowed to spread, as in the case of a picture circulated on the internet of a bundle of mailed-in ballot papers in Transylvania, Romania, which had apparently been tampered with and destroyed (purportedly by ‘opponents’ of Fidesz).

Secrets in the Kremlin.
‘All that Gaz!’ Economic Imperialism & Weaponising Energy Supplies:

Orbán’s secret agreements with Putin on the construction of two new nuclear reactors in 2014 and on gas prices drew attention to his complete change of attitude to Russia. In 2008, when Putin stormed into Georgia, Orbán had said:

‘Nothing like this has happened since the end of the Cold War. The enforcement of brute imperial power politics that Russia has now undertaken has been unknown in the last twenty years.’

‘Russian military action reminds Orbán of 1956’ (Hungarian), Index, 14 August 2008 (index. hu).

One year later, in 2009, Orbán met Putin and a new chapter in their relationship began, in contrast to the cool reserve that had previously marked their interaction. Like most Central European states, including Germany, Hungary gets most of its energy sources from Russia, and so at this meeting, they talked about the oil and gas supplies. Later, it transpired that even then there was also talk about plans to expand the nuclear power station in Paks, Tolna County, an idea Orbán himself had previously condemned. One of the PM’s old acquaintances explained this ‘change of heart’ towards Russia to a journalist by saying that Viktor realised that this had the potential to give him leverage over the EU. However, it was not easy for the Orbán government to achieve this ‘volte fáce’ because of Fidesz’s traditional anti-Russian sentiment dating back to Orbán’s own famous speech in May 1989 at the re-internment of the Prime Minister in 1956, Imre Nagy (see the pictures below) executed by the Kádár régime in 1958, at which he called for the swift withdrawal of the Soviet troops that had been occupying Hungary since 1956. In 1990, the cries of Fidesz supporters at the elections were Ruszkik háza! (‘Russians go home!’)

To build a new, pragmatic relationship with Russia it was necessary for Orbán to commit to the construction of a new nuclear power station in Paks (II), based on a Russian system and using a Russian loan, although the country was not at that time in need of them, because the existing power station was guaranteed to produce electricity until 2032. Since only a small circle of ministers and officials knew of the secret Paks agreement, it took even Fidesz MPs by surprise and caused them grave concern. But they persuaded themselves that if a good relationship with Russia was necessary for pragmatic reasons, they should try to get the most out of it. This central-eastern ‘entente cordiále’ became a sensitive topic after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the Russian incursions into eastern Ukraine. This territorial aggression was sternly condemned by the EU and the United States, who both introduced economic sanctions and suspended bilateral diplomatic relations with Russia. Orbán tried to ‘strike a balance’ in this increasingly divisive conflict. As a gesture towards Putin, he protested noisily against the sanctions, but in the European Council, he voted for them repeatedly. In February 2015, Putin arrived in Budapest with unprecedented security measures in place which blocked the capital’s transport network for an entire day and closed half the country’s airspace.

Opposition politicians were primarily outraged because Orbán’s reception of Putin was in contravention of the European Council’s decision to suspend diplomatic relations with Russia, which Orbán had voted for a year earlier. But MPs were never told what unusual matter justified Putin’s personal visit. Their indignation grew even greater when Putin made use of the Budapest press conference to call on Ukraine to abandon part of its own sovereign territory. Without any alternative reasonable explanation, the visit could only be interpreted as showing Orbán’s support for a demonstration of Russian strength to the western powers, showing that Putin could still be received with pomp in central Europe when the leaders of the continent were punishing his country with sanctions.

Protests in Budapest against Orbán’s ‘illiberal state’ laws.
The ‘Illiberal State’, Fake News & Geopolitics:

Despite the repeated assertions by government ministers that the Russian relationship was merely a matter of business, the political nature of the relationship became all too apparent when Orbán seemed to try to copy Putin’s ‘illiberal state’ system. For some years, Orbán had been systematically bolstering a national business ‘élite’ linked to himself, rather like Putin’s ‘oligarchs’. There were also many new laws curtailing democracy in Hungary, such as the ‘foreign-funded organisations’ law denigrating and intimidating NGOs, many of which had assisted Syrian refugees, and the so-called ‘anti-paedophile law’ which was actually homophobic, prohibiting schools from acknowledging same-sex relationships or dealing with student questions about them. These are similar in tone and content to Russian legislation on these social issues and responsibilities under human rights agreements. The huge Fidesz media empire systematically made use of fake news and propaganda disseminated by Russian state media.

Orbán’s belief in his own exceptional abilities, that he could keep Russian policy in check, could not be relied upon, because Putin’s policies were shot through with imperialism. Ever since 2005, Putin had been of the opinion that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century. Without it, of course, Hungary and the other central European states, including the GDR (DDR) could not have won their freedom. Putin himself had been a KGB operative in East Berlin at that time. I recall that in 1991, at the time of the attempted coup against Gorbachev in Moscow and Crimea, there were real concerns among my Hungarian relatives that the ‘Ruszkis’ would be returning to Hungary, just as they had in 1956.

From 2005 onwards, Putin pursued expansionist strategies and since he always considered NATO as the greatest threat to Russia’s security, Hungary, as a NATO member, could only play a role as a channel through which to influence Western institutions. However, this did not preclude Russia from making deals with various European countries, including Germany, which (under Merkel) had made itself dependent on the direct ‘Nordstream’ pipelines from Russia. It was convenient for Putin to trigger conflicts between the Western allies through Hungary.

Budapest & Brussels – poles apart?

After 2014 Hungary pursued contradictory politics with its neighbours, especially Ukraine. While, on the one hand, it appeared to stand in solidarity when Russia invaded Crimea and the Donbas, within NATO the Orbán government made it impossible to set up a joint commission with Ukraine, claiming that the new Ukrainian language law infringed on the rights of the Hungarian minority in the sub-Carpathian west of the country. In 2017, Ukrainian legislators amended the country’s Education Act, restricting the rights of national minorities (primarily the Russian minority) to use their own languages as media of instruction in schools. The amendment would have had a potentially adverse effect on the 150,000-strong Hungarian community and the Orbán government used it as a means to forge a common cause with the Russian imperialists in their designs upon the largely Russian-speaking eastern parts of Ukraine. The law was later declared unconstitutional by Ukraine’s Constitutional Court, but not before Orbán had used the row to block dialogue between Ukraine and NATO. This was a disproportionate reaction to the language law problems and continued to sour relations between the two neighbours.

‘Mutti’ has harsh words for Viktor.

Meanwhile, the Orbán government continued to improve Hungary’s economic ties with Russia. As well as his shift to ‘illiberalism’, and autocracy within Hungary, his anti-immigration stance in the wake of the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis served the same foreign policy end, antagonising Angela Merkel (above) and Germany in particular. In September 2021, he signed a new fifteen-year natural gas supply deal with Russia’s state-controlled giant Gazprom. Gas started to flow to Hungary through the TurkStream gas pipeline, which opened at almost the same time. This enabled Russia to transport gas to Hungary and other ‘southern’ EU countries by completely avoiding Ukraine, detrimental to Ukraine’s interests. Over several years, therefore, Hungary was actually representing Moscow’s interests on various platforms, and the long-term gas deals made Hungary’s energy supply almost entirely dependent on Russian gas for more than a decade. Thus, Orbán’s already decade-long special relationship with Putin put the Hungarian government in an almost inevitable conflict with its EU partners when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

The War, the EU & NATO – the future of Hungary’s Foreign Policy:

The striking growth in the influence of Orbán’s regime in the 2010s was due to the flawed EU system which gives the smallest countries vetoes over decisions. They exploited this to the utmost with aggressive rhetoric and political manoeuvres. But for the Eastern autocratic powers, ‘little Hungary’ was only of interest as long as it sat at the same table as the most important decision-makers. These régimes made the most of Orbán’s ‘double-step’ diplomatic dance: they took advantage of a greedy, corrupt government to help divide the EU. The Hungarian autocracy, therefore, represented a threat to European integration. Hungary became an unreliable, perpetually revisionist partner.

But Vladimir Putin’s bloody war against Ukraine has shown clearly how restricted Hungary’s room for manoeuvre is in today’s rules-based world. Seeing Orbán’s reluctance and hesitation in standing by Ukraine, his central European allies have fallen away, especially Poland, which is at the opposite end of the spectrum when it comes to opposition to Putin. But Hungary has lost its leadership of the Visegrád group of the five central European nations. Hungary’s overdependence on Russian energy gave Orbán a severe headache, as his country is both an established member of NATO and a full, though an increasingly isolated member state of the EU. In February 2022, with NATO and EU members rapidly converging and unifying in opposition to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Hungary had finally arrived at a crossroads and had to choose between its membership of the EU and NATO on the one hand and its support for the Russian autocracy on the other. A year on, Orbán continues to balance, precariously, on the fence.

Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission since 2019.

On the eve of the anniversary of Putin’s all-out invasion, Ursula von der Leyen sent the following message to the Ukrainian President and his people:

“We have been with you in this existential fight from the beginning. Ukraine has become the centre of our continent. The place where our values are upheld, where our freedom is defended, where the future of Europe is written. Слава Україні.”

Ursula von der Leyen, President of the @EU_Commission. 23 February 2023.
🇪🇺

Looking forward, the effects and outcomes of the war in Ukraine are likely to further weaken Hungary’s roles in both international organisations, making them increasingly untenable, especially in the context of the Orbán government’s continuing issues in meeting the rule of law requirements of EU membership. Equally, its continual refusal to send or allow military aid to cross its territory to arm Ukraine may lead to eventual ‘retribution’ from NATO allies, including the USA. Either way, its international diplomatic relations within the transcontinental and transatlantic alliances will undoubtedly suffer long-term damage. That includes the UK, its first and strongest western ally in post-Soviet times, which is already seeking to improve its relations with its continental neighbours. If Ukraine wins the war, it is likely to gain access to EU membership in due course, perhaps by the end of the decade, perhaps sooner, and to become a strong liberal-democratic state within the bloc.

A poster outside Parliament in 2021, before the invasion, showing how unpopular Boris Johnson was until the war seemed to give him a lifeline, but he was forced to resign after a series of scandals continued in 2022. Britain’s relations with the EU have improved recently, due to cooperation over Ukraine.

No doubt Orbán’s autocratic régime will remain a serious challenge for Hungary’s European partners, at least until the next elections in 2026 by which time the outcome of Putin’s imperial war may be known. Although some steps have been taken by the European institutions to sanction the hard-line government in Budapest over its rule of law violations, the EU itself still lacks coherent and strategic policies to push back against autocracy both within the bloc and at its borders. However, Russia’s war in Ukraine has so far served as a warning sign for Europe’s complacent political élite that history does not progress like a consistently rising straight line on a graph, and that the turbulent geopolitical forces now in play must not be allowed to inhibit visionary thinking for an integrated European Union. Above all, if this war is to be won, the transcontinental alliance must not allow Trojan horses to be deployed among the allied European nations. It cannot rely on the USA’s involvement beyond the 2024 Presidential elections; it must work out its own strategic salvation, and that of Ukraine, before that.

Published Sources:

Zsuzsanna Szelényi (2022), Tainted Democracy: Viktor Orbán and the Subversion of Hungary. London: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd.

Rudolf Joó (1999), Hungary: A Member of NATO. Budapest: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Susan Kovalik Tully, et. al. (2007), The United States & Hungary: Paths of Diplomacy, 1848-2006. Washington D. C.: US Department of State Publications

Bencsik Gábor (2015), Magyarország Alaptörvénye (2012. január 1.). Budapest: Magyar Közlöny Lap- és Könyvkiadó Kft.

Online articles by this author:

Orbán’s Hungary – a member of NATO or Putin’s Fifth Column?: Hungarian Foreign Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration, 1989-2019.

Who are the Ukrainians? Mythology & History, Part II: 1801-2001 – From Napoleon’s Empire to end of Empires?

Who are the Ukrainians? Mythology & History, Part I, 862-1796: Kyivan Rus & Cossacks; Great Powers & Empires.

Old Gold, ‘Golden Team’ & Ballon d’Or: The Globalisation of Football & The Legendary Career of Flórián Albert, 1953-93.

The ‘Magical Magyars’:

As I was born in June 1957, I have no personal recollection of the Hungarian national ‘Golden Team’ (Aranycsapat) of the early fifties that began a new era of football with their famous 6-3 and 7-1 victories over England, never before beaten at home in the ninety years of the Football Association. Nor was I at Molineux, the home of Wolverhampton Wanderers, Billy Wright’s club team, for the friendly floodlit visits of the ‘Mighty Magyars’ of Honvéd and MTK (‘Red Banner’) of 1954-56. Nevertheless, as soon as I was able to go to matches with my father, I heard all the legends from him and from my uncle and cousin who were ‘present’ for these games and either watched them at Molineux, the Wolves’ stadium or live on the NAAFI (Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes) Canteen television during National Service. By the 1966-1967 season, following the enthusiasm generated by England’s World Cup win, I became both a fan of the Wolves and ‘football mad’ in general. It was then that I became familiar with the name Ferencváros FC and of their star player, Flórián Albert (pictured below), who won the coveted French award of the Ballon d’Or for that season.

Spanning Revolutions – Hungarian Football, 1954-1989:

The two matches of 1953-54 were results and performances that radically changed everything the world of football in general and England in particular, the home of football, had until then thought about the game. This was a time when the former colonies of the British Empire were undergoing national awakenings and becoming independent and they were therefore delighted with the outcome. The Eastern bloc countries were also exuberant, celebrating it, at first, as a victory for socialism over imperialism in the early years of the Cold War. Ironically, for many Hungarians, however, Stalin’s death that spring and the resultant thawing in Soviet policy towards its satellites meant that the Hungarian leaders could no longer ignore or resist the calls for greater fraternisation with western associations and clubs. These, they knew, were controversial and even dangerous developments, running alongside the political changes that were already taking place in Hungary. When these changes were ended abruptly in 1956, the footballing contacts continued, despite the worst efforts of the restored Stalinist régime, until they re-emerged with the demands for a more liberal society and state in the 1980s.

These pendants were presented to Ferenc Puskás by his club Honvéd after his 75th goal for the team in 1955.

When Hungary began to emerge from behind its iron curtain twenty years later, these sporting links were among the first to be recalled and revived. As a boys’ football coach and player for the Binley Park teachers’ team in Coventry in the mid-1980s, when I was asked to develop an ‘East-West’ educational exchange programme, it was natural to look to Hungary. On arrival in Kecskemét, Coventry’s twin town on the Great Plain, I was interviewed by the local press and asked what ordinary people in the Midlands of England now knew about Hungary. I was surprised when my answer was used as the paper’s next front-page headline. Hungary was now ‘Not just goulash, Puskás, and 1956’. Compared with other countries in the ‘Eastern Bloc’, the roles of football players, sports people and other international artists were instrumental in maintaining a continuity of contacts throughout the Cold War. Ferenc Puskás’s autobiography in English became a bestseller in Britain in 1955 and was translated into various other languages.

The season 1953-54 was the zenith of success of the Aranycsapat, and I have written about the matches in other articles, listed below… But what is not so well known is that, behind the scenes, team unity had come undone for the first time, although supporters knew nothing about it at the time. The day before the second match at the Népstadion (the newly-built national stadium), the team management, led by the communist state-appointed Gusztáv Sebes, had handed out bonuses at the team’s hotel on the city’s Margaret Island.

The well-established players received substantial, but strongly differing amounts, which came to light almost immediately. The reason for the difference was the result of ill-judged political discrimination. The former Ferencváros players – Budai, Czibor and Kocsis received the smallest and disproportionate amounts, even less than the squad players, while the two long-serving Kispest Honvéd players who held the highest military ranks, Puskás and Bozsik, received the most. Of course, they themselves could do nothing about the injustice, and it was left to Czibor and Kocsis to let their feet make their protest in the match against England. When they stepped on the pitch, they played with a kind of “we’ll show them” determination. But the management had already begun what became a divide-and-rule strategy towards the players, facilitating the formation of cliques within the team.

After the final, Puskás congratulated the winning captain, Fritz Walter.

Following the dramatic 6-3 and 7-1 defeats of England in the 1953-54 season, the Mighty Magyars began their magical progress to the World Cup final in Bern, Switzerland, the following summer, where they were unlucky to be defeated 3-2 by the West Germans. People took to the streets of Budapest to vent their dissatisfaction at the defeat of their ‘Golden team’. There was no TV in Hungary at the time, but the final was broadcast on the radio from the Népstadion, and it was from there that thousands marched together towards the centre of Budapest. Shop windows were smashed and streetcars overturned before finally, the angry masses reached the building of Magyar Rádio, the state broadcaster, where they handed in a petition stating that the team ‘manager’ Gustáv Sebes shouldn’t dare return home after the ignominious failure. The spontaneous demonstration was quickly dispersed, the ringleaders arrested, and the press silenced over the whole event. But a huge grandstand being erected on Hősök tér (Heroes’ Square) had to be rapidly abandoned. And in one night, the State Security apparatus destroyed two million postage stamps the post offices were due to receive on the following Monday morning. They had ‘commemorating the victory achieved at the Fifth World Cup Finals’ printed on them.

Puskás in action v West Germany in the Bern final.

But something of a ‘football revolution’ began in 1954-56 in Hungary. For the first time under the harsh régime of Mátyás Rákosi and Gérő, the anger of the terrorised, destitute and starving Hungarians turned upon their political leaders, who had beforehand and for years basked in the successes of the footballers. These footballers, coaches and players also felt the disappointment and loss of confidence, and police kept a precautionary eye on Puskás’s flat for a couple of weeks just in case. Despite the loss in the final, however, FIFA had chosen him as the player of the tournament, and there was no apparent threat to his safety or that of his family from the people of Budapest. They did not blame him for the defeat, but rather the team’s communist party ‘managers’. As the historian, Tibor Fischer put it recently:

‘Hungarians don’t mind dictatorship, but they hate losing a football match.’

T. Fischer, Under the Frog.

The communist leaders of Hungarian sport: Gusztáv Sebes (speaking) and István Kutas.

The 1954 World Cup final result really did constitute a turning point in the history of both Hungarian football and society at large. This was the first time that ‘ordinary’ Hungarians could test out when and how they could express raise their heads above the parapet. But the devastating effects of this single sporting event were more palpable over a prolonged period than they were in the short term. Indeed, the régime no longer wished to employ its misfiring political musket and the sport itself fell out of favour. In addition to this, the football-supporting party leaders also fell from grace and, as János Kádár rose to power, especially after the Soviet-backed counter-revolution in 1956, Hungarian football went into a slow decline. But in the two seasons of 1954-56, the Aránycsapat soon found their form again and followed up on their four-year undefeated run before the Bern débácle by going on another magnificent stretch over the next eighteen months. In the autumn of 1954, they beat Romania 5-1 and then, after a 1-1 draw with the USSR in Moscow, defeated the Swiss 3-0 and Czechoslovakia 4-1, both in Budapest, before taking on the Scots in Glasgow, beating them 4-2.

Anglo-European Club Nights & International Friendlies, 1954-58:

The defeats of 1953-54 were still fresh in the minds of English fans when, in December 1954, the ‘Mighty Magyars’ club team of the Hungarian Army, ‘Honved’, arrived in Wolverhampton. Their team contained many stars from the national, ‘Golden team’, including the legendary Lieutenant-Colonel Ferenc Puskás and his well-drilled fellow soldiers, Bozsik, Kocsis, Lóránt, Czibor and Budai. Kocsis had been the leading scorer in the World Cup, so, following their own sensational win over Moscow Spartak a month earlier, the first-time English Champions ‘Wolves’ were eager to welcome the tormentors of England to Molineux. It was good news for Wolves that ace goalkeeper Grosics, though named in the pre-match line-up (see below), was not available for selection by Honvéd, but they were probably unaware that this was because, as a soldier, he had been disciplined, ‘banned’ and ‘exiled’ from the club by the communist authorities in Hungary. The team was well-chaperoned by officials, which was symptomatic of the political cloud that had hung over Hungarian football ever since the team’s surprise defeat by West Germany in the final in Bern in the summer of that year and their victimisation of Grosics was meant to send a clear warning shot to both the Honvéd soldiers and the rest of the national team.

The game was played under the new floodlights on a Monday night, 13th December, with 55,000 cheering fans watching at the ground and many more on the new phenomenon of TV. The BBC broadcast the game live, which pleased the National Servicemen who were allowed to watch it in their canteens. Millions more tuned in to the radio, as not many people had acquired TV sets at this time. Just as they had twice led out their national teams in 1953/4, Billy Wright and Ferenc Puskás were again side-by-side (pictured below). Wolves came out in their specially-made satin shirts while Honvéd wore their traditional tracksuits. But it was Puskás’ team that first began to ‘dazzle’ under the lights.

Honvéd visiting Molineux

The visitors immediately began to play with fantastic ball control and speed of passing. The press reported that ‘despite being a bit on the chunky side, Puskás was surprisingly very quick’. However, ‘it was his mesmerising skill with the ball that was so wonderful to see’. By half-time, Honvéd were 2-0 up and in full control, their precision passing and speed of attack drawing gasps of appreciation from the crowd. The first goal came from a pin-point Puskás free kick which found the head of Kocsis and the ball flew past Bert Williams in the Wolves’ goal like a bullet. This was followed up by a second from the speedy winger, Machos, who was put through the Wolves’ defence by Kocsis. That was in the first quarter-hour! England keeper Williams pulled off a string of saves to keep the score down to two at the interval. As the teams left the field, the crowd rose to salute the Hungarian artistry but were worried that the home team might be humiliated in the second half, just as England had been at Wembley a year earlier. What happened, however, was more like a repeat of the Bern final between Hungary and West Germany.

Bert Williams, England and Wolverhampton goalkeeper, in training.

In the second half, the Wolves called upon all their fighting spirit and energy reserves. Johnny Hancocks scored a penalty soon after the restart, walloping the ball past Farago’s left hand, and with fifteen minutes left, the skilful Hungarians were tiring on what had become a very muddy pitch. Dennis Wilshaw combined well with Roy Swinbourne, who scored twice to win the game 3-2. The crowd went wild with joy on a night on which it became good to be an English football fan once more. They were singing all the way home on the bus, and there were great celebrations in the canteens where the National Servicemen were watching. Their morale had also been boosted by this victory. Wolves’ archivist Graham Hughes recounted:

Billy Wright in action for the Wolves.

The shadowy Hungarian Vice-Minister for Sport who attended the match said that the game had been a clean-spirited fight and praised Wolves’ fighting qualities. Apparently, he did not mention Grosics’s absence and the political ‘cloud’ hanging over the club, or that many of its players were tired from playing for the national team against Scotland only five days earlier. Other Hungarians complained about the pitch, which was far from dry at the beginning of the match and was further watered at half-time at the request of Stan Cullis, the Wolves head coach, who later admitted this. This had the effect of slowing down the play, favouring the Wolves’ long-ball tactics. ‘Wolves are champions of the world’ was one of the headlines in the national newspapers the next morning. However, if this was seen as ‘revenge’ for the ‘dents’ in national pride that the defeats of the previous season had inflicted, this was also a friendly match, since the European Champions’ Cup had not yet come into being. Real Madrid, Barcelona, Juventus and others would have something to say about that claim in future seasons. Certainly, for the time being, at least, the club’s prestige had been taken to a higher level than ever before as Wolves gave English football a much-needed boost. Meanwhile, Hungarian football continued to be manipulated by its communist ‘handlers’.

In the spring of 1955, after a 2-2 draw with Austria in a European Cup match in Vienna, the Hungarian national team undertook a tour of Scandinavia, handing out thrashings to all four, concluding with a 9-1 victory over Finland. Then, when the Scots paid a return visit to Budapest in May, they were beaten 3-1 by their hosts. In the second half of the year, they came from behind in Lausanne with two late goals from Puskás to beat the Swiss 5-4 in the European Cup and won three more cup matches in the year, including a 6-1 thrashing of Austria in Budapest, the hundredth meeting between the two neighbouring national teams.

The official programme for the hundredth match between Hungary and Austria at the National Stadium in Budapest; the cover picture is from the match in Vienna the previous April.

Puskás shoots against Austria; on the right is a celebration menu for the after-match supper.

They finished the year with an impressive 2-0 victory over Italy, but then, on 19th February 1956, in terrible winter conditions, they suffered an unexpected 3-1 defeat at the hands of Turkey in Istanbul. In those days, Turkey was not highly respected as a footballing nation. Although Puskás scored the consolation goal, he was no longer the Puskás of 1953-54, already struggling with weight problems. There was a good deal of speculation that he would soon be dropped from the national team and might even retire. The team continued to suffer unexpected defeats in the first half of the year, and produced more unacceptable performances, drawing 2-2 with Yugoslavia in Budapest in a European Cup game and losing to Belgium in Brussels. Gusztáv Sebes had been becoming increasingly unpopular since the Bern disaster and had also been losing political influence. He was ousted after the 2-2 draw with Portugal in Lisbon and replaced with Márton Bukovi, an excellent, expert coach. He was the MTK coach and a member of Sebes’s coaching staff.

A postcard picture of the Népstadion to mark the hundredth match with neighbours Austria.
A photograph which appeared in the Wembley programme for the FA’s November 1953 international.

The completion of the half-finished Népstadion did not come to pass until 2006, fifty years after the Uprising. It became a symbol of Hungarian football’s loss of prestige, and the Party reached a decision which led to much criticism that instead of spoilt footballers the hardworking athletes of other sports should be supported. In reality, this implied ‘pampering’ consisted of a humiliating system whereby, despite being among the finest players in the world, ‘élite’ footballers didn’t receive any official income other than the paltry bonuses which topped up their basic workplace wages. To keep them from defecting to the West, the authorities turned a blind eye to them bringing back goods from their international sojourns which could be sold for a tidy profit on the black market. In many cases, the players were positively encouraged in this smuggling by politicians. Customs checks were regularly omitted by border guards in return for petty bribes. However, at the first sign of failure, the fickle leaders began blackmailing the players who had become accustomed to such ‘solutions’. They ordered arrests of players, including house arrests, banned them from playing, and in some cases instituted internal exiles, such as that of the Honvéd and national team goalkeeper, Gyúla Grosics, who was sent to the mining town of Tatabánya in 1954.

Although the national team continued its winning streak in these seasons, partly out of the financial imperatives facing its players, behind the scenes the players were losing real motivation under this system. Even Puskás was subject to this since he bought his first family house in the Zugló district of Budapest shortly before the 1954 World Cup. He could only keep up the mortgage payments if the team kept winning and he was therefore able to earn his win bonuses. The increasingly anti-football dictatorship continued to humiliate the footballers, whose popularity they envied. As long as they and their families continued to have a better standard of living than the average person in the country, the footballers did not rebel openly.

Ferenc Puskás with his daughter, Anikó

The second half of 1956 began with a fantastic five-match winning streak, Bukovi bringing Grosics back into the team from ‘exile’ and giving Puskás an ultimatum to slim down or be left out. After beating Poland, Yugoslavia, the USSR, France and Austria, the team was preparing for their next match against Sweden at their training camp in Tata in late autumn when a student demonstration became an armed uprising in Budapest. The players returned to Budapest to be with their families and Zoltán Czibor became directly involved in the revolutionary cause. The Honvéd sportsmen elected him as president of the army sports club’s revolutionary committee. The Honvéd players were due to play Athletico Bilbao in the European Cup on 22nd November, and Czibor arranged the squad’s passports with Imre Nagy’s government once, after a few days, the ‘revolution’ seemed to have been successful. On 1st November, the squad set off to prepare for their match.

Following in the wake of MTK, who had participated the previous year as league champions, Honvéd were competing for the first time. Accompanied by the solidarity and compassion of western Europeans, the team played matches across the continent for charity and to cover their own expenses. They donned black armbands and tore out the red star from the Honvéd (army sports cub) badges on their shirts. Then, on 4th November, more than a thousand tanks streamed into Hungary across the eastern border from the USSR to replace the ones already neutralised or destroyed by the revolutionaries. The Honvéd players did everything they could to get their families out of the country to join them in the West, including Puskás’s wife, ‘Bözsike’, and his four-year-old daughter, Anikó, who managed to escape across the border on 1st December. They were reunited with Ferenc in Milan, where they spent Christmas with the rest of the team and their relatives. Because of the volatile situation in Budapest, the return leg of the match against Bilbao took place in Brussels on 20th December. The first had finished 3-2 to the Basques and the second ended in a 3-3 draw, an aggregate of 6-5 to them. Honvéd were out of the cup, but a lucrative tour of South America awaited.

Puskás in his Honvéd Sports Club colours, complete with a red star on the badge, which the players tore out on their 1956 tour.

For Kispest Honvéd, the ‘Golden’ club football team of the mid-fifties, the events of October-November 1956 brought a premature end to their glory days. They were touring at the time of the conflict, and many of the players decided against returning to their homeland, preferring instead to use their skills in western Europe. Almost exactly two years to the day after the match with Honved, on 11th December 1956, Wolves entertained ‘Red Banner’ or MTK Budapest, as they preferred to be known from now on, for another floodlit friendly. Although not as great a match in footballing terms, the game was, if anything, even more significant. It was held as a benefit match and raised what was then a huge sum of £2,312, to be donated to the Hungarian Relief Fund. At the pre-match banquet, the Hungarians, who had expressed their wish to be known by their original name of MTK, rather than ‘Red Banner’, had promised to play the very best football they could in honour of their gracious hosts. Responding, the Wolves Chairman told his guests that the motto of both the town of Wolverhampton and its football club was ‘out of darkness comes light’ and that he hoped that very soon that would be the way in their native land. They had to wait forty years for the light to shine through the gloom at home. Nevertheless, the match was a worthy contest, as the report below demonstrates.

MTK’s team was packed with Hungarian internationals, three of whom had played in the humiliating victories over England a few years earlier. They became only the second team to escape floodlit defeat at Wolves’ Molineux lair, demonstrating a brand of top-class individual football artistry. In the game itself, the Wolves gave the impression of holding something back. Certainly, they didn’t unleash the kind of power we had witnessed on previous occasions…. The rather subdued Molineux crowd, sensing this, produced what can only be described as ’the Molineux murmur’ instead of the customary ’roar’. The biggest cheer came when Johnny Hancocks replaced Jimmy Murray eight minutes from time. Everyone was looking for the little magician to provide a fairy-tale ending, but the winger only touched the ball three times… The wolves couldn’t break down the visitors’ defensive system, which was one of the coolest under pressure ever seen at Molineux.

The Hungarians took the lead in the sixth minute, Palotás whipping the ball past the diving Bert Williams following some excellent work by world-famous centre-forward Hidegkúti. Portsmouth schoolboy Pat Neil, making his debut for Wolves, saved their blushes and their proud unbeaten record under the Molineux floodlights. He scored the equaliser after Veres palmed away a corner. Neil was unmarked, having drifted outside the goal area: his smartly hit shot passed through the ruck of players to beat Veres to his left.… The cool, calculating football of MTK saw them too frequently guilty of trying one pass too many… At half-time, the talented Hidegkúti was replaced by Karasz. The game wasn’t exactly dull; there were chances at both ends. Both goalkeepers acquitted themselves well, making a string of acrobatic saves, but the solemnity of the occasion, set against the backdrop of the Soviet crushing of the Hungarian Uprising, was really responsible for the fayre served up that night.

The day after the Molineux match, the MTK players were on their way to Vienna, where their future movements would be dictated by the course of political events in their stricken country. Meanwhile, the Honvéd players decided to accept the offer of travelling to Brazil in a deal negotiated by Emil Östreicher, the club’s technical director, in which Honvéd would play ten matches for $10,000 each match, plus travel and accommodation expenses. The Kádár government and the Hungarian Football Association did their best to stop the tour, sending Gusztáv Sebes to the team hotel to persuade the players to return to Hungary, but they decided to travel and, despite the threat of international sanctions, the Brazilians staged several games, which attracted hundreds of thousands of spectators.

The majority of the players returned to Hungary, as promised, in February. But Puskás, Czibor, Kocsis, coach Jenő Kalmár, and Östreicher, together with most of the Hungarian youth team, which had also been touring in the west, chose to remain abroad. Puskás chose emigration because, as captain, he would face at least a one-year ban when got home. In the end, he was banned for two years anyway, by FIFA, which was then dominated by many Eastern European associations. What was more of a concern to him, however, was that as an army officer he could be charged with absconding from his post, an offence punishable by death under Hungarian military law. The military tribunals had already tried refugee officers ‘in absentia’ and given sentences which the communist secret services had already carried out summary executions abroad.

Puskás and Kubala, friends since Kispest’s schoolboy matches in 1941, were now both exiles from their native land.

Puskás was, of course, protected to a certain extent by his fame and popularity, but with constant surveillance from the Hungarian secret service and his relatives remaining in Hungary, he couldn’t ‘rest at ease’. He rode out the ban for a time in Vienna, where he was allowed to train with Wiener SC. Still, he had no income and the only person to help him financially was the great Hungarian forward László Kubala, who had played with Puskás in a Schoolboy XI in Kispest in the early 1940s, and was a settled favourite at Barcelona. When Santiago Bernabéu, Real Madrid’s legendary president, invited Emil Östreicher to be his advisor in Madrid, Östreicher persuaded him to sign Puskás, despite his coach’s concerns that the Hungarian star was ‘over the hill’, unfit and conceited. Eventually, Puskás was given a four-year contract and a signing-on fee of $100,000 after he had lost sixteen kilograms in two months.

In October 1957, Wolverhampton Wanderers met Real Madrid in another floodlit friendly at Molineux. This was in the years when Puskás was banned from playing by FIFA, so he was not yet playing for the Spanish Champions alongside their mouth-watering mix of players from South America and France as well as from Spain. The Spanish giants had already dominated the first two years of the European Champions Cup, and would therefore be a stern test for Wolves. Real Madrid had already developed into a huge club by Santiago Bernabéu, whose vision had transformed a club with just sixteen thousand supporters into a footballing colossus. He had spotted the vast money-making potential of a premier European Cup competition and set out to develop the financial clout to buy the best players in the world.

In one of the most thrilling games ever witnessed at Molineux, Real’s footballers unveiled their artistry with the ball, giving a display of controlled athleticism and intuitive running off the ball to create space for their fellow players to move into. However, the Wolves came from behind to beat the maestros with their own display of long-range precision passing together with rapid attacking and approach play. Wolves went into the match in a confident mood after their recent victories over foreign opposition. But as with Honvéd, they allowed the Spanish team to get into the game; they probed away at the Wolves’ defence and finally got their reward when Marsal scored with a bullet-like header. But seven minutes after the break Broadbent equalised when Finlayson punted an enormous kick at the Madrid penalty area, which Murray headed on for Broadbent to lob home. On the hour, Wolves took the lead from a Norman Deeley corner from which Murray scored with a downward header. Then followed a nervy final twenty minutes when after Marsal scored again for Real, but then Dennis Wilshaw calmly lifted the ball over their keeper from Mullen’s corner with ten minutes left.

A Real Madrid Rosette from the late fifties.

So the Old Gold team ran out 3-2 winners again, as they had done against Honvéd, having beaten the pride of Europe, enhancing their own reputation once more as one of the world’s greatest club sides at that time and subduing, in the process, the great Argentinian Alfredo di Stéfano, though he went close with two shots, one of which brought out a fine diving save from Finlayson. The return match against Real Madrid was played under the fantastic Bernabéu floodlights on 11th December 1957, a year to the day since their match with MTK at Molineux and about three years since Honvéd had visited Wolverhampton. In those three short years, so much had happened in the lives of these four clubs.

Wolves produced another fighting performance, withstanding both heavy rain and heavy pressure from the Real players, who were set on revenge. However, it was the home team who were in danger of losing their five-year unbeaten record in Madrid. The only goal of the first half was scored by Bobby Mason for the Wolves, putting the visitors ahead on the half-hour mark with a powerful header. Mateo equalised for Real twenty-five minutes after the restart and in the seventies minute, Di Stéfano put the Spanish team ahead after running into a gap in Wolves’ defence to slot home from Kopa’s defence-splitting cross. But Wolves grabbed an equaliser when Jimmy Mullen’s cross was turned in by a defender’s boot. It finished as a 2-2 draw, but unhappy with some decisions, the Wolves fans felt they had scored a moral victory.

World Cups and European Champions Cups, 1958-62:
John Charles, pictured in 1954 at the match between Wales and Scotland at Ninian Park, Cardiff. (2023, February 8).
In Wikipedia.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Charleshttps://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/ce/John Charles

In the 1958 World Cup finals in Sweden, England’s team were defeated in the group play-offs by the USSR. The English side had been weakened by the Munich air disaster on 6th February, which killed three internationals on the books of Manchester United, including England’s young star Duncan Edwards. It was a tragedy which hit the whole country and the entire footballing world. However, Wales had qualified for the first time, with a strong forward line. The group match between Hungary and Wales in Sandviken became the northernmost World Cup match in history. It finished 1-1, with John Charles, then playing for Italian giants Juventus, scoring for Wales and Bozsik for Hungary, who were no longer the force they had been after in the previous tournament. The Hungarian team had been dealt a blow by the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 after which star players like Sándor Kocsis and Ferenc Puskás fled their homeland in the wake of the failed uprising against the communist regime.

From the 1954 ‘Golden’ team, only goalkeeper Gyula Grosics, defender József Bozsik and forward Nándor Hidegkuti remained. But the latter was by now thirty-six years old and, although named as captain, was nowhere near his previous form, and was dropped to the substitutes’ bench for two of the four matches. But in spite of Hungary’s recent travails, they were still considered a strong side and were expected to advance from their group. The success of Wales was a surprise, but they drew all their group games and beat the Hungarians in a play-off match, with Ivor Allchurch scoring the first goal, equalising Lajós Tichy’s 33rd-minute strike before Terry Medwin scored the winner in the 76th minute. The Welsh were beaten by Pelé’s first World Cup goal in the quarter-final. This was the Welsh team’s first appearance at the FIFA World Cup and they would not qualify for another sixty-four years. This tournament also marked the debuts of fellow United Kingdom side Northern Ireland, as well as the Soviet Union.

Di Stéfano pictured with Puskás after the latter began playing for Real Madrid in 1958.

Meanwhile, Real Madrid had managed to persuade FIFA to shorten Puskas’s ban by six months so that he was able to begin the 1958-59 season alongside Alfredo di Stéfano, beginning his second career, which lasted until his retirement in 1966. In the course of this, besides his three winners’ medals in the European Cup, he came second in the 1960 Ballon d’Or competition, which he would probably have won had his own native country’s representatives and the other Eastern bloc FAs not voted against him as a ‘defector’ to the West.

Meanwhile, in 1958-59, the Old Gold of Wolverhampton had finished English First Division champions once again, qualifying them to compete in the European Champions Cup for the second time the following season. They hoped to recapture some of their devastating league form against foreign opposition. However, after their disappointing performance in the 1958-59 competition, losing on aggregate in the second round to FC Schalke, Wolves had to play a preliminary round against ASK Vorwaerts of East Berlin, winning 3-2 on aggregate at the end of September 1959. In the first round, they went on to beat Red Star Belgrade 4-1 over two legs. But then they came up against two of the most brilliant Hungarian exiles in the quarter-final against Barcelona, László Kubala and Sándor Kocsis, who between them scored five of the nine goals Barca netted against them over the two legs, Kocsis getting four of the five in the second leg in Wolverhampton. Czibor didn’t play in either leg, perhaps a sign of how talented the team was.

Billy Wright had retired at the end of the previous season and the new Wolves and England backline trio of Clamp, Slater and Flowers proved powerless to halt the fantastic flair of the Hungarian pair, especially Kocsis, in what was the last time Wolves played in the premier European competition. In a wonderful exhibition of running off the ball to create space for others to move into, the Catalan team out-thought and out-played the best team in England. There is no doubt that a huge doubt existed between the tactical sophistication of the top continental teams and their English challengers. In the two legs against Barcelona, Wolves’ traditional long-ball game had been exposed by intelligent defending behind inventive counter-attacking. Patience was now required when probing for an opening, and guile was more effective than bravery and enthusiasm. In the semi-final, the Catalan team was beaten 6-2 on aggregate by their great rivals Real Madrid, the eventual winners.

Wolves attacking the Blackburn goal in the 1960 FA Cup Final

By winning the 1960 FA Cup, beating Blackburn Rovers 3-0 in the final, Wolves at least ensured that they would be competing in Europe again in 1960-61, this time in the newly-created Cup Winners’ Cup. They lost 3-1 on aggregate in the semi-final to Glasgow Rangers but still finished third in the league behind Tottenham Hotspur, the first double winners.

Bill Slater is on his teammates’ shoulders holding the FA Cup.

Perhaps Puskás’s greatest club performance came in the 7-3 victory over Eintracht Frankfurt in the 1960 European Cup final in which he scored four goals, a record for a club final. It was called Club Football’s Match of the Century and brought Real Madrid their third cup in as many years. After retiring as a player in 1966, and a third career as a coach, he was welcomed back to Hungary in 1981 as an honoured guest, but didn’t feel secure enough to return permanently until after the régime change of 1989.

Puskás with the 1960 European Cup winning team.
Kubala (centre) with special guests Alfredo di Stéfano (left) and Ferenc Puskás in a match held in his honour in 1961

Meanwhile, in the 1961-2 season, the wheels finally came off the ‘Wolverhampton omnibus’, as Wolves slipped to eighteenth in the First Division, their first time outside the top six in ten seasons. By the summer of 1962, the talented multi-trophy-winning Wanderers’ squad had all but broken up. In the summer of 1962, it was World Cup time again, in Chile. England lost their opening match 2-1 to Hungary, with their new star, Flórián Albert (see below). The newly naturalised Ferenc Puskás followed in the footsteps of Kubala in playing for his adoptive country (Kubala, pictured right, was included in the Spanish squad but was injured).

Puskás in action for Spain in the 1962 World Cup finals.

Spain had beaten Morocco 1-0, in Casablanca, in Puskás’ first match the previous November, but after losing to Czechoslovakia in their first group match at the World Cup, the Spanish team was eliminated by Brazil, 2-1. Ron Flowers was England’s only Wolverhampton representative at the tournament, and, after recovering from a 2-1 defeat to Hungary in their opening match, the English team were also, eventually, beaten 3-1 by holders Brazil in the quarter-finals.

The Return of Honvéd to Molineux, December 1962:

Wolves kicked off their 1962/63 season in fine style, thumping Manchester City 8-1 at Molineux. Ted Farmer, their number nine, scored four of these goals, and the Wolves were unbeaten after their first eleven fixtures. In that time they scored thirty-one goals and conceded only thirteen in a sequence of eight wins and three draws. Farmer scored eight goals in nine games, missing only two matches until received an injury in September. At that time, the Wolves were topping the First Division table, but Farmer only recovered in time to play in the final three matches of the season. By then, the tide had turned against his team and the title had been lost. Wolves finished a disappointing fourth, given their remarkable start to the season, but it was a lot better placing than they had achieved in the previous season. One of the highlights of the season was the 7-0 thrashing of Black Country neighbours West Bromwich Albion on 6th March 1963. In December 1962, Wolves once again entertained Honvéd at Molineux, completing ten years of floodlit friendlies from September 1953 onwards. There was no clamour for tickets this time like there had been eight years earlier when Wolves had defeated Honvéd 3-2.

Admission for this match played on 3rd December 1962, was ‘pay on the night’. The Hungarian teams, both local and national, were no longer the pride of Europe, due largely to the exodus of their players after the Soviet Union’s crushing of the October 1956 Hungarian Uprising. Gone were the likes of the legendary Ferenc Puskás, Sándor Kocsis, and their talented countrymen, among hundreds of thousands of more ordinary citizens who became refugees at that time. But Honvéd were currently second in Hungary’s top division and so would provide robust if friendly, opposition. Újpest Dózsa occupied the top place in the Hungarian league, with MTK (‘Red Banner’) in third. Flowers, Slater and Broadbent were happy to renew old acquaintances. Two of the members of the 1954 Honvéd team had returned to Molineux: József Bozsik was now the club president and Gyula Lóránt was the club coach. Lájos Farago, who as the understudy goalkeeper to the great Grósics, had played such a storming role in his previous appearance at Molineux, would be in goal again.

The teams were:

Wolves: Davies; Showell, Thomson; Kirkham, Slater, Flowers; Wharton, Crowe, Murray, Broadbent, Hinton.

Honvéd: Farago; Levai, Morosi, Dudás; Perecsi, Kotasz; Nagy, Komora, Nógrádi, Tuschinger, Vági.

Attendance: 13,914.

The game bore little resemblance to the classic encounter of 1954. Many of the fans had stayed at home, perhaps anticipating this, but also because it was a bitterly cold night. Farago was once again magnificent, earning the accolade of Star of the Show. He stopped everything Wolves threw at him, except one effort from Wednesbury lad Alan Hinton, who could easily have had a hat-trick by the hour mark. Other Wolves’ strikers missed a hatful of chances before Honvéd’s speedy winger Vági broke away dangerously. He fluffed his chance, but the omens were not good for the Wolves. Next, it took an excellent, headed, off-the-line clearance by Bobby Thomson to keep the visitors out. Then, with only five minutes left, Komora chipped the ball over magnificently for György Nagy to score what he must have thought was the winner. Fortunately, Hinton crashed home a terrific equaliser with only three minutes left, thus earning a 1-1 draw. After the match, Bozsik announced that he wanted to make this fixture an annual event, and a year later the two teams met again in Budapest.

At Molineux in this decade from 1953 to 1962, Wolves had played a total of seventeen games against teams from other European leagues, winning thirteen and drawing four. They also played in six home ties in European competitions, winning three, drawing two and losing only once, to Barcelona. In the following season, Wolves travelled to Budapest to play the promised return friendly against Honvéd on Wednesday 6th October 1963, this time losing 2-1 in the Népstadion. In fine weather, a crowd of nearly thirty-one thousand witnessed a quiet game that the Wolves were lucky only to lose by the odd goal. Tuschinger and Komora netted for Honvéd before Ray Crawford pulled one back for the Wolves. Wolves clearly missed a number of players from the previous season, including Bill Slater and Peter Broadbent.

In the rest of that season, there were many other changes at the club, and ultimately Wolves plummeted to sixteenth place in the First Division. They had to face the obvious fact, like Honvéd, that their current team without their old stars was just not good enough to challenge for the Championship or even the European qualifying places. In particular, although they kept scoring in the early sixties, they had not compensated at the back for Billy Wright’s retirement in the 1959-60 season and they were leaking goals. Then, despite new signing Crawford’s twenty-six goals from thirty-eight games, they managed only seventy in total in 1963-64. The team’s performance worsened the following season, resulting in relegation from the First Division in 1965.

‘Fradi’ &The Wanderers Return to Europe, 1971-72:

Derek Dougan

The ‘Old Gold’ had to wait another decade to shine again against continental opposition under the lights at Molineux. In the interim, they suffered relegation from the First Division and spent two seasons in the Second Division, until finishing second to Coventry at the end of the 1966/67 season, winning promotion back to the top flight. Wolves had acquired some brilliant attacking players, including Derek Dougan, ‘the Doog’, Peter Knowles and Dave Wagstaffe. In January 1968 they were joined by Frank Munro, to play in midfield at first, but then in the centre of defence where he was outstanding for both Wolves and Scotland. But with floodlit friendlies now a thing of the past, it was not until finishing fourth in the First Division in the 1970/71 season that they were able to qualify for the UEFA Cup, renamed from the Inter-City Fairs Cup.

Frank Munro

The fans looked forward to being back in Europe and in this competition, Wolves took on and beat some of the most illustrious teams, starting with the Portuguese club Academia Coimbra in the first round. They then went on to beat FC Den Haag and Carl Zeiss Jena, before meeting Juventus in the Quarter Final. They beat the Italian giants 3-2 on aggregate. In the Semi-final they were to play the Hungarian aces Ferencváros and their great centre-forward Flórián Albert. The first leg was played on a beautiful, sunny late afternoon in April 1972, in the Nepstadion where they had last met Honvéd. The attendance was 44,763 and kick-off was at 5.30 p.m. Wolves managed to maintain their excellent away form in the competition, drawing a hard-fought game, 2-2. They showed a determined effort after their brilliant young striker John Richards had put them ahead after nineteen minutes. Derek Dougan cleverly drew the defenders away before back-healing the ball back to Richards, who didn’t miss.

John Richards

Ferencváros came back strongly, however, scoring two in eight minutes. István Szőke got the first on the half-hour from the penalty spot, and then the Magyars took a two-goal lead. Flórián Albert netted from open play, shooting past Phil Parkes following Szőke’s tempting cross, making it 2-1 to ‘Fradi’ at half-time. At seventy-four minutes, the home team was awarded another penalty, but this time Parkes magnificently saved Szőke’s shot with his left foot. The Budapest team went close again when Kű headed just over. The Wolves then rallied and won a corner. Dave Wagstaffe swung the ball in and Frank Munro was perfectly placed to nod home the equaliser. After that, Kenny Hibbitt and Jimmy McCalliog smacked in powerful shots, but they didn’t result in a winning goal. The Wolves had almost three times the number of efforts on goal as the home team but the two sides went into the return leg on equal terms. The two teams in Budapest were as follows:

Ferencváros: Vörös; Novák, Pancsícs; Megyesi, Vépi, Bálint; Sőke, Bránkovics, Albert, Kű, Múcha (Rákósi). Subs: Rákósi, Fusi, Hórváth, Géczi.

Wolves: Parkes; Shaw, Taylor; Hegan, Munro, McAlle; McCalliog, Hibbitt, Richards, Dougan, Wagstaffe. Subs: Arnold, Parkin, Daley, Sunderland, Eastoe.

Phil Parkes in action at Molineux.

Front cover of the programme for the second leg at Molineux.

The second leg was held at Molineux a fortnight later on 19th April 1972 in front of a disappointingly small crowd (for a European semi-final) of just over twenty-eight thousand. The Wolves were determined not to lose this semi-final as they had their last in Europe, against Glasgow Rangers in 1961. Phil Parkes (pictured above) was once again outstanding, Alan Sunderland came in at right back for the suspended Shaw, and Steve Daley, aged eighteen, made his European debut in place of the also-suspended Dave Wagstaffe. New boy Daley’s dream came true when he put Wolverhampton ahead in the first minute. Goalkeeper Vörös missed Sunderland’s high floating cross, the ball falling to Daley. Just before half-time, up popped Frank Munro as he had in the away leg to put the home team 2-0 up. Lájos Kű pulled a goal back for ‘Fradi’ two minutes after the interval and then Phil Parkes saved another penalty from Szőke with his leg. It was a very entertaining game, worthy of a final, in which Daley and Hibbitt went close, Dougan hit the bar and Sunderland sent in a thirty-yard screamer before Taylor cleared a József Múcha effort off the line. Wolves won a close match 2-1 and tie 4-3 on aggregate.

Sixty-four clubs had initially set out to contest the competition, so it was testimony to the strength of English football that two First Division clubs reached the final. Unfortunately for Wolves, the other team was Tottenham Hotspur, one of their cup bogey teams. Wolves lost their home tie 2-1, Martin Chivers scoring both goals for the visitors, and the second leg was drawn 1-1, so the cup went to Spurs. Wolves should have won their first European trophy, and the 3-2 aggregate score over the two legs was not a fair reflection of the games, according to many media reports the day after the match at White Hart Lane. Dave Wagstaffe’s equalising goal in the forty-first minute was one of the greatest goals ever scored by a man in the golden shirt. It was said by those present to be better than the one he scored in the 5-1 thrashing of Arsenal at Molineux the previous November which had won the BBC’s Goal of the month competition.

Memorabilia from the UEFA Cup Final versus Tottenham Hotspur. on display in the Wolves trophy cabinet.

Although the Wanderers’ 1971-72 European Campaign was ultimately unsuccessful, it seems curious that it is not remembered at least as favourably as the floodlit friendly matches of 1953-54 against Honvéd in the club’s annals. In many ways, the Wolves’ victory against Ferencváros in the semi-final of the UEFA Cup, a real competition, can be seen as the pinnacle of the Old Golds’ distinguished history. Their team that season was perhaps as great as the one that faced Honvéd in 1954, especially in its forward line, though Billy Wright’s defence will always be remembered as the finest ever to take the field for his club and for England. In what was their first European cup final, the fact that their opponents were Tottenham, though a star-studded team themselves, made it seem less of a European final. The game against Ferencváros had been much more of a transcontinental clash, with Florián Albert and other stars in the ‘Fradi’ team.

The Emperor – The Career and Legacy of Flórián Albert, 1959-74:

On 24 September 2021, the Ferencvárosi Torna Club (FTC Budapest) organised an interactive exhibition in honour of their great striker at the FTC stadium. Albert’s career-long contribution to Fradi and Hungarian football has been somewhat under-rated compared with that of Puskás and his Arany Csapat (‘Golden Team’) at Honvéd. Still, the exhibition of ‘the Emperor’s’ most valuable artefacts covered an area of almost three hundred square metres. The main attraction was of course the Ballon d’Or, which he won in 1967. The objects of the exhibition and career of Albert have been recorded in the book, Albert 80: The Legacy of the One and Only Hungarian Ballon d’Or Winner, published in a bilingual edition in Hungary for what would have been his eightieth birthday. I have attempted to highlight and summarise some of the main points of this below.

Flórián Albert was born on 15th September 1941 in Hercegszántó, a village in the south of Bács-Kiskun county, close to the then Yugoslav border, and died seventy years later on 30th October 2011 in Budapest. From 1959 to 1974, he played 540 times for Ferencváros, scoring 395 goals. Fifty-eight of these matches were international, in which he scored thirty-five goals. He won four Hungarian championships with Fradi, between 1962 and 1968, and the Hungarian Cup in 1971-72, scoring the winning goal in the eighty-fourth minute. Before that, he was a member of the 1962-63 Inter-City Fairs Cup semi-finalist team, the 1964-65 winning team and the 1967-68 finalists, besides the 1971-72 UEFA Cup semi-finalist team. He also played seventy-five times for the national eleven, scoring thirty-one goals. He was an Olympic bronze medallist in 1960, and a World Cup participant in 1962 (three matches, four goals) and 1966 (four matches). He also played two matches for Hungary in each of the 1964 and 1972 European Championships, finishing third and fourth respectively. Besides these achievements, he was given a string of honours and awards, though none to match the Ballon d’Or as Best Footballer of Europe in 1967.

Flórián started primary school as a half-orphan; his mother had died in his early years and he was raised by his father. Growing up in multilingual Hercegszántó, it was natural for him to learn Serbo-Croat in addition to Hungarian. He then left his village, feverish with Slavic ‘buzz’, together with his family, in 1952, to live in Erzsébetváros in the capital city. For an eleven-year-old boy from deeply rural Hungary, this was a huge shift in location and culture. After finishing his primary education, he attended Imre Madách Grammar School (gimnázium) in the seventh district of Budapest. He joined the Ferencváros youth team at the time of the 1954 World Cup Final in Bern, and two years later he could see that the key players, many originally from Fradi, but then playing for Honvéd, had already left the country after the Soviet invasion. In the late fifties and early sixties, it was not an easy thing to wear the Hungarians’ cherry red jersey. It was only a few years earlier that the Kocsis team had appeared, and ultimately disappointed, in the 1954 World Cup final. The Aranycsapat had then disintegrated after the Soviet invasion of 1956, with several members, including Ferenc Puskás, emigrating. The legendary Golden team was over for good and the national team lost a lot of respect at the 1958 World Cup tournament in Sweden.

Albert, on his introduction to the Hungarian national team in 1959.

By the end of the fifties, Flórián had matured into a forward at Ferencváros and with the Hungarian national team. He passed the secondary school matriculation exam which he needed in order to join the senior Hungarian national team. He was not even eighteen when he could claim, without arrogance, to be “one of the best forwards in the world.” But Flórian Albert was still known as little Flóri when he made his début for the national team against Sweden, not even yet eighteen, but awarded a place in the national line-up next to Gyula Grosics and Károly Sándor. Lajos Baróti’s team won 3-2. Albert did not score in that match, but goals came in his third appearance for the national team when he netted a hat-trick against Yugoslavia.

Before Albert’s début for Ferencváros. Flórián is in the centre of this group of FTC players with Horváth, Győri-Kiss and Mátrai on his right and Kiss III, Vilezsál and Berta to his left. Fradi beat DVTK 3-1, with two goals from Albert and one from Rákosi (out of the picture).

Flórika became a player at Ferencváros Torna Club during one of the most difficult times in the Club’s history, when it was called Kinizsi, and had been abandoned by its most influential footballers, under duress from the Kádár régime to move to the army team, Kispest Honvéd. Those who remained kept Fradi alive in a period when it became a team of ‘the people’. Talent made its way, as ever, under any circumstances, and even in the enclosed Hungary of these difficult years, when it was still licking its wounds after the events of 1956, it was suddenly enlightened by a bright new star, who went on to light up the old, tired continent, and then the whole world. But Florika never forgot the difficult times his club and its fans had endured, and never left it. Neither money nor power could alter his mind and drag him away. Although he would not have been out of place in the 1950s ‘Golden Team’ and foreign clubs would have given anything for him, he played only for the fans of Ferencváros.

In November 1958, Albert was introduced to the senior Ferencváros team.

The 1960 Rome Olympic Games were Albert’s first major adult world competition, then still ahead of his nineteenth birthday. The Hungarian team beat India 2-1, Peru 6-1 and France 7-0. In the semi-finals, they were beaten 2-0 by the Danes, but in the bronze match, they defeated the Italians 2-1, returning home with a medal. The young Albert played in all five matches, from start to finish, scoring a goal against India and a double-brace against Peru and France, thus finishing the five games with five goals.

Playing for the national team in Rome, in 1960.

The 1960 Rome Olympics Bronze medal

Two years after Rome, Albert appeared in his first World Cup in Chile, where the Hungarian team played four matches, of which Albert played three from start to finish. He scored in the 2-1 defeat of England and took his fair share of goals in the 6-1 win over Bulgaria, scoring a hat-trick. He didn’t start in the last group match against the Argentinians but was again in the line-up in the quarter-final when the Magyars were beaten by Czechoslovakia. With four goals in the tournament, he became its joint top scorer.

His 1964 gold medal was for Albert’s second league championship title with FTC. Fradi won the championship with forty-one points, ahead of Honvéd with thirty-eight (when a win resulted in two points being added). He ended the season with twenty goals, third in the leading goalscorers behind Ferenc Bene (Újpest Dózsa) and Lájos Tichy (Honvéd). The Inter-City Fairs Cup was the predecessor of the UEFA Cup and today’s Europa League. Victory in 1964-5 was the greatest success for Fradi to date. They defeated Juventus in the final, 1-0, with the winning goal scored by Máté Fenyvesi from a chipped cross. Just before the goal, Flórián had been pushed to the ground with both hands by one of the Italian defenders. The Fradi No. 9 could not see that the ball had fallen into the net from the head of Fenyesi. Albert would have questioned the referee, but his friends told him ‘no worries, we’re ahead!’ The joy of scoring could come later. As long as his bones were able to withstand the relentless kicking of opponents, he always stood in battle in many great matches, with an eccentric but easy-going style.

At the 1966 World Cup in England, the name of Flórian Albert was unmissable; he was on the field for all four Hungarian matches. After a 3-1 defeat by Portugal, the team bounced back to beat Brazil 3-1, making the whole world pay attention, once more, to the Mighty Magyars. However, after defeating the Bulgarians 3-1, the team lost to the USSR in the quarter-finals, 2-1. Despite not scoring in this tournament, Albert impressed the crowds and television viewers with his fantastic skills. Proof of this was his selection in the World Cup ‘dream team’ alongside Gordon Banks, Franz Beckenbauer, Bobby Charlton and Eusébio. After the World Cup, Flamengo of Brazil left no stone unturned to sign Albert on loan. Albert was given the opportunity to play as a guest for two weeks in January 1967, the customary break in the Hungarian league programme, but he was warned by the state authorities that if he stayed there with his wife (he had married a well-known actress, Irén Bársony, in 1963), his daughter would be taken into care. Albert scored two goals in four matches at the Brazilian club, where he was adored by the fans. The press paid him the ultimate compliment of likening him to Pelé.

During their league success of 1967, Fradi were eight points ahead of Újpest Dózsa, and Albert was the second top league scorer with twenty-eight goals, behind Antal Dunai II, who had scored thirty-six. At the end of the year, he was chosen as footballer of the year in Hungary and Europe. Managed by Károly Lakát, FTC went on to win their twentieth title at the end of the season. Újpest, with Fazekas, Göröcs and Bene in the team, and coached by the legendary Lajos Baróti, finished as runners-up. The fans had been attracted to the terraces by Albert and these other star players, with the Budapest Derby matches between Vasas and Újpest, and MTK and FTC, with over eighty thousand fans attending. Fradi also won the championship in 1968, their last championship before Újpest overtook them the following season. Flórian Albert, with nineteen goals, finished third in the leading scorers’ list, behind Dunai II and Bene of Újpest (32, 22). They had to wait until 1976 to win the First Division Championship again, by which time Albert had retired.

Albert in his FIFA tracksuit for the 1968 Brazil-World XI match.

According to contemporary reports, the Brazil-World XI match began on 6th November 1968, at 10:30 p.m.; alongside Flórián Albert, his compatriots, Lajos Szűcs and Dezső Novák also took part in the starting line-up. The two defenders played throughout the match and although Albert was replaced at half-time, János Farkas from Vasas came on for the second half. In the twentieth minute, Rivellino (of 1970 World Cup-winning fame) put Brazil ahead, but Albert levelled in the 33rd minute. The South Americans finally won the match in the 89th minute with Tostao’s goal. Four days after the World XI team match Flórián Albert was back to earth in Hungary, playing against Dunaújváros and scoring a brace of goals in Fradi’s 3-0 win.

The 1972 European Championship bronze match against Belgium was the last national team match to feature the legendary striker for a full ninety minutes. He was already struggling to overcome a knee ligament injury sustained three years earlier. In a 1969 World Cup Qualifier against Denmark, the Danish keeper had slid onto his foot, which twisted, rupturing a knee ligament. He was no longer able to perform at his former level. But he battled on for five more years, helping his club to win more trophies and reach the two-leg UEFA Cup semi-final against Wolverhampton Wanderers in April 1972 and scoring the opener in the first leg at the Népstadion in Budapest (as described in the reports above).

This pendant was awarded for Albert’s 75th and last international appearance.

Sadly, in 1974, Albert was forced to retire from the national team he had represented for fifteen years, making seventy-five appearances. He retired, aged thirty-three after it became clear that his knee could no longer bear the strain of top-level competition. His last match, appropriately, was against Yugoslavia, the team he had scored his first three goals for the national team against. In the friendly match played at Székesfehérvár, he was in the starting eleven and led the team onto the pitch as team captain. However, he had to leave the field after fifteen minutes to a standing ovation. The Yugoslavs, who had already been attacking strongly before that, seemed to have been waiting for the moment. As soon as Albert left the pitch they scored two quick goals, but the Magyars fought back with two goals from János Máté and a third from László Fazekas, winning 3-2. Albert played his last match for Ferencváros on 17th March 1974, at the Népstadion. During the farewell match, Albert replaced Lajos Kű in the 54th minute, scoring in the 78th to set the seal on the 3-0 victory. At the end of the match, it was reported that the whole of the People’s Stadium was sobbing, not only Albert himself, his teammates and the adoring Fradi fans.

The Népstadion (National Stadium) where Flórian Albert played many times both in the colours of the national team and Ferencváros (against Wolves in 1972, for example). It was finally renovated and completed in 2006 and renamed the Ferenc Puskás National Stadium.

Although his professional playing career ended in 1974, ‘the Emperor’ continued to play football and was issued a new playing license in 1978. He played several times for Fradi’s ‘Old Boys’, continuing to display his never-ending genius. Foreign readers eagerly read the results of the Hungarian championship, of the fight between the five Budapest ‘giants’: Ferencváros, Vasas, Honvéd, MTK and Újpest. It was as if football, although invented in England, had been made for this ‘loner’ nation, hiding behind ‘the iron curtain’, hardened by centuries of oppression and speaking an exotic language. It seemed enough for the people of Pest to go out at the weekend to any of the capital’s stadiums and watch their ‘little Messiahs’ of which there were two or three in each of the top teams. They were the ones who wrote the history of Hungarian football, and as important as the hot gúlyás (‘goulash) soup or pörkölt (paprika) pork stew they enjoyed once a week, particularly in winter after the savage pig-slaughtering. The rivals of these teams in the freedom of the West knew little of what it took to be a football player with Ferencváros and the other Budapest teams, waiting for the doorbell to ring, nor did they see much of the ‘sports washing’ of the Communist régime by its leaders’ cynical political manipulation and financial exploitation of the players of the Hungarian national team.

By staying at Ferencváros, Albert became a subtle symbol of resistance, a specialist sniper with a silencer on his rifle, featured in the pages of nearly all the football history books with his knowledge of the game. Born and nurtured in the age of the Cold War and the Space Race, Albert’s genius and goals became even more valuable, longed for, and adored over time, like a classic, future-proof poem or painting. After his retirement, he worked as a coach in Africa, with Al-Ahly Benghazi of Libya between 1978 and 1982 and again, briefly, in 1985. He then returned to Ferencváros in the mid-eighties to work alongside his good friend Gyula Rákosi as his assistant, mainly coaching Fradi’s youth team, but also helping Rákosi with the first team.

Coaching the Fradi youth players, and first team as assistant coach to Gyula Rákosi, FTC Head Coach.

It was a journalist from the MTI (Hungarian Telegraphic Office) who told the Albert family the great news of the award of the Ballon d’Or over the phone. That was when his wife, Irén Bársony, first heard of it. The Hungarian national newspaper, Népszabadsag (‘People’s Freedom’) did not even put this sensational news on its front page, as would have happened on other national newspapers. Even the sports paper, Népsport, only included it in a small space at the bottom of the front page. It could already be felt that the authorities would not handle Albert’s recognition as it deserved and would do their best to ensure that no real people’s celebration would take place in Hungary to mark his success on the international football stage. In fact, he received the award almost in secret. Initially, it was intended that the presentation would be made before the national team’s match against the Soviets but, just eleven years after their brutal putting-down of the 1956 Uprising, the communist politicians in power feared that such a celebration might lead to a spontaneous demonstration for freedom. So Flórián received the accolade at the post-match banquet at the Gundel restaurant in the city centre, in near complete secrecy. This was the first time in the history of the Ballon d’Or that the prestigious award had not been presented prior to a big match. Albert never spoke publicly about this treatment, but he admitted privately to being hurt by the leaders’ lack of respect.

In 1966, Flórián Albert played at the level of the world-class players on show in the World Cup finals. It became clear at the tournament that he had matured into one of the best footballers in the world. A year earlier he had won the Inter-City Fairs Cup with Ferencváros, beating Juventus in the final. In 1967, he scored twenty-eight goals in twenty-seven games in FTC colours in the Hungarian Championship, so his position was beyond dispute: Albert’s sixty-eight points were followed by Charlton with forty points and Johnstone with thirty-nine points. In 1997, on the thirtieth anniversary of the Ballon d’Or presentation, Albert received a beautiful ‘golden boot’ from Adidas.

Wolves’ Final European Matches of the Century, 1973-93:

Wolves made their next European appearance in the second round of the UEFA Cup against the East Germans, Lokomotiv Leipzig, in October 1973. In the first leg, in Leipzig, the Wolves were without their midfield king-pin Mike Bailey and strikers John Richards and Dave Wagstaffe. But no one in the Wolves camp could quite believe the result, a 3-0 defeat, and their first away defeat on their UEFA Cup travels. Not since meeting Barcelona in the Quarter-final of the European Champions Cup in 1960 had a side put three past Wolves in a competitive European game. The Old Gold tried to rally and rescue the tie in the second leg at Molineux, in a match that the fans who went to see it felt privileged to witness. They had scored the four goals they needed by the 83rd minute, but Locomotiv had scored the all-important away goal in the 72nd minute. So the tie finished 4-4 on aggregate, but the Wolves went out on the away goals rule. The half-coloured picture below features two of the Wolves’ frustrated goalscorers, Steve Kindon and Derek Dougan, kneeling and sitting on the ground after another Wolves attack came to nothing.

It was some compensation that in March 1974 Wolves won the League Cup, beating Manchester City 2-1 in the final at Wembley and so qualifying for one more season in the UEFA Cup. Man City had one of the best forward lines in the business from Mike Summerbee on the right, through Colin Bell, Francis Lee, Denis Law and Rodney Marsh. But the Wolves also had an impressive striking pair in Derek Dougan and John Richards. Richards scored the winning goal at Wembley but didn’t play again that season, while the ageing ‘Doog’ was now restricted to the substitutes’ bench.

In their first season together, 1971-72, they scored forty goals in the League and the UEFA Cup. I remember watching them in action at the Hawthorns, against West Bromwich Albion, and at Molineux. The duo scored a total of 125 goals in 127 games in their partnership in two-and-a-half seasons. Dougan played his last six full games in 1974-75, two of them in the UEFA Cup when Wolves went ‘one worse’ than their performances in previous seasons by losing in the first round to FC Porto, albeit to a team packed with world stars, including the Brazilian World Cup star, Flavio. Wolves went down 4-1 in the away leg but again came back at Molineux on 2nd October, winning 3-1, with Dougan scoring one of the goals. But his team lost 5-4 on aggregate.

Picture: Steve Daley after scoring the second against Porto

Wolves were relegated to Division Two at the end of the 1975-76 season, and after a brief return and another ‘Indian summer’, again at the end of the 1981-82 season. During the period between relegations, they qualified for the UEFA Cup for a fourth time in 1980-81. But Dutch masters PSV Eindhoven pretty much put an end to the Wolves’ hopes in mid-September by beating them 3-1 in Holland. Although Wolves won the second leg with a goal from Mel Eves (above), they lost the overall tie 3-2 on aggregate. This was their last appearance in a major European competition for thirty-nine years, as they slumped to the Fourth Division and almost went bankrupt.

Mel Eves attacking on the Wolves’ left. From the cover of the Match Magazine for Wolves v PSV Eindhoven, Wolves’ last European match of the century.

Lifelong fan Jack Hayward stepped in to purchase the club in 1990 and immediately funded the extensive redevelopment of a, by then, dilapidated Molineux into a modern all-seater stadium. With work completed in 1993, Hayward redirected his investment onto the playing side in an attempt to win promotion to the newly formed Premier League, which took another ten years, into the twenty-first century.

To mark the official opening of the new stand and the renovation of the Molineux stadium, the Hungarian side Kispest Honvéd was invited to play Wolves. On Tuesday 7 December 1993, a capacity all-seater crowd of 28, 245 watched the visitors hold the home team to a 2-2 draw. For the first time in nine years, Molineux was once again a proper four-sided stadium, all four having black and gold seats.

Interestingly, in this third match against Honvéd at Molineux, thirty-nine years after the first, there was a short delay because of problems with the floodlighting. But compared with some of the darker days of the previous fifteen years, this was not a major issue since, as Wolves fans knew, Out of Darkness Cometh Light.

A Gallery of Artefacts & Additional Photographs from the FTC Exhibition in Honour of Flórián Albert, 2021:

Sources:

Pál Czigányi, et. al. (2021), Albert 80: The Legacy of the One and Only Hungarian Ballon d’Or Winner. Budapest: Ferencvárosi Torna Club.

György Szöllősi (2015), Ferenc Puskás: The Most Famous Hungarian. Budapest: Rézbong Kiadó.

György Szöllősi, Zalán Bodnár (2015), Az Aránycsapat Kinceskönyve (‘The Golden Team Treasure Book’). Budapest: Twister Media.

Bán Tibor, Harmos Zotán (2011), Puskás Ferenc. Budapest: Arena2000.

John Shipley (2003), Wolves Against the World: European Nights, 1953-1980. Stroud (Glos.): Tempus Publishing.

Previous articles on these topics:

Ukraine from Askold to Zelensky: Language, Culture, Art & Architecture, 862-2022.

We Are All Here, We Were Here, We Will be Here:

At the time of my writing this, we are approaching the first anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24th February 2022. On the following day, thirty-eight hours after Russia began its unprovoked all-out war against his country, President Volodymyr Zelensky delivered a thirty-two-second speech, recorded on his phone, with various members of his senior team outside a government building. He spoke very simply:

“Good evening, everyone. We are all here. Our soldiers are here. Civil society is here. We defend our independence. And this is how it will always be from now on.”

Quoted by Arkady Ostrovsky, in his preface to Zelensky’s (2022) book, p. ix, cover pictured below.

The book includes speeches Zelensky personally selected to tell the story of the Ukrainian people. All his proceeds from it, amounting to 60p per copy of the print edition sold in the UK goes to United 24, his initiative to collect donations in support of Ukraine. For more info, go to u24.gov.ua.

By the time the video appeared on social media on the evening of 25th February, much of eastern and central Ukraine had been under relentless fire for more than a day. Russian paratroopers were storming a military airport in Kyiv, commandos were hunting for Zelensky and people were fleeing their homes. There were rumours that Zelensky had left the country, spread by Russian officials, who claimed that his government had collapsed. The half-minute video proved otherwise. In fact, it was proof that Putin’s plan for a lightning-quick victory was failing if it had not already failed. Zelensky did not run, the Ukrainian capital did not fall and people in the Russian-speaking east did not welcome Putin’s troops with flowers. In the weeks leading up to the invasion, Zelensky refused to prepare for it, downplaying its likelihood. He suddenly became an unlikely war leader when he turned down an offer of an airlift within hours of the invasion. His reply to the proposal was concise: I need ammo, not a ride.

Zelensky’s simple rhetoric highlighted a stark contrast between the two sides. The short, warm word tut (‘here’) felt like the kind of reassurance a parent might use to comfort a scared child whose house was being invaded. Zelensky’s use of technology was also significant; where Putin, as a deluded dictator, broadcast to his subjects from inside the Kremlin, Zelensky stood exposed, with his people. Posting his selfie video online showed him to be an everyman, an integral part of Ukraine’s social network as well as its President. By February 2022, Zelensky had been President for just under three years. Voters had first known him as Vasyl Holoborodko, a plain-speaking history teacher who was miraculously catapulted into the job of President after taking on Ukraine’s entire political system – the role Zelensky played in a television satire called Servant of the People. After launching his presidential campaign in December 2018, Zelensky’s background as an actor and producer would prove crucial to his success. He knew how to mirror his audience, read their lips and articulate their feelings. He also knew his national history, expressing this in the introduction to his book of speeches made in 2022:

‘Ukraine did not appear on the world map in early 2022. Ukrainians were not born in the moment of the *rf’s invasion. We were, we are and we will be; we have existed, we exist and we will continue to exist. And so, while we appreciate the help, support and attention the world has given us, the bravery of our people must not be taken for granted. War must not become routine. Supporting Ukraine is not a trend, a meme or a viral challenge. It is not a force to rapidly disappear into oblivion. If you want to understand who we are going, you must first learn more about this.’

Zelensky (2022), pp. 3-4. (*rf = Russian Federation)

Zelensky’s little book chronicles the last three years and three months of Ukraine before the counter-surge in the east, from 20th May 2019 to 24th August 2022, consciously taking his people through a new period in Ukrainian history. He points out that he and his people did not want war and did everything they could to prevent it. He was uttering words to this effect from the moment he was sworn into office until the final hours before the Russian invasion. That was why the Ukrainians did not react to or give in to the series of Russian provocations. They remained committed to a diplomatic solution, to dialogue and negotiations. But on 24th February, Putin gave his clear answer. He wanted to destroy Ukraine as an independent country, a state and a people. It was an answer which had been heard many times before, uttered in many languages across the ages, by many invaders. Ultimately every invading army fled back across the frontier they had made the mistake of crossing, abandoning their weapons and equipment. So, to understand those three years and three months, we need an understanding of the previous thousand and forty years. I have written more extensively about this long-term history in a series of articles published here in the early months of the war, so here I simply give an outline of that history in the shape of the chronology below…

Pre-History to c. 862:

A painting by Pál Vágo (1853-1928) depicting Hungarians and Ukrainians trading at Kyiv. See also the close-up below.

Before the mid-ninth century, it is impossible to speak of nations or states, particularly nation-states, which were not formed until the following century. The Turkish Khazar’s state, the Kaganate, was unstable, and under threat from a new Turkic people attacking from the East, the Pechenegs. The ancestors of both the Ukrainians and the Hungarians moved further west from an area to the north of the Sea of Azov and the Don River. By the mid-ninth century they had moved into the foreground of the Carpathians, along the Dnieper, the Dniester and the Bug, becoming familiar with the shores of the Black Sea down to Byzantium. Among them were Muslims and Jews, and a small number of Christians. A few of them were farmers or rather herdsmen, and the rest were unruly nomadic military people, raiding and trading in slaves, gold and silver which had been taken as plunder. This is probably how they came into contact with the Rus Vikings. But the various tribes living in the lands between the Dnieper and Dniester were, according to Byzantine sources, before the end of the ninth century, familiar with the Balkan peninsula, the Carpathian Basin and the lands along the Danube to the west.

A Timeline of Key Historical Events, c. 860 – 2019:

c. 860-882: The reign of Kyivan Prince Askold was first mentioned in Byzantine sources.

988: The baptism of the Kyivite Rus by Prince Volodymyr (see the fresco below by V. Vasnetsov in St. Volodymyr’s Cathedral).

1015-1016: Conclusion of the first legal code, Ruska Pravda.

1017-1037: Construction of St. Sophia Cathedral, pictured below, and the Golden Gate in Kyiv. The Cathedral was built to mark the victory of the Kyivan prince Yaroslav the Wise over the nomadic Pechenegs.

1239-1241: The Mongol Invasion. Batu Khan conquered Chernihiv and Kyiv. The Papal envoy Carpini reported that “after they had besieged the city for a long time, they took it and put the inhabitants to death.” Following the Triumph of the Sajo River over the Hungarian army in 1241, they reached the outskirts of Vienna. They withdrew after the death of their emperor, returning home to elect a new one, only to return in 1247. But an outbreak of civil wars and the re-emergence of the Mamluk Turks from the Black Sea area down to Syria prevented another full-scale Mongol invasion of Europe.

1253: Envoys of Pope Innocent IV crown Galician Prince Danylo Romanovych as ‘the king of the Rus’.

1343-1362: Division of Ukrainian lands between the Polish kingdom and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

1550s: Foundation of Zaporzhzhian Sich on Mala Khortytsia Island in the Dnipro River.

1569: Polish kingdom and the grand Lithuanian duchy unite into the federal State of Rzeczpospilita.

1574: Ivan Federov founded the first Ukrainian printing house in Lviv.

1581: Publication of the first printed Bible in the Old Church Slavonic language.

1596: Conclusion of the union between the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Churches at the Council in Berest, leading to the foundation of the Uniate Greek-Catholic Church.

1648: Beginning of the War of Liberation under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnytsky leading to the foundation of the Ukrainian Cossack State (Hetmanate).

An old kobza-player

1654: Decision of the Pereyaslav Rada (Council) to adopt the protection of the Russian Czar for the Cossack State.

1658-1686: Polish-Russian War ended in the division of Ukrainian territory between Russia and Rzeczpospolita.

1772-1795: Collapse of Rzeczpospolita and transfer of Ukraine’s western regions to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and central-eastern territories to the Russian Empire. In 1775, Catherine II published her Manifesto for the liquidation of the Zaporozhzhian Sich. In 1784, Lviv Jesuit Collegium became the first university on Ukrainian territory.

1805-1834: Opening of universities in Kharkiv (1805) and Kyiv (1834).

1845-1846: Foundation of Cyrill-and-Methodius Brotherhood, a cultural and educational Christian Democratic organisation.

1848: Abolition of Serfdom in Austria-Hungary, including the western Ukrainian territories.

1848-1906: Publication of the first Ukrainian newspapers in Lviv and Kyiv. Ukrainian national cultural organisations at work in Petersburg and Kyiv, 1860-1900. In 1861, Serfdom was abolished within the Russian Empire. In 1866, the first railways began operation in the Ukrainian territories of Russia and Austria-Hungary.

Bird’s-eye view of St Michael’s Square in Kyiv, with St Volodymyr’s Cathedral at its centre.

1917: The overthrow of Tsarist autocracy; declaration of two independent Ukrainian states – the Ukrainian People’s Republic with its capital city in Kyiv, and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic with its capital in Kharkiv.

1918-1921: Change of governments, Civil War, Russian-Ukrainian and Polish-Ukrainian wars in the territory of Ukraine; defeat of the Ukrainian nationalist movement.

1922: Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as part of it.

1929-1933: Liquidation of private land property and formation of collective farms, mass deportation of the rural population to the north of Russia; the Stalinist organisation of artificial famine (Holodomor) in the countryside of 1932-33.

1939: Outbreak of World War II; the reunification of Eastern and Western Ukraine by the Soviet troops; occupation of Carpathian Ukraine by the Hungarian army.

1941: Outbreak of the Great Patriotic War on Soviet territory; occupation of Ukraine by Nazi Germany.

1945: USSR gained victory over Nazi Germany; inclusion of western Ukrainian lands, Bukovyna and Carpathian Ukraine in the Union.

1954: Crimea was removed from the Russian Federation and transferred to Ukraine.

1956-1964: Relaxation of totalitarian régime under Khrushchev (the “thaw” in the Cold War).

1965-1977: End of the ‘thaw’; Political repression, growth of the dissident movement among intellectuals; organisation of the 1976 Ukrainian Helsinki Group.

1990: 16th July – The Verkhovna Rada (State Council) of the Ukrainian SSR approved the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine.

Ukrainians protested against continued Soviet domination. Ukraine was one of several Soviet republics to assert this claim to independence in 1990.

1991: US President George Bush visited Kyiv in early August, after Moscow. The Ukrainians wanted his support for Ukrainian independence, but he denounced “suicidal nationalism” (Croatia & Slovenia were already at war after leaving the FYR). Bush’s speech was dubbed the ‘Chicken Kyiv’ speech. On the 18th, Russian military leaders imprisoned Gorbachev at his villa on the Black Sea in Crimea. The attempted coup failed by the 20th, and on the 21st Estonia & Latvia declared independence, Lithuania reaffirmed its 1990 declaration, followed by Ukraine and several other republics soon after. The Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine. Gorbachev resigned & by the end of August, the Soviet Communist Party dissolved itself. On 8th December, in Minsk, Yeltsin for Russia, Kravchuk for Ukraine and Shushkevich for Belarus signed a pact ending the USSR and creating the Commonwealth of Independent States. It came into effect on 25th December.

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Above: The map shows the territory of independent Ukraine from 1991.

1994: In the Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine agreed to relinquish its Soviet-era nuclear arsenal, larger than that of the UK, France and China in return for assurances that Russia, the US and the UK would respect its sovereignty.

1996: The ‘Rada’ adopted the Constitution of independent Ukraine, introducing a national currency, the hryvnia.

2004: Pomarancheva (Orange) Revolution and election of Viktor Yushchenko as President of Ukraine. Singer ‘Ruslana’ gave Ukraine its first win in the Eurovision song contest for Ukraine.

2008: NATO summit in Bucharest discussed Ukraine’s membership. The proposal was rejected, to appease Russia.

2010: The leader of the opposition, Viktor Yanukovich won the presidential elections.

2012: Football matches in the European Championships were held in stadiums in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Donetsk and Lviv.

2013 (Nov.) – 2014: Large-scale civilian protests against the policy of the Kyiv government; the confrontation, the Revolution of Dignity (Euromaidan), lasted several months.

Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti) in Kyiv, was the location for the Revolution of Dignity (Euromaidan).

2014 (25th May): Petr Poroshenko won the presidential elections.

2014-15: Russian military aggression against Ukraine; annexation of Crimea; war in Donbas.

2016-17: Ukrainian singer Jamala won the 2016 Eurovision Song Contest, leading to the 2017 contest being held in Kyiv.

Paton Bridge in Kyiv at night, 2017.
Language & Culture:

Spoken by forty-five million people in the world as a first language, Ukrainian belongs to the Slavic group of Indo-European languages. The Ukrainian language, alongside Russian and Byeolorussian, developed on the basis of the dialects of the Old Rus language. The most important phonetic, grammatical and lexical peculiarities of Ukrainian were conceived in the time of the Kyivan Rus. Old Slavic lexemes that have remained unchangeable number about two thousand and the number of words built upon this basis and loan words is nearly 150,000. At the same time, the Ukrainian vocabulary contains many words unknown to other Slavic, including Russian. The ancestors of the Ukrainians became proficient in writing by the end of the eighth century. They had two alphabets: Glagolithic and Cyrillic. After they converted to Christianity, the Cyrillic alphabet became firmly established as the preferred form.

Pages from an old chronicle.

The oldest examples of the language have come down to modern users in the form of numerous songs, ballads and Cossack chronicles. The first grammar of the Ukrainian language was composed in 1643, Slavonic Grammar by Ivan Uzhevych. The foundations of the new Ukrainian literary language were laid by the poet and dramatist Ivan Kotliarevsky, and the initial role in its formation was played by Taras Shevchenko. The great Ukrainian poet did not confine himself to a certain dialect but collected the most typical words and grammatical constructions from the folk language as a whole. In addition, he made use of the best features of the old Ukrainian language, enriching its vocabulary with necessary neologisms and borrowing foreign words. It is to the credit of Panteleimon Kulish, a writer and political figure, that he worked out the Ukrainian alphabet. Used for the first time in 1856 and later reformed by Borys Hrinchenko in his (1908) Dictionary of the Ukrainian Language, this alphabet has underlined present-day Ukrainian phonetic orthography. It consists of thirty-three letters and also has two special punctuation signs: apostrophe and accent. The language is relatively difficult for foreigners to learn. Ukrainian words have three genders: masculine, feminine and neuter. Also, verbs change by numbers and persons, and nouns by numbers and cases. Understanding the language is complicated by shifting stress, usually changing the meaning of the word.

A miniature from the Ostromyrov Gospel

On the other hand, word order is free, facilitating the process of learning at the sentence level and so on. Idiomatically, the language is rich in proverbs, sayings and riddles that represent the collective memory of the people and their reflections on their life experiences; they demonstrate the people’s views on ethics, morals, history and politics. Ukrainian is full of imagery and melody, but in spite of its richness and beauty it continually had to prove itself as worthy of existence. According to the Tsars, it was simply a little Russian dialect and was only allowed to be used on the stage and in journals for authentic dialectical purposes, but not in serious scientific texts. It was therefore prohibited from the language of professional culture and academic discourse. The aim of the imperial prohibition was to turn Ukraine into part of the provinces, a kind of internal colony of the Russian Empire. Ukrainian was only recognised as an official language after the 1905 Revolution. In independent Ukraine, the language has again been proclaimed as the official language. By 2022 it had become the language of public and political institutions, the mass media, education, theatre, science and engineering, and each citizen of Ukraine now has the right to use it in every aspect of everyday life.

The country’s sporting life is a unique phenomenon. Ukrainian athletes have been well-known throughout the world ever since independence, and in some cases even before 1991, when many of them became famous for performing as part of the USSR’s Olympic team. The women’s handball club Spartak won twenty Soviet Championships in a row and thirteen European cups. The Ukrainian women’s handball team won a bronze medal at the 2004 Olympics in Athens. Women’s teams have gone on to win gold medals in 2008 in sabre fencing and in 2012 in rowing. The first individual Olympic gold medal was won by Oksana Baiul (1994) and the fencer Yana Shemyakina also won gold in London 2012.

Football is the most popular sport in Ukraine. Dynamo Kyiv FC, which dates back to 1924 has won the Cup Winners’ Cup twice (1975, 1986). These accomplishments are associated with the legendary coach Valeriy Lobanovsky, who groomed three Ballon d’Or winners, including Andriy Shevchenko (pictured right).

The continuing strength of Ukrainian football clubs, also including Shakhtar Donetsk FC, who won the UEFA Cup in 2009, accounts for the country’s ranking in the top ten for men’s football. In 2006 the National Team made it to the quarter-finals of the FIFA World Cup and qualified for the European Championship Finals in 2016 and 2020. The Klitschko brothers, Volodymyr and Vitaliy, pictured above, hold a record of wins in professional boxing being WBA, WBO, IBE, and IBO heavyweight champions. Since retiring from the ring, Vitaliy has become Mayor of Kyiv, now famous for his resistance to the Russian incursions and the heroic defence of his city. World records of pole vault athlete Sergey Bubka and triple/ long jumper Innessa Kravets have remained unbroken for over twenty-five years now. Yana Klochkova (below) is the only swimmer in Olympic history to win consecutive gold medals in the two hundred and four hundred medleys. Ukraine has also enjoyed success in Olympic gymnastics. Despite its limited budget, and since 2014 Russia’s invasion, the country has taken care to create conditions for raising athletes. Ukraine has hundreds of sports education institutions while building new training facilities with new members of the coaching staff.

Ukrainian theatre was born in the period of the folk art revival of the mid-nineteenth century. Therefore, it absorbed the romanticism of that period, traversing a complicated path of evolution from the theatre of the baroque epoch to the formation of the professional theatre of the late nineteenth century, when there was a rapid development of dramatic art. Present-day theatrical life in Ukraine is rather diversified, embracing various directions and genres; from classic comedy to tragedy, from the avant-garde tendencies of the early twenty-first century, and from the absurdity theatre to the post-modernist drama of today. The repertoire of the drama theatres of Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk and other cities includes works by foreign playwrights and novelists as well as by Ukrainian authors. Ukrainian theatrical companies also take an active part in Ukrainian and international festivals of dramatic art.

A scene from a ballet of Dnipropetrovsk Theatre of Opera and Ballet.

The first attempts to create a distinct Ukrainian cinematography were made back in the early twentieth century. But it only became famous in the interwar period due to the creative work of the film director Oleksandr Dovzhenko (pictured in the monument on the right). His Earth movie got shortlisted by UNESCO among the world’s five greatest masterpieces. Ukrainian Poetic Cinema dominated during the 1960s and 1970s. Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors, a film by Sergei Parajanov, won thirty-nine international awards. The film also became a landmark for the Dissident Movement as its premiére in Kyiv turned into a massive protest against arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals. There were six State film studios in Ukraine in the late 1980s and in the early 1990s film production was intensified as private enterprise came into the industry and new studios were founded. Ukraine began to acquire its own cinematography which had been impossible in Soviet times.

Shooting the film The Gadfly (Director M. Maschenko)

Oleksandr Rodniansky, director and general producer of the company Studio 1 +1 made a valuable contribution to the development of national documentary cinema. His films, Mission of Raoul Wallenberg, Farewell to the USSR and others received numerous awards at international film festivals. Myroslav Slaboshpytskyi’s film The Tribe was acclaimed by thirty of these and won forty awards, as well as three Cannes Film Academy awards. Hollywood listed it among the best films of 2015.

The National Academic Theatre of Opera & Ballet is named after T. Shevchenko.

Professional music in Ukraine has developed on the basis of folk music culture. The creative work of Samion Hulak Artemovsky, Mykola Lysenko, Kostiatyn Dankeyvych, Reingold Gliere, Anatoliy Kos-Anatolsky and other composers played an important role in the development of Ukrainian classical music. The repertoire of the National Philharmonic Society in Kyiv and many concert halls all over Ukraine includes classical works from both national and international repertoires. The Taras Shevchenko National Academic Theatre of Opera and Ballet is the best opera and ballet company in Ukraine. The National Opera House, Odesa Opera and Ballet Theatre and Lviv Opera House are among the hundred best theatres in the world.

Ukrainian bagpipes

Choral singing is perhaps the most powerful form of Ukrainian professional music culture. The country has several choirs of international reputation. There are many other genre groups that embrace different styles and meet different tastes, from hard-rock to punk-rock and from hip-hop to whimsical musical conglomerations and elements of folk music.

Visual Art & Architecture:

Icon painting began to develop among the Kyivan-Rus in the tenth century after Prince Volodymyr baptised them. Byzantine traditions were a model for local masters. Quite independent and original schools of icon painting came into being later. The Kyiv School was the most refined among them. Unfortunately, most of the works of the early Middle Ages have been lost. Chronicles alone have preserved the marvellous works by outstanding icon painters, in particular those by Alipiy, a monk of the Kyiv-Pechersk Monastery. Mosaics and frescos of St. Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv are the most distinguished among the monumental paintings. Built during the reign of Prince Yaroslav the Wise, this Cathedral became one of the first monuments of old-Rus architecture. After the Mongol-Tatar invasion and the decline of the Old-Rus State, the Halychyna-Volyn principality inherited the art traditions of the Kyivan Rus. The icon of the Virgin of Volyn (above) is a thirteenth-century masterpiece of that exact place.

The icon St George the Dragon Fighter, early sixteenth century.

The ancestors of the Ukrainians had no problem with building materials, and there was more than enough timber for construction purposes. A thousand and a half years ago, using axes, hammers, chisels and saws, and without nails, they raised towns, fortifications, palaces, modest huts and pagan temples. During the old princely period, from the tenth to the thirteenth centuries, building in stone was widespread under the influence of Christian culture. Stone was used primarily for churches, however; their foundations were laid with rubble, and their walls were built with small, thin bricks. Lime served for mortar and the floors were paved with marble slabs. The oldest churches were adopted from Byzantium, Orthodox churches differing from western, Romanesque structures in their ‘drums’, spherical roofs looking like helmets. The number of drums varied, but they were always cruciform in alignment. Interiors were divided into naves separated by columns or arcades. Ukrainian churches look higher than they are in reality, an illusion achieved by a gradual diminution in stories and rhythmic repetition of lines and decorations. Inside the churches were furnished with representations that depicted the Bible stories for the illiterate. They also served as treasure houses, libraries and fortresses during frequent wars and invasions.

Interior of St. Volodymyr’s Cathedral.

Among the structures of princely Ukraine, the St Sophia Cathedral of Kyiv occupies a special place. It was built to celebrate the victory of the Kyivan Prince Yaroslav the Wise over the nomadic Pechenegs. Its golden dome is seen from all the hills surrounding Kyiv. The Cathedral consists of five naves, the main volume of the structure surrounded by two rows of galleries; their open arches connect the building with its environment. The whole complex is crowned with thirteen drums with a high central dome. The interior of the church is decorated with frescoes and mosaics, making it one of the best art ensembles of the early Middle Ages. Among the most valued monuments of the 11th-12th centuries is the Cathedral of Our Saviour in Cherniv, the Dormition Cathedral of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra (pictured below) and the remnants of the Golden Gate.

Dormitian Cathedral in Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra.

The next phase of native Ukrainian art followed in the sixteenth century when the humanistic ideas of the Renaissance had a great impact on culture. At the same time, Ukrainian professional art was influenced more and more by folk traditions. Simple images, decorative character and sincerity created an authentic Ukrainian iconography. Renaissance architecture came to Ukraine predominantly from Italy. Italian architects created the famous ‘ensemble’ Rynok in Lviv. Another outstanding monument of the Renaissance in the city is the ensemble of the Lviv Brotherhood – the Ukrainian Orthodox community there. The main structure is the Dormition Church, pictured below.

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In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the Cossack territory gained its own statehood after the bloody War of Liberation, Ukrainian architecture achieved its most flourishing period. Under the influence of western styles, Ukrainian baroque came into being. In these centuries baroque became a widespread trend in Ukrainian and European art as a whole. In Ukraine, it was closely linked with traditional folk art. Such unification enriched the art of icon painting with the festive and colourful mood of the country on the one hand and toned down the exaltation of images characteristic of Catholic baroque on the other. Icon painting acquired secular colouring from the countryside and artists began to use chiaroscuro, the principles of spatial and aerial perspective. Also, oil painting became increasingly popular with local schools such as the Lviv painting guild, studios at Kyiv-Pechersk and Pochaiv Lvras, monasteries and nobleman’s estates, all of which played a significant role.

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A Cossack Mamay.

Ukrainian baroque also manifested itself in majestic temples symbolising numerous Cossack victories. Buildings constructed under Hetman Ivan Mazepa are particularly distinguished for their decorative magnificence. In Hetman’s Ukraine, churches became a subject of public concern and self-respect. Every urban and rural community considered it their honourable duty to build a church and as a result, architectural masterpieces sprang up in the provinces exciting the envy of capital cities: the Syronchist Church in Poltava province, founded by Hetman Danylo Apostol, the Trinity Cathedral of the Hustyn monastery, and the Transfiguration Cathedral at the Mharsk monastery, near Lubny in Poltava province, and the Intercession Cathedral in Kharkiv, are all fine examples.

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The period of the Hetmanite State coincided with the flourishing of wooden cult construction. Wooden churches with bell towers continue to fascinate visitors with their lyricism, picturesque forms and technical perfection. The common construction element of the walls and ceilings of all wooden churches is their framework of a rectangular or octahedral form. In spite of their small dimensions, the churches produce an impression of monumentality that is intensified by spacious and high interiors. The wooden Cathedral of Trinity in Novoselytsi (Novomoskovst) is the only church in Ukraine with nine drums built in 1773-1781 by the self-taught master Yakym Pohrebniak. A simpler, more typical wooden construction is St Michael’s Church in Pyrohovo (above).

Lviv Opera-House.

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Ukraine formed a metaphorical frontier that divided religious and secular art. The period is marked by the creative work of such outstanding portrait painters as Dmytro Levytsky and Volodymyr Borovyskovy who made Ukrainian art world-famous. At the turn of the nineteenth century, too, classicism became the dominating trend in European art. The establishment of the style took place at a time when Ukraine lost the remains of the Cossacks’ autonomy, and through the mediation of Russian culture, classicism became established in Ukraine. Spreading among the Ukrainian nobility, the classical style manifested itself in the magnificent palace-and-park ensembles. They were followed by the landlords who built thousands of Graeco-Roman courtyards all over the country, with porticoes, colonnades and triangle pediments on the facades. The French variant of the classical style in combination with Polish baroque and rococo spread widely in western Ukrainian lands. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, architectural structures in modernist styles were built.

Portrait of the Burgomaster of Poltava by V. Borovykovsky (top left); Water-mill by V. Shternberg (top right) & Landscape by H. Narbut (below).

There were artistic benefits of Ukraine being part of the Russian Empire at this time. The Petersburg Academy of Arts opened its doors to Ukrainian artists and, as a result, in the middle of the nineteenth century, Ukrainian art became closely associated with the name Taras Shevchenko. A former serf, he became a member of the engraving class at the Petersburg Academy and consolidated the principles of realism in his creative work. He had the original idea of creating an album, Picturesque Ukraine, which he devoted to the history, monuments, life and nature of his native land. His poetic images of the country aroused his compatriots’ patriotic spirit and inspired the works of his fellow artists, leading to the establishment of a national school of landscape painting. Ukraine became known as the Italy of the East as artists from the Russian Empire and other European countries sojourned in the country to enrich themselves with new themes and images. One such artist was Vasyl Schternberg, a friend of Shevchenko and a master of lyrical landscape.

Odesa Archaeology Gallery

Odesa art school and Kyiv drawing school occupied an important place at the beginning of the twentieth century. Ukrainian art and architecture at the turn of the century could not avoid the influence of the leading European art trends – impressionism and post-impressionism, art nouveau and various avant-garde tendencies. The Kharkiv School, where artists were under the influence of constructivism, was notable for its originality. Oleksandr Ekster, a well-known reformer of theatrical art, propagated the ideas of cubiform futurism, working from Kyiv. An original phenomenon of the early twentieth century was the Mykhailo Boychuk Art School which strived to create national monumental art on the principles of religion, uniting it with the traditions of folk art, local primitive painting and cheap popular printing. Unfortunately, most of these artists were subjected to Stalinist repression in the 1930s.

The Bridge by O. Ekster

The first attempt at a certain synthesis of architecture within the Ukrainian national spirit was made by the brothers Vasyl and Fedir Krychevsky who designed a range of civic buildings in various towns which remained the highest attainments of national-democratic aesthetics. Between World War I and II constructivism came to Ukraine for a short time, leaving its trace in the form of Dzerzhinsky Square in Kharkhiv (1925-39). The Socialist epoch also found its expression in architecture and an example of its heavy ‘heroic’ style is the government building of the Ukrainian SSR, the Verkhovna Rada, built between 1936 and ’39 to a design by V. Zabolotny (pictured below). The so-called Stalinist neoclassicism remains in the official structures of that period. The post-war decades were not the time for architectural innovations: every effort was made to restore ruined cities and villages. Kyiv was rebuilt according to an overall plan and even in the 1960s, the top priority in construction was housing.

The Rebirth of a Nation, 2014-2019:

The birthplace of modern Ukraine was Maidan Nezalezhnosti – Independence Square – in Kyiv, the site of revolutionary uprisings in which Ukrainians had come together to decide their own future. In 2014 they went there to say that they belonged to Europe and to overthrow Viktor Yanukovych, a Moscow-backed thug who had tried to deny them this right. The peaceful revolution ended in violence. Yanukovych fled, and Russia annexed the Ukrainian territory of Crimea, starting a war in the east of Ukraine. The still relatively-free Moscow press warned the world of Putin’s intentions, as the cartoons below demonstrate, but little attention was paid to these warnings. Volodymyr Zelensky was among those who called for Yanukovych to step down, though he was not himself on the Maidan and did not participate in the ‘Revolution of Dignity’. As a successful television producer, he had a strong sense of his audience and during the revolution, many of them stayed at home watching his sitcoms.

He cringed when politicians used lofty language while scheming for their own financial gain, and was appalled when the old élites regrouped, wrapped themselves in new banners and went back to their old ways. But while the establishment carried on as before, the country was changing; its civil society was growing and it was no longer prepared to put up with business as usual. In 2019, Ukrainians rebuked the corrupt post-Soviet élite by voting for Holoborodko, Zelensky, as President. It was a case of real-life imitating art, but they knew exactly what they were doing in electing him. Yet the idea of an outsider bursting into an oligarchical system where money decided everything seemed almost as improbable a story as Holoborodko’s. But, as we have seen, Ukrainians have a taste for the improbable and the avant-garde. A pro-Ukrainian Russian speaker from a Jewish family in Eastern Ukraine, Zelensky received the votes of three-quarters of the electorate across the entire country. Never before had the electoral map of Ukraine looked so cohesive.

Some liberals both inside Ukraine and those watching the country from outside were sceptical about Zelensky. They were concerned about his lack of either a comprehensive programme or a team of professional politicians. But what he lacked in experience, he made up for in his sense of humour and communication skills, a set of assets crucial to survival in Kryvyi Rih, the rough industrial city in central Ukraine where he grew up. Zelensky reflected Ukraine not as some romantic idyll, but as it really was, with all its flaws and eccentricities.

The Post-historical President, 2019-22:

In April 2019, Volodymyr Zelensky was elected President of Ukraine. Over the first four months of the year, the former TV producer and comedian had fought a campaign that emphasised his outsider status and his determination to take on Ukraine’s political élite. He now had the chance to remake his country. As he said in his inaugural address, Ukraine was on the verge of a ‘new era’, defined by a new set of values. In the three and a half years that followed his inauguration in May 2019 and October 2022, President Zelensky delivered more than a thousand different speeches and addresses around the world. To begin with, these described his vision for his reborn country as a democratic, fully independent nation, free of corruption and confident in its place at the heart of Europe. But as the threat of war loomed, he also outlined the greatest threat to this new era: Russia. Putin, he warned, could not accept the choice the Ukrainian people had made, for Europe over Russia, and democracy over autocracy. Russian journalists had also warned of this, as the article and cartoon below show.

On 25th September 2019, he gave an address to the UN General Assembly in which he reminded the assembled ambassadors that the war in the Donbas had already lasted five years, together with the Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula. Yet despite the requirements of international law and the hundreds of organisations designed to defend it, Ukraine had been left to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity alone, fighting with and losing its citizens. More than thirteen thousand had been killed, and one and a half million people had been forced to leave their homes. Every year these statistics had been recited at the UN, and every year the numbers kept getting bigger. In his speech, Zelensky reminded his audience of Erich Maria Remarque, who had died on that day in 1970, and that his novel, All Quiet on the Western Front had been published ninety years ago. He recalled the words from its preface, promising that it would try simply to tell of a generation of men who, even though they may have escaped its shells, were destroyed by the war. That makes it especially fitting that the film version of the book, in its original German language medium, has recently been released and has been nominated for the 2023 Academy Awards. His conclusion was that:

” The world must remember that every generation destroyed by war paves the path to the next one: a new war, which in turn will be impossible to win through victory alone. “

Zelensky, p. 24.

Almost two years later, on 1st September 2021, the anniversary of the outbreak of World War II, Zelensky made an address to the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington DC. Naturally, he spoke about Nazism as its major cause. One and a half million Ukrainian Jews were murdered in the war, about one in four of the total number of European Jews. He told his audience the story of four brothers, three of whom were shot by the German invaders who had attacked Ukraine in 1941 as part of their Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union. The wives, children and all other relatives of the three brothers were also murdered. The fourth brother survived because he was away fighting at the front. He fought until the end of the Second World War and the defeat of Nazism. He returned home and had a son and after thirty-one years, his grandson was born, Volodymyr Zelensky.

He is one of the thousands whose family lives were touched in some way, even crippled, by the Nazis, in addition to those who lost their lives fighting them or just trying to survive their reign of terror. But while the ideas of the Nazis, of violent nationalism, racism and xenophobia, still existed in many different countries and forms, in modern Ukraine, Zelensky said, racism and intolerance had no influence and stood even less chance of resurgence, despite Putin’s later perverse claims that he was invading the country to purge it of Nazism (the Kremlin has continually stated that one of the objectives of its ‘special military operations’ was to denazify Ukraine). Even in historical terms, the claims are negated by the 2,659 Ukrainians who were given the title Righteous Among the Nations, a title used by the State of Israel to non-Jews who saved the lives of Holocaust victims; people who saved Jewish lives, often at the cost of their own. Ukraine was fourth-highest on this list.

Moreover, as President, Zelensky had established lifelong pensions for surviving Ukrainian citizens who had saved Jews. Zelensky was categorical in his rejection of accusations of anti-Semitism, saying that the evils of Nazism had no place in the hearts of the people who survived Babyn Yar. Already, on Holocaust Memorial Day 2020, the Ukrainian government had unveiled a memorial in the middle of Kyiv to the victims of Babyn Yar where, in two days in September 1941, thirty-four thousand Jews were murdered, to be followed by a further two hundred thousand over the next two years throughout Ukraine. Throughout Soviet times, there was no memorial, and a sports complex and a shooting range were built on the site of the massacre. From 1991 onwards, Babyn Ya was bulldozed rather than memorialised. At the end of 2020, Zelensky signed the decree creating the Babyn Yar Memorial Reserve, going some way to correcting the previous post-war presidents’ failure to honour the Nazis’ victims. On 29th September 2021, marking the eightieth anniversary of the beginning of the mass shootings and in the week leading up to 6th October, inter-faith prayers were said in Kyiv for all those who died during the Holocaust. Zelensky ended his speech by warning his audience not to think that the war in the Donbas was a matter concerning only Russia and Ukraine…

“… For Nazism begins with the violation of international law, with the violation of human rights, with murders and imprisonments. Elie Wiesel, the Nobel Laureate and survivor of Auschwitz and Buchenwald, said ‘The opposite of love is not hate. It is indifference.’ “

Zelensky, p. 31

In his Address on the Day of Dignity and Freedom made in Kyiv on 21 November 2021, Zelensky spoke of the terror of the Soviet era. Vasyl Stus (1938-85) was a Ukrainian poet and dissident who responded to the wave of arrests of creative young people across Ukraine by staging a protest at the premiére of Sergei Parajanov’s film, Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors, referred to above. He rose to his feet and called on everyone who opposed the arrests to do the same. A few people did so, then a few more, and then even more. Snus knew that by this act he might lose his freedom, but he also knew that if he didn’t, he would certainly lose his dignity. Leonid Bykov, the Soviet Ukrainian actor and film director (1928-79) wanted to film his masterpiece, Only ‘Old Men’ Are Going into Battle in colour, but the authorities would only give him black-and-white film to make it with. He did not lose his dignity but made a film that is adored by millions, a film about people who are dignified and free. They are, Zelensky said, like those who stood on Maidan Square in the uprisings of 1990, 2004 and 2014 and like those holding the trenches in eastern Ukraine, defending our state. They are ‘lads’ from western Ukraine and from the southeast; Russian speakers from Kharkiv and Kryvi Rih, Ukrainian speakers from Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk; Christians, Jews and Muslims.

Zelensky’s Political Strategy, 2021-22 – ‘No Exit’:

Zelensky’s approach to politics was similarly distinct from that of his predecessors since he chose not to exploit regional and linguistic differences in the way many previous politicians had done. Instead, he chose to exploit what people had in common; a desire for dignity, normality and a rejection of state centralisation of power under the old élites. This may have been populism of a sort, but Zelensky was far more than simply another Eastern European populist. One of his favourite quotes in 2021 was:

“I have been impetuous in my drive for change, but I am not the kind of person who starts off with an exit strategy.“

Ostrovsky, pp. xv-xvii

Ostrovsky, ‘Russia and Eastern Europe Editor’ of The Economist wrote that when he first met Zelensky in Kyiv at the end of 2021, the President seemed to him as out of place in the Stalinist era halls as he was as out of his depth, taking on a system that would almost certainly demolish him. The journalist could not, at that stage, have imagined him as a war leader.

At 12.30 a.m. on 24th February, Zelensky delivered an Address to the Ukrainian and Russian people from Kyiv. He declared a state of emergency for thirty days across the whole of Ukraine, a decision already supported by 335 deputies of the Parliament. A ‘great defensive coalition’ had begun its work. Parliament also adopted a package of measures to finance the defence sector. The next day, the deputies would depart the capital for the regions to support their constituents. International partners were mobilising to support Ukraine while Zelensky met with the representatives of major Ukrainian businesses, who all pledged to remain in the country with their teams and to work to protect the country. He then switched to Russian and addressed the citizens of Russia on the other side of the two-thousand-kilometre border, along which the two-hundred-thousand-strong invasion force was massed with thousands of military vehicles:

“Your leaders have given approval for them to step into the territory of another country. This step could mark the beginning of a huge war on the European continent.

“Today, the whole world is talking about what will happen next. Any provocation – any spark – could burn everything to the ground. You are told that this flame will bring freedom to the people of Ukraine. But the Ukrainian people are already free. We remember our past, and we are building our future ourselves: building it, not destroying it, despite what you are told every day on the television. …

“The Ukraine in your news and the Ukraine in real life are two completely different countries. And the main difference is that ours exists.

“You are told that we are Nazis. How can a country that gave more than eight million lives in the struggle against Nazism support Nazism? How could I be a Nazi? Tell that to my grandfather. He went through the war fighting as an infantryman for the Soviet Army, and died as a colonel in independent Ukraine.

You are told that we hate Russian culture. How is it possible to hate a culture? Neighbours always enrich each other culturally. But that does not make us a single entity; it does not dissolve us into you. We are different. But that is no reason to be enemies. We merely want to create our history ourselves: peacefully, calmly, honestly.”

Zelensky, pp. 49-50.

The claim that Ukraine could present a threat to Russia was dismissed by Zelensky, pointing out that this was not considered the case in the past, that it was not the case at present and would not be so in the future. The truth was that while Russia demanded security guarantees from NATO, it was not prepared to honour its own guarantees of Ukrainian security given in the Budapest Memorandum along with the US, the UK and France. Ukraine was not a member of NATO, though its security was connected to that of its neighbours who are, most notably Poland. That was why, he said, was why it was necessary to talk about the security of the whole of Europe. Of course, Zelensky knew that his last-minute appeal for peace would not be shown on Russian television, but he hoped that the citizens of Russia might see it because this situation needs to end before it is too late.

The Thirteen Days: Leaders in War and Peace, February-March 2022:

But it was already well past midnight in Moscow, both metaphorically and literally, and too late already, as just four hours later, at 4.30 a.m. in Kyiv on 24th February, the Russian Army crossed into Ukraine from the North and advanced in the East. Over the previous year, Putin had amassed well over a hundred thousand troops along the country’s borders with both Russia and Belorussia, demanding that Ukraine renounce its sovereignty and give up its aspiration to join the EU. Later that morning, at 6 a.m., by which time all Ukrainians were already wide awake, having been woken up by the Russian barrage of cruise missiles, the President gave another address, this time exclusively to his own people. Explosions had been heard in many Ukrainian cities, and martial law had been introduced across the country. Zelensky also reported on his phone call with President Biden, who had already started to gather international support for the Ukrainians. Much of the USA was still awake, of course. After admonishing his people not to panic and assuring them that the whole military, defence and security forces were working to protect them, Zelensky went to prepare an address for the rest of Europe, which he delivered the next day.

In this, he was critical of the slowness of Europe’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion. The United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Australia and New Zealand had introduced sectoral sanctions against Russia – namely against the largest Russian banks and businesses, and against Russia’s access to Western technologies. But Russian tanks were still shooting at residential blocks and armoured vehicles were still attacking civilians. Europe, said Zelensky, had sufficient force to stop this aggression: What more would it do? Would it cancel visas for Russians? Would it cut Russia off from SWIFT, the international payments system used by most banks, recall ambassadors, agree to an oil embargo, and impose a no-fly zone? All of these should be on the table, he said, because Russia is a threat to all of us; to all of Europe.

Most observers assumed that the Ukrainian military, massively outnumbered, would buckle and that the régime in Kyiv would collapse. But the war did not play out as Putin expected it would, and in the days and weeks following, Ukraine fought back and halted the advance. Far from fleeing the country, Zelensky stayed in Kyiv and assumed a new role: delivering daily addresses that powerfully captured the resilience and strength of his people. And with his speech to the UK Parliament on 8th March, Zelensky opened a new front in Ukraine’s war with Russia: a communication front. Over the next six months, he delivered over a hundred speeches to audiences around the world. Everywhere from the US Congress to the Israeli Knesset, Zelensky emphasised the need for the world to offer military aid to Ukraine and impose sanctions on Russia. Along the way, he gave the Ukrainian people an unprecedented voice on the world stage. In his speech to Westminster, delivered to a packed House of Commons by video link, Zelensky recalled the first thirteen days of the war in Ukraine:

“On the second day, we fought off attacks in the air, on land and at sea. Our heroic border guards on Zminyi Island in the Black Sea showed everyone how the war will end. When a Russian ship demanded that our guys lay down their weapons, they answered him with – well, an answer so firm, that one cannot repeat it in Parliament. In that moment, we felt strong. It was the strength of a people who will resist the invader to the end.”

Zelensky, p. 66.

On the sixth day, Russian missiles hit Babyn Yar, where the Nazis had murdered over a hundred thousand people, Putin dishonouring their memories by hitting them for a second time. On the seventh day, the Russian forces began hitting churches, and on the eighth day, they began firing at a nuclear power plant, the largest in Europe. That was when the world began to understand that this was an act of great terror against the whole of the continent. On the ninth day, a meeting of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly ended without the agreement and display of courage Ukraine was looking for. It demonstrated that the Atlantic Alliance was not working, since it could not impose a no-fly zone. It has not yet done so, nearly a year later. Zelensky believed that this demonstrated that the security guarantees in Europe would need to be re-established from their foundations. On the eleventh day, children, cities and hospitals were hit by rockets and children even had to be evacuated from a cancer ward. On the thirteenth day, a child died of dehydration in the besieged city of Mariupol, because the Russian forces had cut off the supplies of food and water. In these first thirteen days, fifty children had been killed. Zelensky concluded his summary of events with the following memorable statement:

We were not looking for this war. Ukraine did not seek greatness. But over these last thirteen days, Ukraine has become great. Ukraine: a country that is saving lives despite the terror of the occupiers. A country that is defending freedom despite the blows of one of the biggest armies in the world. And a country that is defendng itself, despite its sky still being open to Russian missiles, planes and helicopters.”

Zelensky, pp. 68-69.

Finally, he added some words to those of Winston Churchill of 1940:

“We shall fight on the spoil tips, on the banks of the Kalmius and the Dnieper. We shall never surrender.”

Zelensky, p. 69.

Just over a week after this Churchillian speech to the UK Parliament, Zelensky went on to address the US Congress, also via video link. He made reference to the 7th of December 1941, the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the 11th of September 2001…

“… when evil tried to turn your cities into a battlefield… when innocent people were attacked from the air, in a way nobody expected and nobody could stop.”

Ibid., p. 70.

The Ukrainian President said that every night for the past three weeks Russia had transformed the sky over Ukraine into a place of death, claiming the lives of thousands and that Russian troops had already fired more than a thousand missiles at his country, and countless bombs. He again raised the issue of a no-fly zone and also asked for defensive weapons and aircraft. He then spoke in English, directly addressing President Biden both as a fellow president and as the leader of the free world:

“Today, I am almost forty-five years old. And in the weeks leading up to today, the hearts of more than one hundred children have stopped beating. I see no sense in my life if it cannot prevent death. … You are the leader of a great nation. I wish you to be leader of the world. Being the leader of the world means being the leader in peace.”

Ibid., p. 73
The Ides of March: Ukraine stabbed in the back?

Next, on 17th March, Zelensky made an address to the German Bundestag in Berlin via video link. He told it that it was behaving as if Germany was behind a wall again, not the Berlin Wall, but another metaphorical wall in central Europe, one between freedom and slavery. This wall, he said, was growing stronger with each bomb falling on Ukraine, and with every decision that was not made by governments in the name of peace. He claimed that Ukraine had warned Germany, under Angela Merkel, that Nord Stream, the gas pipelines connecting Russia to Germany under the Baltic Sea, was a weapon being built in preparation for a great war, but they had been told by Berlin that it was about nothing more than ‘the economy’. But, he said, it was cement for a new wall. He also reminded his listeners that Germany had opposed Ukraine being considered for NATO membership and delayed the beginning of Ukraine’s EU accession process. Germany also, at first, had resisted preventative sanctions against Russia in the name of supporting its own economy and trade routes. So he was addressing the Bundestag on behalf of the residents of Mariupol, a city that Russian troops had blockaded and raised to the ground. As the graph below shows, Gazprom, the Russian state-controlled gas giant was supplying more than a third of all of Europe’s gas via pipeline, making huge profits which went primarily to financing Putin’s war in Ukraine.

Financial Times, 8th April 2020

He asked the Bundestag members to recall what the Berlin Airlift meant to the city’s citizens, preventing it from falling into the Soviet sphere of influence. It was made possible because the skies were first made ‘safe’. The sky over Ukraine offered up only Russian missiles and bombs for as long as the western allies refused to put a ‘no-fly zone’ in place. After the destruction of Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Sumy and Donbas for the second time in eighty years, Ukraine needed all the support Germany could offer. Otherwise, he added, Germany’s historic responsibility for World War II would go unredeemed. He concluded with a reference to Ronald Reagan’s historic visit to Berlin at the beginning of the end of the Cold War and his call to ‘Mr. Gorbachev’ to ‘tear down this wall’. He would tell Chancellor Scholz the same, and to ‘give Germans the leadership they deserve.’

On 20th March 2022, the Ukrainian President turned his attention to the Israeli Knesset. In his speech to it, again by video link, he pointed to the similarity between the two states in facing neighbours who threatened the total destruction of a people and culture. They even wanted to deprive both nations of their names: Ukraine, and Israel. The Russian full-scale invasion of 24th February was begun by a criminal order beginning a treacherous war, aimed at destroying a whole people. Its goal was clearly to eliminate Ukrainian families, including their children, the state of Ukraine, its cities, communities, and culture. Russian troops were doing this deliberately in order to send Putin’s message to the world. The words ‘final solution’ had returned to the European lexicon, and the term ‘Ukrainian issue’ had replaced the term ‘Jewish issue’. These were the words and phrases coming out of Moscow. They were used openly, at an official meeting in Moscow, the minutes of which were published online and quoted in Russian state media. They said that without their ‘special military operation,’ they would not be able to ensure a ‘final solution’ to the supposed problem of Russia’s security. He called on the Knesset to help Ukraine defend itself with its missile defence systems. Yet Israel had not supplied these, neither had it imposed strong sanctions on Russia nor even put pressure on Russian businesses.

The Volunteer-in-chief:

Ostrovsky met Zelensky again in late March 2022 when his editor from The Economist travelled with him to Kyiv by train. Towns were under curfew and train lights dimmed to avoid detection. There was an eerie silence at Lviv railway station, despite it being filled with people running from the war: women with sunken eyes, too exhausted to talk; children too exhausted to cry. When Ostrovsky reached Kyiv, Zelensky spoke to him not like a commander-in-chief but like an ordinary man thrust into extraordinary circumstances. He had also aged about ten years and grown a beard. He engaged in a conversation conducted in three languages:

“We are not heroes. We do our job, and we are where we are.”

Ostrovsky, p. xvii

It was clear, Ostrovsky observed, that Zelensky was not commanding the army. The generals were doing that, and he was wise enough to leave them to it. Nor was he micromanaging mayors and local communities. Everyone in Ukraine was doing what they did best, and Zelensky was no exception: he concentrated on communicating with the Ukrainian people, lobbying governments and businesses to supply arms. Ukraine had become a volunteer nation, and Zelensky was its volunteer-in-chief. He did not just appeal to politicians, but to the people who elected them.

When Putin launched his all-out war, the Russian armed forces reportedly packed their parade uniforms in their kit bags as they advanced towards Kyiv; soldiers were told that they would be welcomed with open arms and would be parading through the capital within days. Yet, at the end of March, Ukraine’s resistance had taken both Vladimir Putin and the rest of the world’s leaders by surprise. The government did not collapse and disperse, and Zelensky had not fled into exile. In many parts of the country, the Ukrainian military pushed the Russian forces back. But while life in Kyiv had returned to something resembling ‘normality’ by early April, with every new city liberated evidence of Russian war crimes mounted. This was not just a struggle of armies; it was a confrontation of values.

The Financial Times, 8th April edition.

There were large pro-Ukrainian demonstrations in Berlin, Paris and London, galvanised by his addresses so that governments were compelled to go further in their support for Ukraine than anyone had thought possible. Putin has miscalculated that western governments would not sacrifice their economic prosperity for the cause of Ukrainian resistance. Zelensky delivered a message of such moral clarity and force that it left few people indifferent. His words contained something that people in the West, especially younger people, had been searching for: a sense of meaning and purpose in a post-ideological society in which liberty and prosperity had long been taken for granted by their elders. The world had not heard words of such significance since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the so-called ‘end of history’.

Vladimir Putin’s genocidal war against Ukraine’s identity, culture and people was a reminder that history was far from over, and that fascism was far from dead. But Zelensky challenged Putin’s narrative for the war almost as soon as it started. There is no distinction between the words ‘history’ and ‘story’ in either Ukrainian or Russian and in his powerful speeches Zelensky recounted both: the stories of individual people and his narrative of the most deadly European conflict since the end of the Second World War. As winter gave way to spring, their references and examples would change, but Zelensky’s message stayed the same. The war now being fought in Ukraine was not a regional war for territory, like that fought by Russia for Crimea and the Donbas in 2014, or even a struggle for geopolitical hegemony. It was a war between a corrupt, nuclear state and a people who merely wished to live in peace in their own land and in their own way. It was a war between empathy and hatred, dignity and enslavement, and Zelensky argued on that basis, that it was therefore everyone’s war.

In Zelensky’s speeches from April onwards, he would emphasise how these values had brought Ukrainians together as a nation. Putin had tried to destroy a people, and he had failed. From the ruins of the war Ukraine had emerged more defiant and united than ever before. It was, genuinely, a nation reborn. But on 3rd April, he had to speak about the atrocities revealed in Bucha and the other cities from which the occupiers were expelled. Hundreds of people had been killed, and many civilians tortured and then executed. Their corpses were left lying on the streets to decompose. Landmines had been left across the city, even inside the bodies of the dead. Old people had been shot while riding home from the market on their bicycles, and others in the back of their heads, with their hands tied behind their backs. Women had been raped and then killed in front of their children. The effects of looting were visible everywhere. One woman had been strangled after her earrings were ripped out. Corpses were desecrated and crushed by tanks. Russian culture and humanity had died along with the men and women killed, Zelensky said.

Zelensky announced that he had approved the creation of a special judicial mechanism in Ukraine to investigate every crime committed by the occupiers of Ukrainian territory, drawing upon the joint efforts of national and international expert investigators, prosecutors and judges. He went on:

“The world has seen war crimes before, committed on many occasions and on many countries. But we must make the war crimes of the Russian military the last time this evil plagues the earth. Everyone guilty of such crimes will be included in a special ‘Book of Torturers’. They will be found and they will be punished.”

Zelensky, pp. 91-92.

Calls to bolster Ukraine’s defences and toughen sanctions on Russia multiplied after the evidence emerged of the atrocities carried out by Russian troops before they pulled out of Kyiv’s outskirts. The war crimes committed in Bucha and other cities were to be considered by the United Nation Security Council within a few days of Zelensky’s statement, along with a new package of sanctions against Russia. Ukrainian troops, government officials and journalists had found the corpses of hundreds of civilians, some with indications they had been tortured, and heard accounts of summary killings, rape and other human rights abuses from surviving residents. The US President, French President Emmanuel Macron and other western leaders called for an investigation of Russian officials responsible for what they called ‘war crimes’.

Zelensky was speaking on the fourteenth anniversary of the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest when the members had an opportunity to remove Ukraine from ‘the grey zone’ in Eastern Europe, a zone in which Moscow thought they could do anything they liked, even committing the most horrific war crimes. During these talks about Ukraine’s accession to NATO, the Alliance concealed its intention to refuse access in order to appease Russia; to persuade Russia to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and live peacefully with its neighbour. This was a miscalculation, Zelensky said, pointing to the fourteen years since in which Ukraine experienced a revolution rejecting Russian hegemony, followed by eight years of war in the Donbas. He invited Mrs Merkel and Mr Sarkozy to visit Bucha to see what their concessions to Russia had led to fourteen years later. While Zelensky did not blame the West for Bucha, he contrasted Ukraine’s own decisiveness with the dithering and duplicity of individual western ‘leaders’:

“But we have the right to talk about indecision and to identify the path that led us to Bucha, to Hostomel, to Kharkiv, to Mariupol.

“Fourteen years ago, in Bucharest, Russia’s leader told the West that there was no such state as Ukraine. But we have proved that there is. There has long been such a country and long will there be.”

Zelensky, p. 93

While the Kremlin continued to claim that the Bucha massacre was staged by Ukrainian forces, the western heads of Russian-owned companies began to express condemnation of the conflict and to call for investigations into the reports of war crimes:

Dmytro Kuleba, Ukraine’s foreign minister, said that Ukraine was still demanding “a full oil and gas embargo for Russia”, adding that he hoped it would not take more allegations of war crimes to force the West to take additional measures:

“Frankly speaking, I hope we will never face a situation again when we… need atrocities like Bucha to be revealed and to impress and to shock other partners to the extent that they sit down and say ‘OK, fine, we will introduce new sanctions’ “

Quoted by John Reed in The Financial Times.

Although Russian troops retreated from the suburbs of Kyiv and the north of the country in the early spring, Ukraine’s military authorities warned in the second week of April that invading Russian troops were regrouping and preparing an offensive in the eastern Donbas region, aimed at seizing territory in the two administrative regions that separatists had partially occupied since the Moscow-backed uprising in 2014. The general staff of the armed forces said that:

“The main efforts of the occupiers are focused on preparing for an aggressive operation in eastern Ukraine, which aims to establish complete control over the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.”

Quoted by John Reed in The Financial Times, April 2022.

The State of War in Eastern & South-Eastern Ukraine, April 2022. Source: The Financial Times, 8th April.

They called on the residents living in the two ‘Oblasts’ of the Donbas, as well as in parts of the Kharkiv region, to leave “while they still had the chance”. Borys Filatov, the Mayor of Dnipro, recommended the evacuation of women, children and the elderly from the city in anticipation of a flare-up of fighting in the Donbas. Zelensky also told his people as a whole that Moscow was planning an “aggressive operation in eastern Ukraine”.

FT, 8th April 2022.

Meanwhile, Volodymyr Zelensky continued to plead with the international community to provide more military supplies and to impose tighter sanctions on Russia, saying that failure to do so would equate to giving Moscow “permission” to intensify its offensive. Washington responded by imposing its most severe sanctions on Sberbank, Russia’s biggest financial institution, and Alpha-Bank, its biggest private bank. The EU moved to target more oligarchs and ban coal imports from Russia.

Zelensky also called again on Russian citizens to demand an end to the war as it entered its seventh week. In one of his nightly addresses, he told them:

“In demanding peace, it is better to lose something, to face down the Russian repressive machine, than to be equated with Nazis for the rest of your life.”

The Financial Times, April 2022.

But Russia responded to the news of its atrocities in Bucha by claiming to its citizens that this was “fake news”, as Jemima Kelly noted in her article in The Financial Times (8th April 2022):

The President’s Easter Address, ‘God save Ukraine’, was given in St. Sophia’s Cathedral in Kyiv, the site of the victory of the Kyivan Rus over the Pechenegs. He pointed out that it had stood since then and was destroyed by neither the Mongol Horde nor the Nazi invasion of the USSR. Above the mosaic of the Virgin Mary were words from the Psalms: God dwells in that city; it cannot be destroyed. From the very break of day, God will protect it. The image was known as the ‘Oranta’, meaning ‘the one who prays’ and Zelensky’s address mostly consisted of a long prayer for Ukraine and its people, but he also reminded the worshippers that the previous year, they had to celebrate Easter at home due to the pandemic and that this year they were afflicted by another virus: the plague of war. But, he said, the holiday offered them…

… faith that light will overcome darkness; good will overcome evil; life will overcome death…

Zelensky, p. 101.

On the Ukrainian Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation, 8th May, commemorating the end of World War II, Zelensky delivered an address at Borodyanka, in which he said that for Ukraine, the exclamation mark in the familiar phrase Never Again! had now been replaced with a question mark. He went further in stating that Russia’s all-out war, masquerading as a ‘special operation’ had erased the word ‘never’. It had been shot through and bombed out by hundreds of missiles at 4 a.m. on the 24th of February so that all that remained was the word ‘again?!’ The small town of Borodyanka had been shelled by 250-kilogram bombs which rendered it mute within a minute, unable to say anything, let alone Never Again! In the Second World War, fifty men from the town were sent to Germany as forced labour. Other people were burned alive when the Nazis set a hundred houses on fire, and two hundred and fifty soldiers from Borodyanka died fighting fascism on the fronts. These numbers were out of a total population at the time of only a thousand. Many of the people of Ukraine were now experiencing a second occupation; for the citizens of Mariupol, it was a third. During two years of occupation, the Nazis killed ten thousand of them; in the two months following the incursion there, Russia had killed twenty thousand. Zelensky characterised this as the return of Nazism:

“A bloody reconstruction of Nazism has taken place in Ukraine. A reconstruction of the old ideas, actions, words and symbols. A reconstruction of its atrocities and its attempts to imbue evil with some legitimate purpose. … It aims to set a new record for xenophobia, hatred and racism, and for the number of victims it can harm. ”

Zelensky, p. 105.

The truth, he stated, was understood by all those countries who endured the Second World War, and who support Ukraine today:

“The Poles have not forgotten how evil first accuses you, calls you an aggressor, and then attacks at 4 a.m. while calling it self-defence. … When they recall the Nazi-destroyed Warsaw, and they see what was done to Mariupol, they remember.

“The British have not forgotten how the Nazis wiped out Coventry, … bombed forty-one times. They have not forgotten the Luftwaffe’s so-called ‘Moonlight Sonata’, in which the city was under contant air-raids for eleven hours. They have not forgotten how Coventry’s historic centre, how its factories, how St Michael’s Cathedral were destroyed. When they see the missiles hit Kharkiv and damage its historic centre, its factories and the Assumption Cathedral, they remember. … when they recall how Birmingham was bombed, and they see its sister city Zaporizhzhia under attack, they remember.”

Ibid., pp. 106-7

He concluded:

The Reckoning, Retrenchment & Revival of Summer:

By mid-summer, the EU had moved to cut the consumption of Russian gas among member states, including Germany and excluding Hungary, and the UK agreed to send more weapons to Ukraine. Other NATO countries soon followed suit, but these did not include planes and missiles, and NATO still refused to implement a no-fly zone.

Pages from the ‘i’ paper, c. 21st July 2022

Exactly six months after Russia’s all-out attack, on Ukraine’s Independence Day, there were Russian tanks in the centre of Kyiv: burned out and mangled ones. This ‘reverse’ display of destroyed Russian armour was a parade of Ukraine’s defiance, not to mention its sense of humour. Students and scientists, musicians and actors, teachers and doctors, engineers and farmers come together with the military. They had halted what was supposed to be the world’s second-strongest army, literally in the tracks of its tanks and armoured vehicles. They had also sent the flagship of the Russian fleet to the bottom of the Black Sea and had mastered the M270 MLRS and the US HIMARS system in under a week. In his speech on 24th August, Zelensky declared defiantly that he would not reach an understanding with the terrorists. Looking forward to the day when he could sit around the negotiating table, he promised that…

“… it will not be because of fear, with a gun pointed at our head. Because for us, the most terrible steel is not within missiles, aircraft and tanks – but in shackles. We would rather live in trenches than live in chains. …

“We do not bargain away our lands and our people. Ukraine means all of Ukraine. All twenty-five regions, without any ‘concessions’ or ‘compromises’. We no longer recognise such words. They were destroyed by missiles on 24 February.

“Donbas is Ukraine. And it will return to us, whatever the path may be. Crimea is Ukraine. And it will return to us …

Zelensky, p. 117.

Zelensky’s speech on that day marked a turning point in the war. Ukraine no longer wanted peace with Russia, he said. It wanted victory. In the weeks that followed that day, Ukrainian forces launched an impressive counter-offensive, liberating more territory in a few days than Russia had managed to take in the previous five months. Putin, desperate and humiliated, lashed out at Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and threatened a nuclear strike. The rhetorical power of Zelensky’s address came from the quality that has defined so many of his speeches: truth.

In October 2022, President Zelensky wrote in To Change the Past, his introduction to his book of speeches, of the thousands of lives already taken by the war unleashed by Russia:

“If only we could change the past. There is so much I would give up in an instant. The acclaim and admiration from around the world. I would prefer that when people heard the name Zelensky, they replied ‘Who?’ I would rather I had never heard the applause of the US Congress, the British House of Commons or the European Parliament – and that Ukrainians had never heard the sound of explosion or gunshots in our homeland.

” … I would rather it wasn’t my face on the cover of TIME magazine … I would give up every mention of my name in the global press, every re-post on social media …

“… all I feel is my heart breaking for the thousands killed in Bucha and Izyum …”

Zelensky, p. 2.

In this article, I have tried to provide a simple narrative of the history and culture of Ukraine before the Russian invasion to enable an understanding of how the war has changed Ukraine and why. In order to understand the events of the past year, it is essential to place them, not just in the context of the past three years of Zelensky’s presidency, nor even the nine years since the first incursions in Crimea and Donbas, but in that of the previous 1,500 years of Ukraine’s history.

Sources:

Volodymyr Zelensky (2022), A Message from Ukraine: Speeches, 2019-22. London: Hutchinson Heinemann (Penguin Random House).

Oleksandr Bilousko (2017), Ukraine: Nature, Traditions, Culture. Kyiv: Baltia Druk Publishers.

István Lázár (1990), An Illustrated History of Hungary. Budapest: Corvina.

Jeremy Isaacs & Taylor Downing (1998), Cold War. London: Transworld Publishers.

By this author, online:

Majesty & A Fall from Grace: The Lives & Times of the Latter-Day Windsors – Part Two: Borders, Brexit & Bombings, 2002-17.

The Twin Causes of ‘Brexit’ – Migration & Asylum:

In 2015, David Cameron and the Conservatives surprisingly won an overall majority of MPs and were able to form a government by themselves. In their Manifesto, they had promised to conduct a renegotiation of the terms of Britain’s membership in the EU, and then ask the electorate in a referendum, whether they accepted these terms and wished Britain to remain in the EU, or whether they wanted to leave.

Now it was not De Gaulle or even the Brussels ‘Eurocrats’ who were asking the question, but the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, and the ‘Brexiteer’ Conservatives in his cabinet and on the back benches. The people themselves had not asked to be asked, but when they answered at the 2016 Referendum, they decided, by a very narrow majority, that they preferred the vision (some would say a blurred one) of a ‘global’ Britain to the ‘gold-card benefits’ available at the European table it was already sitting at. The Tory rebels’ ‘tenacious attachment’ to ‘bloody-minded liberty’ led, among other factors, to them expressing their desire to detach themselves from the European Union, though it was by no means clear whether they wanted to remain semi-detached or move to a detached property at the very end of the street which as yet had not yet been planned, let alone built. All they had was a glossy prospectus of what may or may not be delivered or even be deliverable.

An internet poster from the 2016 Referendum Campaign

Looking back to 2002, the same year in which Simon Schama published his BBC series book, The Fate of Empire, the latest census for England and Wales was published. Enumerated and compiled the previous year, it showed the extent to which the countries had changed in the decade since the last census was taken. Douglas Murray, in the first chapter of his book, The Strange Death of Europe, first published in 2017, challenged his readers to imagine themselves back in 2002, speculating about what England and Wales might look like in the 2011 Census. Imagine, he asks us, that someone in our company had projected:

“White Britons will become a minority in their own capital city by the end of this decade and the Muslim population will double in the next ten years.”

How would his readers have reacted in 2002? Would they have used words like ‘alarmist’, ‘scaremongering’, ‘racist’, and ‘Islamophobic’? In 2002, a Times journalist made far less startling statements about likely future immigration, which were denounced by David Blunkett, then Home Secretary (using parliamentary privilege) as bordering on fascism. Yet, however much abuse they received for saying or writing it, anyone offering this analysis would have been proved absolutely right at the end of 2012, when the 2011 Census was published. It proved that only 44.9 percent of London residents identified themselves as ‘white British’. It also revealed far more significant changes, showing that the number of people living in England and Wales born ‘overseas’ had risen by nearly three million since 2001. In addition, nearly three million people in England and Wales were living in households where not one adult spoke English or Welsh as their primary language.

Parish Churches like the one shown above, in Framlingham, Suffolk, though picturesque, had dwindling congregations of mainly elderly worshippers.

These were major ethnic and linguistic changes, but there were equally striking findings of changing religious beliefs. The Census statistics showed that adherence to every faith except Christianity was on the rise. Since the previous census, the number of people identifying themselves as Christian had declined from seventy-two per cent to fifty-nine. The number of Christians in England and Wales dropped by more than four million, from thirty-seven million to thirty-three. While the Churches witnessed this collapse in their members and attendees, mass migration assisted a near doubling of worshippers of Islam. Between 2001 and 2011 the number of Muslims in England and Wales rose from 1.5 million to 2.7 million. While these were the official figures, it is possible that they were underestimated, because many newly-arrived immigrants might not have filled in the forms at the beginning of April 2011 when the Census was taken, not yet having a registered permanent residence.

The London Boroughs

The two local authorities whose populations were growing fastest in England, by twenty per cent in the previous ten years, were Tower Hamlets and Newham in London, and these were also among the areas with the largest non-response to the census, with around one in five households failing to return the forms. Yet the results of the census clearly revealed that mass migration was in the process of altering England completely. In twenty-three of London’s thirty-three boroughs (see map above) ‘white Britons’ were now in the minority. A spokesman for the ONS regarded this as demonstrating ‘diversity’, which it certainly did, but by no means all commentators regarded this as something positive or even neutral. When politicians of all the main parties addressed the census results they greeted them in wholly positive terms.

This had been the ‘orthodox’ political view since in 2007 the then Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, had spoken with pride about the fact that thirty-five per cent of the people working in London had been born in a foreign country. For years a sense of excitement and optimism about these changes in London and the wider country seemed the only appropriate tone to strike. This was bolstered by the sense that what had happened in the first decade of the twenty-first century was simply a continuation of what had worked well for Britain in the previous three decades. This soon turned out to be a politically-correct pretence, though what was new in this decade was not so much growth in immigration from Commonwealth countries and the Middle East, or from wartorn former Yugoslavia, but the impact of white European migrants from the new EU countries, under the terms of the accession treaties and the freedom of movement provisions of the single market.

Besides the linguistic and cultural factors, there were important economic differences between the earlier and the more recent migrations of Eastern Europeans. After 2004, young, educated Polish, Czech and Hungarian people moved to Britain to earn money to send home or to take home with them in order to acquire relatively cheap, good homes, marry and have children in their rapidly developing countries. And for Britain, as the host country, the economic growth of the 2000s was fuelled by the influx of energetic, skilled and talented people who, working, for example, in the NHS, were also denying their own country their much-needed skills for a period. But the UK government had seriously underestimated the number of these workers who wanted to come to Britain. Ministers suggested that the number arriving would be around twenty-six thousand over the first two years. This turned out to be wildly wrong, and in 2006 a Home Office minister was forced to admit that since EU expansion in 2004, 427,000 people from Poland and seven other new EU nations had applied to work in Britain. If the self-employed were included, he added, then the number might be as high as 600,000. There were also at least an additional thirty-six thousand spouses and children who had arrived, and twenty-seven thousand child benefit applications had been received. Even if most of these turned out to be temporary migrants, they still needed to find houses, schools and various services, including health for the period of their stay.

It has to be remembered, of course, that inward migration was partially offset by the annual outflow of around sixty thousand British people, mainly permanent emigrants to Australia, the United States, France and Spain. By the winter of 2006-07, one policy institute reckoned that there were 5.5 million British people living permanently overseas, nearly ten per cent of Britons, or more than the population of Scotland. In addition, another half a million were living abroad for a significant part of the year. By 2016, the number of ex-pats was estimated to have grown to over ten million. Aside from Europe, the Middle East and Asia were seeing rising ‘colonies’ of expatriate British. A worrying proportion of them were graduates; Britain was believed to be losing one in six of its graduates to emigration. Many others were retired or better-off people looking for a life in the sun, just as many of the newcomers to Britain were young, ambitious and keen to work. Government ministers tended to emphasise these benign effects of immigration, but their critics looked around and asked where all the extra people would go, where they would live, and where their children would go to school, not to mention where the extra hospital beds, road space and local services would come from, and how these would be paid for.

Members of the campaign group Citizens UK hold a ‘refugees welcome’ event outside Lunar House in Croydon. Photograph: John Stillwell/PA

A secondary issue to that of ‘numbers’ was the system for asylum seekers. In 2000, there were thirty thousand failed asylum seekers in the United Kingdom, a third of those who had applied in 1999, when only 7,645 had been removed from the country. It was decided that it was impossible to remove more, and that to try to do so would prove divisive politically and financially costly. Added to this was the extent of illegal immigration, which had caught the ‘eye’ of the British public. There were already criminal gangs of Albanians and Kosovars, operating from outside the EU, who were undermining the legal migration streams from Central-Eastern Europe in the eyes of many. The social service bill for these ‘illegal’ migrants became a serious burden for the Department of Social Security. Towns like Slough protested to the national government about the extra cost of housing, education and other services.

In addition, there was the sheer scale of the migration and the inability of the Home Office’s immigration and nationality department to regulate what was happening, to prevent illegal migrants from entering Britain, to spot those abusing the asylum system in order to settle in Britain and the failure to apprehend and deport people. Large articulated lorries filled with migrants, who had paid over their life savings to be taken to Britain, rumbled through the Channel Tunnel and the ferry ports. A Red Cross camp at Sangatte, near the French entrance to the ‘Chunnel’, was blamed by Britain for exacerbating the problem. By the end of 2002, an estimated 67,000 had passed through the camp to Britain. The then Home Secretary, David Blunkett finally agreed on a deal with the French to close the camp down, but by then many African, Asian and Balkan migrants, believed the British immigration and benefits systems to be easier than those of other EU countries, had simply moved across the continent and waited patiently for their chance to jump aboard a lorry to Britain.

Successive Home Secretaries from Blunkett to John Reid tried to deal with the trade, the latter confessing that his department was “not fit for purpose”. He promised to clear a backlog of 280,000 failed asylum claims, whose seekers were still in the country after five years. The historic Home Office was split up, creating a separate immigration and nationality service. Meanwhile, many illegal immigrants had succeeded in bypassing the asylum system entirely. In July 2005, the Home Office produced its own estimate of the number of these had been over the previous four years. It reckoned that this was between 310,000 and 570,000, or up to one per cent of the total population. A year later, unofficial estimates pushed this number up to 800,000. The truth was that no one really knew, but official figures showed the number applying for asylum was now falling, with the former Yugoslavia returning to relative peace.  Thousands of refugees were also being returned to Iraq, though the signs were already apparent that further wars in the Middle East and the impact of global warming on sub-Saharan Africa would soon send more disparate groups across the continents.

To begin with, the arrival of workers from the ten countries who joined the EU in 2004 was a different issue, though it involved an influx of roughly the same size. By the government’s own figures, annual net inward migration had reached 185,000 and had averaged 166,000 over the previous seven years. This was significantly more than the average net inflow of fifty thousand New Commonwealth immigrants which Enoch Powell (pictured below) had referred to as ‘literally mad’ in his 1968 Rivers of Blood speech, though he had been criticising the immigration of East African Asians, of course. But although Powell’s speech was partly about race, colour and identity, it was also about the numbers of immigrants and the practical concerns of his Wolverhampton constituents in finding hospital and school places in an overstretched public sector. These concerns persisted, though they were largely ignored by senior politicians.

Enoch Powell

It seems not unreasonable, and not at all racist, to suggest that it is the duty of the central government to predict and provide for the number of newcomers it permits to settle in the country, though until 2015 this was largely left to local authorities, which were already struggling with centrally-imposed austerity cut-backs. In 2006, the Projections based on many different assumptions suggested that the UK population would grow by more than seven million by 2031. Of that increase, eighty per cent would be due to migration. The organisation, Migration Watch UK, set up to campaign for tighter immigration controls, said this was equivalent to requiring the building of a new town the size of Cambridge each year, or five new cities the size of Birmingham over the predicted quarter century.

But such characterisations were, in fact, caricatures of the situation since many of these new Eastern European migrants did not intend to settle permanently in the UK and could be expected to return to their countries of origin in due course. This eventually came to pass, after the UK finally left the EU in 2019 and during the subsequent Covid19 pandemic. However, before that happened, the massive underestimations of the scale of the inward migration were, of course, obvious to anybody with any knowledge of the history of post-war migration, replete with vast underestimates of the numbers expected. But it did also demonstrate that immigration control was simply not a priority for New Labour or the Con-Libs. They gave the impression that they regarded all immigration control, and even discussion of it, as inherently ‘racist’, which made any internal or external opposition to it hard to voice. The public response to the massive upsurge in immigration and to the swift transformation of parts of Britain it had not really reached before, was exceptionally tolerant. There were no significant or sustained outbreaks of racist abuse or violence before 2016, and the only racist political party, the British National Party (BNP) was subsequently destroyed, especially in London.

In April 2006, Margaret Hodge, the Labour MP for Barking since 1996 (pictured right), commented in an interview with The Sunday Telegraph that eight out of ten white working-class voters in her constituency might be tempted to vote for the British National Party (BNP) in the local elections on 4 May 2006 because “no one else is listening to them” about their concerns over unemployment, high house prices and the housing of asylum seekers in the area. She said the Labour Party must promote…

Margaret Hodge MP

“… very, very strongly the benefits of the new, rich multi-racial society which is part of this part of London for me”.

There was widespread media coverage of her remarks, and Hodge was strongly criticised for giving the BNP publicity. The BNP went on to gain 11 seats in the local election out of a total of 51, making them the second-largest party on the local council. 

It was reported that Labour activists accused Hodge of generating hundreds of extra votes for the BNP and some local Labour members began to privately discuss the possibility of a move to deselect her. The GMB union wrote to Hodge in May 2006, demanding her resignation. The then Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, later accused Hodge of “magnifying the propaganda of the BNP” after she said that British residents should get priority in council house allocations. In November 2009, the Leader of the BNP, Nick Griffin, announced that he intended to contest Barking at the 2010 general election, which saw New Labour finally defeated under Gordon Brown’s leadership. In spite of the union’s position, Hodge was returned as MP for Barking, doubling her majority to over 16,000, while Griffin came third behind the Conservatives. The BNP subsequently lost all of its seats on Barking and Dagenham Council.

Opinion polls and the simple, anecdotal evidence of living in the country showed that most people continued to feel no personal animosity towards immigrants or people of different ethnic backgrounds. But poll after poll also showed that a majority were deeply worried about what ‘all this’ migration meant for the country and its future. But even the mildest attempts to put these issues on the political agenda, such as the concerns raised by Margaret Hodge, were often met with condemnation from the established Labour left, especially in London, with the result that there was still no serious public discussion of them. Perhaps successive governments of all hues had spent decades putting off any real debate on immigration because they suspected that the public disagreed with them and that it was a matter they had lost control over anyway. This was done through charges of ‘racism’ and ‘bigotry’, such as the accidental ‘caught-on-mike’ remark made by Gordon Brown while getting into his car in the 2010 election campaign, when confronted by one of his own Labour councillors in a northern English town about the sheer numbers of migrants. It is said to have represented a major turning point in the campaign.

A series of deflecting tactics became a replacement for action in the wake of the 2011 census, including the remark that the public should ‘just get over it’, which came back to haunt David Cameron’s ministers in the 2016 Referendum campaign. Even Boris Johnson, then Mayor of London, in his Daily Telegraph column of December 2012, titled Let’s not dwell on immigration but sow the seeds of integration, responded to the census results by writing…

We need to stop moaning about the dam-burst. It’s happened. There is nothing we can now do except make the process of absorption as eupeptic as possible … 

It did not seem to have occurred to Johnson that there were those who might be nursing a sense of righteous indignation about the fact that for years all the main parties had taken decisions that were so at variance with the opinions of their electors, or that there was something profoundly disenfranchising about such decisions, especially when addressed to a majority of the voting public. In the same month as Johnson’s admonition, a poll by YouGov found two-thirds of the British public believed that immigration over the previous decade had been a ‘bad thing for Britain’. Only eleven percent thought it had been a ‘good thing’. This included majorities among supporters of all three main parties. Finally, the leaders of all three parties conceded that immigration was indeed too high. But none had any clear or proven policy on how to change course. By 2015, public opinion surveys were suggesting that a failure to do anything about immigration even while talking about it was one of the key areas of the breakdown in trust between the electorate and their political representatives.

At the same time, the coalition government of 2010-15 was fearful of the attribution of base motives if it got ‘tough on immigrants’. The Conservative leadership was trying to reposition itself as more socially ‘liberal’ under David Cameron. Nevertheless, at the election, they had promised to cut immigration from hundreds of thousands to tens of thousands per year, but they never succeeded in getting near that target. To show that she meant ‘business’, however, in 2013, Theresa May’s Home Office organised a number of vans with advertising hoardings to drive around six London boroughs where many illegal immigrants and asylum seekers lived. The posters on the hoardings read, In the UK illegally? Go home or face arrest, followed by a government helpline number. The posters became politically toxic immediately. The Labour Shadow Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, described them as “divisive and disgraceful” and the campaign group Liberty branded them “racist and illegal”.

After some months it was revealed that the pilot scheme had successfully persuaded only eleven illegal immigrants to leave the country voluntarily. Theresa May admitted that the scheme had been a mistake and too “blunt”. Indeed, it was a ‘stunt’ designed to reassure the ‘native’ population that their government was getting tough, and it was not repeated, but the overall ‘hostile environment’ policy it was part of continued into the next majority Conservative government after the 2015 election, leading to the illegal deportation of hundreds of ‘Windrush generation’ migrants from the Caribbean who had settled in Britain before 1968 and therefore lacked passports and papers identifying them as British subjects. In fact, under Cameron’s Conservative government, net immigration reached a record level of 330,000 per year, numbers which would fill a city the size of Coventry. The movement of people, even before the European migration crisis of 2015, was of an entirely different quantity, quality and consistency from anything that the British Isles had experienced before, even in the postwar period. Yet the ‘nation of immigrants’ mythology continued to be used to cover the vast changes of recent years and to pretend that history could be used to provide precedents for what had happened since the turn of the millennium.

Brexit – The Turning of the Tide for British Tolerance?

Following the 2011 Census, net migration into Britain continued to be far in excess of three hundred thousand per year. The further rise in the population of the United Kingdom recorded in 2021 was almost entirely due to inward migration, and higher birth rates among the predominantly young migrant population. In 2014 women who were born overseas accounted for twenty-seven per cent of all live births in England and Wales, and a third of all newborn babies had at least one overseas-born parent, a figure that had doubled since the 1990s. However, since the 2016 Brexit vote, statistics have shown that many recent migrants to Britain from the EU have been returning to their home countries so it is difficult to know, as yet, how many of these children will grow up in Britain, or for how long. But based on the increases projected by the Office for National Statistics in 2017, Douglas Murray asks the following rhetorical questions of the leaders of the mainstream political parties:

All these years on, despite the name-calling and the insults and the ignoring of their concerns, were your derided average white voters not correct when they said that they were losing their country? Irrespective of whether you think that they should have thought this, let alone whether they should have said this, said it differently or accepted the change more readily, it should at some stage cause people to pause and reflect that the voices almost everybody wanted to demonise and dismiss were in the final analysis the voices whose predictions were nearest to being right.

One might retort with the observation that Murray seems to lay too much emphasis on the ‘average white voter’ and hints at the need for a policy based on reversing what he seems to see as the ‘racial replacement’ of the previous half-century. In the 2016 Referendum Campaign, the UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party) campaign also seemed to confuse the question of asylum seekers with that of freedom of movement within EU borders by using the following photo, taken in 2015, on one of the eastern external borders:

A pro-EU campaign poster from 2016 countering an original UKIP poster which used a picture of Syrian refugees in 2015 to warn of ‘mass immigration’.

Indeed, the issue of immigration as it affected the 2016 Referendum in Britain was largely about the numbers of Eastern European migrants arriving in the country, rather than about illegal immigrants from outside the EU, or asylum seekers. Inevitably, all three issues became confused in the public mind, something that UKIP used to good effect in its campaigning posters. The original version of the poster above, featuring UKIP leader Nigel Farage, caused considerable controversy by using pictures from the 2015 Crisis in Central-Eastern Europe to suggest that Europe was at a ‘Breaking Point’ and that once in the EU, refugees and migrants would be able to enter Britain and settle there. This was untrue, as the UK was not, in any case, in the ‘Schengen’ area, as shown by the map below. Campaigners against ‘Brexit’ pointed out the facts of the situation in the adapted photo on the internet.

The Schengen Area in 2004. Applicant countries are marked in orange. Croatia joined in 2022.

In addition, during the campaign, Eastern European leaders, including the Poles and the Hungarians, complained about the misrepresentation of their citizens as ‘immigrants’ like many of those who had recently crossed the EU’s Balkan borders in order to get to Germany or Sweden. As far as they were concerned, their citizens were temporary internal migrants within the EU’s arrangements for ‘freedom of movement’ between member states. Naturally, because this was largely a one-way movement in numeric terms, this distinction was lost on many voters, however, as ‘immigration’ became the dominant factor in their backing of Brexit. On 23rd June 2016, the UK electorate, with a turnout of 72%, voted by a margin of 52% to 48% to leave the EU. Leave won the majority of votes in England and Wales, while every council in Scotland saw Remain majorities, and Northern Ireland voted to remain by 56% to 44%.(https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/eu_referendum/results)

An Ipsos poll published after the referendum result was declared, in July 2016, surveyed public attitudes towards immigration across Europe. It revealed just how few people thought that immigration had had a beneficial impact on their societies. To the question – Would you say that immigration has generally had a positive or negative impact on your country? – very low percentages of people in each country thought that it had had a positive effect. In fact, Britain had a comparatively positive attitude, with thirty-six per cent of people saying that they thought it had had a very or fairly positive impact. Meanwhile, only twenty-four per cent of Swedes felt the same way and just eighteen per cent of Germans. In Italy, France and Belgium only ten to eleven per cent of the population thought that it had made even a fairly positive impact on their countries. Despite the Referendum result, the British result may well have been higher because, despite UKIP’s posters, Britain had not experienced the same level of immigration from outside the EU as had happened in the inter-continental migration crisis of the previous summer.

Migrants/ Asylum Seekers arriving on the shores of the Greek island of Lesbos during the refugee crisis of 2015.

In Britain, the issue of Calais remained the foremost one in discussion in the autumn of 2016. The British government announced that it was going to have to build a further security wall near the large migrant camp there. The one-kilometre wall was designed to further protect the entry point to Britain, and specifically to prevent migrants from trying to climb onto passing lorries on their way to the UK. Given that there were fewer than 6,500 people in the camp most of the time, a solution to Calais always seemed straightforward to some. All that was needed, argued these activists and politicians, was a one-time generous offer and the camp could be cleared. But the reality was that once the camp was cleared it would simply be filled again. For 6,500 was an average day’s migration to Italy alone.

In the meantime, while the British and French governments argued over who was responsible for the situation at Calais, both day and night migrants threw missiles at cars, trucks and lorries heading to Britain in the hope that the vehicles would stop and they could climb aboard as stowaways for the journey across the Channel. The migrants who ended up in Calais had already broken all the EU’s rules on asylum in order to get there. They had not applied for asylum in their first country of entry, Greece, nor even in Hungary. Instead, they pushed on through the national borders of the ‘Schengen’ free passage area (see map above) until they reached the north of France. If they were cold, poor or just worse off, they were seen as having the right to come and settle in a European Union that seemed no longer to have the heart, and/or will, to turn anyone away.

The Disintegration of Multiculturalism in Britain:

After the 9/11 attacks on the USA, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the 7/7 London bombings, there was no bigger cultural challenge to the British sense of proportion and fairness than the threat of ‘militant Islam’ or rather ‘Islamist‘ terrorism. There were plenty of angry young Muslim men prepared to listen to fanatical ‘imams’ and to act on their narrow-minded and bloodthirsty interpretations of ‘Jihad’. Their views, at odds with those of the well-established south Asian Muslim communities in Britain, referred to above, were those of the ultra-conservative ‘Wahhabi’ Arabs and Iranian mullahs who insisted, for example, on women being fully veiled. But some English politicians, like Norman Tebbit, felt justified in asking whether all Muslim communities throughout Britain really wanted to fully integrate. Would they, in Tebbit’s notorious ‘test’, support the English Cricket team when it played against Pakistan?

Britain did not have as high a proportion of Muslims as France, and not many, outside London and parts of the South East, were of Arab and North African origin. But the large urban centres of the Home Counties, the English Midlands and the North of England had third-generation Muslim communities of hundreds of thousands. They felt like they were being watched in a new way and were perhaps right to feel more than a little uneasy. In the old industrial towns on either side of the Pennines and in areas of West London there were such strong concentrations of Muslims that the word ‘ghetto’ was being used by ministers and civil servants, not just, as in the seventies and eighties, by right-wing organisations and politicians. White working-class people had long been moving, quietly, to more semi-rural commuter towns in the Home Counties and on the South Coast, and in the cities of the Midlands, like Birmingham, to the ‘suburbs’.

But those involved in this ‘white flight’, as it became known, were a minority if polling was an accurate guide, and their motives for leaving the inner city areas were often complicated, not linked to ‘race’ or culture. Only a quarter of Britons said that they would prefer to live in white-only areas. In retrospect, this may seem to be a significant minority. Yet even this measure of tolerance or ‘multiculturalism’, colloquially defined as ‘live and let live’, was being questioned. How much should the new Britons ‘integrate’ or ‘assimilate’, and how much was the retention of traditions a matter of their rights to a distinctive cultural identity? After all, Britain had a long heritage of allowing newcomers to integrate on their own terms, retaining customs and contributing elements of their own culture. Speaking in December 2006, Blair cited forced marriages, the importation of ‘sharia’ law and the ban on women entering certain mosques as being on the wrong side of this line. In the same speech he used new, harder language. He claimed that, after the London bombings, …

“… for the first time in a generation there is an unease, an anxiety, even at points a resentment that out very openness, our willingness to welcome difference, our pride in being home to many cultures, is being used against us … Our tolerance is what makes is part of what makes Britain, Britain. So conform to it; or don’t come here. We don’t want the hate-mongers … If you come here lawfully, we welcome you. If you are permitted to stay here permanently, you become an equal member of our community and become one of us.”

His speech was not just about security and the struggle against terrorism. He was defining the duty to integrate. Britain’s strong economic growth over the previous two decades, despite its weaker manufacturing base, was partly the product of its long tradition of hospitality. The question now was whether the country was becoming so overcrowded that this tradition of tolerance was finally eroding. England, in particular, had the highest population density of any major country in the Western world. It would require wisdom and frankness from politicians together with watchfulness and efficiency from Whitehall to keep the ship on an even keel. Without these qualities and trust from the people, how can we hope for meaningful interactions between Muslims, Christians, Jews and Humanists?; between newcomers, sojourners, old-timers and exiles?; between white Europeans, black Africans, south Asians and West Indians?

Map showing the location of Rotherham in South Yorkshire

In January 2011, a gang of nine Muslim men, seven of Pakistani heritage and two from North Africa, were convicted and sentenced at the Old Bailey in London for the sex trafficking of children between the ages of eleven and fifteen. One of the victims sold into a form of modern-day slavery was a girl of eleven who was branded with the initials of her ‘owner’ and abuser: ‘M’ for Mohammed. The court heard that he had branded her to make her his property and to ensure others knew about it. This did not happen in a Saudi or Pakistani backwater, nor even in one of the northern English towns that so much of the country had forgotten about until similar crimes involving Pakistani heritage men were brought to light. This happened in Oxfordshire between 2004 and 2012. Nobody could argue that gang rape and child abuse were the preserve of immigrants, but these court cases and the official investigations into particular types of child-rape gangs, especially in the case of Rotherham, have identified specific cultural attitudes towards women, especially non-Muslim women, that are similar to those held by men in parts of Pakistan. These have sometimes been extended into intolerant attitudes toward other religions, ethnic groups and sexual minorities. But they are cultural attitudes which are anathema to the teachings of the Qu’ran and mainstream Imams, but fears of being accused of ‘racism’ for pointing out such factual connections had been at least partly responsible for these cases taking years to come to light.

British Muslims and members of the British-Pakistani community condemned both the abuse and that it had been covered up. Nazir Afzal (pictured below), Chief Crown Prosecutor of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) for North West England from 2011–2015, himself a Muslim, made the decision in 2011 to prosecute the Rochdale child sex abuse ring after the CPS had turned the case down. Responding to the Jay report, he argued that the abuse had no basis in Islam:

Above: Nazir Afzal, Crown Prosecutor for North-West England.
Left: The front page of The Times, 24 September 2012.

“Islam says that alcohol, drugs, rape and abuse are all forbidden, yet these men were surrounded by all of these things. … It is not the abusers’ race that defines them. It is their attitude toward women that defines them.” 

Even then, however, in the Oxfordshire case, the gangs were described as ‘Asian’ by the media, rather than as men of Pakistani and Arabic origin or heritage. In addition, the fact that their victims were chosen because they were not Muslim was rarely mentioned in court or dwelt upon by the press. But despite sections of the media beginning to focus on Pakistani men preying on young white girls, a 2013 report by the UK Muslim Women’s Network found that British Asian girls were also being abused across the country in situations that mirrored the abuse in Rotherham. The unfunded small-scale report found thirty-five cases of young Muslim girls of Pakistani heritage being raped and passed around for abuse by multiple men. In the report, one local Pakistani women’s group described how Pakistani-heritage girls were targeted by taxi drivers and on occasion by older men lying in wait outside school gates at dinner times and after school. They also cited cases in Rotherham where Pakistani landlords had befriended Pakistani women and girls on their own for purposes of sex, then passed on their name to other men who had then contacted them for sex.

The Jay Report, published in 2014, acknowledged that the 2013 report of abuse of south Asian-heritage girls was ‘virtually identical’ to the abuse that occurred in Rotherham, and also acknowledged that British Asian girls were unlikely to report their abuse due to the repercussions on their family. South Asian girls were ‘too afraid to go to the law’ and were being blackmailed into having sex with different men while others were forced at knife-point to perform sexual acts on men. Support workers described how one teenage girl had been gang-raped at a ‘party’ her ‘boyfriend’ had taken her to:

“When she got there, there was no party, there were no other female members present. What she found was that there were five adults, their ages ranging between their mid-twenties going on to the late-forties and the five men systematically, routinely, raped her. And the young man who was supposed to be her boyfriend stood back and watched”.

Groups would photograph the abuse and threaten to publish it to their fathers, brothers, and in the mosques, if their victims went to the police.

In June 2013, the polling company ComRes carried out a poll for BBC Radio 1 asking a thousand young British people about their attitudes towards the world’s major religions. The results were released three months later and showed that of those polled, twenty-seven per cent said that they did not trust Muslims (compared with 15% saying the same of Jews, 13% of Buddhists, and 12% of Christians). More significantly, perhaps, forty-four percent said that they thought Muslims did not share the same views or values as the rest of the population. The BBC and other media in Britain then set to work to try to discover how Britain could address the fact that so many young people thought this way.

Part of the answer may have had something to do with the timing of the poll, the fieldwork being carried out between 7-17 June. It had only been a few weeks before this that Drummer Lee Rigby, a young soldier on leave from Afghanistan, had been hit by a car in broad daylight outside an army barracks in South London, dragged into the middle of the road and hacked to death with machetes. The two murderers, Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale identified as Muslims of African origin who were carrying letters claiming justification for killing “Allah’s enemies”. It’s therefore reasonable to suppose that, rather than making assumptions about a religious minority without any evidence, those who were asked their opinions connected Muslims with a difference in basic values because they had been very recently associated with an act of extreme violence on the streets of London.

Unfortunately, attempts to provide a more balanced view and to separate these acts of terrorism from Islam have been dwarfed by the growing public perception of a problem which will not simply go away through the repetition of ‘mantras’. The internet has provided multiple and diverse sources of information, but the simple passage of the various events related above, and the many others available examples, meant that people were able to make their own judgements, and they were certainly not as favourable as they had been at the start of the current century. By 2015, one poll showed that only thirty per cent of the general public in Britain thought that the values of Islam were ‘compatible’ with the values of British society. The passage of terrorist events on the streets of Europe continued through 2016 and 2017. 

On 22 March 2017, a 52-year-old British-born convert to Islam, Khalid Masood, ploughed his car across Westminster Bridge, killing two tourists, one American and the other Romanian, and two British nationals. Dozens more were injured as they scattered, some falling into the River Thames below. Crashing into the railings at the side of Parliament, Masood then ran out of the hired vehicle and through the gates of the palace, where he stabbed the duty policeman, PC Keith Palmer, who died a few minutes later. Masood was then shot dead by armed police, his last phone messages revealing that he believed he was “waging jihad.” Two weeks later, at an inter-faith Service of Hope at Westminster Abbey, its Dean, the Very Reverend John Hall, spoke for a nation he described as ‘bewildered’:

What could possibly motivate a man to hire a car and take it from Birmingham to Brighton to London, and then drive it fast at people he had never met, couldn’t possibly know, against whom he had no personal grudge, no reason to hate them and then run at the gates of the Palace of Westminster to cause another death? It seems that we shall never know.

Then on 22 May thousands of young women and girls were leaving a concert by the US pop singer Ariana Grande at Manchester Arena. Waiting for them as they streamed out was Salman Abedi, a twenty-two-year-old British-born man, whose Libyan parents had arrived in the UK in the early nineties after fleeing from the Gadaffi régime. In the underground foyer, Abedi detonated a bomb he was carrying which was packed with nuts, bolts and other shrapnel. Twenty-two people, children and parents who had arrived to pick them up, were killed instantly. Hundreds more were injured, many of them suffering life-changing wounds.

Next in what began to seem like a remorseless series of events, on 3 June three men drove a van into pedestrians crossing London Bridge. They leapt out of it and began slashing at the throats of pedestrians, appearing to be targeting women in particular. They then ran through the Borough Market area shouting “this is for Allah”. Eight people were murdered and many more were seriously injured before armed police shot the three men dead. Two of the three, all of whom were aged twenty to thirty, were born in Morocco. The oldest of them, Rachid Redouane, had entered Britain using a false name, claiming to be a Libyan and was actually five years older than he had pretended. He had been refused asylum and had absconded. Khurram Butt had been born in Pakistan and arrived in the UK as a ‘child refugee’ in 1998 when his family moved to the UK to claim asylum from ‘political oppression’, although Pakistan was not on the UNHCR list of ‘unsafe’ countries. On the evening of 19 June, at end of the Muslim sabbath, in what appeared to be a ‘reprisal’, a forty-seven-year-old father of four from Cardiff drove a van into crowds of worshippers outside Finsbury Park Mosque who were crossing the road to go to the nearby Muslim Welfare House. One man, who had collapsed on the road and was being given emergency aid, was run over and died at the scene. Almost a dozen more were injured.

Up to this point, all the Islamist terror attacks, from 7/7/2005 onwards, had been planned and carried out by ‘home-grown’ terrorists. Even the asylum seekers involved in the June attack in London had been in the country since well before the 2015 migration crisis. But in mid-September, an eighteen-year-old Iraqi who arrived in the UK illegally in 2015, and had been living with British foster parents ever since, left a crudely-manufactured bomb on the London Underground District line during rush hour when the carriages were also crowded with schoolchildren. The detonator exploded but failed to ignite the homemade device itself, leading to flash burns to the dozens of people in the carriage. A more serious blast would have led to those dozens being taken away in body bags, and many more injured in the stampede which would have followed at the station exit with its steep steps. As it was, the passengers remained calm during their evacuation.

Of course, it would have been difficult to predict and prevent any of these attacks, either by erecting physical barriers or by identifying individuals who might be at risk from ‘radicalisation’, much of which takes place online. Most of the attackers had been born and radicalised in the UK, so no reinforcements at the borders, either in Calais or Kent would have kept them from enacting their atrocities. But the need for secure borders is not simply a symbolic or psychological reinforcement for the British people if it is combined with a workable and efficient asylum policy. We are repeatedly told that one of the two main reasons for the 2016 referendum decision for Britain to leave the EU was in order to take back control of its borders and immigration policy, though it was never demonstrated how exactly it had lost control of these, or at least how EU membership had made it lose control over them.

‘Globule’ Britain, Exceptionalism & the Globalisation of Populism:

By 2017, there were already signs that, due to the fall in the value of the pound since the Referendum, many Central-Eastern European migrants were returning to their home countries, but the vast majority of them had already declared that they did not intend to settle permanently in the UK anyway. The fact that so many came from 2004 onwards was entirely down to the decision of the British government not to delay or derogate the operation of the accession treaties. But, after ‘Brexit’ was finally done in 2019, the reality remained that, even if they were to be replaced by other European ‘immigrants’ in future, the UK would still need to control, as ever, the immigration of people from outside the EU, including asylum seekers, and that returning failed or bogus applicants would become more difficult. So, too, would the sharing of intelligence information about any potential threats of terrorists attempting to enter Britain as bogus refugees. Other than these considerations, the home-grown threat from Islamist terrorists was unlikely to be affected by Brexit one way or another, and could only be dealt with by anti-radicalisation strategies, especially through education and more active inter-cultural community relations aimed at full integration, not ‘parallel’ development.

‘Populism’

Since the Brexit referendum in 2016 and the election of Donald Trump, it seemed that ‘gutter’ journalists, the ‘global media’, especially ‘social media,’ just couldn’t get enough of Populism in the form of tropes and memes. In 1998, the Guardian alone published about three hundred articles that contained the term. In 2015, it was used in about a thousand articles, and one year later this number had doubled to almost two thousand. Populist parties across Europe have tripled their vote in Europe over the past twenty years and more than a quarter of Europeans voted for populists in their last elections. So, in deciding to leave the EU, the British were, ironically, not demonstrating how exceptional they were, but becoming more like their transcontinental European and American allies and partners in supporting nativist, populist and extremist policies and parties.

From the Ladybird book, The Story of Brexit (see below)
The Green & Pleasant Land under siege:

But, in reality, the biggest threat that Britain faced was not from the Brussels Eurocracy, nor from immigration. It was the threat of climate change, a physical threat rather than a demographic one, waves of water, not people. It promised to reshape the outline of Britain, as seen from space or on any map. Nothing was more sensitive to the British people than the shape of their island. Rising sea levels could make its entire coastline look different. They could eat into East Anglia, centuries after the wetlands were reclaimed with Dutch drainage, and submerge the concrete-crusted, terraced marshlands around London, and drown idyllic Scottish islands, forcing the abandonment of coastal towns which had grown up in Victorian and Edwardian times. Long-established wildlife would die out and be replaced by new species – these were already making their presence known in British gardens. All this was beyond the power of Britain to control alone since it was responsible for just two per cent of global emissions. Even if the British could be persuaded to give up their larger cars, their foreign holidays and their gadgets, would it make a real difference?

The village of Corton Denham, Somerset, with views across the Dorset countryside.

In 2009, Andrew Marr concluded, somewhat prophetically:

Without a frank, unheated conversation between the rest of us and elected politicians, who are then sent out into the the world to do the bigger deals that must be done, what hope for action on climate change? It seems certain to involve the loss of new liberties, such as cheap, easy travel. It will change the countryside as grim-looking wind farms appear. It will change how we light and heat our homes and how we are taxed. All these changes are intensely political, in a way the British of the forties would have recognised. Politics is coming back as a big force in our lives, like it or not. …

Without this frankness, what help is there for a sensible settlement between Muslim and Christian, incomer and old timer?

… The threats facing the British are large ones. But in the years since 1945, having escaped nuclear devastation, tyranny and economic collapse, we British have no reason to despair, or emigrate. In global terms, to be born British remains a wonderful stroke of luck.

Andrew Marr (2007-9), A History of Modern Britain pp. 601-2.

Postscript – The Last Years, Platinum Jubilee & A Royal Tribute:

Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the Commonwealth of Nations celebrated HM The Queen’s Platinum Jubilee (70th Anniversary of her Accession to the throne) for four days in June. Queen Elizabeth turned ninety-six on 21st April 2022. She had witnessed many triumphs and tragedies since she became heir to the throne, at the age of ten in 1936, becoming Princess Elizabeth, and turned twenty-one in 1947 when, in a radio broadcast, she told the Kingdom and the Commonwealth:

‘I declare before you all that my whole life, whether it be long or short shall be devoted to your service.’

She successfully adapted to a rapidly changing world from 1952, when there was no TV, to the digital age of the Internet. Her influence and inspiration are far-reaching, and she has definitely earned every ounce of love and respect she received during the Platinum Jubilee celebrations. She was nearly never late for anything or anyone and was extremely courteous and respectful towards everyone, no matter what their position was. She considered tardiness a sign of disrespect and her deep respect for her employees was manifested in the way she treated all twelve hundred of them. She never saw them as ‘servants’ and never called them when they were off-duty since she valued their privacy and family life as much as her own. She had a tremendous memory for detail and a great deal of compassion for each individual in her family and the royal household.

She exuded a serene authority, Majesty and calmness in the faithful conduct of her duties and frequently expresses her faith in God. Although she never attended university, she was well educated and served as a confidante to seventeen Prime Ministers from Winston Churchill to Elizabeth Truss. Her charities and patronages deal with a wide range of social problems from youth opportunities to wildlife and environmental protection. Her Majesty balanced all her public responsibilities with a full family life, raising four children, and welcoming grandchildren and great-grandchildren.

The four-day UK bank holiday weekend culminated in a series of magnificent activities held across the country, but especially in central London, to commemorate Her Majesty’s extraordinary milestone. The Trooping of the Colours, comprising fifteen hundred soldiers and commanders, four hundred musicians, 250 horses and seventy aeroplanes, kicked off the festivities. Across the country, large jubilee street parties were held, with people coming together to honour the Queen and their local communities. As part of the Jubilee celebrations, a pageant was staged in the Mall on Sunday 5th June, bringing together five thousand people from across the UK and the Commonwealth, to commemorate the Queen’s reign. It included street art, music, puppets and costume.

The bells of Westminster Abbey pealed as they did on Coronation Day, 1953. The Gold Ste Coach, pulled by eight Windsor Grey horses was led by the mounted band of the Household Cavalry. There were four acts in the pageant. The first was led by the featured a military march with 1,750 participants and two hundred horses. The second depicted changes in culture, music and fashion during the last seven decades. The third act told the story of the Queen’s life in twelve chapters, and Ed Sheeran sang ‘God Save the Queen’ in the fourth act. The Queen watched the finale of the pageant from the balcony of the Palace where she was joined by three generations of her family.

Elsewhere, a new underground line called the Elizabeth Line was inaugurated, operating twelve trains per hour between Paddington and Abbey Wood. Queen Elizabeth’s portraits were projected onto the standing stones of Stonehenge, each picture from one of the seven decades of her reign. A twelve-foot-tall floral crown was installed in St James’ Park, sparkling with the brilliant blooms of 13,500 plants in the colours of the precious stones in the crown worn on Coronation Day. The Queen also surprised and delighted millions of viewers by appearing in a special comic sketch filmed in the Palace with Michael Bond’s Paddington Bear to start the Jubilee Concert outside. The Queen and Paddington engaged in dialogue about their mutual love of marmalade sandwiches. As the long weekend’s events drew to a close, the Queen issued a statement:

“When it comes to how to mark seventy years as your Queen, there is no guidebook to follow. It really is a first. But I have been humbled and deeply touched that so many people have taken to the streets to celebrate my Platinum Jubilee. While I may not have attended every event in person, my heart has been with you all; and I remain committed to serving you to the best of my ability, supported by my family. I have been inspired by the kindness, joy and kinship that has been so evident in recent days, and I hope this renewed sense of togetherness will be felt for many years to come…”

Over the next few months, as the Queen’s health became increasingly more fragile, Prince Charles stepped up to cover duties. He had already become known as a thoughtful and caring champion of a wide range of worthy causes, as well as a hardworking, dutiful Prince and a kind, humourous man, happy to meet and chat with the public in the streets. After the Queen’s death, dealing with his own grief, supported by Camilla, the Queen Consort, he steadfastly followed his mother’s coffin, dutifully fulfilling all the ceremonial roles and providing comfort to vast numbers of the Queen’s mourning subjects. At his address to the Accession Council on 9th September, he pledged:

“… throughout the remaining time God grants me to uphold the constitutional principles at the heart of our nation.”

Text Sources:

Douglas Murray (2018), The Strange Death of Europe: Immigration, Identity, Islam. London: Bloomsbury.

Simon Schama (2002), A History of Britain III: 1776-2000, The Fate of Empire. London: BBC Worldwide.

Andrew Marr (2009), A History of Modern Britain. London: Pan Macmillan.

John Morrill (ed.), (2001), The Penguin Atlas of British and Irish History. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Previous articles on the web:

Photos/Graphics:

Igloobooks.com (2013), The History of Britain. Sywell, NN6 OBJ: Igloo Books Ltd.

Christine Lindop (2013), Factfiles: William and Kate. Oxford: OUP (Oxford Bookworms Library):

The book contains a full list of photo acknowledgements.

Majesty & A Fall from Grace: The Lives & Times of the Latter-Day Windsors – Part One: Big Days, Budgets & Bigotry 2002-17

Another Royal Fairy Tale Begins – William & Kate, 2002-2011:

The sun was coming up over Westminster Abbey on Friday 29th April 2011, and on the Mall, some of the visitors were sleeping on chairs near the road, and others were standing and talking. They came from all over the capital city, as well as from other towns and cities all over Britain, and from other countries too. Later in the morning, Catherine Elizabeth Middleton was getting ready for her very special day. Her parents, sister and brother, were staying in the same hotel – the Goring Hotel in Belgravia. She would soon have to put on her specially designed dress.

At the same time, not far away, Prince William was getting ready too. He and his brother, Prince Harry, were putting on their uniforms – red for him, black for his brother.

Prince William was then second in line to the throne of the United Kingdom, after his father, Prince Charles. William and Kate came from two very different families, the Windsor-Mountbatten royal family, and the Middletons, an upper-middle-class family. Kate’s parents were Michael and Carole Middleton. They met when they worked for British Airways. Kate is their eldest child and she has a sister, Pippa, and a brother, James. When Kate was six, Carole Middleton began a business called Party Pieces and later Michael Middleton worked with her. It made a lot of money for the family.

But although she was from a perfectly respectable, wealthy family, Kate was a ‘commoner’, had no title and was not therefore a member of the aristocracy. Before William’s great-grandmother, Elizabeth Bowes-Lyon married the then Duke of York, the future George VI, marriages like this, between princes and ‘commoners’ could not happen. When his grandmother, as heir to the throne, married Philip Mountbatten in 1947, she was marrying into the Greek royal family. His father had originally married Lady Diana Spencer, who was from a ‘stately home’. But modern princes and princesses from countries around the world do not always, or even usually, marry people from other royal families, or even the aristocracy.

Carole, James, Michael and Pippa Middleton.

Kate was born in January 1982, six months before William, in Reading. The Middletons had lived in the (Home County) Berkshire village of Bradfield Southend since 1986 when they returned from two years in Amman, Jordan. Kate went to primary school in the village before the family moved to a large detached house in Bucklebury in 1995. She then went to Marlborough College in Wiltshire, where she played hockey and tennis for the school teams, and succeeded academically. When she left Marlborough in 2000, she took a gap year during which she went to Florence, Italy and to Chile in the New Year of 2000, arriving there, by coincidence, a few weeks after William had returned from there on his gap year, so they didn’t meet. She worked as a teaching assistant before returning to England to get ready to go to the University of St Andrew’s in Scotland as a student of art history. The University is the oldest in Scotland, first opened in 1413, and the third oldest in the UK after Oxford and Cambridge. It has a student population of over eight thousand. William and Kate lived in the same building, were both students of art history and had some of the same friends.

In March 2002, Kate was in a fashion show at the university, and William and some of his friends went to watch. First, Kate modelled a colourful jumper, and then she walked out in an exciting black dress, catching William’s attention. William and Kate soon became good friends and remained so for over a year before, in the summer of 2003, Kate turned twenty-one (she was six months older than William), and he went to a party at her parents’ house in Berkshire, together with other friends from St. Andrew’s. Later that year, Prince Charles had an ‘African’ party for William’s twenty-first, and Kate was one of the guests. In September 2003, they began their third year and William moved to a house in the country called Balgrove House, not far from the town and the university, but a quiet place, away from photographers and reporters. Then in March 2004, William and Kate were in the news together. They went on a skiing holiday to Klosters in Switzerland with some friends and William’s father. Soon, newspapers from all over the world had a photo of William and Kate. Now everybody wanted to know, Who is Kate Middleton? The newspapers started to write about Will and Kate as a couple.

September 2004 was the beginning of their last year at St. Andrew’s. There were often photos of William at parties and weddings, but without Kate. As she was not part of the royal family and its official entourage, she couldn’t go with him, but they were still a courting couple. In 2005, they graduated and Her Majesty, Prince Philip and Prince Charles all came up for the ceremony. Kate’s mother and father were there too, but the two families did not meet.

Soon after graduation, William went to New Zealand for a second time, his first official visit overseas, which lasted eleven days. Then he went on a month’s holiday to Lewa Downs in Kenya, where he was later joined, for a short time, by Kate and some of their mutual friends. William then began to have a very busy time, working in the City of London and learning about banking. He also worked for the Football Association at Chatsworth House in Derbyshire. In December, he spent two weeks with a mountain rescue team and after another skiing holiday together at Klosters in January 2006, William and Kate agreed to ‘separate’ while they both established themselves in work. William went to Sandhurst to train as an army officer, where he stayed for almost the rest of the year, not seeing Kate very often. She was trying to find work, but as the girlfriend of the future monarch, she was plagued by photographers who waited near her house and ran after her in the street. For a lot of the time, she worked in her parents’ business; there she could get away from the newspapers. In November 2006, she began work with a women’s clothes business called Jigsaw, which had a chain of high-street shops throughout the UK. The next month, William graduated from Sandhurst, and Kate and her parents were invited to the ‘passing out’ ceremony.

But the media’s invasion of Kate’s privacy got worse in 2007 and at twenty-four, William was not ready to get married. He was still very busy in the army in Dorset, and Kate was working in London, a hundred miles away. Sometimes photos appeared in the papers of William with other girls. Couples in the public eye often stop being together in these circumstances, and of the Queen’s four children, three had divorced. Only Edward, her youngest, was still in his first marriage. In April 2007, they decided to announce that they were no longer a couple. Kate probably needed time to decide whether she wanted to be a future queen consort, and went back to her parents’ house, away from London and the cameras. But she did not stay at home for very long, and she was often seen out shopping with her sister, Pippa. Nor did she stay away from William for long, since on 1st July she accepted his invitation to be among his guests at a special concert organised by Harry and himself to honour their mother, Diana, on her birthday. She did not sit next to William but was not far away and seemed happy again. After two months, they were back together again and flew to The Seychelles for a week together.

Kate goes shopping with her sister, Pippa.

William next spent twelve weeks with the RAF, learning to fly, and he then had two months with the Royal Navy, before returning to the RAF to learn how to fly a helicopter, like his father and uncle, in the autumn of 2008. Meanwhile, Kate continued to work for her parents’ business, taking photographs for them, and people took an interest in her clothes. In January 2010, William finished his helicopter training and went to the island of Anglesey in North Wales to train with the RAF in search and rescue work. He lived in a little house on a farm, and Kate visited him there frequently. William’s training ended in September 2010, and soon after that he and Kate went to Kenya for a three-week holiday.

For some of the time they were in Kenya, William and Kate were with friends. But near the end of the holiday, they had some time alone as a couple again. William had taken his mother’s engagement ring with him, gold with a big blue sapphire surrounded with little diamonds. He carried it carefully with him all through the holiday, and on 19th October, he proposed to Kate with it. She agreed to marry him, and the couple returned to the UK, but could not tell the exciting news to their friends, and Kate could not wear the ring. Finally, on 16th November, the couple appeared on TV at St. James’ Palace and announced their engagement to the public. Kate wore a stunning blue dress to match the sapphire in her ring. William had already asked the Queen and Kate’s father for their consent to the marriage. Both of them gave it.

Prudence takes a Back Seat – New Labour Spending:

In January 2000, Tony Blair announced directly to it that he would bring Britain’s health spending up to the European average within five years. That was a huge promise because it meant spending a third as much again in real terms, and his ‘prudent’ Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, was unhappy that Blair had not spoken enough on television about the need for health service reform to accompany the money, and had also ‘stolen’ his budget announcements. On Budget day itself, Brown announced that until 2004 health spending would rise at above six per cent beyond inflation every year, …

… by far the largest sustained increase in NHS funding in any period in its fifty-year history … half as much again for health care for every family in this country.       

The tilt away from Brown’s sharp spending controls during the first three years of the New Labour government had begun by the first spring of the new millennium, and there was more to come. With a general election looming in 2001, Brown also announced a review of the NHS and its future by a former banker. As soon as the election was over, broad hints about necessary tax rises were dropped. When the Wanless Report was finally published, it confirmed much that the winter crisis of 1999-2000 had exposed. The NHS was not, whatever Britons fondly believed, better than health systems in other developed countries, and it needed a lot more money. ‘Wanless’ also rejected a radical change in funding, such as a switch to insurance-based or semi-private health care. Brown immediately used this as objective proof that taxes had to rise in order to save the NHS. In his next budget of 2002, Brown broke with a political convention that had reigned since the mid-eighties, that direct taxes would not be raised again. He raised a special one per cent national insurance levy, equivalent to a penny on income tax, to fund the huge reinvestment in Britain’s health.

Public spending shot up with this commitment and, in some ways, it paid off, since by 2006 there were around 300,000 extra NHS staff compared to 1997. Hardly anyone was left waiting for an inpatient appointment for more than six months. Death rates from cancer for people under the age of seventy-five fell by 15.7 per cent between 1996 and 2006 and death rates from heart disease fell by just under thirty-six per cent. Meanwhile, the public finance initiative meant that new hospitals were being built around the country. But, unfortunately for New Labour, that was not the whole story of the Health Service under their stewardship. As Andrew Marr (2007-9) has attested,

…’Czars’, quangos, agencies, commissions, access teams and planners hunched over the NHS as Whitehall, having promised to devolve power, now imposed a new round of mind-dazing control.

By the autumn of 2004 hospitals were subject to more than a hundred inspections. War broke out between Brown and the Treasury and the ‘Blairite’ Health Secretary, Alan Milburn, about the basic principles of running the hospitals. Milburn wanted more competition between them, but Brown didn’t see how this was possible when most people had only one major local hospital. Polling suggested that he was making a popular point. Most people simply wanted better hospitals, not more choices. A truce was eventually declared with the establishment of a small number of independent, ‘foundation’ hospitals. By the 2005 general election, Michael Howard’s Conservatives were attacking Labour for wasting money and allowing people’s lives to be put at risk in dirty, badly run hospitals. Many newly and expensively qualified doctors and even specialist consultants could not find work. It seemed that wage costs, expensive new drugs, poor management and the money poured into endless bureaucratic reforms had resulted in a still inadequate service. 

As public spending had begun to flow during the second Blair administration, vast amounts of money had gone into pay rises, new bureaucracies and on bills for outside consultants. Ministries had been unused to spending again, after the initial period of ‘prudence’, and did not always do it well. Brown and his Treasury team resorted to double and triple counting of early spending increases in order to give the impression they were doing more for hospitals, schools and transport than they actually could. As Marr has pointed out, …

… In trying to achieve better policing, more effective planning, healthier school food, prettier town centres and a hundred other hopes, the centre of government ordered and cajoled, hassled and harangued, always high-minded, always speaking for ‘the people’.  

The railways, after yet another disaster, were shaken up again. In very controversial circumstances Railtrack, the once-profitable monopoly company operating the lines, was driven to bankruptcy and a new system of Whitehall control was imposed. At one point, Tony Blair boasted of having five hundred targets for the public sector. Parish councils, small businesses and charities found that they were loaded with directives. Schools and hospitals had many more. Marr has commented, …

The interference was always well-meant but it clogged up the arteries of free decision-taking and frustrated responsible public life. 

Throughout the New Labour years, with steady growth and low inflation, most of the country grew richer. Growth since 1997, at 2.8 per cent per year, was above the post-war average, GDP per head was above that of France and Germany and the country had the second lowest jobless figures in the EU. The number of people at work increased by 2.4 million. Incomes grew, in real terms, by about a fifth. Pensions were in trouble, but house price inflation soured, so the owners found their properties more than doubling in value and came to think of themselves as prosperous. By 2006 analysts were assessing the disposable wealth of the British at forty thousand pounds per household. However, the wealth was not spread geographically, averaging sixty-eight thousand in the southeast of England, but a little over thirty thousand in Wales and northeast England.

The Click & Collect Economy – Buying & Selling Britain by the Acre:

The internet, also known as the ‘World-Wide Web’, which was ‘invented’ by the British computer scientist Tim Berners-Lee at the end of 1989 (pictured right in 2014), was advancing from colleges and institutions into everyday life by the mid- ‘noughties’. It first began to attract popular interest in the mid-nineties: Britain’s first internet café and magazine, reviewing a few hundred early websites, were both launched in 1994.

The introduction of new forms of mail-order and ‘click and collect’ shopping in the mid-nineties quickly attracted significant adherents from different ‘demographics’. But the ‘dot-com’ bubble burst due to its own rapid and excessive expansion, and following a pause and a lot of ruined dreams, the ‘new economy’ roared on again. By 2000, according to the Office of National Statistics (ONS), around forty per cent of Britons had accessed the internet at some time. Three years later, nearly half of British homes were ‘online’. By 2004, the spread of ‘broadband’ connections had brought a new mass market in ‘downloading’ music and video. By 2006, three-quarters of British children had internet access at home.

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Above: The Albert Dock in Liverpool was an example of a redundant industrial relic that took on a multitude of other uses. By the new millennium, its nineteenth-century buildings housed a maritime museum, an art gallery, a shopping centre and a television studio, becoming a major tourist attraction.

Simultaneously, the rich of America, Europe and Russia began buying up parts of London and other ‘attractive’ parts of the country, including Edinburgh, the Scottish Highlands, Yorkshire and Cornwall. ‘Executive houses’ with pebbled driveways, brick facing and dormer windows were growing across farmland and by rivers with no thought of flood-plain constraints. Parts of the country far from London, such as the English southwest and Yorkshire, enjoyed a ripple of wealth that pushed their house prices to unheard-of levels. From Liverpool to Gateshead, Belfast to Cardiff Bay, once-derelict shorefront areas were transformed. For all the problems and disappointments, and the longer-term problems with their financing, new schools and public buildings sprang up – new museums, galleries, vast shopping complexes, corporate headquarters in a biomorphic architecture of glass and steel, more imaginative and better-looking than their predecessors from the dreary age of concrete.

Supermarket chains exercised huge market power, offering cheap meat and dairy products to almost everyone’s budgets. Factory-made ready meals were transported and imported by the new global air freight market and refrigerated trucks and lorries moved freely across a Europe shorn of internal barriers. Out-of-season fruit and vegetables, fish from the Pacific, exotic foods of all kinds and freshly cut flowers appeared in superstores everywhere. Hardly anyone was out of reach of a ‘Tesco’, a ‘Morrison’s’, a ‘Sainsbury’s’ or an ‘Asda’. By the mid-noughties, the four supermarket giants owned more than fifteen hundred superstores throughout the UK. They spread the consumption of goods that in the eighties and nineties had seemed like luxuries. Students had to take out loans in order to go to university but were far more likely to do so than previous generations, as well as to travel more widely on a ‘gap’ year, not just to study or work abroad.

Those ‘Left Behind’ – Poverty, Pensions & Public Order:

Materially, for the majority of people, this was, to use Marr’s term, a ‘golden age’, which perhaps helps to explain both why earlier real anger about earlier pension decisions and stealth taxes did not translate into anti-Labour voting in successive general elections. The irony is that in pleasing ‘Middle Englanders’, the Blair-Brown government lost contact with traditional Labour voters, especially in the North of Britain, who did not benefit from these ‘golden years’ to the same extent. Gordon Brown, from the first, made much of New Labour’s anti-poverty agenda, especially child poverty. Since the launch of the Child Poverty Action Group, this latter problem had become particularly emotive. Labour policies took a million children out of relative poverty between 1997 and 2004, though the numbers rose again later. Brown’s emphasis was on the working poor and the virtue of work. So his major innovations were the national minimum wage, the ‘New Deal’ for the young unemployed, the working families tax credit, and tax credits aimed at children. There was also a minimum income guarantee and a later pension credit, for poorer pensioners.

The Tories, now under new management in the shape of a media-marketing executive and old Etonian, David Cameron, also declared that they believed in this concept of relative poverty. After all, it was on their watch, during the Thatcher and Major governments, that it had tripled. A world of ‘black economy’ work also remained below the minimum wage, in private care homes, where migrant servants were exploited, and in other nooks and crannies. Some 336,000 jobs remained on ‘poverty pay’ rates. Yet ‘redistribution of wealth’, a socialist phrase which had become unfashionable under New Labour lest it should scare away Middle Englanders, was stronger in Brown’s Britain than in other major industrialised nations. Despite the growth of the super-rich, many of whom were also immigrants anyway, overall equality increased in these years. One factor in this was the return to the means-testing of benefits, particularly for pensioners and through the working families tax credit, subsequently divided into a child tax credit and a working tax credit. Gordon Brown, as Chancellor, concluded that if he was to direct scarce resources at those in real poverty, he had little choice but to reintroduce means-testing.

Apart from the demoralising effect it had on pensioners, the other drawback to means-testing was that a huge bureaucracy was needed to track people’s earnings and to try to establish exactly what they should be getting in benefits. Billions were overpaid and as people did better and earned more from more stable employment, they then found themselves facing huge demands to hand back the money they had already spent. Compared with Mrs Thatcher’s Victorian Values and Mr Major’s Back to Basics campaigns, Labour was supposed to be non-judgemental about individual behaviour. But a form of moralism did begin to reassert itself. For the minority who made life hell for their neighbours on housing estates, Labour introduced the Anti-Social Behaviour Order (‘Asbo’). These were first given out in 1998, and granted by magistrates to either the police or the local council. It became a criminal offence to break the curfew or other sanctions, which could be highly specific. Asbos could be given out for swearing at others in the street, harassing passers-by, vandalism, making too much noise, graffiti, organising ‘raves’, flyposting, taking drugs, sniffing glue, joyriding, prostitution, hitting people and drinking in public.

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By the ‘mid-noughties’, more than four million closed-circuit television cameras were watching the British in what was fast becoming a surveillance society.

Although Asbos served a useful purpose in many cases, there were fears that for the really rough elements in society and their tough children they became a badge of honour. Since breaking an Asbo could result in an automatic prison sentence, people were sent to jail for crimes that had not warranted this before. But as they were refined in use and strengthened, they became more effective and routine. By 2007, seven and a half thousand had been given out in England and Wales alone and Scotland had introduced its own version in 2004. Some civil liberties campaigners saw this development as part of a wider authoritarian and surveillance agenda. In addition, the number of mobile phones was already equivalent to the number of people in Britain. With global satellite positioning chips (GPS) these could show exactly where their users were and the use of such systems in cars and even out on the moors meant that Britons were losing their age-old prowess for map-reading.

The ‘Seven Seven’ Bombings – War on Terror & Home-grown ‘Jihadis’:

Despite these increasing means of mass surveillance, Britain’s cities have remained vulnerable to terrorist attacks, more recently by so-called ‘Islamic terrorists’ rather than by the Provisional IRA, who abandoned their bombing campaign in 1998. On 7 July 2005, at rush-hour, four young Muslim men from West Yorkshire and Buckinghamshire, murdered fifty-two people and injured 770 others by blowing themselves up on London Underground trains and on a London bus. The report into this worst such attack in Britain later concluded that they were not part of an al Qaeda cell, though two of them had visited camps in Pakistan, and that the rucksack bombs had been constructed at the cost of a few hundred pounds. Despite the government’s insistence that the war in Iraq had not made Britain more of a target for terrorism, the Home Office investigation asserted that the four had been motivated, in part at least, by ‘British foreign policy’.

They had picked up the information they needed for the attack from the internet. It was a particularly grotesque attack, because of the terrifying and bloody conditions in the underground tunnels and it vividly reminded the country that it was as much a target as the United States or Spain. Indeed, the long-standing and intimate relationship between Great Britain and Pakistan, with constant and heavy air traffic between them, provoked fears that the British would prove uniquely vulnerable. Tony Blair heard of the attack at the most poignant time, just following London’s great success in winning the bid to host the 2012 Olympic Games. The ‘Seven Seven’ bombings are unlikely to have been stopped by CCTV surveillance, of which there was plenty at the tube stations, nor by ID cards (which had recently been under discussion), since the killers were British subjects, nor by financial surveillance, since little money was involved and the materials were paid for in cash. Even better intelligence might have helped, but the Security Services, both ‘MI5’ and ‘MI6’ as they are known, were already in receipt of huge increases in their budgets, as they were in the process of tracking down other murderous cells.

In 2005, police arrested suspects in Birmingham, High Wycombe and Walthamstow, in east London, believing there was a plot to blow up as many as ten passenger aircraft over the Atlantic. After many years of allowing dissident clerics and activists from the Middle East asylum in London, Britain had more than its share of inflammatory and dangerous extremists, who admired al Qaeda and preached violent jihad. Once 11 September 2001 had changed the climate, new laws were introduced to allow the detention without trial of foreigners suspected of being involved in supporting or fomenting terrorism. They could not be deported because human rights legislation forbade sending back anyone to countries where they might face torture. Seventeen were picked up and held at the Belmarsh high-security prison. But in December 2004, the House of Lords ruled that these detentions were discriminatory and disproportionate, and therefore illegal.

Five weeks later, Home Secretary Charles Clarke hit back with ‘control orders’ to limit the movement of men he could not prosecute or deport. These orders would also be used against home-grown terror suspects. A month later, in February 2005, sixty Labour MPs rebelled against these powers too, and the government only narrowly survived the vote. In April 2006 a judge ruled that the control orders were an affront to justice because they gave the Home Secretary, a politician, too much power. Two months later, the same judge ruled that curfew orders of eighteen hours per day on six Iraqis were a deprivation of liberty and also illegal. The new Home Secretary, John Reid, lost his appeal and had to loosen the orders.

Britain found itself in a struggle between its ancient laws and liberties and a new, borderless world in which the hallowed principles of ‘habeas corpus’, free speech, a presumption of innocence, asylum, the right of British subjects to travel freely in their own country without identifying papers, and the sanctity of homes in which the law-abiding lived were all coming under increasing jeopardy. The new political powers seemed to government ministers the least that they needed to deal with a threat that might last for another thirty years in order, paradoxically, to secure Britain’s liberties for the long term beyond that. They were sure that most British people agreed, and that the judiciary, media, civil rights campaigners and elected politicians who protested were an ultra-liberal minority. Tony Blair, John Reid and Jack Straw were emphatic about this, and it was left to liberal Conservatives and Liberal Democrats to mount the barricades in defence of civil liberties.

As Gordon Brown eyed the premiership, his rhetoric was similarly tough, but as Blair was forced to turn to the ‘war on terror’ and Iraq, he failed to concentrate enough on domestic policy. By 2005, neither of them could be bothered to disguise their mutual enmity, as pictured above. A gap seemed to open up between Blair’s enthusiasm for market ideas in the reform of health and schools, and Brown’s determination to deliver better lives for the working poor. Brown was also keen on bringing private capital into public services, but there was a difference in emphasis which both men played up. Blair claimed that the New Labour government was best when we are at our boldest. But Brown retorted that it was best when we are Labour. 

002 (2)Tony Blair’s legacy continued to be paraded on the streets of Britain, here blaming him and George Bush for the rise of ‘The Islamic State’ in Iraq.

Immigration & Identity at the Beginning of the New Millennium:

Immigration had always been a constant factor in British life, now it was also a fact of life that Europe and the whole world had to come to terms with. Earlier post-war migrations to Britain had provoked a ‘racialist’ backlash, riots, the rise of extreme right-wing organisations and a series of new laws aimed at controlling it. New laws had been passed to control both immigration from the Commonwealth and the backlash to it. The later migrations were controversial in different ways. The ‘Windrush’ arrivals from the Caribbean (see the photo below) and those from the Indian subcontinent were people who looked different but who spoke the same language and in many ways had had a similar education to that of the ‘native’ British. Many of the later migrants from Eastern Europe looked similar to the white British but shared little by way of a common linguistic, educational and cultural background.

As Simon Schama pointed out in 2002, it was a fact that even though half of the British-Caribbean population and a third of the British-Asian population were born in Britain, they continued to constitute only a small proportion of the total population. It was also true that any honest reckoning of the post-imperial account needed to take account of the appeal of separatist fundamentalism in majority Muslim communities. At the end of the last century, an opinion poll found that fifty per cent of British-born Caribbean men and twenty per cent of British-born Asian men had, or once had, white partners. In 2000, Yasmin Alibhai-Brown found that, when polled, eighty-eight per cent of white Britons between the ages of eighteen and thirty had no objection to ‘inter-racial’ marriage; eighty-four per cent of West Indians and East Asians and fifty per cent of those from Indian, Pakistani or Bangladeshi backgrounds felt the same way. Schama commented:

The colouring of Britain exposes the disintegrationalist argument for the pallid, defensive thing that it is. British history has not just been some sort of brutal mistake or conspiracy that has meant the steamrollering of Englishness over subject nations. It has been the shaking loose of peoples from their roots.

A Jewish intellectual expressing impatience with the harping on ‘roots’ once told me that “trees have roots; Jews have legs”. The same could be said of Britons who have shared the fate of empire, whether in Bombay or Bolton, who have encountered each other in streets, front rooms, kitchens and bedrooms.

Until the Summer of 2001, this ‘integrationist’ view of British history and contemporary society was the broadly accepted orthodoxy among intellectuals and politicians, if not more broadly in the population. At that point, however, partly as a result of riots in the north of England involving ethnic minorities, including young Muslim men, and partly because of events in New York and Washington, the existence of parallel communities began to be discussed more widely and the concept of ‘multiculturalism’ began to become subject to fundamental criticism on both the right and left of the political spectrum. In the ‘noughties’, the dissenters from the multicultural consensus began to be found everywhere along the continuum.

The Breaking of the Multicultural Consensus:

One result of the long Iraqi conflict, which President Bush finally declared to be over on 1 May 2003, as part of his war on terror, was the arrival of many Iraqi asylum-seekers in Britain; Kurds, as well as Shiites and Sunnis. This attracted little comment at the time because there had been both Iraqi and Iranian refugees in Britain since the late 1970s, especially as students. But soon there was a much larger migration into the country which changed it fundamentally during the Blair years. This was a multi-lingual migration, including many Poles, some Hungarians and other Eastern Europeans whose countries had joined the EU and its single market in 2004. There were also sizeable inflows of western Europeans, though these were mostly academics and students, who (somewhat controversially) were also counted in the immigration statistics, and young professionals with multi-national companies.

At the same time, there was continued immigration from Africa, the Middle East and Afghanistan, as well as from Russia, Australia, South Africa and North America. In 2005, according to the Office for National Statistics, ‘immigrants’ were arriving to live in Britain at the rate of fifteen hundred a day. Since Tony Blair had been in power, more than 1.3 million had arrived. By the 2010s, English was no longer the first language of half the primary school children in London, and the capital had more than 350 different first languages. Five years later, the same could be said of many towns in Kent and other Eastern counties of England.

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Polish tradesmen, fruit-pickers and factory workers were soon followed by shops owned by Poles or stocking Polish and East European delicacies and selling Polish newspapers and magazines. Even road signs appeared in Polish, though in Kent these were mainly put in place along trucking routes used by Polish drivers, where for many years signs had been in French and German, a recognition of the employment changes in the long-distance haulage industry. Even as far north as Cheshire (see below), these were put in place to help monolingual truckers using trunk roads, rather than local Polish residents, most of whom had enough English to understand road signs either upon arrival or shortly afterwards. Although specialist classes in English had to be provided in schools and community centres, there was little evidence that multi-lingual migrants had any long-term impact on local children and wider communities. In fact, schools were soon reporting a positive impact in terms of the migrant children’s attitudes toward learning and in improving general educational standards.

‘Globalisation’

More serious problems were beginning to be posed, however, by the operations of people smugglers and criminal gangs. Chinese migrants were involved in a particular tragedy when nineteen of them were caught while cockle-picking in Morecambe Bay by the notorious tides and drowned. Many more were working for ‘gang-masters’ as virtual and in some cases actual ‘slaves’. Russian voices became common on the London Underground, and among prostitutes on the streets. The British Isles found themselves to be ‘islands in the stream’ of international migration, the chosen ‘sceptred isle’ destinations of millions of newcomers. Unlike Germany, Britain was no longer a dominant manufacturing country but had rather become, by the late twentieth century, a popular place to develop digital and financial products and services.

When the EU expanded Britain decided that, unlike France or Germany, it would not try to delay opening the country to migrant workers. The accession treaties gave nationals from these countries the right to freedom of movement and settlement. With average earnings three times higher in the UK, this was a benefit that the Eastern Europeans were keen to take advantage of. Some member states, however, exercised their right to ‘derogation’ from the treaties, whereby they would only permit migrant workers to be employed if employers were unable to find a local candidate. In terms of European Union legislation, a derogation involved a delay to the full implementation of the treaty for five years. Unlike other member states, including France, the UK decided not to exercise this option.

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Within the EU, however, British politicians maintained Thatcher’s earlier determination to resist the Franco-German federalist model, with its ‘social chapter’ involving ever tighter controls over international corporations and ever closer political union. Britain, it was argued, had always gone out into the world. Now, increasingly, the world came to Britain, whether poor migrants, rich corporations or Chinese manufacturers. The poorer of the new migrant groups were almost entirely unrepresented in politics, but radically changed the sights, sounds and scents of urban Britain, and even some of its market towns. The veiled women of the Muslim world or its more traditionalist Arab, Afghan and Pakistani quarters became common sights on the streets, from Kent to Scotland and across to South Wales.

An unspoken consensus existed whereby immigration, while always gradually increasing, was controlled. However, with the advent of hundreds of thousands of migrant EU workers, politicians and commentators began to break with this multicultural consensus, and their views began to have an impact because while those on the right were suspected of having ‘nativist’ if not ‘racist’ tendencies in the ‘Powellite’ tradition, those from the left could generally be seen as having less easily assailable motives. What happened after the accession treaties of 2004 was therefore a breaking of the multicultural consensus.

The journalist Douglas Murray, author of the recent (2017) book, The Strange Death of Europe has claimed that once in power in 1997, Tony Blair’s government oversaw an opening of the borders on a scale unparalleled even in the post-war decades. His government abolished the ‘primary purpose rule’, which had been used to filter out bogus marriage applications. The borders were opened to anyone deemed essential to the British economy, a definition so broad that it included restaurant workers as ‘skilled labourers’. And as well as opening the door to the rest of the world, they opened the door to the new EU member states after 2004. It was the effects of all of this that created the changed picture of the country which was eventually revealed in the 2011 Census, published towards the end of 2012.

Trevor Phillips (pictured right), the first black President of the National Union of Students in 1978-79 (of Ghanaian parentage), became the Chair of the Commission for Racial Equality in 2003, opening up territory in discussion and debate that others had not dared to ‘trespass’ into.

His realisation that the race-relations ‘industry’ was part of the problem, and that partly as a result of talking up diversity the country was ‘sleepwalking to segregation’ was an insight that others began to share. Simon Schama had argued, in his influential BBC TV (2002) series on the History of Britain looking back from the beginning of the new millennium, that Britain should not have to choose between its own multi-cultural, global identity and its place in Europe. Interestingly, he put the blame for the pressure to do so primarily on continental leaders and, latterly, on the EU bureaucracy in Brussels, suggesting that…

 … the increasing compulsion to make the choice that General de Gaulle imposed on us between our European and our extra-European identity seems to order an impoverishment of our culture. It is precisely the the roving, unstable, complicated, migratory character of our history that ought to be seen as a gift for Europe.

It is a past, after all, that uniquely in European history combines a passion for social justice with a tenacious attachment to bloody-minded liberty, a past designed to subvert, not reinforce, the streamlined authority of global bureaucracies and corporations.

Our place at the European table ought to make room for that peculiarity or we should not bother showing up for dinner. What, after all, is the alternative? To surrender that ungainly, eccentric thing, British history, with all its warts and disfigurements, to the economic beauty parlour that is Brussels will mean a loss. But properly smartened up, we will of course be fully entitled to the gold-card benefits of the inward-looking club…

Nor should Britain rush towards a re-branded future that presupposes the shame-faced repudiation of the past. For our history is not the captivity of our future; it is, in fact, the condition of our maturity. 

The Royal Wedding of 2011- A Gallery:

At the time of the royal wedding, Britain was not just becoming increasingly divided over immigration and EU membership, but it was also in recession, following the international financial crash of 2010. Some businesses were forced to close and people were losing their jobs, and it was difficult for young people to borrow enough money to buy or rent their first home. The royal wedding cheered everyone up, but the royal family were concerned that it should not be too lavish. The wedding was meant to be very traditional, but simple.

William and Catherine’s wedding day was set for 29th April 2011, in Westminster Abbey. The Queen asked about nineteen hundred people to attend the wedding. Many of these guests were family and friends, but she also invited kings and queens from around the world. A wedding ring was made of Welsh gold, a tradition within the royal family going back to his great-grandmother. William’s brother Harry was to be his best man, and Kate’s sister, Pippa, her chief bridesmaid. Then there were to be four little bridesmaids and two page boys. On the eve of the big day, thousands of people began to arrive in London, determined to camp near Westminster Abbey and on the Mall. The Duchess of Cornwall and Prince William himself came out to meet them. The day of the Wedding was warm and dry. Hundreds of thousands waited on the streets, and five thousand police officers were deployed around the route. Spread over different parts of the capital, there were more than eight thousand radio and television reporters, ready to tell people around the world about the wedding.

At eight o’clock the news came from Buckingham Palace that William and Kate would be known as the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge. At mid-morning, William and Harry came into the abbey, William wearing an Irish Guards uniform and Harry the uniform of a captain in the Blues and Royals. Minutes later, Kate’s mother arrived and soon after that, the Queen and Prince Philip. Then, just before eleven, people saw Kate leaving the hotel to get into a Rolls-Royce with her father. Unlike previous royal brides, brides, Kate did not arrive at the wedding in a horse-drawn coach. Ten minutes later, she arrived at the Abbey and everyone could see her dress, by British designer Sarah Burton, for the first time. It was made from ivory and white satin, with a V-neck bodice with lace detailing. It had a big skirt and long lace sleeves. The train measured 270cm, 110ins. Kate wore a white veil over her face, held in place by a diamond tiara, lent to her by the Queen. It was originally given by King George V to Queen Elizabeth, the Queen Mother, in 1936. They had given it to the then Princess Elizabeth on her eighteenth birthday. According to reports, a blue ribbon was stitched inside the dress. In her hands, Kate carried small white flowers.

As she walked in with her father, there were hundreds of white and green flowers lining the abbey nave, and eight tall trees. Her sister Pippa walked behind, carefully carrying the long train of the dress. Pippa almost stole the show, wearing a simple white shift dress with buttons down the back. The ceremony took a little more than an hour. Then the new Duke and Duchess walked out of the abbey with the four children, bridesmaids and pages, Prince Harry, Pippa, Prince Charles and the Duchess of Cornwall, and Kate’s parents. The bells of Westminster Abbey were rung for three hours after the wedding.

The Duke & Duchess leaving the Abbey for the ‘breakfast’ party at the Palace.

The bride and groom got into an open-top gold and black coach, the 1902 State Landau, to go to Buckingham Palace, with the other important royal guests and Carole and Michael Middleton in the following carriages. After they arrived at the Palace, thousands of people began to walk up the Mall behind a cordon of police officers. Then everyone in the crowd watched the balcony and waited for the royal couple to appear. A royal bride and groom first did this in 1858, and William’s parents, Charles and Diana famously kissed there in 1981. So when Kate and William came out onto the balcony, the crowd expected them to do the same. The noise created by the crowd’s approval made one of the little bridesmaids put her hands over her ears!

Then there were the formal photographs inside the palace, with the bride and groom together, with their pages and bridesmaids, and with their families. After that, there was a party for 650 guests in nineteen rooms, and Prince Charles made a speech. There were further speeches at the dinner for three hundred guests, from Prince Harry, Michael Middleton and from Prince William. Two of the couple’s friends also spoke. In the ballroom, the guests talked and danced until 3 a.m., when the bride and groom left and the party ended. The Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, gave the couple a tandem bike as a wedding present.

The big wedding cake was made from seventeen different cakes, but Prince William asked for a chocolate cake as well, to remind him of when he was visiting her from Eton, at Windsor, his grandmother would give him this cake.

Of course, the party at the palace was not the only one in the Kingdom. The day of the wedding was a bank holiday, and there were more than five thousand street parties across the different countries. In Scotland, at St Andrew’s, more than two thousand people came together to watch the ceremony on a giant TV. David Cameron, the Coalition Government‘s PM, also had a party in Downing Street, inviting elderly people and children to join him. His wife, Samantha, made the cakes. In cities and towns throughout the Kingdom, people closed their streets to traffic and came together for the day, watching the wedding together.

There were parties in many other places around the world, from Afghanistan to India to Canada. In a hundred and eighty countries, many millions of people watched the pictures from London with fellow members of the British armed forces, families and friends. In the early morning in Times Square in New York City, three couples got married just after William and Kate. However, there was no immediate honeymoon, and after three days away, they went back to Anglesey as, on the following Tuesday, William had to return to work with the search and rescue team. Ten days after the wedding, they flew to The Seychelles for ten days, away from the prying eyes of press photographers.

After the Wedding – The Working Duke & Duchess:

After their honeymoon, the couple returned to Anglesey, and a new life for Kate in the royal family. Before long they had their first visit as the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge, to Canada, from 30th June to 8th July. Again, thousands of people came out to see them as they attended official ceremonies. William gave speeches in both English and French. On leaving Canada, they went to California for three days, where they attended a big dinner in Los Angeles, meeting Jennifer Lopez, Nicole Kidman and other rich Hollywood celebrities. At these overseas functions, Kate wore dresses specially designed for her, but she usually wore things from British shops. So, when young women saw her wearing a new dress made in Britain of this kind, they went to their nearest high-street fashion store to see if they could get the same dress. Often, the shops sold out of these ‘Kate’ dresses within hours of her appearing on TV in it, so she was good news for the British clothes shops and fashion ‘houses’. But while in California they also spent time at the charitable foundation, Inner-City Arts, where children from poorer families went to have lessons in dance and the arts. The Duke and Duchess watched the dances and made pictures with the children.

Back home, too, many charities asked for ‘patronage’ from them as members of the royal family. The charity Centrepoint was sponsored by his mother, and William gave his time to it as well, including sleeping out on the cold streets of London for a night to learn something, firsthand, about the experience of homeless people. The Duchess also began helping four charitable organisations. One of them is the East Anglia Children’s Hospice, which helps seriously and terminally ill children and their families. Another, building on her background in art history, is the National Portrait Gallery.

When they got engaged, Kate said, “Family is very important to me,” and William said, “We want a family.” By 2022 they had two new royal princes, George (b. 2013) and Louis, and a princess, Charlotte. Had she been born first, Charlotte would have become third in line to the throne following a change in the law of succession to permit the eldest child of the Monarch to become heir to the throne, whether they are male or female. So it seems that British subjects will have two more kings after Charles III, William and George before they have another queen. In the meantime, after overcoming the difficult obstacles placed in their way in their courtship, the new royal couple has been in the news for all the right reasons over the past dozen years, balancing their private family life together with their public work for the Monarchy.

Together, while working in Canada

Prince William was a patron of a mountain rescue organisation and often did work for the Football Association, including joint bids for the British nations to stage the European Championships and World Cup. He also helped with the organisation of the summer 2012 London Olympic Games. It was a very busy time for the whole royal family, who greeted and talked with many famous visitors from around the world and went to the big opening and closing ceremonies (see the section below on the Olympics).

The Diamond Jubilee:

By 2012, Queen Elizabeth had reigned for almost as long as her great-grandmother Queen Victoria, the longest-reigning monarch to date. In 2012, Elizabeth celebrated sixty years on the throne. By 2022, of course, she had also surpassed Victoria, reaching her Platinum Jubilee before her death later in the year. There had already been a big celebration in 1977 to mark the Queen’s Silver Jubilee and another one in 2002 for her Golden Jubilee. For 2012, a celebration was planned that would be even bigger than the earlier ones. Celebrations went on throughout the year, with the Queen and Duke of Edinburgh making special visits around the country, but the focal point was London and the Jubilee Weekend in June. A special bank holiday was declared on Tuesday 5th June, so that everyone in the UK had a four-day weekend. Celebrations were held in Britain and throughout the Commonwealth:

The Jubilee Concert was held outside Buckingham Palace. It was a joint venture between the BBC and Gary Barlow, who, together with Andrew Lloyd Webber wrote a special anthem, Sing, which was performed by a choir from many Commonwealth countries. Other artists who appeared at the concert included Robbie Williams, the pianist Lang Lang, Tom Jones, Shirley Bassey and Elton John. Two thousand and twelve beacons were lit by communities and individuals throughout the Kingdom, as well as in the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and the Commonwealth. Her Majesty herself lit the National Beacon in central London.

The River Thames Flotilla on Sunday was made up of nearly a thousand boats from around the UK, the Commonwealth and other parts of the world. The Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh travelled in the Royal Barge, which formed the centrepiece of the flotilla.

The 2012 London Olympics Games:

The spectacular opening ceremony was an unforgettable start to the Olympic Games. The whole spectacular event was orchestrated by composer Danny Boyle and writer Frank Cottrell Boyce, providing a unique journey through British history. The visual effects team created a thrilling animated journey down the river from its source to the Olympic stadium itself, passing sights real and imaginary. The sound of the shipping forecast and billowing blue sheets transformed the ‘meadow’ of ‘the Green and Pleasant Land’ into an Isle of Wonder, to the stirring sounds of Elgar’s Nimrod, played by the London Symphony Orchestra’s On Track Project. Frank Turner’s acoustic songs performed in the stadium perfectly captured the atmosphere of a long summer evening.

Above. The opening ceremony of the 2012 Olympics

The intense sporting action from the first ten days of the Games began with Team GB’s first medal from Lizzie Armistead, the silver she won in the Road Race. Although she was beaten to the gold in a sprint finish with Marianne Voss, this was the focus of national attention. Their first gold came from rowers Helen Glover and Heather Stanning. In cycling, Bradley Wiggins (“Wiggo”), who had just won the Tour de France, won gold in imperious style in the time trial. This brought his total of Olympic medals to seven, a record shared with Chris Hoy, who later won gold in the indoor team sprint. Both men were subsequently knighted, and Wiggins was named BBC Sports Personality of the Year for 2012. Many more thrilling moments followed with US swimmer Michael Phelps’ record nineteenth Olympic medal in the pool and rower Katherine Grainger’s long-awaited gold for GB. In athletics, millions watched as Jamaican sprinter Usain Bolt successfully defended his hundred-metre title.

In the middle, ‘Super Saturday’, with an electric atmosphere in the stadium, Jessica Ennis won gold in the heptathlon, a combination of seven field and track events, and Mo Farah won gold in the ten thousand metres, followed by a third gold from Greg Rutherford in the Long Jump. In tennis, Andy Murray beat Roger Federer in an emotional final, making up for his loss to Federer at Wimbledon just a few weeks before. In the final six days, the Brownlee brothers found triathlon glory, Usain Bolt completed a historic sprint treble, and Nicola Adams punched her way to the first women’s boxing gold. There was incredible tension in Greenwich Park for Team GB’s Equestrian dressage victory, the world record-breaking US sprint relay and Samantha Murray (no relation to Andy), securing the 65th and final medal for Team GB.

The London Olympics ended in style with a celebration of British musical and sporting achievements, created by Kim Gavin. It marked the end of an amazing chapter in London’s life and featured an array of British artists from the previous sixty years, including Eric Idle, The Kinks, The Spice Girls and Jessie J. As the whole event drew to a close, Britain seemed, despite the recession, to be once more at ease with itself.

(to be continued…)

Majesty & Grace X: The Reign of Elizabeth Windsor – Winter of Discontent to Golden Jubilee, 1979-2002; Part 2 – The Peace Process & The People’s Princess.

The Sectarian Divide in Belfast & the Peace Process, 1980-98:

After the Provisional IRA assassinated Lord Mountbatten on his boat off the Western coast of Ireland in 1979, the mainland bombing campaign went on with attacks on the Chelsea barracks, then Hyde Park bombings, when eight people were killed and fifty-three injured. With hindsight, the emergence of Sinn Féin, the political wing of the Provisional IRA, as a political party in the early 1980s can be seen as one element in the rethinking of British policies. Yet throughout the 1980s and 1990s, there were still periodic major incidents in various places across the province. After the Provisional IRA’s cease-fire in 1994, these were initiated by dissident republican splinter groups. However, much of the continuing street violence throughout these decades was concentrated in the areas of Belfast where the population was mainly either predominantly republican or unionist, as shown on the map below.

Sectarian divisions in Belfast, c. 1985

Another preliminary element in the Peace Process was the belated interest successive Irish governments began to take in Northern Ireland during the same period. The fear that the disturbances in the North might spread south and destabilise their state lay behind the Dublin government’s decision to start talking directly to Downing Street from 1980 onwards. This led to the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, which essentially represented a reiteration of British policy aims in the province, but now with an added all-Ireland dimension, which the Unionists continued to find difficult to accept.

The political violence in Belfast was largely confined to the confrontation lines where working-class unionist districts, such as the Shankhill, and working-class nationalist areas, such as the Falls, Ardoyne and New Lodge, border directly on the city centre and/or on one another. The mixed middle-class areas did not experience any significant political violence.

It was in the wake of this agreement that an entirely new approach emerged. Sinn Féinn’s dual strategy of ‘ballot box and bullet’, and its realisation that the war could not be won militarily, led to secret negotiations with both Dublin and London in the late 1980s in pursuit of a way into active participation in the political process. Britain’s recognition that if the extremists could be brought into the search for a political solution then the mainstream parties in Northern Ireland politics would follow suit was a complete reversal of its previous approach. Once the IRA had accepted the need for a ceasefire, the remaining difficulty was to persuade unionists that the reformed ex-paramilitaries could be trusted.

US President Bill Clinton addressed a peace rally in Belfast during his visit in 1995. Clinton played a significant role as a peace broker in negotiations leading up to the Good Friday Agreement.

The willingness of some unionists to give up previous policies – which had consisted of trying to recover the power they had lost in 1972 – sprang from their pragmatic realisation that only sharing power with nationalists would guarantee unionists some say in the future government of Northern Ireland. It was not until the late 1990s that the Irish constitution was amended, recognising British sovereignty over Northern Ireland. US President Bill Clinton acted as a peace broker, contributing to an uneasy cease-fire in the North from 1994.

Unionist rioters pelt police with stones after Orangemen are prevented from marching through nationalist Drumcree, near Portadown, in July 1996.

Still, the street violence persisted and intensified during the marching season in July, when the protestant Orange Order held its traditional but often offensive or provocative parades near or through Catholic areas around Belfast.

The Good Friday Agreement & the Omagh Bombing of 1998:

After long negotiations, and with the help of former US senator George Mitchell, the Good Friday Agreement was signed between all the parties to the conflict in 1998. This sought to establish a power-sharing government at Stormont, as well as acknowledging both British and Irish interests in the future of the province. The impressive Parliament Buildings in Stormont, shown below, were built in 1921 to house the new Government of Northern Ireland after Partition, and since the Belfast Agreement, they have been the home to the Northern Ireland Assembly and its power-sharing executive. Despite recurrent crises and accusations of bad faith, the peace survived more or less intact.


Picture & graphic from BBC History Magazine.

Sadly, however, it did not immediately bring an end to the bombing. The Omagh bombing was a car bombing on 15 August 1998 in the town of Omagh in County Tyrone carried out by the Real Irish Republican Army (Real IRA), a Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) splinter group that opposed the IRA’s ceasefire and the Good Friday Agreement, signed earlier in the year. The bombing killed twenty-nine people and injured about 220 others, making it the deadliest single incident of the Troubles in Northern Ireland. There was a strong regional and international outcry against ‘dissident’ republicans and in favour of the Northern Ireland peace process. Prime Minister Tony Blair called the bombing an “appalling act of savagery and evil.” Queen Elizabeth expressed her sympathies to the victims’ families, while the Prince of Wales paid a visit to the town and spoke with the families of some of the victims. Pope John Paul II and President Bill Clinton also expressed their sympathies. Churches across Northern Ireland called for a national day of mourning. Church of Ireland Archbishop of Armagh Robin Eames said on BBC Radio that,

“From the Church’s point of view, all I am concerned about are not political arguments, not political niceties. I am concerned about the torment of ordinary people who don’t deserve this.”

The Return & Results of Widespread Mass Unemployment in Britain:

In February 1986, across the UK as a whole, there were over 3.4 million unemployed, although statistics were manipulated for political reasons and the real figure is therefore a matter of speculation. The socially corrosive effects of the return of widespread mass unemployment, not seen since the early thirties, were felt throughout the country, manifesting themselves in the further bouts of inner-city rioting that broke out in 1985. This was more serious for the government than the rioting against the Means Test of half a century before because it occurred in cities throughout the country, rather than in depressed mining areas. London was just as vulnerable as Liverpool, and a crucial contributory factor was the number of young men of south Asian and Caribbean heritage who saw no hope of ever entering employment: opportunities were minimal and they felt particularly discriminated against. The term underclass was increasingly used to describe those who felt themselves to be completely excluded from the return of prosperity to many areas in the late eighties.

By 1987, service industries were offering an alternative means of employment in Britain. Between 1983 and 1987 about one and a half million new jobs were created. Most of these were for women, many of whom were entering employment for the first time, and many of the jobs available were part-time and, of course, lower paid than the jobs lost in primary and secondary industries. By contrast, the total number of men in full-time employment fell still further. Many who had left mining or manufacturing for the service sector also earned far less. By the end of the century there were more people employed in Indian restaurants than in the coal and steel industries combined, but for much lower pay. The economic recovery that led to the growth of this new employment was based mainly on finance, banking and credit. Little was invested in home-grown manufacturing, however, but far more was invested overseas, with British foreign investments rising from 2.7 billion pounds in 1975 to 90 billion in 1985.

At the same time, there was also a degree of re-industrialisation, especially in the Southeast, where new industries employing the most advanced technology were growing. In fact, many industries shed a large proportion of their workforce but, using new technology, maintained or improved their output. These new industries were certainly not confined to the M4 Corridor by the late eighties. By then, Nissan’s car plant in Sunderland had become the most productive in Europe, while Siemens established a microchip plant at Wallsend. However, such companies did not employ large numbers of local workers. Siemens invested more than a billion pounds, but only employed a workforce of about eighteen hundred.

Regionally based industries suffered a dramatic decline during this period. Coal mining, for example, was decimated in the decade following the 1984-85 miners’ strike, not least because of the shift of the electricity-generating industry to other alternative energy sources, especially gas. During the period 1984-87 the coal industry shed a hundred and seventy thousand miners, and there was a further net loss of employment in the coalfields, with the exception of north Warwickshire and south Derbyshire, in the early 1990s. The economic effect upon local communities could be devastating, as the 1996 film Brassed Off accurately shows, with its memorable depiction of the social impact on the Yorkshire pit village of Grimethorpe of the 1992 closure programme. The trouble with the economic strategy followed by the Thatcher government was that South Wales, Lancashire, the West Riding of Yorkshire, Tyneside and Clydesdale were precisely those regions that had risen to extraordinary prosperity as part of the British imperial enterprise. Now they were being written off as disposable assets, so what interest did the Scots in particular, but also the Welsh, have in remaining as part of that enterprise, albeit a new corporation in the making?

The Two Britains & the Demise of Thatcher, 1987-1990:

The understandable euphoria over Thatcher and her party winning three successive general elections disguised the fact this last victory was gained at the price of perpetuating a deep rift in Britain’s social geography. Without the Falklands factor to help revive the Union flag, a triumphalist English conservatism was increasingly imposing its rule over the other nations of an increasingly disunited Kingdom. Although originally from Lincolnshire, Thatcher’s constituency was, overwhelmingly, the well-off middle and professional classes in the south of England, where her parliamentary constituency of Finchley lay. Meanwhile, the distressed northern zones of derelict factories, pits, ports and terraced streets were left to rot and rust. People living in these latter areas were expected to lift themselves up by their own bootstraps, retrain for work in the up-and-coming industries of the future and if need be get on Tory Chairman, Norman Tebbitt’s bicycle and move to one of the areas of strong economic growth such as Cambridge, Milton Keynes or Slough, where those opportunities were clustered.

However, little was provided by publicly funded retraining and, if this was available, there was no guarantee of a job at the end of it. The point of the computer revolution was to save labour, not to expand it. In the late 1980s, the north-south divide seemed as intractable as it had any period in the previous six decades, with high unemployment continuing to be concentrated in the declining manufacturing areas of the North and West of the British Isles. That the north-south divide increasingly had a political dimension as well as an economic one was borne out by the 1987 General Election in the UK. Margaret Thatcher’s third majority was largely based on the votes of the South and East of England. North of a line running from the Severn estuary through Coventry and on to the Humber estuary, the long decline of Toryism, especially in Scotland, where it was reduced to only ten seats, was apparent to all observers. At the same time, the national two-party system seemed to be breaking down so that south of that line, the Liberal-SDP Alliance was the main challenger to the Conservatives in many constituencies.

In June 1988, 185 men died when a North Sea oil platform, Piper Alpha, blew up.

Even though the shift towards service industries was reducing regional economic diversity, the geographical distribution of regions eligible for European structural funds for economic improvement confirmed the continuing north-south divide. The pace of change quickened as a result of the 1987 Single European Act, as it became clear that the UK was becoming increasingly integrated with the European continent. The administrative structure of Britain also underwent major changes by the end of the nineties. The relative indifference of the Conservative ascendancy to the plight of industrial Scotland and Wales had transformed the prospects of the nationalist parties in both countries. In the 1987 election, Scottish and Welsh nationalists, previously confined mainly to middle-class, rural and intellectual constituencies, now made huge inroads into Conservative areas and even into the Labour heartlands of industrial south Wales and Clydeside.

Culturally, the Thatcher counter-revolution ran into something of a cul-de-sac, or rather the cobbled streets of Salford typified in the long-running TV soap opera, Coronation Street. Millions in the old British industrial economy had a deeply ingrained loyalty to the place where they had grown up, gone to school, got married and had their kids; to the pub, their park, and their football team. In that sense at least the Social Revolution of the fifties and sixties had recreated cities and towns that, for all their ups and downs, their poverty and pain, were real communities. Fewer people were willing to give up on Liverpool and Leeds, Nottingham and Derby than the pure laws of the employment marketplace demanded. For many working-class British people, it was their home which determined their quality of life, not the width of their wage packet.

The notoriously violent poll-tax riot of 1990 in Trafalgar Square.

Not everything that the Thatcher government did was out of tune with social reality, however. The sale of council houses created an owner-occupier class which, as Simon Schama has written, corresponded to the long passion of the British to be kings and queens of their own little castles. Sales of remaining state-owned industries, such as the public utility companies, were less successful since the concept of stakeholdership was much less deeply rooted in British traditions, and the mixed fortunes of both these privatised companies and their stocks did nothing to help change customs. Most misguided of all was the decision to call a poll tax imposed on the house and flat owners a community charge, and then to impose it first, as a trial run, in Scotland, where the Tories already had little support. The grocer’s daughter from Grantham thought that it would be a good way of creating a property-owning, tax-paying democracy, where people paid according to the size of their household. This was another mistaken assumption.

The Tories had Nigel Heseltine as their conference darling. He also became Thatcher’s nemesis when he challenged her for the leadership of the party in 1990. But although he wielded the knife, he did not ascend the throne.

Later in 1990, the iron lady was challenged for her leadership of the Party by Michael Heseltine, and although she beat him in the first ballot, the margin was insufficient to prevent a second ballot. With her supporters and cabinet fearing her defeat and humiliation, she felt obliged to step down from the contest. She was then replaced as PM by one of her loyal deputies, John Major, another middle-class anti-patrician, the son of a garden-gnome salesman, apparently committed to family values and a return to basics. In 1990, some EEC leaders thought that Britain was too slow in making decisions. In 1986, President Mitterand had signed an agreement with Margaret Thatcher to build the long-planned Channel Tunnel between France and England. But while the French had pressed ahead with constructing road and high-speed train links to the tunnel, Britain had been slow to act.

In the cartoon above, President Mitterand of France (left) and Helmet Kohl of Germany (right) try to force the new PM, John Major to agree to the terms and conditions in the Maastricht Treaty, agreed by 1993, which aimed at bringing freer trade between member states. Britain refused.

Throughout his time in office, a significant number of Conservative back-bench MPs continued to oppose closer economic and political ties within the EEC, which then became the European Community (EC). Against all the odds, at Maastricht in 1991, he managed to slip Britain out of paying fealty to the EC on most of what was demanded. He and his Chancellor, Norman Lamont, negotiated a special opt-out from the monetary union and managed to have the social chapter excluded from the treaty altogether. For a man with a weak hand, under fire from his own side at home, it was quite an accomplishment. Briefly, he was a hero, hence the cartoons of him wearing his Y-fronts outside his trousers. He described his reception by his own party in the Commons as the modern equivalent of a Roman triumph, quite something for a boy from Brixton.

The Brixton Boy & New Growth, 1992-97:

Soon after his Maastricht triumph, flushed with confidence, Major called the election that most observers thought he must lose. The economy was still in a mess, the poll tax issue so fresh and Neil Kinnock’s Labour Party now so well purged of Militants and well organised that there was a widespread belief that the ‘Thatcher era’ was at an end. But then, Lamont’s pre-election budget came to the rescue of his PM. It proposed cutting the basic rate of income tax by five pence in the pound, which would help people on lower incomes, badly wrong-footing Labour. During the campaign, Major found himself returning to Brixton, complete with a soapbox, which he mounted to address raucous crowds through a megaphone.

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On 9th April, Major’s Conservatives won fourteen million votes, more than any party in British political history. It was a great personal achievement for Major, based on voters’ fears of higher Labour taxes. It was also one of the biggest percentage leads since 1945, but the vagaries of the electoral system gave only gave Major a majority of just twenty-one seats.

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Never has such a famous victory produced such a rotten result for the winners. Major was back in number ten, but Chris Patten, tipped by many as a future PM, lost his seat in Bath to the Liberal candidate.

Unlike his predecessor and successor as Prime Minister, both of whom won three elections, in a parliamentary system under which greatness is generally related to parliamentary arithmetic, John Major has not gone down as a great leader of his country, though he was far more of a unifying figure than those who went before and came after. Despite its somewhat surprising victory in the 1992 General Election, the Major government ended up being ignominiously overwhelmed by an avalanche of sexual and financial scandals and blunders. Added to this, the ‘Maastricht rebels’ on the Tory back-benches now openly campaigned for Britain to leave the European Community.

Left: Labour leader Neil Kinnock attacking ultra-left members of the Militant Tendency at the Labour Party conference in 1985. Right: John Smith MP, Kinnock’s successor after Labour’s third successive defeat in the 1992 election, who would probably have become PM in 1997 but for a heart attack.

Kinnock was devastated by the 1992 result and quickly left front-line politics, becoming even less of a footnote in parliamentary history than Major, though deserving of an honourable chapter in the history of the Labour Party. Despite his popular mandate, the smallness of his majority meant that Major’s authority in the Commons was steadily chipped away by the Labour Opposition under their less bellicose but more able parliamentary leader, Kinnock’s Scottish Shadow Chancellor, John Smith.

Deindustrialisation & Re-industrialisation into the Nineties:

The process of deindustrialisation continued into the nineties with the closure of the Swan Hunter shipyard on the Tyne in May 1993. It was the last working shipyard in the region but failed to secure a vital warship contract. It was suffering the same long-term decline that reduced shipbuilding from an employer of two hundred thousand in 1914 to a mere twenty-six thousand by the end of the century. This devastated the local economy, especially as a bitter legal wrangle over redundancy payments left many former workers without any compensation at all for the loss of what they had believed was employment for life. As the map above shows, the closure’s effects spread far further than Tyneside and the Northeast, which were undoubtedly badly hit by the closure, with two hundred and forty suppliers losing their contracts. The results of rising unemployment were multiplied as the demand for goods and services declined.

Swan Hunter suppliers in 1993. The closure of the shipyard had a ‘knock-on’ effect as far afield as London and Glasgow.

As the map above shows, the closure of Swan Hunter certainly had a widespread impact on Suppliers as far afield as Southampton and Glasgow, as well as in the West Midlands and the Southeast. They lost valuable orders and therefore also had to make redundancies. Forty-five suppliers in Greater London also lost business. Therefore, from the closure of one single, large-scale engineering concern, unemployment resulted even in the most prosperous parts of the country. In the opposite economic direction, the growing North Sea oil industry helped to spread employment more widely throughout the Northeast and the Eastern side of Scotland, with its demands for drilling platforms and support ships, and this benefit was also felt nationally, both within Scotland and more widely, throughout the UK. However, this did little in the short term to soften the blow of the Swan Hunter closure.

Oil rig in the North Sea, drilling for oil and then pumping it ashore.

The old north-south divide in Britain seemed to be eroding during the recession of the early 1990s, which hit southeast England relatively hard, but it soon reasserted itself with a vengeance later in the decade as young people moved south in search of jobs and property prices rose. Overall, however, the 1990s were years of general and long-sustained economic expansion. The continued social impact of the decline in coal, steel and shipbuilding was to some extent mitigated by inward investment initiatives. Across most of the British Isles, there was also a continuing decline in the number of manufacturing jobs throughout the nineties. Although there was an overall recovery in the car industry, aided by the high pound in the export market, much of this was due to the new technology of robotics (shown below) which made the industry far less labour-intensive and therefore more productive.

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The service sector expanded, however, and general levels of unemployment, especially in Britain, fell dramatically in the 1990s. Financial services saw strong growth, particularly in the London Docklands (pictured below), which saw the transformation of former docks areas into offices and fashionable modern residential developments, with a new focus around the huge Canary Wharf scheme, to the east of the city on the previously isolated Isle of Dogs. On the right is an aerial view of the complex being built in the late 1980s. But although the new development was expected to boost commerce and local businesses.

A decade later, however, many of the buildings were still unoccupied.

In addition, by the end of the decade, the financial industry was the largest employer in northern manufacturing towns like Leeds, which grew rapidly, aided by its ability to offer a range of cultural facilities that helped to attract an array of UK company headquarters. Manchester, similarly, enjoyed a renaissance, particularly in music and football. Manchester United’s commercial success led it to become the world’s largest sports franchise. Edinburgh’s banking and finances sector also expanded. Other areas of the country were helped by their ability to attract high technology industry. Silicon Glen in central Scotland was, by the end of the decade, the largest producer of computer equipment in Europe. Computing and software design was also one of the main engines of growth along the silicon highway of the M4 Corridor west of London. But areas of vigorous expansion were not necessarily dominated by new technologies. The economy of East Anglia, especially Cambridgeshire, had grown rapidly in the 1980s and continued to do so throughout the 1990s. While Cambridge itself, aided by the university-related science parks, fostered high-tech companies, especially in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, expansion in Peterborough, for instance, was largely in low-tech areas of business services and distribution.

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The Road and Airport Network 1973-2000.

Getting around Britain was, at last, getting easier. By 1980 there were nearly one and a half thousand miles of motorway in Britain. In the last twenty years of the century, the stretching of the congested motorway network to just over two thousand miles mostly involved the linking of existing sections. Motorway building and airport development were delayed by lengthy public enquiries and well-organised public protests. Improving transport links were seen as an important means of stimulating regional development as well as combating local congestion. Major road developments in the 1990s included the completion of the M25 orbital motorway around London, the Skye bridge and the M40 link between London and Birmingham. However, despite this construction programme, congestion remained a problem: the M25 was labelled the largest car park on the planet, while average traffic speeds in central London fell to only ten miles per hour in 2001, a famous poster on the underground pointing out that this was the same average speed as in 1901. Environmental concerns became an important factor in limiting further expansion of both roads and runways and in a renewed focus on improving the rail network both between regions and within them.

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Improvements to public transport networks tended to be concentrated in urban centres, such as the light rail networks in Manchester, Sheffield and Croydon. At the same time, the migration of some financial services and much of the Fleet Street national press to major new developments in London’s Docklands prompted the development of the Docklands Light Railway and the Jubilee line extension, as well as some of the most expensive urban motorway in Europe. Undoubtedly, the most important transport development was the Channel Tunnel rail link from Folkestone to Calais, completed in 1994. By the beginning of the new millennium, millions of people had travelled by rail from London to Paris in only three hours.

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The Channel Tunnel was highly symbolic of Britain’s commitment to Europe in the 1990s. By the end of the decade, millions of people and vehicles had already travelled from London to Paris in a mere three hours.

The development of Ashford in Kent, following the opening of the Channel Tunnel rail link, provides a good example of the relationship between transport links and general economic development. The railway had come to Ashford in 1842 and railway works were established in the town. This was eventually run down and closed between 1981 and 1993, but this did not undermine the local economy. Instead, Ashford benefited from the Channel Tunnel rail link, which made use of the old railway lines running through the town, and its population actually grew by ten per cent in the 1990s. The completion of the Tunnel combined with the M25 London orbital motorway, with its M20 spur, gave the town an international catchment area of some eighty-five million people within a single day’s journey.

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Source: Penguin Books, 2001 (see list below).

This, together with the opening of Ashford International railway station as the main terminal for the rail link to Europe, attracted a range of engineering, financial, distribution and manufacturing companies. Fourteen business parks were opened in and around the town, together with a science park owned by Trinity College, Cambridge, and a popular outlet retail park on the outskirts of the town. By the beginning of the new millennium, the Channel Tunnel had transformed the economy of Kent. Ashford is closer to Paris and Brussels than it is to Manchester and Sheffield, both in time and distance. By the beginning of this century, it was in a position to be part of a truly international economy.

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Ashford in relation to its British hinterland and the European Continent. Source: Penguin Books (see list below)

Even the historic market relocated to Orbital Park to the South of the town, reflecting in microcosm a national trend towards siting not only industrial estates but also retail parks on the edge of towns.

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At the beginning of the new century, modern-day affluence was reflected in the variety of goods and services concentrated in shopping malls: They were often built on major roads outside cities and towns to make them more accessible to the maximum number of people.

New Labour & The Renewal of the United Kingdom, 1997-2002:

In a 1992 poll in Scotland, half of those asked said that they were in favour of independence within the European Union. The enthusiasm the Scottish National Party discovered in the late 1980s for the supposed benefits that would result from independence in Europe may help to explain its subsequent revival. In the General Election of the same year, however, with Mrs Thatcher and her poll tax having departed the political scene, there was a minor Tory recovery north of the border. Five years later this was wiped out by the Labour landslide of 1997 when all the Conservative seats in both Scotland and Wales were lost. Nationalist political sentiment grew in Scotland and to a lesser extent in Wales. In 1999, twenty years after the first devolution referenda, further votes led to the setting up of a devolved Parliament in Edinburgh, Wales got an Assembly in Cardiff, and Northern Ireland had a power-sharing Assembly again at Stormont near Belfast. In 2000, an elected regional assembly was established for Greater London, the area covered by the inner and outer boroughs in the capital, with a directly elected Mayor. This new authority replaced the Greater London Council which had been abolished by the Thatcher Government in 1986 and was given responsibility for local planning and transport.

In 1997, Tony Blair won the first of three elections, creating ‘New Labour’.

The devolution promised and instituted by Tony Blair’s new landslide Labour government did seem to take some of the momenta out of the nationalist fervour, but apparently at the price of stoking the fires of English nationalism among Westminster Tories, resentful at the Scots and Welsh having representatives in their own assemblies as well as in the UK Parliament. Only one Scottish seat was regained by the Tories in 2001. In Scotland at least, the Tories became labelled as a centralising, purely English party.

After the 1992 defeat, Blair had made a bleak public judgement about why Labour had lost so badly. The reason was simple: Labour has not been trusted to fulfil the aspirations of the majority of people in the modern world. As shadow home secretary he began to put that right, promising to be tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime. He was determined to return his party to the common-sense values of Christian Socialism, also influenced by the mixture of socially conservative and economically liberal messages used by Bill Clinton and his New Democrats. So too was Gordon Brown but as shadow chancellor, his job was to demolish the cherished spending plans of his colleagues. Also, his support for the ERM (the EU’s Exchange Rate Mechanism) made him ineffective when Major and Lamont suffered their great defeat. By 1994, the Brown-Blair relationship was less strong than it had been, but they visited the States together to learn the new political style of the Democrats which, to the advantage of Blair, relied heavily on charismatic leadership. Back home, Blair pushed John Smith to reform the party rulebook, falling out badly with him in the process. Media commentators began to tip Blair as the next leader, and slowly but surely, the Brown-Blair relationship was turning into a Blair-Brown one.

The Blair-Brown partnership’ was to survive until 2007 when Tony Blair stepped down as PM and Gordon Brown replaced him unopposed.
This photo was taken at the Labour Conference in 2005, by which time neither could disguise their personal enmity.

When it arrived, the 1997 General Election demonstrated just what a stunningly efficient and effective election-winning team Tony Blair led, comprising those deadly masters of spin, Alistair Campbell and Peter Mandelson. ‘New Labour’ as it was now officially known, won 419 seats, the largest number ever for the party and comparable only with the seats won by the National Government of 1935. Its Commons majority was also a modern record, with 179 seats, thirty-three more than Attlee’s landslide majority of 1945. The swing of ten per cent from the Conservatives was another post-war record, roughly double that which the 1979 Thatcher victory had produced in the opposite direction. But the turn-out was very low, at seventy-one per cent the lowest since 1935. Labour had won a famous victory but nothing like as many actual votes as John Major had won five years earlier. But Blair’s party also won heavily across the south and in London, and in parts of Britain that it had been unable to reach or represent in recent times.

It had also a far more diverse offer of candidates, especially in terms of gender. A record number of women were elected to Parliament, 119, of whom 101 were Labour MPs, nicknamed Blair’s babes at the time. Despite becoming one of the first countries in the world to have a female prime minister, in 1987 there were just 6.3% of women MPs in government in the UK, compared with ten per cent in Germany and about a third in Norway and Sweden. Only France came below the UK with 5.7%. Before the large group of female MPs joined her in 1997, Margaret Hodge (pictured below, c.1992) had already become MP for Barking in a 1994 by-election. While still a new MP, Hodge had endorsed the candidature of Tony Blair, a former Islington neighbour, for the Labour Party leadership, and was appointed Junior Minister for Disabled People in 1998. Before entering the Commons, she had been Leader of Islington Council and had not been short of invitations from constituencies to stand in the 1992 General Election. She had turned these offers down, citing her family commitments:

“It’s been a hard decision; the next logical step is from local to national politics and I would love to be part of a Labour government influencing change. But it’s simply inconsistent with family life, and I have four children who mean a lot to me. 

“It does make me angry that the only way up the political ladder is to work at it twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. That’s not just inappropriate for a woman who has to look after children or relatives, it’s inappropriate for any normal person.

“The way Parliament functions doesn’t attract me very much. MPs can seem terribly self-obsessed, more interested in their latest media appearance than in creating change.” 

Alistair Campbell, Toy Blair’s Press Secretary, guards the door as Blair dictates a statement.

As the sun came up on a jubilant, celebrating Labour Party returning to power after an eighteen-year absence, there was a great deal of Bohemian rhapsodizing about a new dawn for Britain. Alistair Campbell (pictured above, right) had assembled crowds of party workers and supporters to stand along Downing Street waving union flags as the Blairs strode up to claim their victory spoils. Briefly, at least, it appeared that the whole country had turned out to cheer the champions. The victory was due to a small group of self-styled modernisers who had seized the Labour Party and made it a party of the ‘left and centre-left’, at least for the time being, though by the end of the following thirteen years, and after two more elections, they had taken it further to the centre-right than anyone expected on that balmy early summer morning; there was no room for cynicism amid all the euphoria. Labour was rejuvenated, and that was all that mattered.

Blair needed the support and encouragement of admirers and friends who would coax and goad him. There was Mandelson, the brilliant but temperamental former media boss, who had now become an MP. Although adored by Blair, he was so mistrusted by other members of the team that Blair’s inner circle gave him the codename ‘Bobby’ (as in Bobby Kennedy). Alistair Campbell, Blair’s press officer and attack dog was a former journalist and natural propagandist, who had helped orchestrate the campaign of mockery against Major. Then there was Anji Hunter, the contralto charmer who had known Blair as a young rock singer and was his best hotline to middle England. Derry Irvine was a brilliant Highlands lawyer who had first found a place in his chambers for Blair and his wife, Cherie Booth. He advised on constitutional change and became Lord Chancellor in due course. These people, with the Brown team working in parallel, formed the inner core. The young David Miliband, son of a well-known Marxist philosopher, provided research support. Among the MPs who were initially close were Marjorie ‘Mo’ Mowlem and Jack Straw, but the most striking aspect about ‘Tony’s team’ was how few elected politicians it included.

The small group of people who put together the New Labour ‘project’ wanted to find a way of governing which helped the worse off, particularly by giving them better chances in education and to find jobs, while not alienating the mass of middle-class voters. They were extraordinarily worried by the press and media, bruised by what had happened to Kinnock, whom they had all worked with, and ruthlessly focused on winning over anyone who could be won. But they were ignorant of what governing would be like. They were able to take power at a golden moment when it would have been possible to fulfil all the pledges they had made. Blair had the wind at his back as the Conservatives would pose no serious threat to him for many years to come. Far from inheriting a weak or crisis-ridden economy, he was actually taking over at the best possible time when the country was recovering strongly but had not yet quite noticed that this was the case. Blair had won by being ruthless, and never forgot it, but he also seemed not to realise quite what an opportunity ‘providence’ had handed him.

How European were the British in the Nineties?:

The European Community in c. 1992 (Turkey did not join and still hasn’t)

Transport policy was only one of the ways in which the EU increasingly came to shape the geography of the British Isles in the 1990s. In 1992, British people in general were far more positive about membership in the European Community (EC) than they were twenty years later, especially those employed in transport. Roy Clementson, a fifty-nine-year-old long-distance truck driver for more than thirty years was interviewed about his attitude to driving in the EC. He said that he preferred driving in Europe to the UK because the facilities were better:

“It’s easier to get a shower and there are far more decent places to eat, especially in France. I’m not one of those drivers who won’t eat anything except sausage, eggs, beans and chips. I like French food and I like the prices they charge. In France, if you look around, you can get a five-course meal and as much wine as you can drink for Ł5.50. In Italy, the food is very good, but it is more expensive: more like ten pounds per meal.

“I can assure you all the drivers would welcome a single European currency. It would be much better if you didn’t have to change money all the time. I’ve got nothing against the Royal Family, but not having coins with the Queen’s picture on doesn’t make any difference to me.

” I don’t see any disadvantages of going into Europe. I think the French and Germans have a better standard of living than we do. I recently saw a beautiful four-bedroomed house that cost about Ł75,000 in France. Now my house is worth more than that, but it’s only about one-third the size.

“People talk about our being ruled by Brussels; well, I think we could pick up a lot of good ideas. I wouldn’t say I feel European, but I don’t agree with people who have this attitude that we’re somehow better than they are. We have a lot to learn.”

The Independent.
Roy Clementson; photo by Nicholas Turpin.

Transport policy became a key factor in the creation of the new EU administrative regions of Britain between 1994 and 1999, as shown on the map below. At the same time, a number of British local authorities opened offices in Brussels for lobbying purposes. The European connection proved less welcome in other quarters, however. Fishermen, particularly in Devon and Cornwall and along the East coast of England and Scotland, felt themselves the victims of the Common Fisheries Policy quota system. A strong sense of Euroscepticism developed in parts of southern England in particular, fuelled by a mixture of concerns about sovereignty and economic policy. Nevertheless, links with Europe had been growing, whether via the Channel Tunnel, the connections between the French and British electricity grids, or airline policy, as were the number of policy decisions shaped by the EU.

Britain and Ireland in the 1990s, showing EU Regional Policy Areas, 1994-99.

With these better transport links, international travel became easier and cheaper for ordinary Britons. In particular, the cost of air travel began to fall, with the establishment of budget airlines, package holidays were affordable for families, and more independent, longer-term cultural links were forged between individuals, families and organisations. Holiday consultant Suzi Stembridge, also featured in the article from The Independent, exemplified many of these developments and the changing attitudes to a growing European community they brought:

Suzi Stembridge was clearly enthusiastic about the vision of a new Europe that membership of the European Community offered. It seems that, with the exception of fishermen and some Tory Westminster politicians, the majority of British people were becoming more European and more enthusiastic about EC membership, especially those involved in transport and travel, education, entertainment and culture. In addition, they were no longer concerned about its effects on food prices and the cost of living, as many had been at the time of the 1975 Referendum. They could see from their own experience that, if anything, the standard of living on the continent was higher than that in Britain, and that the quality of life was, in many ways, better. On the other hand, they were not so enthusiastic about Britain joining a single currency and wanted each country to be able to keep its own identity. They may not have felt as ‘truly European’ as people on the continent, but neither were they, at that point (the time of the Maastricht Treaty negotiation and implementation), opposed to, or even sceptical of membership of the European institutions.

The Growth of Celebrity Culture:

In 1997, Tony Blair arrived in power in a country with a revived fashion for celebrities, offering a few politicians new opportunities, though often at a high cost to their privacy and family lives. It was not until 1988 that the full shape of modern celebrity culture had become apparent. That year had seen the publication of the truly modern glossy glamour magazines when Hello! was launched. Its successful formula was soon copied by OK! from 1993 and many other magazines soon followed suit, to the point where the yards of coloured ‘glossies’ filled the newsagents’ shelves in every town and village in the country. Celebrities were paid handsomely for being interviewed and photographed in return for coverage which was always fawningly respectful and never hostile. The rich and famous, no matter how flawed in real life, were able to shun the mean-minded sniping of the ‘gutter press’, the tabloid newspapers. In the real world, the sunny, airbrushed world of Hello! was inevitably followed by divorces, drunken rows, accidents and ordinary scandals. But people were happy to read good news about these beautiful people even if they knew that there was more to their personalities and relationships than met the eye.

In the same year that Hello! went into publication, ITV also launched its most successful of the daytime television shows, This Morning, hosted from Liverpool by Richard Madeley and Judy Finnigan, providing television’s celebrity breakthrough moment. A new form of television, Reality Television, was created that featured ‘ordinary’ people rather than actors or celebrities. This idea was developed from the fly-on-the-wall documentaries and talent shows of previous decades. The programme Big Brother, taking its title from the phrase in George Orwell’s novel 1984, ‘Big brother is watching you,’ was first aired in 1999. Members of the public were locked in a house and observed on camera. This turned ordinary members of the public into media stars overnight, though mostly only for a short time afterwards. The pop ‘agent’ Simon Cowell (b. 1959) created Pop Idol in 2001. Young singers were auditioned and then coached to become pop stars, eliminated one by one until a winner was chosen and then given a recording contract. This format continued into the X-factor and Britain’s Got Talent which included acts other than pop singers and was open to people of all ages and backgrounds. These programmes were ‘interactive,’ inviting viewers to vote by phone.

Just as in sixties Britain, in the nineties Britain started producing music that became popular all over the world. Boy bands included Take That, including Robbie Williams and Gary Barlow who later had solo singing careers. Unlike The Beatles, however, these ‘bands’ had to rely on backing instrumentalists, however. Girl bands like The Spice Girls promoted a fashion for “girl power” and one of them, Victoria Adams, ‘Posh Spice’, married the footballer David Beckham. Together, they became a notable celebrity couple in Britain and around the world.

There had been a feeling that life under John Major’s government was rather dull, and that its politics was full of men in dark grey suits. Tony Blair’s victory in 1997 brought a change of mood in which it was ‘cool’ to be British again. The Blair government captured this mood, inviting pop stars, sporting heroes and other celebrities to Downing Street for ‘photo opportunities’ and encouraging a ‘rebranding’ of Britain as ‘Cool Britannia’.

Monarchy as the Indispensable Marker of British Identity, 1981-2002:
The Royal lineage in 1992

By the early 1990s, another indispensible marker of British identity, the monarchy, began to look tired, under the strain of being simultaneously a ceremonial and familial institution. Behind the continuing hard work and leadership of HM Queen Elizabeth and her Consort, Philip, and the Queen Mother, there were growing signs that the younger generation of the Royal Family, including the heir, Charles, Prince of Wales, was struggling to live up to the high standards set by the older ones. The seeds of these problems were sown at the beginning of the previous decade, if not earlier, with the deliberate development of the monarchy into a ‘family’ institution.

Top: The Duke of Edinburgh, Prince Philip, was given his title after his marriage to the then Princess Elizabeth in 1947. The Duke took a great deal of interest in the achievements of young people – in 1956 he founded the Duke of Edinburgh Award Scheme (through which awards are made to young people aged 14-21 for enterprise, initiative and achievement.


Below: The Queen’s Official Birthday, the second Saturday in June, is marked by the Trooping of the Colour, a ceremony during which the regiments of the Guards Division and the Household Cavalry parade (troop) the regimental flag (colour) before the sovereign.

Ever since the abdication of Edward VIII in 1936, which suddenly propelled the ten-year-old Princess Elizabeth into the spotlight as the heir apparent, the membership of this institution was thought to require standards of personal behaviour well above the general norm of late twentieth-century expectations.

A Page from a school textbook.

This celebrity fantasy world, which continued to open up in all directions throughout the nineties, served to re-emphasise to alert politicians, broadcasting executives and advertisers to the considerable power of optimism. The mainstream media in the nineties was giving the British an unending stream of bleakness and disaster, so millions tuned in and turned over to celebrities. That they did so in huge numbers did not mean that they thought that celebrities had universally happy lives. And in the eighties and nineties, no star gleamed more brightly in the firmament than the beautiful yet troubled Princess Diana. The fairy-tale wedding of the Prince of Wales and Lady Diana Spencer at St Paul’s in 1981, which had a worldwide audience of at least eight hundred million viewers, meant that for fifteen years she was an ever-present in the media. Yet, as an aristocratic girl whose childhood had been blighted by the divorce of her parents, she found herself pledging her life to a much older man who shared few of her interests and did not even seem to be truly in love with her.

Above: Hello! looks back on the 1981 Royal Wedding from that of Catherine Middleton and William in 2011.

At first, Princess Diana seemed shy, naive and slightly awkward in front of the cameras. She suffered from an eating disorder, Bulimia, and lost weight. But as she became more confident she began to enjoy the attention she was attracting. In 1982, a little over a year after her fairy-tale wedding, Diana had her first son, William Arthur Philip Louis, who was born in London on the 21st of June. He lived at Kensington Palace with Prince Charles and Princess Diana. When he was only nine months old, his parents made an official visit to Australia and New Zealand. His mother did not want to be away from him for six weeks, so the little prince went with his parents.

Becoming ever more popular, she was soon dubbed The People’s Princess by the tabloid press. She also became the world’s most-photographed woman, and she was frequently seen on the covers of magazines and on television. She was even filmed dancing with the star of Saturday Night Fever and Grease, John Travolta.

In 1984, the royal couple had a second son, Prince Harry. William and Harry were always in the public eye as the new additions to the royal family. Photographers, newspaper reporters and TV cameras were part of their everyday life.

The two little boys enjoyed playing with each other at Kensington Palace. Young children in the royal family usually had nursery lessons at home, but Princess Diana, herself a nursery assistant, changed things. When William was three, he began to go to school in London with other young children. When he was eight, he went to Ludgrove School, about forty miles away from London, so he lived at the school and only went home once a month. At first, he was unhappy, but he soon began to enjoy football and other sports. Two years later, his brother Harry joined him at the school.

Above: The State Opening of Parliament in November 1991, for the last session before the 1992 General Election.

As ever, the opening ceremony, shown above, was a mixture of pageantry and serious political business. Once the Queen took her seat on the throne in the House of Lords, she sent ‘Black Rod’ to the Commons chamber to summon the MPs to join her and the Lords for her reading the speech outlining the new laws the Government was planning to make in the forthcoming parliamentary year. The Speaker of the Commons, Betty Boothroyd, was then followed by the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition into the House of Lords, followed by the rest of the MPs. Of course, it was not really the Queen’s Speech at all, but the Government’s, written by the Prime Minister at the time, in this case, John Major, and his colleagues to be read out by the Queen. In 1991, the Speech contained fewer proposals, or bills, than in previous years because the Government wanted to cut short the parliamentary year and call a General Election in the Spring (as it turned out, for 9th April). The main bills referred to in the Speech were on criminal justice and the environment, a ‘green’ bill. Other anticipated measures to bring in privately financed toll roads and new rules to ease traffic congestion in London.

From a Profile of Charles III in an English Language magazine.

Just as the monarchy had gained from its ceremonies, especially its royal weddings, so it lost commensurately from the failure of those unions. As a young man, Charles had dated Camilla Shand. But when he was sent abroad with the Royal Navy, Camilla married Andrew Parker-Bowles. Even though he eventually married Diana, it became obvious that Charles was still in love with Camilla. When rumours spread of Diana’s affairs, they no longer had the moral impact that they might have had in previous decades. By the nineties, Britain was now a divorce-prone country, in which what’s best for the kids and I deserve to be happy were phrases which were regularly heard in suburban kitchen diners. Diana was not simply a pretty woman married to a king-in-waiting but someone people felt, largely erroneously, would understand them. There was an obsessive aspect to the admiration of her, something that the Royal Family had not seen before, and its leading members found it very uncomfortable and even, at times, alarming. They were being weighed in the balance as living symbols of Britain’s ‘family values’ and found wanting. 

Yet as the two contemporary stories from The Daily Mail (below) show, even as they became increasingly estranged, the couple were able to support each others’ concerns, passions and charitable work. In the article on the left, Prince Charles pointed to the danger of teachers using teaching methods recommended by educational ‘experts’ leading to teaching only fashionable topics, neglecting students’ cultural heritage. Though controversial with some in the profession, his call for more resources for schools was well-received by most. Opening a London conference on children with AIDS, Princess Diana spoke about the confused understanding of HIV that existed and encouraged people through her own actions as well as words, to overcome their fear of touching people, especially children, with the virus. She also outlined the tragic situation of children with HIV and the prejudice they felt.

From the Daily Mail.

Nevertheless, by the mid-1990s, the monarchy was looking shaky, perhaps even mortal. The year 1992, referred to by the Queen, in her Christmas Speech, as her annus horriblis, had seen not just the separations of Charles and Diana (of Wales) as well as Andrew and Sarah (the Yorks), but also a major fire at Windsor Castle in November. When it was announced that the Crown would only pay for the replacement and repair of items in the royal private collection and that repairs to the fabric would therefore come from the tax-paying public, a serious debate began about the state of the monarchy’s finances and its tax status. In a poll, eight out of ten people asked thought the Queen should pay taxes on her private income, hitherto exempt. A year later, Buckingham Palace was opened to public tours for the first time and the Crown did agree to pay taxes.

In December 1992, Diana went to see William and Harry at school. She told them that Charles and she were not a couple anymore. Naturally, William and Harry were very upset about this. Later the same month, John Major announced the separation of Charles and Diana to the House of Commons. After their separation, Diana continued her charity work, especially with AIDS victims and in the campaign against the use of land mines in wars, all of which kept her in the public eye and maintained her popularity in Britain and worldwide.

William with his mother in the early nineties.

The journalist Andrew Morton claimed to tell Diana’s True Story in a book which described suicide attempts, blazing rows, her bulimia and her growing certainty that Prince Charles had resumed an affair with his old love Camilla Parker-Bowles, something he later confirmed in a television interview with Jonathan Dimbleby. There was a further blow to the Royal Family’s prestige in 1994 when the royal yacht Britannia, the floating emblem of the monarch’s global presence, was decommissioned. Mr and Mrs Parker-Bowles, Andrew and Camilla, divorced in 1995 and then came the revelatory 1995 (now discredited) interview on BBC TV’s Panorama programme between Diana and Martin Bashir. Breaking every taboo left in Royal circles, she freely discussed the breakup of her marriage, claiming that there were three of us in it, attacked the Windsors for their cruelty and promised to be ‘queen of people’s hearts.’ When Charles and Diana finally divorced in 1996, she began a relationship with Dodi al-Fayed, the son of the owner of Harrods, Mohammed al-Fayed.

Meanwhile, William continued his education at Eton College, near Windsor Castle, so that he could go there to visit his grandmother when she was at home. William worked hard at Eton and was also successful at sports. Then, on 31st August 1997, William and Harry were on holiday with his father and grandparents at Balmoral when the terrible news of their mother’s death in a car accident in Paris. On 6th September, the boys walked behind his mother’s coffin through the streets of London to Westminster Abbey for her funeral. Prince Harry, Prince Charles, Prince Philip and Diana’s brother, Earl Spencer, walked alongside them. Everyone felt heartbroken for the two young princes on what was a terrible day for the British royal family. William left Eton three years later, in 2000, and then went on a gap year, including a stint in Chile, where he worked as a resident teaching assistant.

To many in the establishment, Diana was a selfish, unhinged woman who was endangering the monarchy. To many millions more, however, she was more valuable than the formal monarchy, her readiness to share her pain in public making her even more fashionable. She was followed all around the world, her face and name selling many papers and magazines. By the late summer of 1997, Britain had two super-celebrities, Tony Blair and Princess Diana. It was therefore grimly fitting that Tony Blair’s most resonant words as Prime Minister which brought him to the height of his popularity came on the morning, in August 1997, when Princess Diana was killed in a car accident in Paris with Dodi Fayed. Their car was speeding away from paparazzi photographers when it crashed into the pillars of an underpass. Tony Blair was woken at his Sedgefield constituency home, first to be told about the accident, and then to be told that Diana had died. Deeply shocked and worried about what his proper role should be, Blair spoke first to Alistair Campbell and then to the Queen, who told him that neither she nor any other senior member of the Royal Family would be making a statement. He decided, therefore, that he had to say something. Later that Sunday morning, standing in front of his local parish church in Trimdon, he spoke words which were transmitted live around the world:

“I feel, like everyone else in this country today, utterly devastated. Our thoughts and prayers are with Princess Diana’s family, in particular her two sons, her two boys – our hearts go out to them. We are today a nation in a state of shock…

“Her own life was often sadly touched the lives of so many others in Britain and throughout the world with joy and with comfort. How many times shall we remember her in how many different ways, with the sick, the dying, with children, with the needy? With just a look or a gesture that spoke so much more than words, she would reveal to all of us the depth of her compassion and her humanity.

“People everywhere, not just here in Britain, kept faith with Princess Diana. They liked her, they loved her, they regarded her as one of the people. She was – the People’s Princess and that is how she will stay, how she will remain in our hearts and our memories for ever.”

Although these words seem, more than twenty-five years on, to be reminiscent of past tributes paid to religious leaders, at the time they were much welcomed and assented to. They were the sentiments of one natural charismatic public figure for another. Compared with other politicians, Tony Blair seemed very young and in tune with youth culture. Blair regarded himself as the People’s Prime Minister, leading the people’s party, beyond left and right, beyond faction or ideology, with a direct line to the people’s instincts. After his impromptu eulogy, his approval rating rose to over ninety per cent, a figure not normally witnessed in democracies.

Blair and Campbell then paid their greatest service to the ancient institution of the monarchy itself. The Queen, still angry and upset about Diana’s conduct and concerned for the welfare of her grandchildren, wanted a quiet funeral and to remain at Balmoral, away from the scenes of spontaneous public mourning in London. However, this was potentially disastrous for her public image. There was a strange mood in the country deriving from Diana’s charisma, which Blair had referenced in his words at Trimdon. If those words had seemed to suggest that Diana was a saint, a sub-religious hysteria responded to the thought. People queued to sign a book of condolence at St James’ Palace, rather than signing it online on the website of the Prince of Wales. Those queuing even reported supernatural appearances of the dead Princess’ image. By contrast, the lack of any act of public mourning by the Windsors and the suggestion of a quiet funeral seemed to confirm Diana’s television criticisms of the Royal Family as being cold if not cruel towards her.

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A sea of flowers laid in tribute to Diana, Princess of Wales, outside Kensington Palace, London, August 1997

Also, with Prince Charles’ full agreement, Blair and his aides put pressure on the Palace first into accepting that there would have to be a huge public funeral so that the public could express their grief, and second into accepting that the Queen should return to London. She did, just in time to quieten the genuine and growing anger about her perceived attitude towards Diana. This was a generational problem as well as a class one. The Queen had been brought up in a land of buttoned lips, stoicism and private grieving. She now reigned over a country which expected and almost required exhibitionism. For some years, the deaths of children, or the scenes of fatal accidents had been marked by little shrines of cellophane-wrapped flowers, soft toys and cards. In the run-up to Diana’s funeral parts of central London seemed almost Mediterranean in their public grieving. There were vast mounds of flowers, people sleeping out, holding up placards and weeping in the streets, and strangers hugging each other.

The funeral itself was like no other before, bringing the capital to a standstill. In Westminster Abbey, campaigners stood alongside aristocrats, entertainers with politicians and rock musicians with charity workers. Elton John performed a hastily rewritten version of ‘Candle in the Wind’, originally his lament for Marilyn Monroe, now dedicated to ‘England’s Rose’, and Princess Diana’s brother Earl Spencer made a half-coded attack from the pulpit on the Windsors’ treatment of his sister. This was applauded when it was relayed outside and clapping was heard in the Abbey itself. Diana’s body was driven to her last resting place at the Spencers’ ancestral home of Althorp in Northamptonshire. Nearly a decade later, and following many wild theories circulated through cyberspace which reappeared regularly in the press, an inquiry headed by a former Metropolitan Police commissioner concluded that she had died because the driver of her car was drunk and was speeding in order to throw off pursuing ‘paparazzi’ photographers. The immense outpouring of public emotion in the weeks that followed seemed both to overwhelm and distinguish itself from the more traditional devotion to the Queen herself and to her immediate family. As Simon Schama has put it,

The tidal wave of feeling that swept over the country testified to the sustained need of the public to come together in a recognizable community of sentiment, and to do so as the people of a democratic monarchy.

Diana’s funeral was probably watched by as many people as had watched her wedding. For a short time, the Queen became very unpopular, as she did not immediately return from Balmoral to Buckingham Palace when Diana died, or even fly a flag at half-mast. But those who complained about this in the popular media did not seem to understand that Royal protocol dictates that the Royal Standard should only be flown above Buckingham Palace when the Monarch is in residence. Added to this, the Union Flag is only flown above the royal palaces and other government and public buildings on certain special days, such as the Princess Royal’s birthday, 15 August. Since it was holiday time for the Royal family, and they were away from London, there were no flags flying. Nor would the general public have known that flags are only flown at half-mast on the announcement of the death of a monarch until after the funeral, and on the day of the funeral only for the deaths of other members of the royal family.

The Queen, as the only person who could authorise an exception to these age-old customs, received criticism for not flying the union flag at half-mast in order to fulfil the deep need of her grief-stricken subjects. Although Her Majesty meant no disrespect to her estranged and now deceased daughter-in-law, the Crown lives and dies in such symbolic moments, and she duly relented. The crisis was rescued by a live, televised speech she made from the Palace which was striking in its informality and obviously sincere expression of personal sorrow. Her people now understood that their way of grieving was very different from the more conventional but no less heartfelt mourning of the Queen and her immediate family. Her Majesty quickly rose again in public esteem and came to be seen to be one of the most successful monarchs for centuries and the longest-serving ever. A popular film about her, including a sympathetic portrayal of these events, sealed this verdict.

Above: Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth in 2001, aged 75. She reigned for another twenty-one years,
and celebrated her Diamond Jubilee in 2012 and her Platinum (70th) Jubilee in 2022.

Tony Blair never again quite captured the mood of the country as he did in those sad late summer days. It may be that his advice and assistance to the Queen in 1997, vital to her as they were, in the view of Palace officials, were also thoroughly impertinent. His instinct for popular culture when he arrived in power was certainly uncanny. The New Age spiritualism which came out into the open when Diana died was echoed among Blair’s Downing Street circle. What other politicians failed to grasp and what he did grasp, was the power of optimism expressed in the glossy world of celebrity, and the willingness of people to forgive their favourites not just once, but again and again. One of the negative longer-term consequences of all this was that charismatic celebrities discovered that, if they apologised and bared a little of their souls in public, they could get away with most things short of murder. For politicians, even charismatic ones like Tony Blair, life would prove a little tougher, and the electorate would be less forgiving of oft-repeated mistakes. Nevertheless, like Magaret Thatcher, he won three elections and was in office for more than ten years.

The monarchy was fully restored to popularity by the Millennium festivities, at which the Queen watched dancers from the Notting Hill Carnival under the famous Dome, and especially by the Golden Jubilee celebrations of 2002, which continued the newly struck royal mood of greater informality.

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One of the highlights of the ‘Party in the Mall’ came when Brian May, the lead guitarist of the rock band Queen began the pop concert at Buckingham Palace by playing his instrumental version of God Save the Queen from the Palace rooftop. Modern Britannia seemed, at last, to be at ease with its identity within a multi-national, multi-ethnic, United Kingdom, in all its mongrel glory.

Also in 2002, George VI’s widow, Queen Elizabeth, known as the Queen Mother after her husband’s death and her daughter’s accession in 1952, died at the age of 102. After George VI’s death, she continued to carry out many public duties at home and abroad. Many thought that Charles would not marry the divorced Camilla while his grandmother was still alive. She had become Queen Consort in 1937 because her brother-in-law, Edward VIII had not been allowed to marry a divorcée as king, choosing to abdicate the throne instead.

Prince Charles & the Duchess of Cornwall leaving their civil marriage ceremony at the Windsor Registry Office in 2005.

Charles and Camilla were able to marry in 2005, in a civil wedding at Windsor, but it was decided that Camilla should be known as Duchess of Cornwall, out of respect for Diana, Princess of Wales.

She is now (2022) also known as the Queen Consort.

Sources:

Simon Schama (2002), A History of Britain; The Fate of Empire, 1776-2000. London: BBC Worldwide.

Robert McCrum, William Cran & Robert MacNeil (1987), The Story of English. London: Penguin Books.

John Haywood & Simon Hall, et.al. (2001), The Penguin Atlas of British and Irish History. London: Penguin Books.

Gwyn A. Williams (1985), When Was Wales? Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Bill Lancaster & Tony Mason (eds.)(n.d.), Life and Labour in a Twentieth Century City: The Experience of Coventry. Coventry: University of Warwick Cryfield Press.

Appendix: A Breakdown of Census Statistics, 1901-1991, in Graphs:

Right:

Population: By the end of the twentieth century, there were twenty million more Britons than there were at its beginning, In the first part of the century, the population grew fast due to high birth rates. Since the 1970s, this growth slowed down. Fewer babies were being born. But people born since 1991 can expect to live much longer than those born in 1901. Women, as always, can expect to live longer than men. At the beginning of the century, only about four per cent of the population was over sixty-five: By its end, this had risen to thirteen per cent. At the same time, fewer babies were being born, so whereas in 1901 the average household included 4.6 people, in 1991, it was only 2.5. It was not just that there were fewer children, but also because there were many more single-parent families.

There was also a dramatic fall in the number of servants. Over the first half of the century, the number of households with live-in servants fell from over ten per cent to only about one per cent.

Work: The number of working women doubled over the course of the century. The number of unemployed people rose even faster, especially in the period between the two world wars, and again in the 1970s and ’80s. Those employed in manual labour or ‘manufacturing’ decreased significantly, by more than a quarter, from three-quarters of the workforce to less than half, so that in 1991 most people in work were in non-manual occupations based in shops and offices. On average, working hours were reduced by nine hours per week, more than one whole working day on average, leaving more family and leisure time.

Spending (left, below): Over the twentieth century, people were gradually able to spend an increasing proportion of their income on ‘consumer goods’ and a smaller proportion on food.

Majesty & Grace X: The Reign of Elizabeth Windsor – Winter of Discontent to Golden Jubilee, 1979-2002; Part 1 – Wars & Paupers.

Britain at the End of the Cold War World:
Britain, Ireland and the World, 1970-2000.

Britain had retreated from most of its empire by 1970. The only remaining colony was Rhodesia, which had been ruled by a white minority government, illegally, since 1967 and through the seventies. Britain resumed control in 1980 and the country became independent as Zimbabwe later that year. Various smaller island colonies in the Caribbean and the Pacific were granted independence in the seventies and eighties. The European Union, the Cold war and the NATO Alliance were Britain’s main concerns until 1990, while Ireland pursued a policy of neutrality. With the end of the Cold War, Britain took a more active role in Iraq, Bosnia and Kosovo. Hong Kong and its adjacent New Territories became an autonomous region of China in 1997 upon the expiry of the hundred-year lease. The removal of that colony, with its large population, enabled the British government to offer citizenship to the remaining small colonies that formed the British Overseas Territories.

A European solution, through membership of the EEC, twice vetoed by de Gaulle in the sixties, had finally been found in the early seventies under Heath and Wilson. Simultaneously, the third way, initiated in 1970 by free-enterprise, anti-collectivist Tories like Anthony Barber, Edward du Cann and Keith Joseph at the Selsdon Park conference, prepared the way for Margaret Thatcher’s attempt in the 1980s to liquidate what was left of the welfare state. Billed as a return to Victorian values, Thatcher’s Revolution was not, in fact, a return to Gladstonian liberalism, but a reversion to the hard-faced reactionary conservatism of the 1920s, leaving industries alone to survive and thrive or to go to the wall. As in the twenties, resistance to brutal rationalisation through closures and sell-offs of uneconomic nationalised enterprises, or through wage or job cuts, was met with determined opposition, which came to a head in the long-running coal dispute of 1984-85.

Britain continued to operate as a dominant centre of world finance, but even this advantage turned into a liability when the defence of the sterling forced successive governments, especially the second Wilson government, into accepting humiliating conditions, either from the United States or from the International Monetary Fund, involving deep spending cuts. The shrinkage of sovereignty accelerated, with increasing battles over the slice sizes of the ever-diminishing economic pie, fought out between unions and government. But successive governments seemed determined to keep Britain as a substantial military power with a fully funded welfare state. All the alternative models of post-imperial power applied between the sixties and the eighties ran into trouble. Relying exclusively on the United States for its nuclear defence was ruled out as anathema by both Labour and Conservatives. This was seen as an abdication, not just of great power but any power status, seeming to be a recolonisation in reverse.

The Assassination of Lord Mountbatten by the IRA, August 1979:

Of all the areas of the United Kingdom, it was Northern Ireland that continued to suffer the highest levels of unemployment in the eighties. This was mainly because the continuing sectarian violence discouraged inward investment in the six counties of the Province.

Lord Mountbatten of Burma

On August 27, 1979, in Mullaghmore, County Sligo, on the western coast of the Republic of Ireland (see the map above), a massive 50lb remote-controlled bomb exploded on board the fishing boat Shadow V, killing Lord Louis Mountbatten, his grandson and two others while they were boating on holiday off the coast. Lord Mountbatten was HM Queen Elizabeth’s second cousin and Prince Philip’s uncle. He was also, at that time, HRH Prince Charles’ great uncle, godfather and mentor. This was the height of the Provisional IRA’s bombing campaign across the British Isles.

Charles later described Lord Louis Mountbatten as the grandfather I never had. Mountbatten was a strong influence in the upbringing of his grand-nephew, and from time to time strongly upbraided the Prince for showing tendencies towards the idle pleasure-seeking dilettantism of his predecessor as Prince of Wales, King Edward VIII, whom Mountbatten had known well in their youth. Yet he also encouraged the Prince to enjoy the bachelor life while he could, and then to marry a young and inexperienced girl so as to ensure a stable married life.

Prince Charles in the late 1970s: the eligible Bachelor.

Mountbatten’s qualification for offering advice to this particular heir to the throne was unique; it was he who had arranged the visit of King George VI and Queen Elizabeth to Dartmouth Royal Naval College on 22 July 1939, taking care to include the young Princesses Elizabeth and Margaret in the invitation, but assigning his nephew, Cadet Prince Philip of Greece, to keep them amused while their parents toured the facility. This was the first recorded meeting of Charles’s future parents. But a few months later, Mountbatten’s efforts nearly came to nought when he received a letter from his sister Alice in Athens informing him that Philip was visiting her and had agreed to repatriate permanently to Greece. Within days, Philip received a command from his cousin and sovereign, King George II of Greece, to resume his naval career in Britain which, though given without explanation, the young prince obeyed.

In 1974, Mountbatten began corresponding with Charles about a potential marriage to his granddaughter, Amanda Knatchbull. It was about this time he also recommended that the 25-year-old prince get on with “sowing some wild oats”. Charles dutifully wrote to Amanda’s mother (who was also his godmother), Lady Brabourne, about his interest. Her answer was supportive but advised him that she thought her daughter was still rather young to be courted. Four years later, Mountbatten secured an invitation for himself and Amanda to accompany Charles on his planned 1980 tour of India. Their fathers promptly objected. Prince Philip also thought that the Indian public’s reception would more likely reflect a response to the uncle, the last Viceroy, than to the nephew. Lord Brabourne counselled that the intense scrutiny of the press would be more likely to drive Mountbatten’s godson and granddaughter apart than together. Charles was rescheduled to tour India alone, but Mountbatten did not live to the planned date of departure.

Mountbatten usually holidayed at his summer home, Classiebawn Castle, on the Mullaghmore Peninsula in County Sligo, in the northwest of Ireland. The village was only twelve miles from the border with County Fermanagh in Northern Ireland and near an area known to be used as a cross-border refuge by IRA members. In 1978, the IRA had allegedly attempted to shoot Mountbatten as he was aboard his boat, but poor weather had prevented the sniper from taking his shot. On 27th August 1979, Mountbatten went lobster potting and tuna fishing in his thirty-foot wooden boat, Shadow V, which had been moored in the harbour at Mullaghmore. IRA member Thomas McMahon had slipped onto the unguarded boat the previous night and attached a radio-controlled bomb weighing fifty pounds. When Mountbatten and his party had taken the boat just a few hundred yards from the shore, the bomb was detonated. The boat was destroyed by the force of the blast and Mountbatten’s legs were almost blown off. Mountbatten, then aged seventy-nine, was pulled alive from the water by nearby fishermen but died from his injuries before being brought to shore.

Also aboard the boat were Amanda Knatchbull’s elder sister Patricia, Lady Brabourne; her husband Lord Brabourne; their twin sons Nicholas and Timothy Knatchbull; Lord Brabourne’s mother Doreen, Dowager Lady Brabourne; and Paul Maxwell, a young crew member from Enniskillen in County Fermanagh. Nicholas (aged fourteen) and Paul (fifteen) were killed by the blast and the others were seriously injured. Doreen, Dowager Lady Brabourne (eighty-three), died from her injuries the following day. The attack triggered outrage and condemnation around the world. The Queen received messages of condolence from leaders including US President Jimmy Carter and Pope John Paul II. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said:

‘His death leaves a gap that can never be filled. The British people give thanks for his life and grieve at his passing.‘

Admiral of the Fleet The Right Honourable
The Earl Mountbatten of Burma
Portrait by Allan Warren, 1976

On the day of the bombing, the IRA also ambushed and killed eighteen British soldiers at the gates of Narrow Water Castle, just outside Warrenpoint, in County Down in Northern Ireland, sixteen of them from the Parachute Regiment, in what became known as the Warrenpoint ambush. It was the deadliest attack on the British Army during the Troubles. Six weeks later, Sinn Féin vice-president Gerry Adams said of Mountbatten’s death:

“The IRA gave clear reasons for the execution. I think it is unfortunate that anyone has to be killed, but the furor created by Mountbatten’s death showed up the hypocritical attitude of the media establishment. As a member of the House of Lords, Mountbatten was an emotional figure in both British and Irish politics. What the IRA did to him is what Mountbatten had been doing all his life to other people; and with his war record I don’t think he could have objected to dying in what was clearly a war situation. He knew the danger involved in coming to this country. In my opinion, the IRA achieved its objective: people started paying attention to what was happening in Ireland.”

When Charles finally proposed marriage to Amanda later in 1979, the circumstances had changed and she refused him.

The Winter of Discontent:

The winter of our discontent, a phrase from Shakespeare’s play Richard III, was used by James Callaghan, Labour Prime Minister from 1976, to describe the industrial and social chaos of 1978-79. It has stuck in people’s memories, as few economic or political events had done before or have done since. In the two years, 1977 and ’78 there was an explosion of resentment, largely by poorly paid public employees, against a minority Labour government incomes policy they felt was discriminatory. It began earlier in 1978 but got far worse with a series of strikes going into winter, resulting in rubbish being left piled up and rotting in the streets throughout the country. Added to this, the schools closed, the ports were blockaded and the dead went unburied. Left-wing union leaders and activists whipped up the disputes; individual union branches and shop stewards were reckless and heartless. Right-wing newspapers, desperate to see the end of Labour, exaggerated the effects and rammed home the picture of a nation no longer governable. The scenes on Britain’s streets provided convincing propaganda for the conservatives in the subsequent election in May 1979.

Callaghan had opposed the legal restrictions on union power pleaded for by Wilson and Castle and then fought for vainly by Heath. Healey, acting in good faith, had imposed a more drastic squeeze on public spending and thus on the poorest families than had been economically necessary. They had also tried to impose an unreasonably tough new income policy on the country. Finally, by dithering about the date of the general election, he destroyed whatever fragile calm he had managed to establish and enjoy since he had taken over from Wilson. Most observers and members of the cabinet assumed that Callaghan would call an autumn election in 1978. The economic news was still good and Labour was ahead in the polls. Two dates in October had already been pencilled in, but musing on his Sussex farm during the summer, Callaghan decided that he did not trust the polls. He decided to wait until the following spring. But when he invited a dozen trade union leaders to his farm to discuss the decision, they left still thinking he was going in the autumn. But then, at the beginning of autumn, at the TUC conference, he confused the issue even more with a bizarre rendition of an old music hall concert, leaving his audience to interpret its meaning. When he finally came clean with the cabinet, they were shocked.

This might not have mattered so much had Callaghan also not promised a new five per cent pay limit to bring down inflation further. As a result of the 1974-75 cash limit on pay rises at a time of high inflation, take-home pay for most people had been falling ever since. Public sector workers, in particular, had been having a hard time, and there were stories of fat cat directors and bosses awarding themselves high settlements. The union leaders and many ministers thought that a further period of pay limits would be impossible for them to sell to their members, while a five per cent limit, was widely considered to be ludicrously tough. Had Callaghan gone to the country in October, Labour’s popularity among the general electorate might have been boosted by the pay restraint policy. But by postponing the election until the spring, Callaghan ensured that the five per cent limit would be tested in Britain’s increasingly impatient and dangerous industrial relations environment. The first challenge came from the fifty-seven thousand car workers employed by the US giant Ford. The TGWU called for a thirty per cent pay rise, on the back of high profits and an eighty per cent rise for its chairman and directors. Callaghan was severely embarrassed and when, after five weeks of lost production, Ford eventually settled for seventeen per cent, he became convinced that he would lose the coming election.

Oil tanker drivers, also TGWU members, came out for forty per cent, followed by haulage drivers, British Leyland workers, and then sewerage workers. BBC electricians threatened a blackout of Christmas TV. The docks were picketed and closed down with Hull, virtually cut off, becoming known as the second Stalingrad. The effects of this were being felt by government ministers as well as the rest of the country. Bill Rodgers, the transport minister, whose mother was dying of cancer, found that vital chemotherapy chemicals were not being allowed out of Hull. In the middle of all this, Callaghan went to an international summit in the Caribbean, from where the pictures of him swimming and sunning himself did not improve the mood back home. When he returned to Heathrow, confronted by news reporters asking about the industrial crisis, he replied blandly, “I don’t think other people in the world will share the view that there is mounting chaos.” This was famously translated into the Daily Mail’s headline, ‘Crisis? What Crisis?’

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Above: Rubbish is left piled up in London’s Leicester Square in February 1979

In the centre of London and other major cities, huge piles of rotting rubbish piled up, overrun with rats and becoming a serious health hazard. Most of those striking among the public sector workers were badly paid and living in relative poverty, also having no history of industrial militancy. Nor was the crisis quite as bad as the media portrayed it. There were no deaths in hospitals as a result of union action, there was no shortage of food in the shops and there was no violence. Troops were never used. This was chaos and a direct threat to the authority of the government, but it was not a revolutionary situation, or even an attempt to overthrow a particular government. Yet that was the effect it had, and it led to what was to become Thatcherism, not socialism. A ‘St Valentine’s Day Concordat’ was eventually reached between the government and the TUC, which agreed on annual assessments and guidance, targeting long-term inflation and virtually admitting that the five per cent pay limit had been a mistake. By March most of the action had ended and various large settlements and inquiries had been set up. But by then irreparable damage had already been done to the Labour Government’s reputation as a manager of industrial disputes.

The St David’s Day Devolution Debácle & General Election of 1979:

When the matter of devolution was put to the Welsh electorate in a referendum on St. David’s Day, 1979, it voted overwhelmingly against the planned assembly, by 956,000 votes to 243,000. Every one of the relatively new Welsh counties voted ‘No’. The supporters were strongest in the north-west (Gwynedd), at twenty-two per cent of those voting and weakest in Glamorgan and Gwent at seven to eight per cent, but everywhere there was a crushing rejection of the Labour government’s proposal; only some twelve per cent voted in favour overall. The narrow failure of the Scottish referendum due to the forty per cent clause meant that under previously agreed rules, the Devolution Act setting up a Scottish Assembly had to be repealed. In the Commons, the government was running out of allies. There was therefore no longer any reason for the SNP to continue supporting the Labour government. Plaid Cymru, unlike the SNP, did not call on its MPs to vote to bring about the end of the government. As dying MPs were carried through the lobbies to keep the sinking Labour ship afloat. Michael Foot and the Labour whips continued to try to find any kind of majority, appealing to renegade Scots, Ulster Unionists and Irish nationalists simultaneously but Callaghan, by now, was in a calmly fatalistic mood. He did not want to struggle on through another summer and autumn in the hope that something would turn up.

Finally, on 28th March, the government was defeated by a single vote, and Callaghan became the first Prime Minister since Ramsay MacDonald in 1924 to have to go to Buckingham Palace and ask for a dissolution of parliament because he had lost a vote in the Commons. The election campaign began after the IRA’s assassination of Mrs Thatcher’s leadership campaign manager, Airey Neave, murdered by a Provisional IRA car bomb on his way to the Commons. Thatcher took on Callaghan, who was still more popular than his party and who now emphasised stable prices and his new deal with the unions. Thatcher showed a fresh, authentic face in the media, working with television news teams and taking the advice of advertising gurus, like the Saatchi brothers. Using the slogan Labour isn’t working, which appeared on huge hoardings showing long dole queues, the Tories came back to power with a clear and substantial majority with 339 seats. In the General Election, the Conservatives took sixty-one seats directly from Labour and gained nearly forty-three per cent of the vote.

At a time of heavy swings to the Tories everywhere, the heaviest swings of all, outside London, was in Wales, and in every part of Wales. More Tory MPs were returned in Wales than at any previous twentieth-century election, eleven in all. Nevertheless, Labour remained a massive presence, with twenty-one seats out of thirty-six and forty-seven per cent of the vote compared with thirty-two per cent for the Conservatives. In June, in the heartland of Labourism, there was also a heavy vote against the European Common Market. In the General Election of May, Wales located itself firmly in the political South of Britain, rather than its traditional role as a Northern Labour stronghold. What had happened was that a third challenger had bypassed the old debates and left Labour and Plaid Cymru gasping. The latter’s President, Gwynfor Evans, came third behind the Tory in Carmarthen, and a Sussex solicitor ‘parachuted’ onto Anglesey, Mother of Wales, to win the seat ahead of both Labour and Nationalist parties with a swing of twelve per cent. The Tories also ended generations of Liberal predominance in Montgomeryshire. Even in Labour’s industrial heartlands of the southern valleys, the swing to the Conservatives was the second strongest in Britain.

One effect of this abrupt reversal of a hundred years of history was to equally abruptly cut off an intelligentsia from its people. The ‘professional’ Welsh, blinded by their own desires, had misread Wales very badly in the 1970s. In the 1980s, historians Gwyn Williams (right) and Dai Smith (below) argued that the reasons for this were as much sociological as ideological. The decline of the Welsh coalfields entailed a withering of major political and cultural energies. History had been wilfully redefined so that it stood only as a commentary on what might, or should, have been.

Both Smith and Williams recognised that a more pragmatic, economic nationalism was on offer from the ‘National Left’ of Plaid Cymru, which took a libertarian socialist stance and tried to establish links with ecological, peace and feminist groups. Nevertheless, the broad understanding behind the resurgence of political, cultural and linguistic nationalism remained the same, implicitly, as it had been, explicitly in the 1920s and 30s: The prevailing theory endured from that original period that the anglicisation of Wales was an avoidable disaster because the industrialisation of Wales had replaced the pure ‘old Welsh collier’ population with a conglomeration of ‘half-people,’ the Cymry di-Gymraeg (‘the Welsh without Welsh’).

Of course, by the mid-1970s, Plaid Cymru was no longer advocating, with the cold logic of Saunders Lewis, the deindustrialisation of Wales. In any case, this was something that was to be largely accomplished by the Thatcher government after 1979, though for very different reasons. In the twenty years previous to 1979, what had been stressed by cultural and political nationalists was the extent to which the modern experience of Wales had been a ‘fall from grace.’ Even in the eighties, many traditional nationalists did still believe that Wales could only be saved through the restoration of the old ‘Welsh’ values, delivered by the vehicle of the ancient Welsh language, albeit in ‘living’ form. But by then, the votes of 1979 had already dramatically registered the end of an epoch in Wales in which intellectuals – liberal, nationalist and labourist – had articulated the consciousness of various social groups and classes in Welsh society.

After the Spring of 1979, managerial and administrative groups in Wales became increasingly integrated into broader, technocratic European contexts, without any specifically Welsh content. The most visible and creative formers of educated opinion among the Welsh were rejected by their people and viewed as irrelevant. Old Labourism in Wales, along with Gwynfor Evans’s Nationalism and Lloyd George’s Liberalism were all effectively dead. Michael Foot and Neil Kinnock (above) tried hard to resurrect the Bevanite tradition across Wales and England, supported by the Tribune Left in the early eighties, but they ultimately failed to provide an Alternative Economic Strategy to that of Thatcherism in the three successive general elections. Mrs Thatcher herself had an acronym for her monetarist policies, TINA (There is no alternative). Dai Smith summed up the extent to which the cultural battlefield had already shifted, writing in 1984:

Wales in the 1980s has become its own industry. … The production of history in Wales is now a battleground on which rival armies contend to dispel the confusion. … What we are witnessing is the invoking of the Welsh past in the disputed name of the Welsh future. … Social history that dips a toe in national waters is invariably accused of polluting intent. The purity of emotion is defiled. … for the Wales that is projected to the outside world is not a Wales most of the Welsh know or recognise as anything of their own. Perhaps our ambivalent condition is exemplary after all. We are already a long way down the road which England… has just begun to contemplate. After all, England, too, is a country of the mind.

Dai Smith (1984), Wales! Wales? Hemel Hempstead: George Allen & Unwin, pp. 165-68.

The Breaking of Consensus, Blitz on Jobs & Wales in the Wilderness:

Meanwhile, the players in the last act of Old British Labour and the broken post-war Consensus stumbled on. Callaghan continued as Labour leader until retiring in October 1980. Michael Foot took over as Labour leader after a contest with Denis Healey, who then fought a desperate struggle against Tony Benn and the Left to become Deputy leader, as his party did its best to commit suicide in public. Numerous moderates formed the breakaway SDP. The Scottish Nationalists, derided by Callaghan for voting him down as “turkeys voting for Christmas” lost eleven of their thirteen MPs. The unions lost almost half their members and any real political influence they briefly held.

More important than all that, mass unemployment would return to Britain. It was the one economic medicine so bitter that no minister in the seventies, Labour or Tory, had dared to uncork it, until those of the Thatcher government. In the election campaign, Margaret Thatcher promised a return to the values which had made Victorian Britain great. However, what the British people got was more of a return to the hard-nosed Toryism of the interwar years as the Thatcher government set about the task of deliberately lengthening those dole queues. As wage rises were believed to be the main source of inflation and heavy unemployment, it was often openly argued, would weaken trade union bargaining power, and was a price worth paying. At the same time, an economic squeeze was introduced, involving heavy tax increases and a reduction in public borrowing to deflate the economy, thus reducing both demand and employment. In the 1980s, two million manufacturing jobs disappeared, most of them by 1982.

When Thatcher took on the moderate ‘wets’ in her cabinet, including Jim Prior (bottom of the cartoon), she could rely on the support of much of the press.

Almost immediately after the general election, Wales was fully exposed to the Conservative crusade and the radical restructuring of increasingly multinational capitalism in Britain. The Welsh working population reached a peak in 1979 when just over a million people were at work, fifty-five per cent of them in the service sector and forty-two per cent of them women in the core industries. The run-down of the coal industry continued and was followed by a sharp reduction in steel. A Guardian columnist wrote that, in economic terms, every time England catches a cold, Wales gets influenza. Between June 1980 and June 1982, the official working population fell by no fewer than 106,000. The most catastrophic losses were in steel which lost half its workers and plummeted to 38,000. In addition, there were heavy losses in chemicals, textiles, engineering, construction and general manufacturing. The distributive trades, transport and communications also shed thousands of jobs. Public administration lost proportionately fewer, while a whole range of services in insurance, banking, entertainment, leisure, education and medical services gained four thousand workers.

By June 1983 the official working population of Wales was at 882,000, its lowest level in modern times. There was a high level of unemployment, particularly among a whole generation of young people. In the Thatcher years Wales, like Scotland, was dominated by the politics of resistance to Conservatism, but the Wales TUC was weakened by losing numbers and funds, seemingly incapable of adequate adjustment and response. Overall, the organised trade union movement seemed encased in a perception of a Welsh working class which had become a myth. There was a People’s March for Jobs, but it was a pale imitation not just of previous mass demonstrations in the valleys, but even of the contemporary ones in England. The exceptions were, again, the successful strikes and campaigns against closures by the South Wales Miners (South Wales Area, NUM) in 1981-82, but even there, the question was being asked at public meetings, Have the Miners Really Won? The answer came in 1984, by which time they were gaining support, and preparing to fight a struggle as hard and as dedicated as any in their history.

Meanwhile, much radical energy went into CND mass meetings and protests, which acquired much more weight across south Wales and the valleys, from Monmouthshire to Carmarthenshire. The protest camp at the Greenham Common missile base was started by a march of women from Cardiff. Around the language issue, the clamour and turmoil revived and continued in the campaign for the Welsh-medium television channel, S4C. Among Welsh nationalist students, support for constitutional nationalism plummeted after the Referendum result and calls for more radical direct action multiplied for the first time since the Investiture Crisis of 1969 and the botched bombing of Caernarfon Castle. This action was largely limited to student members of Cymdeithas yr Iaith (Welsh Language Society) climbing transmitter masts and smashing old television sets at the National Eisteddfod. The friction between Welsh-speaking and English-speaking students led to a division in the student unions in both Bangor and Aberystwyth, allowing right-wing English conservatives to take control. Using Gandhian tactics, Gwynfor Evans, having stood down as President of the Plaid Cymru, began a lengthy hunger strike to secure the Fourth Channel in Welsh, which was eventually launched, by Superted, the cartoon character, in the late summer of 1982.

In 1981, after a successful campaign to establish a fourth television channel in Welsh, Gwynfor Evans (left) stood down as Plaid Cymru President after thirty-six years, to be replaced by Dafydd Wigley, MP for Caernarfon (right).

There was also a no far more sinister campaign led by the shadowy organisations, Meibion Glyndwr (Sons of Glyndwr) and The Workers’ Army of the Welsh Republic (the Welsh initials spelling ‘Dawn’), which apparently acquired weapons from the former Official IRA. A major campaign of arson began in 1980, against holiday homes throughout western Wales, where passive support from local people went under the humourous slogan Strike a Light for Wales above a picture of an ‘England’s Glory’ matchbox. A major police action was launched by Gwynedd and Dyfed-Powys police forces, Operation Tán (Fire), producing a chorus of complaints over violations of civil rights, telephone tapping and the use of agents provocateurs. Several police officers were accused of fabricating evidence and confessions and of trying to falsely implicate the Meirionydd MP Dafydd Elis Thomas in a bombing campaign against military, government and Conservative Party offices.

The Iron Lady on manoeuvres with a tank, union flag and Prince of Wales’s feathers. By 1983, she had well and truly parked her tank on the green, green grass of Wales, and was at the peak of her powers throughout the United Kingdom.
Sacrificing the Young – the Case of Coventry in the Recession:

In Coventry, nearly sixty thousand jobs were lost in this period of recession from 1979 to 1983. The Conservative policy of high-interest rates tended to overvalue the pound, particularly in the USA, the major market for Coventry’s specialist cars, leading to a rapid decline in demand. Also, the Leyland management embarked on a new rationalisation plan. The company’s production was to be concentrated at its Cowley and Longbridge plants. Triumph production was transferred to Cowley, and Rover models were to be produced at the new Solihull plant. The Coventry engine plant at Courthouse Green was closed and Alvis, Climax and Jaguar were sold off to private buyers. In the first three years of the Thatcher government, the number of Leyland employees in the city fell from twenty-seven thousand to eight thousand. One writer summarised the effects of Conservative policy on Coventry in these years as turning a process of gentle decline into a quickening collapse. Overall the city’s top manufacturing firms shed thirty-one thousand workers between 1979 and 1982. Well-known pillars of Coventry’s economic base such as Herbert’s, Triumph Motors and Renold’s all disappeared. Unemployment had stood at just five per cent in 1979, the same level as in 1971. By 1982 it had risen to sixteen per cent.

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None of this had been expected locally when the Thatcher government came to power. After all, Coventry had prospered reasonably well during the previous Tory administrations. The last real boom in the local economy had been stimulated by the policies of Ted Heath’s Chancellor, Anthony Barber. However, the brakes were applied rather than released by the new government. Monetarist policies were quick to bite into the local industry. Redundancy lists and closure notices in the local press became as depressingly regular as the obituary column. The biggest surprise was the lack of resistance from the local Labour movement, given Coventry’s still formidable trade union movement. There was an atmosphere of bewilderment and an element of resignation characterised in the responses of many trades-union officials. It was as if the decades of anti-union editorials in the Coventry Evening Telegraph were finally being realised.

There were signs of resistance at Longbridge, but the British Leyland boss, Michael Edwardes, had introduced a tough new industrial relations programme which had seen the removal from the plant of the union convenor, Red Robbo (Derek Robinson), Britain’s strongest motor factory trade union leader. Edwardes had also closed the Speke factory on Merseyside, demonstrating that he could and would close plants in the face of trade union opposition. Coventry’s car workers and their union leaders had plenty of experience in local wage bargaining in boom times but lacked strategies to resist factory closures during the recession. Factory occupation, imitating its successful use on the continent, had been tried at the Meriden Triumph Motorcycle factory, but with disastrous results. The opposition from workers was undoubtedly diminished by redundancy payments which in many cases promised to cushion families for a year or two from the still unrealised effects of the recession.

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Above: Employment levels in Coventry to 1981, showing a sharp decline after 1979.

As experienced in Wales, young people were the real victims of these redundancies, as there were now no places or apprenticeships for them to fill. The most depressing feature of Coventry’s unemployment was that the most severely affected were the teenagers leaving the city’s newly-completed network of Community Comprehensives. As the recession hit the city, many of them joined the job market only to find that expected opportunities in the numerous factories had evaporated. By June 1980, forty-six per cent of the city’s sixteen to eighteen-year-olds were seeking employment and over half of the fourteen thousand who had left school the previous year were still unemployed. Much prized craft apprenticeships all but vanished and only ninety-five apprentices commenced training in 1981. In 1981-2, the Local Authority found posts for some 5,270 youths on training courses, work experience and community projects, but with limited long-term effects.

The early 1980s were barren years for Coventry youngsters, despite the emergence of their own sca group, The Specials, and their own theme song, Ghost Town, which also gave vent to what was becoming a national phenomenon. The lyric’s sombre comparison of boom time and bust was felt much more sharply in Coventry than elsewhere. Coventry paid a very heavy price in the 1980s for its over-commitment to the car industry, suffering more than nearby Midland towns such as Leicester and Nottingham, both of which had broader-based economies. Its peculiar dependence on manufacturing and its historically weak tertiary sector meant that it was a poor location for the so-called sunrise industries. These were high-tech enterprises, based largely along the axial belt running from London to Slough, Reading and Swindon, so they had an insignificant initial impact on unemployment in Coventry and other Midland and Northern industrial centres. The growth in service industries was also, initially at least, mainly to the benefit of the traditional administrative centres, such as Birmingham, rather than to its West Midland neighbours.

While little development work took place in local factories, Nissan recruited hundreds of foremen from Coventry for its new plant in Sunderland, announced before the Thatcher government, and Talbot removed its Whitley research and development facility to Paris in 1983, along with its French-speaking Coventrians. Only at Leyland’s Canley site did research provide a service for plants outside the city. For the first time in a hundred years, Coventry had become a net exporter of labour. By the time of the 1981 Census, the city had already lost 7.5 per cent of its 1971 population. The main losses were among the young skilled and technical management sectors, people who any town or city can ill afford to lose. Summing up the city’s position at this time, Lancaster and Mason (see source list) emphasised the dramatic transition in its fortunes from boomtown, a magnet for labour from the depressed areas, to a depressed district itself:

Coventry in the mid 1980s displays more of the confidence in the future that was so apparent in the immediate post-war years. The city, which for four decades was the natural habitat of the affluent industrial worker is finding it difficult to adjust to a situation where the local authority and university rank amongst the largest employers. Coventry’s self-image of progressiveness and modernity has all but vanished. The citizens now largely identify themselves and their environment as part of depressed Britain.  

The Falklands Factor – War in the South Atlantic:

One of the many ironies of the Thatcher story is that she was rescued from the political consequences of her monetarism by the blunders of her hated Foreign Policy. In the great economic storms of 1979-81, and on the European budget battle, she had simply charged ahead, ignoring all the flapping around her in pursuit of a single goal. In the South Atlantic, she would do exactly the same and with her good luck, she was vindicated. Militarily, it could so easily have all gone wrong, and the Falklands War could have been a terrible disaster, confirming the Argentinian dictatorship in power in the South Atlantic and ending Margaret Thatcher’s career after just one term as Prime Minister. Of all the gambles in modern British politics, the sending of a task force of ships from the shrunken and underfunded Royal Navy eight thousand miles away to take a group of islands by force was one of the most extreme.

On both sides, the conflict derived from colonial quarrels, dating back to 1833, before the reign of Queen Victoria began, when the scattering of islands had been declared a British colony. In Buenos Aires, a newly installed ‘junta’ under General Leopoldo Galtieri was heavily dependent on the Argentine navy, itself passionately keen on taking over the islands, known in Argentina as the Malvinas. The following year would see the 150th anniversary of ‘British ownership’ which the Argentines feared would be used to reassert the Falklands’ British future. The junta misread Whitehall’s lack of policy for lack of interest and concluded that an invasion would be easy, popular and impossible to reverse. In March an Argentine ship tested the waters by landing on South Georgia, a small dependency south of the Falklands, disembarking scrap-metal dealers. Then on 1 April, the main invasion began, a landing by Argentine troops which had been carefully prepared for by local representatives of the national airline. In three hours it was all over, and the eighty British marines surrendered, having killed five Argentine troops and injured seventeen with no losses of their own.

In London, there was mayhem. Thatcher had had a few hours’ warning of what was happening from the Defence Secretary, John Nott. Calling a hurried meeting in her Commons office, Sir John Leach gave her clarity and hope, when her ministers were as confused as she was. He told her he could assemble a task force of destroyers, frigates and landing craft, led by Britain’s two remaining aircraft carriers. It could be ready to sail within forty-eight hours and the islands could be retaken by force. She told him to go ahead. Soon after, the Foreign Secretary, Peter Carrington, tended his resignation, accepting responsibility for the Foreign Office’s failings. But Margaret Thatcher was confronted by a moral question which she could not duck, which was that many healthy young men were likely to die or be horribly injured in order to defend the ‘sovereignty’ of the Falkland Islanders. In the end, almost a thousand died, one for every two islanders and many others were maimed and psychologically wrecked.

In the cabinet and the Commons, Thatcher argued that the whole structure of national identity and international law was at stake. Michael Foot, who had been bellicose in parliament at first, harking back to the appeasement of fascism in the thirties, urged her to find a diplomatic answer. Later she insisted that she was vividly aware of the blood price that was waiting and not all consumed by lust for conflict. Thatcher had believed from the start that caving in would finish her. The press, like the Conservative Party itself, was seething about the original diplomatic blunders. As it happened, the Argentine junta, even more belligerent, ensured that a serious deal was never properly put. They simply insisted that the British Task Force be withdrawn from the entire area and that Argentine representatives should take part in any interim administration and that if talks failed Britain would simply lose sovereignty. The reality, though, was that their political position was even weaker than hers. She established a small war cabinet and the Task Force, now up to twenty vessels strong was steadily reinforced. Eventually, it comprised more than a hundred ships and twenty-five thousand men. The world was both transfixed and bemused.

The Empire struck back, and by the end of the month South Georgia was recaptured and a large number of Argentine prisoners taken: Thatcher urged questioning journalists outside Number Ten simply to ‘rejoice, rejoice!’ Then came one of the most controversial episodes in the short war. A British submarine, The Conqueror, was following the ageing but heavily armed cruiser, the Belgrano. The British task force was exposed and feared a pincer movement, although the Belgrano was later found to have been outside an exclusion zone announced in London, and streaming away from the fleet. With her military commanders at Chequers, Thatcher authorised the submarine attack. The Belgrano was sunk, with the loss of 321 sailors. The Sun newspaper carried the headline ‘Gotcha!’ Soon afterwards, a British destroyer was hit by an Argentine Exocet missile and later sunk. Forty died.

On 18 May 1982, the war cabinet agreed that landings on the Falklands should go ahead, despite the lack of full air cover and worsening weather. By landing at the unexpected bay of San Carlos in low clouds, British troops got ashore in large numbers. Heavy Argentine air attacks, however, took a serious toll. Two frigates were badly damaged, another was sunk, then another, then a destroyer, then a container ship with vital supplies. Nevertheless, three thousand British troops secured a beachhead and began to fight their way inland. Over the next few weeks, they captured the settlements of Goose Green and Darwin, killing 250 Argentine soldiers and capturing 1,400 for the loss of twenty British lives. Colonel ‘H’ Jones became the first celebrated hero of the conflict when he died leading ‘2 Para’ against heavy Argentine fire.

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The Royal Marines ‘yomp’ towards Port Stanley during the Falklands War, June 1982

The battle then moved to the tiny capital, Port Stanley, or rather to the circle of hills around it where the Argentine army was dug in. Before the final assault on 8 June, two British landing ships, Sir Tristram and Sir Galahad were hit by missiles and the Welsh Guards suffered dreadful losses, many of the survivors being badly burned. Simon Weston was one of them. Out of his platoon of thirty men, twenty-two were killed. The Welsh Guards lost a total of forty-eight men killed and ninety-seven wounded aboard the Sir Galahad. Weston survived with forty-six per cent burns, following which his face was barely recognisable. He recalled:

Simon Weston in 2008

“My first encounter with a really low point was when they wheeled me into the transit hospital at RAF Lyneham and I passed my mother in the corridor and she said to my gran, “Oh mam, look at that poor boy” and I cried out “Mam, it’s me!” As she recognised my voice her face turned to stone.”

Simon Weston later became a well-known spokesman and charity worker for his fellow injured and disabled veterans. The Queen’s second son, Prince Andrew, Duke of York, also saw active service in the Falklands War, as a helicopter pilot. For millions around the world, however, the War seemed a complete anachronism, a Victorian gunboat war in a nuclear age. But for millions in Britain, it served as a wholly unexpected and almost mythic symbol of rebirth. Margaret Thatcher herself lost no time in telling the whole country what she thought the war meant. It was more than simply a triumph of freedom and democracy over the Argentinian dictatorship. Speaking at Cheltenham racecourse in early July, she said:

We have ceased to be a nation in retreat. We have instead a newfound confidence, born in the economic battles at home and found true eight thousand miles away … Printing money is no more. Rightly this government has abjured it. Increasingly the nation won’t have it … That too is part of the ‘Falklands factor.’ … Britain found herself again in the South Atlantic and will not look back from the victory she has won. 

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A 1982 cartoon: Britain was at war with Argentina over the Falkland Islands. The inhabitants of the islands, a dependent territory of the United Kingdom, wanted to remain under British rule, but Argentina invaded.

Of course, the Falklands War fitted into Margaret Thatcher’s personal narrative and merged into a wider sense that confrontation was required in public life and the country’s politics. Thatcher was victorious, but it was a costly war for the British. Across Wales, for example, where the atmosphere was already becoming unpleasant in many respects, the impact was direct, especially relating to the disaster which befell the Welsh Guards at Bluff Cove, but also in anxieties over the Welsh communities in Patagonia in Argentina, who, like the Falklanders, had formed their colonies there in the nineteenth century. Despite opposition to the War from Plaid Cymru, a traditional pacifist party, there is little doubt that the War gave the same impetus to British patriotism, and chauvinism, and to the Conservatives, as it did in other parts of Britain. The Tories had looked destined for defeat in the 1983 General Election, but following the Falklands War, the Iron Lady, also variously characterised as Boadicea (Boudicca) and Britannia, swept back to power on a tidal wave of revived jingoistic imperialism. Even in Labour heartlands, such as south Wales, the Tories made more major gains.

The Demise of the Heartlands & Death of ‘Old King Coal’, 1983-87:

As the general election loomed, with Labour in visible disarray, and with the appreciably calamitous effects of the Tory policies on the Welsh economy, it was on the left wing of the national movement that awareness of the bankruptcy of traditional political attitudes seem to have registered. However, in the Wales of 1983, these could only be marginal movements. The great majority of the Welsh electorate remained locked within what was now essentially an unholy trinity of parties. The General Election of 1983 exposed the myth that the South Welsh valleys were still some kind of ‘heartland’ of Labour; it registered even more visibly than 1979 had done, Wales’s presence within the South of Britain in terms of political geography. In Wales as a whole, the Labour vote fell by nearly ten per cent, a fall exceeded only in East Anglia and the South East; it ran level with London again. The Conservative vote fell by only twenty-four thousand (1.7 per cent), whereas the Labour vote fell by over 178,000. The great beneficiaries were the Liberal-SDP alliance, whose vote rocketed by over two hundred thousand.

The Conservatives took the Cardiff West seat of George Thomas, the former Speaker, and the marginal seat of Bridgend, swept most of Cardiff and again pressed very hard throughout the rural west, ending up with thirteen seats out of thirty-eight. Plaid Cymru held its two seats in the northwest and moved into second place on Anglesey. It also registered significant votes in Carmarthen, Caerphilly, Ceredigion, Llanelli and the Rhondda. The success of the Liberal-SDP Alliance was spectacular. It more than doubled the former Liberal poll, reaching twenty-three per cent of the Welsh electorate, won two seats and came second in nineteen out of thirty-eight. Labour’s defeat came close to becoming a rout, but the party managed to retain a score of seats despite dropping nearly ten per cent in the poll. It was now a minority party again, at its lowest level since 1918. It held on by the skin of its teeth in Carmarthen and to Wrexham, a former stronghold. Even in the coalfield valleys, where it held all but one of its seats, six became three-way marginals without an overall majority. The Alliance came second in ten, and in the Rhondda won eight thousand votes without even campaigning. Only seven seats remained with overall Labour majorities, and only three of the old twenty-thousand majorities were left: Rhondda, Merthyr Tydfil and Ebbw Vale (Blaenau Gwent). Looking ahead (from c 1984), Gwyn A. Williams wrote that Wales was becoming…

… a country which largely lives by the British State, whose input into it is ten per cent of its gross product, faces a major reconstruction of the public sector; … faces the prospect of a new depression or a recovery, either of which will intensify the process… faces the prospect of a large and growing population which will be considered redundant in a state which is already considering a major reduction in the financial burden of welfare.

Small wonder that some, looking ahead, see nothing but a nightmare vision of a depersonalised Wales which has shrivelled up into a Costa Bureaucratic in the south and a Costa Geriatrica in the north; in between, sheep, holiday homes burning merrily away and fifty folk museums where there used to be communities … the majority of the inhabitants are choosing a British identity which seems to require the elimination of a Welsh one.

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Striking Yorkshire miners barrack moderate union leaders in Sheffield.

The government then took a more confrontational approach at home. As in the 1920s, resistance to brutal rationalisation through the closure or selling off of uneconomic enterprises, or by wage or job reductions, was met by determined opposition, never tougher than in the confrontation of 1984-85 with the National Union of Mineworkers, led by Arthur Scargill. The National Coal Board, supported by the government, put forward a massive programme of pit closures. The bitter, year-long miners’ strike which followed was roundly defeated, amid scenes of mass picketing and some violence from both miners and the police. The miners’ strike was long and bitter, a fight for the survival of coalfield communities. For example, during the late nineteenth and for most of the twentieth century, Armthorpe in South Yorkshire became known for its coal mining and a deep seam colliery was sunk; the pit was named Markham Main. In 1984, an Armthorpe dress shop sales assistant was quoted as saying:

“If this pit closed down, the whole village would close down because of the number of men working there. This shop and a lot of other shops would have to close down.”

Markham Main Colliery: After the closure of the mine in 1996 the area went through a deep depression. The old colliery site is now a large housing estate, with a thriving community and parks and tracks for walking and cycling to the local wood. Today, Armthorpe remains one of the more affluent areas of Doncaster, with an IKEA warehouse providing local employment. Photo (circa 1980?) by Chris Allen, CC BY-SA 2.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org.

But ultimately the government proved equally determined and had, crucially, built up the resources to resist their anticipated demands for it to back down. In 1983, a team of researchers in south Wales published a pamphlet, Who Profits from Coal? revealing that not only had the NCB been importing stocks of South African coal for some years, but that it was also investing in its production, even raiding the miners’ pension fund to do so. There were also major divisions within the NUM itself, with the Nottinghamshire area breaking away to form the UDM (Union of Democratic Mineworkers) and the South Wales area calling for an orderly return to work when it became apparent that the NUM could not win. However, the national executive, led by its president, Arthur Scargill, refused to call a country-wide ballot on this proposal, prolonging the struggle and suffering unnecessarily.

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Miners’ leader, Arthur Scargill.

The strike and the colliery closures left a legacy of bitterness and division in British which was only too apparent at the time of Margaret Thatcher’s recent state funeral and is the subject or background for many recent films, some of which have distorted or trivialised our recollection of the reality. Among the better representations of it is Billy Elliott. Under the thirty years rule, the government documents from 1984 have only just become available, so we can now look forward to the more rounded perspectives of historians on these events. Already, politicians have called for government apologies to be given to the miners and their families.

Picketing miners were caught and hand-cuffed to lamp posts by police in 1986.

In the Durham Coalfield, pits were often the only real source of employment in local communities, so the economic and social impact of closures could be devastating. The 1984-5 Strike was an attempt to force a reversal of the decline. The pit closures went ahead and the severe contraction of the mining industry continued: it vanished altogether in Kent, while in Durham two-thirds of the pits were closed. The government had little interest in ensuring the survival of the industry, determined to break its militant and well-organised union. There was further resistance, as pictured above, but by 1987, the initial programme of closures was complete. The social cost of the closures, especially in places in which mining was the single major employer, as in many of the pit villages of South Yorkshire, Durham and the valleys of south Wales, was devastating. The entire local economy was crippled. On Tyneside and Merseyside, more general deindustrialisation occurred. Whole sections of industry, including coal, steel and shipbuilding, simply vanished from their traditional areas.

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(to be continued)

Majesty & Grace IX: The Reign of Elizabeth Windsor, 1963-78: Part 2 – Multicultural Britons.

Present into Past – The Problem of Retrospection:

The closer that social historians get to their own times, the harder it is for them to be sure they have hold of what is essential about the period in question: the more difficult it is to separate the rich tapestry of social life which appears on the surface of the woven fabric from its underlying patterns. This is the problem of perspective that historians have to try to overcome in their craft. The period from 1963 to 1978 was one of rapid social change and one in which the pace and direction of social change itself became a matter of concern in social discourse. The discussion in the sixties was about whether the surface evidence of change really added up to a social revolution for ordinary people. What happened to the standards of living of ordinary Britons in the seventies threw into question the depth of the changes. That argument is still unresolved: more than sixty years later we are still living out its contradictory legacy. Many witnesses to the period are still alive, and each with their own differing memories, impressions and interpretations of the period.

The Caernarfon Investiture of 1969 & the botched bombings:

The ‘Investiture Crisis’ as it was known to contemporaries in Wales referred to an undercurrent of violence in Welsh nationalism and republicanism that had been getting stronger since the drowning of the village of Tryweryn to supply Liverpool with water earlier in 1957. This was done by an Act of Parliament, despite almost all Welsh MPs voting against it. As the Welsh historian John Davies wrote in his 1990 History of Wales:

Liverpool’s ability to ignore the virtually unanimous opinion of the representatives of the Welsh people, confirmed one of the central tenets of Plaid Cymru – that the national Welsh community, under the existing order, was wholly powerless.

J. Davies (1990): Allen Lane.

Attacks on the Tryweryn reservoir followed and the Free Wales Army was founded in 1963. Violent (against property) Welsh Nationalism was, thankfully, almost as unpopular and badly organised as violent Scottish nationalism. But the sabotage of reservoirs yielded to a bombing campaign during the run-up to the Investiture in which two bombers blew themselves up in trying to blow up the Royal train, and a little child was mutilated in an accident with explosives near the walls of Caernarfon Castle, where the ceremony was due to take place. Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru (Welsh Defence Movement) was behind the bombings, in league with the Free Wales Army.

In preparation for his Investiture in 1969, Charles spent some time at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, learning Welsh and studying the history and culture(s) of Wales under the tutelage of Professor Teddy Millward. The initial purpose of this was so that he would know enough of the ancient language to be able to make the oath at the Investiture Ceremony and, subsequently, to read speeches out loud with intelligible pronunciation. When a delegation of student leaders met him at Lampeter in 1980, he admitted to them that his conversation was limited and that although he had retained much of the vocabulary Millward had taught him, he had not had many opportunities to use it. Part of his problem was that the formal, classical register in written form was very different to the Cymraeg Byw (Living Welsh) needed for everyday communication and simple conversation. Nevertheless, on his first visit to Cardiff as Charles III, following his mother’s death, he delivered a speech in Welsh with considerable accuracy and fluency. As Nelson Mandela once said, if you talk to people in a common language they know, you will speak to their minds. You will speak to their hearts if you talk to them in their native language. Charles seems to have understood and to have sought to apply the ‘Mandela principle.’

Tynged yr Iaith – the Fate of the Language:

By 1961, Welsh speakers made up only twenty-five per cent of the population, and by 1971 they were barely twenty per cent. The crisis appeared terminal, so in 1962 the writer and founder member of the Welsh Nationalist Party, Saunders Lewis (pictured below) returned to public affairs determined to prevent the death of the ancient language. In the BBC Wales Annual Radio Lecture that year, Tynged yr Iaith (The Fate of the Language), he called upon the Welsh people to make the salvation of the language their central priority and to be prepared to use revolutionary means to achieve it. The response was remarkable. After the formation of Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg, the Welsh Language Society, its young activists stormed all over Wales, opening twenty years of direct action campaigning against offices, roadsigns, staging sit-ins, wrecking TV masts, generally making life hell for any kind of official and the police. While Plaid Cymru remained somewhat aloof, there was much human overlap, and the heavy colonisation of Welsh institutions, particularly in the media, by Welsh-speaking professional people (‘sons of ministers‘) proved to be of powerful assistance.

Around this campaign, which assumed the character of a crusade, all sorts of movements developed: a major drive to establish Welsh-medium nurseries, primary and secondary schools, Welsh-speaking University College hostels, special posts for the teaching of Welsh, demands for an all Welsh-medium College, or Coleg Cymraeg, and for positive discrimination in favour of the use of Welsh. There were crash immersive programmes, or ‘wlpan’ for learners, dysgwyr, based on the invention of a modern form of the language, Cymraeg Byw, (Living Welsh), and the grouping of learners into an organisation at local and national levels. The new Welsh Arts Council directed subsidies towards an ailing Welsh Language publishing world. Step by step a Labour government, followed by a Conservative one, was forced to yield; a Secretary of State for Wales in 1964, a major Language Act in 1967, and a whole series of autonomy measures. Within, around and distinct from this drive a whole world of Welsh language publishing, film production, radio and television broadcasting and infinite varieties of pop, rock, folk and urban music mushroomed.

Many of these initiatives, like the Welsh-medium Channel 4, S4C, did not come to full fruition until the early 1980s, but most originated in the mid to late sixties. These were the most visibly Welsh signals of the onset of outright revolt in the late sixties. The major factor in this uprising was disillusionment with the Welsh Labour establishment. The abrupt reversal of Labour government policy in 1966, after the high hopes of 1964, seemed a culminating disappointment after long years of diminishing relevance in the Party’s policies, internal debate and inner life. The Labour hegemony in Wales had hardened into an oligarchy. On the other hand, the long and dismal history of elitist and contemptuous attitudes towards Anglo-Welsh people had been a disturbing feature of Welsh nationalism and much language-focused Welsh national feeling since the days of its founders.

Young people in Wales and Scotland generated a tide of nationalist protest, the scale of which had until then only been experienced in the Basque regions of Spain or in French Quebec. Neither Wales nor Scotland had enjoyed the economic growth of the south and midlands of England in the fifties, despite the ‘Development Areas’ legislation and programmes introduced by Labour governments before 1951. Their national aspirations were hardly fulfilled by the formal institutions as the offices of Westminster-appointed Secretaries of State. In the case of Wales, this appointment was only made for the first time in centuries by the Wilson government in 1964. Scottish nationalists complained, with some justification, that the very title Elizabeth II was a misnomer in their country since Elizabeth I had not been Queen of Scots.

Caernarfon Castle was set up for the Investiture of Prince Charles on
30th June 1969

As far as many of the Welsh were concerned, the title of ‘Prince of Wales’ (Tywysog Cymry), as bestowed by the monarch by ‘right of conquest’ on the eldest son and heir to the English throne since the reign of Edward I, was also a misnomer. In Wales, there was the added theme of an ancient language and culture threatened with extinction in an unequal battle against anglicising mass culture and media. A narrow victory for a Welsh Nationalist, Gwynfor Evans, in a parliamentary by-election in Carmarthen in 1966, was followed by a renewed civil disobedience campaign in support of the defence and propagation of the Welsh language. Under Evans’ leadership, a new Plaid Cymru (Party of Wales) began to emerge. In 1969, elaborate ceremonies greeted the formal Investiture of Prince Charles as Prince of Wales, to paraphrase Gwyn Williams, in a tumult of public acclaim, largely in English, and a tumult of public mockery, largely in Welsh.

The Anglo-Welsh historian Dai Smith, more than a decade later drew a comparison between the Investiture of Edward Prince of Wales (later Edward VIII) in 1911 and the more recent ceremony at Caernarfon:

Here was stage-managed the investiture of Edward, Prince of Wales, in a rich ceremony of dedication and loyalty. This patriotic event could be seen, like that of Charles in 1969, as a plot to dupe the ‘masses’. In this scenario, the chief Welsh politicians of ‘deliver up’ the nation to English/ British domination and, in due course, are suitably rewarded with titular baubles – Lloyd George becomes the Earl of Dwyfor and George Thomas becomes Viscount Tonypandy. … Neither event defused radical politics in Wales – after 1969 Plaid Cymru grew in influence and the miners’ unions began their five-year campaign…

Dai Smith (1984), Wales! Wales? Hemel Hempstead: George Allen & Unwin.

The Investiture Ceremony
Celtic Languages & Dialects in the British Isles:

After many decades of decline, most notably (and dangerously) in the number of ‘monoglot’ native speakers, by 1981 there was currently a stable proportion of between one-fifth and one-quarter of Welsh residents, over half a million, describing themselves as Welsh speakers. The Celtic nations of the British Isles also protected their own Celtic-influenced or Scots-influenced dialects or varieties of ‘English’, each of which can be subdivided further into localised varieties. For example, Welsh English, or Anglo-Welsh, has differing northern and southern varieties, with parts of the south, specifically south Pembrokeshire and the Gower Peninsula, having had English and Flemish colonies since the twelfth century. A uniform spoken English across the British Isles is an unlikely prospect. In Wales, the same is true of spoken Welsh, with varieties in accent and vocabulary, if not in grammar.

As far as constitutional Welsh nationalism was concerned, Gwynfor Evans lost his Carmarthen seat in the 1970 general election but two more striking Plaid Cymru by-election performances Rhondda West and Caerffili (Caerphilly) in 1967 and 1968 suggested that the Carmarthen victory had been was no flash in the pan. At last, the complacent Welsh Labour Party was being challenged, and in the 1974 election, Plaid Cymru won two northern Welsh seats, Caernarfon and Meirionydd, taking a third in the second general election that year. Welsh Labour was divided in its response. Michael Foot, MP for Aneurin Bevan’s old seat of Ebbw Vale, thought the nationalists should be ‘bought off’ through reform measures, including devolution, but Neil Kinnock, who declared that road-sign bilingualism (like that shown below) was a waste of funds, believed they should be fought. Either way, they held their seats, continuing to pose an electoral threat in Labour’s traditional heartlands in the southern valleys and refusing to ‘go away.’ Neither did the bilingual road signs.

A road sign in Powys.

The equality accorded to English and Welsh on road signs symbolised a victory for Welsh language activists. They had campaigned long and hard to gain official recognition of their native language and to ensure its survival. By 1974, both Cornish and Manx no longer had any native speakers and attempts to revive them led to only a very small number of learners of both Celtic languages. Although the official figure for users of Irish Gaelic was subsequently recorded as 1.4 million in the Republic, equivalent to forty per cent of the population. But this reflected the status of the language in Irish schools, whereas the habitual use of Irish in daily life in the Gaeltacht, the Irish-speaking communities, was estimated at 0.25 per cent of the population. In Scotland, the Scottish Gaelic community accounted for about one per cent of the population there. According to the 1981 Census, only 473 children spoke Gaelic according to the 1981 Census.

Broadford Primary School, Isle of Skye, where children are taught in Gaelic.

Skye was once thought of as the centre of the Gaeltachd, the land of the Gaels. The only large concentration of Gaelic speakers still left on the island is on the northeast tip, the Staffin peninsula. The parish is one of the last redoubts of the northern Gaels. All the children in Staffin in the 1980s knew Gaelic but seldom used it after transfer to secondary school in Portree, where the other children teased them, calling them teuchtars or bumpkins (uneducated people of the land). They also thought that the language wouldn’t get them anywhere. As Gaelic speakers, they would just stay on their croft and stay poor. It would be better for them to develop their English and head south.

A Gaelic-speaking child at Broadford Primary School.
Wales, the Cymry & the Anglo-Welsh in the late seventies:

Meanwhile, around the Welsh language, the clamour and turmoil continued into the eighties, as did the many initiatives to arrest its decline in the previous decades. According to the 1981 Census returns, these seemed to have worked. Although the overall proportion of Welsh speakers had slipped further since 1971, to 18.9 per cent, there had been a dramatic slowing in the rate of decline over the decade, and it seemed almost to be coming to a halt. However, while there were marginal increases in Anglo-Welsh areas such as Gwent and Glamorgan, there was still a serious decline in the heartlands of the language, most notably in the southwest, where the fall was six per cent. There had been some ‘retrenchment’ in Ceredigion and parts of Gwynedd, and there were unmistakable signs that all the campaigning had begun to take effect among the younger age groups. Overall, out of a population of almost 2.8 million, over 550,000 identified as Welsh speakers. Nonetheless, the continuing threat to the bro or Welsh-speaking heartland had led to the growth of a new movement in the seventies, Adfer (‘restore’), with a swathe of intellectual zealots, dedicated to building a monoglot Welsh gaeltachd in the west and to the construction of an ethnically pure and self-sufficient economy and society there. This organisation viewed the true Cymry as the Welsh speakers and adopted a chauvinistic attitude towards the remainder of the people of Wales.

Yet Welsh-speaking figures from the industrial south, like Dai Francis, the leader of the South Wales NUM (see part one), who became a Bard in the Order of the Gorsedd of the National Eisteddfod, became leading Welsh-speaking figures. Francis was nominated by Undeb Cenedlaethol Myfyrwyr Cymru (NUS Wales) as an alternative candidate to Prince Charles for the role of Chancellor of the University of Wales in 1977/78. He lost the contest (the exact result of the vote was never declared), but only after the campaign had caused considerable embarrassment to the Welsh establishment in the University Court, one of the few all-Wales bodies at this time. Most importantly, it enabled UCMC to raise support among Welsh academics for the official recognition of the language in education on a nationwide basis in subsequent years.

A cogent and effective proposal for an elected Welsh assembly had been formulated and presented by the MP and cabinet minister Cledwyn Hughes in the 1960s, but it got nowhere. The proposal which emerged in the mid-seventies was partly an afterthought to the response to the growing strength of the nationalist challenge in Scotland. It was, though, an ineffective compromise for Wales, which won no real enthusiasm, even among its supporters among the constitutionalist nationalists in Wales. After endless parliamentary agonies, it was to be submitted to a referendum on St David’s Day, 1st March 1979. However, it was already dead in the water by the end of 1978, due to an amendment at Westminster requiring forty per cent of both the Scottish and Welsh electorates to vote ‘yes.’

It was resisted by a huge bloc of opinion ranging from the representatives of multinational corporations and their British subsidiaries to the populist press and on to the Adferites in the north. It was also fiercely opposed by a bloc of South Wales Labour MPs led by Neil Kinnock and Leo Abse, who played on fears of their Anglo-Welsh constituents of being taken over and dominated by a Welsh-speaking, mainly northern, ‘crach’ (élite). There were also those on the left who were suspicious of what they had increasingly viewed as a corrupt Welsh-British establishment. Nationalist supporters also found themselves in a difficult situation, especially in Caernarfon and Meirionydd, where their voters, not just the supporters of Adfer, were not keen on being ruled from Cardiff. Not surprisingly, faced with all these obstacles, the campaign lacked conviction. As Gwyn Williams commented:

… it was an unreal war over an unreal proposal. One major reality, however, was a wholesale political revolt against the kind of Wales being presented and created through the medium of the Welsh language campaigns. It was a revulsion wholly negative in content and style.

Gwyn A. Williams (1985), When Was Wales? Pelican (Penguin) Books.

Professor Gwyn Williams, Photograph by HTV Wales.

However, Williams also pointed out that far more than a Welsh-language Wales was being rejected. Opinion polls showed the Conservatives running at a level of support they hadn’t enjoyed for a century. After the economic crisis of 1976 and its unnecessary surrender to the IMF (see below), the Labour government adopted the policies which the radical new leadership of the Conservatives had been developing. In the seventies, Labour ceased to be either socialist or social-democratic. Wales was plagued by economic difficulties, and its working population was being transformed at a pace too swift for its traditional institutions to handle. It is, in retrospect, that it was not interested in public discourse mainly among its intellectuals that focused largely and widely on language and culture.

The reality was that, by 1978, the client economy of Wales was in very deep trouble. Yet despite the success of Plaid Cymru in local elections during the final years of ‘old Labour’ rule, they did not seem to pose quite the same threat as the SNP. Of course, Welsh water was far less valuable and cheaper to extract than Scottish oil, which was fundamentally why the proposed Welsh assembly was to have fewer powers than the Scottish one. It was to oversee a large chunk of public expenditure, but it would not have law-making powers. The proposal was therefore unlikely to make anyone’s blood pound.

‘Black Gold’ – North Sea Gas & Oil Fields:

Certainly, living standards continued to rise, aided by the discovery in the North Sea of natural gas in 1965 and oil in 1969. The complex mosaic of yellow blocks in the 2016 map of the North Sea (below) illustrates the development of the UK oil industry which provided an economic boon to seventies Britain. The Forties field, shown on the map, was the biggest of the North Sea oil fields whose royalties made the country an unexpected hydrocarbon superpower for a limited period. In 1959, following a single find of natural gas in Gröningen in the Netherlands, it became apparent the geological structure of the North Sea meant that further discoveries were likely, although the prohibitive cost of drilling in offshore waters impeded initial exploration.

Section of the map below which gives a close-up of the Forties field & pipelines in Sea 2.

The first large find was also of gas, struck in the West Sole field, off the Yorkshire coast, by British Petroleum’s Sea Gem platform in September 1965, though celebrations were soon dampened when the rig sank three months later, with the loss of thirteen lives, in the North Sea’s first major disaster. By 1969 oil had been struck in the Montrose field east of Aberdeen, followed soon after by the giant Forties field in 1970 and the Brent field a year later. The system of licensing fees for exploration and royalties payable on gas and oil production provided an economic shot in the arm for a country which was struggling to restructure its traditional industries and facing increased competition from emerging industrial giants such as Japan. Production became even more profitable after the 1973 oil shock when the principal Middle Eastern oil-producing countries imposed oil embargoes in response to Western countries’ policies which they said favoured Israel in its struggle with the Palestinian Arabs. As oil importers sought alternative sources of supply, global prices rose and North Sea oil found new customers.

Large-scale map, showing the full extent of the North Sea oil fields.

By the time of the Queen’s Silver Jubilee, in 1977, North Sea Oil was coming ashore to the tune of more than half a million barrels a day, meeting a third of the country’s needs. Britain would be self-sufficient in oil by 1980 and already was in gas. Oil and gas were not the only new sources of power to be exploited in the sixties. A lonely stretch of coast near Leiston in Suffolk became the site of Britain’s second nuclear power station, built in the early 1960s. In 1966 power began surging out from the grey, cuboid plant into the national grid. By the mid-seventies, Sizewell’s five hundred and eighty thousand kilowatts were going a long way towards meeting the electricity needs of eastern England.

Sizewell Nuclear Power Station (2014)

Devaluation & Deindustrialisation:

But there were also disquieting signs that Britain was approaching an as yet undefined cultural and financial crisis. British economic growth rates did not match those of competitor states, and it was partly for this reason that Britain applied to join the European Economic Community, in 1961 and 1967, entry both times being vetoed by France.

New kinds of industry, based largely on the revolution in electronics, came into being alongside the old, without displacing them. There was a shift in the patterns of skills, and of work, and the composition of the labour force, with more workers involved in clerical, highly skilled or service occupations. At the same time, more workers were pushed down into the unskilled ranks of mass production. They became more mobile again, pulled to where the jobs were. The pattern of regional decline in the older industrial areas and rapid, unorganised growth in the new areas began to re-emerge. In some areas and industries, the long-term pattern of continuity from one generation to the next persisted, while in other, newer areas, this continuity was broken.

Long-term changes patterns of employment, 1921-76.

Hitherto the social fabric across Britain had been kept intact, at least in part, because of high and advancing living standards for the population as a whole. But clear evidence mounted up in the late 1960s that increasing economic pressures were adding to new social tensions. Britain lurched from one financial expedient to another, with the frequent balance of payments crises and many runs on the pound sterling. Devaluation in 1967 did not produce any lasting remedy. Economically, the real problems of the decade arose from both the devaluation of the currency in November 1967 and the deterioration in industrial relations. Employment in manufacturing nationally declined, until it accounted for less than a third of the workforce by 1973. The income policy declared by the Wilson Government was hard to swallow for engineering workers who had long enjoyed the benefits of free collective bargaining and wage differentials. By way of contrast, employment in the service sector rose, so that by 1973, over half of all workers in the UK were employed in providing services. The map below shows both the long-term and regional character of the decline of the British manufacturing industries. The resulting mass unemployment hurt the old industries of the Northwest badly, but the job losses were proportionately as high in the Southeast and Midlands, where there were newer manufacturers.

The Second Wilson Labour administration that followed faced a huge balance-of-payments crisis and the tumbling value of the pound and they soon found themselves under the control of the IMF (International Monetary Fund), which insisted on severe spending cuts. The contraction of manufacturing began to accelerate and inflation was also increasing alarmingly, reaching twenty-four per cent by 1975. It came to be seen as a more urgent problem than unemployment and there was a national and international move to the right and against high-taxing and high-spending governments. Demands were made that they should stop propping up lame-duck industries with public money or taking them, however temporarily, into public ownership.

By the mid-seventies, the dock area at Felixstowe covered hundreds of acres, many reclaimed, made up of spacious wharves, warehouses and storage areas equipped with the latest cargo handling machinery. The transformation had begun in 1956 as the direct result of foresight and careful planning. The Company launched a three-million pound project to create a new deep-water berth geared to the latest bulk transportation technique – containerisation. It calculated that changing trading patterns and Felixstowe’s proximity to Rotterdam and Antwerp provided exciting prospects for an efficient, well-equipped port. Having accomplished that, it set aside another eight million for an oil jetty and bulk liquid storage facilities. In addition, a passenger terminal was opened in 1975. The dock soon acquired a reputation for fast, efficient handling of all types of cargo, and consignments could easily reach the major industrial centres through faster road and rail networks.

There were many reasons for this unprecedented growth. which brought Suffolk a prosperity unknown since the expansion of the cloth trade in the mid-fourteenth century. As back then, Suffolk’s depression gave a boost to new development. Most of the county was within eighty miles of London and served by improving road and rail connections. Ports like Felixstowe were no further from the capital than those of Kent and they were a great deal closer to the industrial Midlands and the North.

An old milestone in the centre of Woodbridge, Suffolk

Some of Suffolk’s most beautiful countryside was no further from the metropolis than the stockbroker belt of the Home Counties, and yet land and property prices in Suffolk were less than half of what they were there. People were becoming more mobile and light industries were less tied to traditional centres. Companies escaping from high overheads found that they could find both the facilities and labour they needed in Ipswich, Bury, Sudbury and Haverhill. Executives also discovered that they could live in areas of great natural beauty and yet be within commuting distance of their City desks. Moreover, the shift in international trade focused attention once more on the east coast ports. As the Empire was being disbanded and Britain was drawn increasingly towards trade with the European Common Market, producers were looking for the shortest routes to the continent. More and more lorries took to the roads through Suffolk.

Meanwhile, the rate of migration into Coventry had undoubtedly slowed down by the mid-sixties. Between 1961 and 1971 the population rose by nearly six per cent compared with a rise of nineteen per cent between 1951 and 1961. The failure of Coventry’s manufacturing industry to maintain immediate post-war growth rates was providing fewer opportunities for migrant manual workers, while the completion of the city centre redevelopment programme and the large housing schemes reduced the number of itinerant building workers. Between 1951 and 1966 the local population increased by approximately four thousand every year, but in the following five years the net annual increase fell to about a thousand per annum. Moreover, the proportion of this increase attributable to migration had dramatically declined. Between 1951 and 1961, a Department of the Environment survey estimated that whereas migration accounted for about forty-five per cent of population growth in the Coventry belt, in the following five years it made up only eighteen per cent. In the following three years to 1969, the survey noted that the same belt had begun, marginally, to lose population through out-migration.

Between the census of 1961 and the mini-census of 1966, some major shifts in the pattern of migration into Coventry took place. There was a substantial increase in immigration from Commonwealth countries, colonies and protectorates during these five years. The total number of those born in these territories stood at 11,340. The expansion needs to be kept in perspective, however. Nearly two-thirds of the local population was born in the West Midlands, and there were still nearly twice as many migrants from Ireland as from the Commonwealth and Colonies. Indeed, in 1966 only 3.5 per cent of Coventry’s population had been born outside the British Isles, compared with the national figure of five per cent. The Welsh stream had slowed down, increasing by only eight per cent in the previous fifteen years, and similar small increases were registered among migrants from Northern England. There were significant increases from Scotland, London and the South East, but only a very small increase from continental Europe.

By the mid-seventies, Coventry was faced with a new challenge posed by changes in the age structure of its population. The city was having to care for its increasing numbers of elderly citizens, a cost which soon became difficult to bear, given its declining economy. By 1974, it was estimated that the local population was rising by two thousand per year, twice the rate of the late 1960s. By 1976, however, the youthfulness of the city’s population was being lost as the proportion of over sixty-five-year-olds rose above the national average. With its large migrant element, it began to lose population rapidly during this decline, from 335,238 to 310,216 between 1971 and 1981, a fall of 7.5 per cent. Nearly sixty thousand jobs were lost during the recession, and given the shallowness of the family structure of many Coventrians, this resulted in a sizeable proportion of its citizens being all too willing to seek their fortunes elsewhere. For many others, given the widespread nature of the decline in manufacturing in the rest of the UK, there was simply nowhere to go.

Migration, Immigration and Racialism – Rivers of Blood:

Elsewhere, however, the number of ‘New Commonwealth’ immigrants was proving a cause for concern, mainly, as it seems in retrospect, to the skin colour of these immigrants, and partly, in the case of south Asians, due to religious and cultural differences with the host country. These ‘concerns’ were not new, and nor were the active forms of prejudice and discrimination which had accompanied them since the mid-fifties in the general population. In addition to dilapidated housing and racial discrimination in employment, and sometimes at the hands of the police, there was the added hazard of racial bigotry in older urban areas. What was new was the way in which this was articulated and amplified from the early sixties onwards by Conservative MPs and parliamentary candidates, leading to the emergence of the National Front as a political force in the early seventies.

Harold Wilson was always a sincere anti-racist, but he did not try to repeal the Conservatives’ 1962 Act with its controversial quota system. One of the new migrations that arrived to beat the 1963 quota system just before Wilson came to power came from a rural area of Pakistan threatened with flooding by a huge dam project. The poor farming villages from the Muslim north, particularly around Kashmir, were not an entrepreneurial environment. They began sending their men to earn money in the labour-starved textile mills of Bradford and the surrounding towns. Unlike the West Indians, the Pakistanis and Indians were more likely to send for their families soon after arrival in Britain. Soon there would be large, distinct Muslim communities clustered in areas of Bradford, Leicester and other older manufacturing towns.

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Unlike the West Indians, the Pakistanis and Indians were more likely to send for their families soon after arrival in Britain. Soon there would be large, distinct Muslim communities clustered in areas of Bradford, Leicester and other older manufacturing towns. The photo above shows a south Asian immigrant in a Bradford textile factory. But the decline of the textile industries in the 1970s led to high long-term unemployment in south Asian communities.

Unlike the Caribbean immigrants, who were largely Christian by background, these new streams of migration were bringing people who were religiously separated from the white ‘Christians’ around them and cut off from the main forms of working-class entertainment, many of which involved the consumption of alcohol, from which they abstained. Muslim women were expected to remain in the domestic environment and ancient traditions of arranged marriages carried over from the subcontinent meant that there was almost no intermarriage with the native population. To many of the ‘natives’, the ‘Pakis’, as they were then casually called, even to their faces, were less threatening than young Caribbean men, but they were also more culturally alien.

Wilson had felt strongly enough about the ‘racialist’ behaviour in the Tory campaign at Smethwick, to the west of Birmingham, in 1964, to publicly denounce its victor Peter Griffiths as a ‘parliamentary leper’. Smethwick had attracted a significant number of immigrants from Commonwealth countries, the largest ethnic group being Sikhs from Punjab in India, and there were also many Windrush Caribbeans settled in the area. There was also a background of factory closures and a growing waiting list for local council housing. Griffiths ran a campaign critical of both the opposition’s and the government’s immigration policies. The Conservatives were widely reported as using the slogan “if you want a nigger for a neighbour, vote Labour” but the neo-Nazi British Movement later claimed that its members had produced the initial slogan as well as led the poster and sticker campaign. However, Griffiths did not condemn the phrase and was quoted as saying:

“I should think that is a manifestation of popular feeling. I would not condemn anyone who said that.”

The 1964 general election involved a nationwide swing from the Conservatives to the Labour Party which resulted in the party gaining a narrow five-seat majority. However, in Smethwick, as Conservative candidate, Peter Griffiths gained the seat and unseated the sitting Labour MP, Patrick Gordon-Walker, who had served as Shadow Foreign Secretary for the eighteen months prior to the election. In these circumstances, the Smethwick campaign, already attracting national media coverage, and the result itself stood out as clearly the result of racialism.

Griffiths, in his maiden speech to the Commons, pointed out what he believed were the real problems his constituency faced, including factory closures and over four thousand families awaiting council accommodation. But in 1965, Wilson’s new Home Secretary, Frank Soskice, tightened the quota system, cutting down on the number of dependents allowed in, and giving the Government the power to deport illegal immigrants. At the same time, it offered the first Race Relations Act as a ‘sweetener’. This outlawed the use of the ‘colour bar’ in public places and by potential landlords, and discrimination in public services, also banning incitement to racial hatred like that seen in the Smethwick campaign. At the time, it was largely seen as toothless, yet the combination of restrictions on immigration and the measures to better integrate the migrants already in Britain did form the basis for all subsequent policies.

Birmingham’s booming postwar economy had not only attracted its ‘West Indian’ settlers from 1948 onwards, but had also ‘welcomed’ south Asians from Gujarat and Punjab in India, and East Pakistan (Bangladesh) both after the war and the partition of India and in increasing numbers from the early 1960s. The South Asian and West Indian populations were equal in size and concentrated in the inner city wards of the city and in west Birmingham, particularly Sparkbrook and Handsworth, as well as in Sandwell (see map above; then known as Smethwick and Warley). Labour shortages had developed in Birmingham as a result of an overall movement towards skilled and white-collar employment among the native population, which created vacancies in less attractive, poorly paid, unskilled and semi-skilled jobs in manufacturing, particularly in metal foundries and factories, and in the transport and healthcare sectors of the public services. These jobs were filled by newcomers from the Commonwealth.

Whatever the eventual problems thrown up by the mutual sense of alienation between natives and immigrants, Britain’s fragile new consensus and ‘truce’ on race relations of 1964-65 were about to be broken by another form of racial discrimination, this time executed by Africans, mainly the Kikuyu people of Kenya. After the decisive terror and counter-terror of the Mau Mau campaign, Kenya won its independence under the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta in 1963 and initially thrived as a relatively tolerant market economy. Alongside the majority of Africans, however, and the forty thousand whites who stayed after independence, there were some 185,000 Asians in Kenya.

They had mostly arrived during British rule, were mostly better off than the local Kikuyu, and were well-established as doctors, civil servants, traders, business people and police. They also had full British passports and therefore an absolute right of entry to Britain, which had been confirmed by meetings of Tory ministers before independence. When Kenyatta gave them the choice of surrendering their British passports and gaining full Kenyan nationality or becoming foreigners, dependent on work permits, most of them chose to keep their British nationality. In the generally unfriendly and sometimes menacing atmosphere of Kenya in the mid-sixties, this seemed the sensible option. Certainly, there was no indication from London that their rights to entry would be taken away.

The 1968 Immigration Act was specifically targeted at restricting Kenyan Asians with British passports. As conditions grew worse for them in Kenya, many of them decided to seek refuge in the mother country of the Empire which had settled them in the first place. Throughout 1967 they were coming in by plane at the rate of about a thousand per month. The newspapers began to depict the influx on their front pages and the television news, by now watched in most homes, showed great queues waiting for British passports and flights. It was at this point that Enoch Powell, Conservative MP for Wolverhampton and shadow minister, in an early warning shot, said that half a million East African Asians could eventually enter which was ‘quite monstrous’. He called for an end to work permits and a complete ban on dependants coming to Britain. Other prominent Tories, like Ian Macleod, argued that the Kenyan Asians could not be left stateless and that the British Government had to keep its promise to them. The Labour government was also split on the issue, with the liberals, led by Roy Jenkins, believing that only Kenyatta could halt the migration by being persuaded to offer better treatment. The new Home Secretary, Jim Callaghan, on the other hand, was determined to respond to the concerns of Labour voters about the unchecked migration.

By the end of 1967, the numbers arriving per month had doubled to two thousand. In February 1968, Callaghan decided to act. The Commonwealth Immigrants Act effectively slammed the door while leaving a ‘cat flap’ open for a very small annual quota, leaving some twenty thousand people ‘stranded’ and stateless in a country which no longer wanted them. The bill was rushed through in the spring of 1968 and has been described as among the most divisive and controversial decisions ever taken by any British government. Some MPs viewed it as the most shameful piece of legislation ever enacted by Parliament, the ultimate appeasement of racist hysteria. The government responded with a tougher anti-discrimination bill in the same year. For many others, however, the passing of the act was the moment when the political élite, in the shape of Jim Callaghan, finally woke up and listened to their working-class workers. Polls of the public showed that 72% supported the act. Never again would the idea of free access to Britain be seriously entertained by mainstream politicians.

This was the backcloth to the notorious Rivers of Blood speech made in Birmingham by Enoch Powell, in which he prophesied violent racial war if immigration continued. Powell had argued that the passport guarantee was never valid in the first place. Despite his unorthodox views, Powell was still a member of Edward Heath’s shadow cabinet which had just agreed to back Labour’s Race Relations Bill. But Powell had gone uncharacteristically quiet, apparently telling a local friend,

I’m going to make a speech at the weekend and it’s going to go up “fizz” like a rocket, but whereas all rockets fall to earth, this one is going to stay up. 

The ‘friend’, Clem Jones, the editor of Powell’s local newspaper, The Wolverhampton Express and Star, had advised him to time the speech for the early evening television bulletins, and not to distribute it generally beforehand. He came to regret the advice. In a small room at the Midland Hotel in Birmingham on 20th April 1968, three weeks after the act had been passed and the planes carrying would-be Kenyan Asian immigrants had been turned around, Powell quoted a Wolverhampton constituent, a middle-aged working man, who told him that if he had the money, he would leave the country because, in fifteen or twenty years time, the black man will have the whip hand over the white man. Powell continued by asking rhetorically how he dared say such a horrible thing, stirring up trouble and inflaming feelings. He answered himself:

“The answer is I do not have the right not to do so. Here is a decent, ordinary fellow-Englishman, who in broad daylight in my own town says to me, his Member of Parliament, that this country will not be worth living in for his children. I simply do not have the right to shrug my shoulders and think about something else. What he is saying, thousands and hundreds of thousands are saying and thinking… ‘Those whom the Gods wish to destroy, they first make mad.’ We must be mad, literally mad, as a nation to be permitting the annual flow of some fifty thousand dependants, who are for the most part the material growth of the immigrant-descended population. It is like watching a nation busily engaged in heaping its own its own funeral pyre.” 

He then used a classical illusion to make a controversial prophecy:

As I look ahead, I am filled with foreboding. Like the Roman, I seem to see ‘the river Tiber foaming with much blood.’

Enoch Powell, the influential opponent of immigration.

In the context of his speech to this point and his earlier pronouncements as a maverick right-winger, most people considered this a prophecy of a violent inter-racial war if black immigration continued. His inflammatory rhetoric was taken as a prediction that rivers of blood would flow similar to those seen in the recent race riots in the United States. The speech therefore quickly became known as The Rivers of Blood Speech and formed the backdrop of the legislation. He also made various accusations, made by other constituents, that they had been persecuted by ‘Negroes’, having excrement posted through their letterboxes and being followed to the shops by children, charming wide-grinning pickaninnies chanting “Racialist.” If Britain did not begin a policy of voluntary repatriation, it would soon face the kind of race riots that were disfiguring America. Powell claimed that he was merely restating Tory policy. But the language used and his own careful preparation suggests it was both a call to arms by a politician who believed he was fighting for white English nationhood and a deliberate provocation aimed at Powell’s enemy, Heath.

After horrified consultations when he and other leading Tories had seen extracts of the speech on the television news, Heath promptly ordered Powell to phone him, and summarily sacked him. Heath announced that he found the speech racialist in tone and liable to exacerbate racial tensions. As Parliament returned three days after the speech, a thousand London dockers marched to Westminster in Powell’s support, carrying ‘Enoch is right’ placards; by the following day, he had received twenty thousand letters, almost all in support of his speech, with tens of thousands still to come. Smithfield meat porters and Heathrow airport workers also demonstrated in support of him. Powell received death threats and needed full-time police protection for a while; numerous marches were held against him and he found it difficult to make speeches at or near university campuses. Asked whether he was a racialist by the Daily Mail, he replied:

‘We are all racialists. Do I object to one coloured person in this country? No. To a hundred? No. To a million? (A query). To five million? Definitely.’

Did most people in 1968 agree with him, as Andrew Marr has suggested? It’s important to point out that, until he made this speech, Powell had been a Tory ‘insider’, though also seen as a maverick and a trusted member of Edward Heath’s shadow cabinet. He had rejected the consumer society growing around him in favour of what he saw as a ‘higher vision’. This was a romantic dream of an older, tougher, swashbuckling Britain, freed of continental and imperial (now ‘commonwealth’) entanglements, populated by ingenious, hard-working white people rather like himself. For this to become a reality, Britain would need to become a self-sufficient island, which ran entirely against the great forces of the time. His view was fundamentally nostalgic, harking back to the energetic Victorians and Edwardians. He drew sustenance from the people around him, who seemed to be excluded from mainstream politics. He argued that his Wolverhampton constituents had had immigration imposed on them without being asked and against their will.

But viewed from Fleet Street or the pulpits of broadcasting, he was seen as an irrelevance, marching off into the wilderness. In reality, although immigration was changing small patches of the country, mostly in west London, west Birmingham and the Black Country, it had, by 1968, barely impinged as an issue in people’s lives. That was why, at that time, it was relatively easy for the press and media to marginalize Powell and his acolytes in the Tory Party. He was expelled from the shadow cabinet for his anti-immigration speech, not so much for its racialist content, which was mainly given in reported speech, but for suggesting that the race relations legislation was merely throwing a match on gunpowder. This statement was a clear breach of shadow cabinet collective responsibility. Besides, the legislation controlling immigration and regulating race relations had already been passed, so it is difficult to see what Powell had hoped to gain from the speech, apart from embarrassing his nemesis, Ted Heath.

Edward Heath, leader of the Conservatives from 1965 & Prime Minister, 1970-74.
Ted’s Grandfather Clause & the Ugandan Refugees:

Despite the dramatic increase in wealth, coupled with the emergence of distinctive subcultures, technological advances and dramatic shifts in popular culture, there was a general feeling of disillusionment with Labour’s policies nationally. In the 1970 General Election, the Conservative Party, under its new leader Edward Heath, was returned to power. Although Enoch Powell had been sacked from the shadow cabinet by Heath, more legislative action followed with the 1971 Immigration Act, which effectively restricted citizenship on racial grounds by enacting the Grandfather Clause, by which a Commonwealth citizen who could prove that one of his or her grandparents was born in the UK was entitled to immediate entry clearance. This operated to the disadvantage of Black and Asian applicants while favouring citizens of the old Commonwealth, descendants of white settlers from Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa. Thus immigration control had moved away from primary immigration to restricting the entry of dependants, or secondary immigration.

Enoch Powell himself, from the back-benches, likened the distinction between ‘new’ and ‘old’ Commonwealth immigrants to a Nazi race purity law; he wanted a new definition of British citizenship instead. The grandparent rule was defeated by the right and left combining for opposite reasons but was restored two years later. In the meantime, the Kenyan crisis was replayed in another former East African colony, Uganda. Here, the swaggering, Sandhurst-educated Idi Amin had come to power in a coup. He announced that he had been told in a dream he must expel the country’s Asians, just as the Kenyans had theirs. Though Powell argued angrily that Britain had no obligation to allow the trapped Ugandan Asians into its cities, Heath acted decisively to bring them in. Airlifts were arranged, with a resettlement board to help them, and twenty-eight thousand arrived within a few weeks in 1971, eventually settling in the same areas as other East Africans, even though Leicester had published adverts in Ugandan newspapers pleading with them not to come there.

Those who knew Powell best claimed that he was not a racialist. The local newspaper editor, Clem Jones, thought that Enoch’s anti-immigration stance was not ideologically-motivated, but had simply been influenced by the anger of white Wolverhampton people who felt they were being crowded out; even in Powell’s own street of good, solid, Victorian houses, next door went sort of coloured and then another and then another house, and he saw the value of his own house go down. But, Jones added, Powell always worked hard as an MP for all his constituents, mixing with them regardless of colour:

We quite often used to go out for a meal, as a family, to a couple of Indian restaurants, and he was on extremely amiable terms with everybody there, ‘cos having been in India and his wife brought up in India, they liked that kind of food.

On the numbers migrating to Britain, however, Powell’s predicted figures were not totally inaccurate. Just before his 1968 speech, he had suggested that by the end of the century, the number of black and Asian immigrants and their descendants would number between five and seven million, about a tenth of the population. According to the 2001 census, 4.7 million people identified as black or Asian, equivalent to 7.9 per cent of the total population. Immigrants were, of course, far more strongly represented in percentage terms in English cities. Powell may have helped British society by speaking out on an issue that, until then, had remained taboo. However, the language of his discourse still seems quite inflammatory and provocative, even fifty years later, so much so that even historians hesitate to quote them. His words also helped to make the extreme-right Nazis of the National Front more acceptable. Furthermore, his core prediction of major civil unrest was not fulfilled, despite riots and street crime linked to disaffected youths from Caribbean immigrant communities in the 1980s. So, in the end, Enoch was not right, though he may have had a point.

Immigrants to Birmingham also tended to congregate in the western suburbs along the boundary with Smethwick, Warley, West Bromwich (now Sandwell), and Dudley, where many of them also settled. By 1971, the South Asian and West Indian populations were equal in size and concentrated in the inner city wards and in north-west Birmingham, especially in Handsworth, Sandwell and Sparkbrook. Labour shortages had developed in Birmingham as a result of an overall movement towards more skilled and white-collar employment among the native population, which created vacancies in the poorly paid, less attractive, poorly paid, unskilled and semi-skilled jobs in manufacturing, particularly in metal foundries and factories, and in the transport and health care sectors of the public services. These jobs were filled by newcomers from the new Commonwealth. In the 1970s, poor pay and working conditions forced some of these workers to resort to strike action. Hostility to Commonwealth immigrants was pronounced in some sections of the local white population and what became known as white flight, migration from the inner city areas to the expanding suburbs to the southwest and east of the city, though it is still unclear to what extent this migration was really due to concerns about immigrants.

In nearby Coventry, despite these emerging signs of a stall in population growth by the end of the sixties, the authorities continued to view the city and its surroundings as a major area of demographic expansion. In October 1970 a Ministry of Housing representative predicted that the city’s population would rise by a third over the next twenty years. Immigration had changed Britain more than almost any other single social factor in post-war Britain, more significant than the increase in life expectancy, birth control, the death of deference or the spread of suburban housing. The only change that eclipses it is the triumph of the car. It was not a change that was asked for by the indigenous British cultures, though the terms and circumstances of fifty million people choosing suddenly to ask and answer such a question, possibly in a referendum, are impossible to imagine.

The majority of British people did not want the arrival of large numbers of Irish, West Indians and south Asians, but neither did they want an end to capital punishment or membership in a federal European Union, or many other things that their political élite decided upon. Yet, at no stage was there a measured, rational and frank debate about immigration between party leaders in front of the electorate. And while allowing this change to take effect piecemeal and by default, the main parties did very little to ensure the successful integration of immigrants from the Caribbean or the Indian subcontinent. When help was given, in the case of the East African Asian refugees, integration was more successful. But even with these sudden influxes, there was no real attempt to nurture mixed communities, avoiding mini-ghettoes such as those that developed in the East Midlands and South Yorkshire. Race relations legislation did come, but only as a counter-balance to further restrictions.

Primary children celebrate Diwali, the Hindu festival of lights, wearing their traditional dress.

As New Commonwealth immigrants began to become established in postwar Birmingham, community infrastructures, including places of worship, ethnic groceries, halal butchers and, most significantly, restaurants, began to develop. Birmingham became synonymous with the phenomenal rise of the ubiquitous curry house, and Sparkbrook in particular developed unrivalled Balti restaurants. These materially changed the city’s social life patterns among the native population. In addition to these obvious cultural contributions, the multilingual setting in which English exists today became more diverse in the sixties and seventies, especially due to immigration from the Indian subcontinent and the Caribbean. The largest of the community languages was Punjabi, with over half a million speakers by the late seventies. Still, there were also substantial communities of Gujarati speakers, as many as a third of a million, and up to a hundred thousand Bengali speakers. In some areas, such as East London, public notices recognised this.

A Bengali road sign in East London.

A new level of linguistic and cultural diversity was introduced by Commonwealth immigration. This manifested itself not just in the various ‘new’ languages that entered Britain, but also in the development of new dialects of English originating in different parts of the old Empire, especially in the West Indies.

Inter-cultural Diversity, Music & Integration:

Within the British West Indian community, Jamaican English, or the patois – as it is known – has had a special place as a token of identity. While there were complicated social pressures that frowned on Jamaican English in Jamaica, with parents complaining when their children ‘talk local’ too much, in England, it became almost obligatory to do so in London. One Jamaican schoolgirl who made the final passage to the Empire’s capital city with her parents in the seventies put it like this:

It’s rather weird ’cos when I was in Jamaica I wasn’t really allowed to speak it (Jamaican creole) in front of my parents. I found it difficult in Britain at first. When I went to school I wanted to be like the others in order not to stand out. So I tried speaking the patois as well… You get sort of a mixed reception. Some people say, ’You sound really nice, quite different.’ Other people say, ’You’re a foreigner, speak English. Don’t try to be like us, ’cos you’re not like us.’

Despite the mixed reception from her British West Indian friends, she persevered with the patois, and, as she put it after a year I lost my British accent, and was accepted. However, for many Caribbean visitors to Britain, the patois of Brixton and Notting Hill was a stylised form that was not, as they saw it, truly Jamaican, not least because British West Indians came from all parts of the Caribbean. Another West Indian schoolgirl, born in London and visiting Jamaica for the first time, was teased for her patois. She was told that she didn’t sound right and that. The experience convinced her that…

… in London the Jamaicans have developed their own language in patois, sort of. ’Cos they make up their own words in London, in, like, Brixton. And then it just develops into patois as well.

Researchers found that there were already white children in predominantly black schools who had begun using the British West Indian patois in order to be accepted by the majority of their friends, who were black:

I was born in Brixton and I’ve been living here for seventeen years, and so I just picked it up from hanging around with my friends who are mainly Black people. And so I can relate to them by using it, because otherwise I’d feel an outcast… But when I’m with someone else who I don’t know I try to speak as fluent English as possible. It’s like I feel embarrassed about it (the patois), I feel like I’m degrading myself by using it.

The unconscious racism of such comments pointed to the predicament of Black Britons. Not fully accepted, for all their rhetoric, by the established native population, they felt neither fully Caribbean nor fully British. This was the poignant outcome of what the British Black writer Caryl Phillips called The Final Passage. Phillips, who came to Britain as a baby in the late 1950s, was one of the first of his generation to grapple with the problem of finding a means of literary self-expression that was true to his experience:

The paradox of my situation is that where most immigrants have to learn a new language, Caribbean immigrants have to learn a new form of the same language. It induces linguistic schizophrenia – you have an identity crisis that mirrors the larger cultural confusion.

In his novel, The Final Passage, the narrative is in Standard English. But the speech of the characters is a rendering of nation language:

I don’t care what anyone tell you, going to England be good for it going to raise your mind. For a West Indian boy you just being there is an education, for you going see what England do for sheself… It’s a college for the West Indian.

The lesson of this college is, as Phillips puts it, that symptomatic of the colonial situation, the language has been divided as well. English – creole or standard – was the only available language in the British Black community and in the English-speaking islands of the Caribbean.

By the end of the seventies, Caribbean and Rastafarian Reggae music were beginning to have a broad impact on British pop culture. In Birmingham, a group of out-of-work young white men formed the band UB40, named after their benefit claim forms. The multicultural band Steel Pulse also became popular. On the other side of rock ‘politics’, there was an eruption of racist, skinhead rock, and a ‘casual’ but influential interest in the far right from among more established artists. At a concert at the Birmingham Odeon, in 1976, Eric Clapton, arriving on stage an hour late either drunk or stoned (or both), enquired as to whether there were any immigrants in the audience. He then said, to the shock and disgust of almost everyone there, Powell is the only bloke whose telling the truth, for the good of the country. David Bowie was also heard to flirt with far-right ideas and Sid Vicious of the punk band, The Sex Pistols, contributed the following dubious lyrics to contemporary political thought:

‘Belsen was a gas/ I read the other day/ About the open graves/ Where the Jews all lay …’

Punk gets cheeky: Vivienne Westwood (centre), Chrissie Hynde (left) and Jordan advertise Westwood’s King’s Road punk shop, Sex, in 1976.

Reacting to the surrounding mood, as well as to concerns about these deliberately outrageous statements and actions (McLaren and Westwood produced clothing with swastikas and other Nazi emblems), Rock Against Racism was formed in August 1976, organising a series of charity concerts throughout Britain and helping to create the wider Anti-Nazi League a year later. Punk bands were at the forefront of the RAR movement, above all The Clash whose lead singer Joe Strummer became more influential than Johnny Rotten and the rest of the Sex Pistols. Ska and Soul music also had a real influence in turning street culture decisively against racism. Coventry’s Ska revival band, The Specials captured and expressed this new mood. The seventies produced, in the middle of visions of social breakdown, a musical revival which reflected the reality of a lost generation, whilst in turn reviving their sense of enjoyment of life. As one contemporary cultural critic put it:

‘A lifestyle – urban, mixed, music-loving, modern and creative – had survived, despite being under threat from the NF.’

Dave Haslam (2005), Not Abba, Fourth Estate.

Punk rock was in part a reaction against growing youth unemployment and also came to symbolise a rejection of commercialism. Ironically, as with earlier youth sub-cultures, it soon became highly commercialised.

Punk rockers

The streets might be dirty and living standards falling, but by the end of the seventies, the streets were also getting safer from racist thugs and, contrary to some stereotypes, the quality of life was improving. The integration of diverse cultures and sub-cultures was working at a ‘local’ street level and in parish schools, not directed from the top down.

The arrival of Islam, Sikhism and Hinduism transformed the celebration of religious faith, including Christianity, in many schools. In 1970 there were about 300,000 Muslims in Britain. By 1990 this number had grown to one million. There were more than three hundred mosques, the largest of which was in Central London. There were also Sikh and Hindu communities, each numbering around 300,000 members. For many Christians at Advent, the school Nativity play and carol service remained the main traditions, but many schools were developing new customs and practices to ensure that pupils from a range of backgrounds and faiths were included. It was increasingly recognised that a lack of thought or sensitivity on the part of schools at this time of year could negate much of the rest of the year to improve community relations. Parents seemed to be satisfied with the diverse menu on offer. They turned up in their thousands to see their children perform in celebrations which were primarily a source of fun for all.

Above: Christmas celebrations in the Scottish Highlands and inner-city comprehensive in London. Top: at Islington Green Secondary School, pupils of all ethnicities give traditional performances and learn each other’s national dances. Bottom: Christmas decorations at Kirkton Primary School.

Economic Decline & Deindustrialisation:

A great variety of explanations for the decline in British industrial competitiveness were put forward, and have continued to be debated since. None of these explanations has proved wholly satisfactory, however. One explanation suggests that there is a cultural obstacle, that the British have been conditioned to despise industry. This might be a relevant argument to apply to a new England, with an industrial heritage going back only two or three generations, and to the old England, the traditional rural areas, although even in these areas it would be something of a stereotype, it would be difficult to apply to industrial Britain, with its generations of coal miners, shipbuilders, foundry and factory workers.

During the depression years of the 1930s many of these workers, finding themselves unemployed, had, like the father of Norman Tebbitt (Margaret Thatcher’s Party Chairman in the late seventies) got on their bikes, or walked long distances, in their hundreds of thousands to find work in the new manufacturing areas. With no jobs to find anywhere in the seventies, these were pretty pointless words of advice. Pointless or not, Tebbitt’s speech was picked up by the popular Tory press and appeared in the banner On Your Bike headlines which have since become so emblematic of the Thatcher era. Unfortunately, the same press used them to put forward a related argument that the British were not sufficiently materialistic to work hard for the rewards associated with improved productivity. Complacency from generations of national success has also been blamed, as has the Welfare State’s cosseting of both the workforce and those out of work.

Keynes’ argument had been that keeping workers in employment multiplied the effect through the economy as they spent part of their incomes on goods and services was shown to operate in the opposite direction through the effects of rising unemployment. However, the majority of people of working and voting age had no adult memory of their own of the 1930s, and radical politicians were able to exploit these demographics to their advantage to argue the case for monetarism with tight controls on public spending. In these circumstances, voters felt that spending public money on ailing industries was wasteful and inappropriate, especially as it raised their tax burden.

The story of 1970s Britain, whether viewed from an economic, social or cultural perspective can be summed up by one word, albeit a long one – deindustrialisation. As with the processes of industrialisation two centuries before, Britain led the way in what was to become a common experience of all the mature industrial nations. The so-called maturity thesis suggested that, as industries developed and became more technologically sophisticated, they required less labour. At the same time, rising living standards meant that more wealth was available, beyond what would normally be spent on basic necessities and consumer goods, giving rise to a growing demand for services such as travel, tourism and entertainment. By 1976, services had become the largest area of employment in all the regions of Britain.

Another problem faced by the manufacturing sector was the long-standing British taste for imported goods. Many observers noted that not only was the country failing to compete internationally, but British industry was also losing its cutting edge when competing with foreign imports in the domestic market. The problem of deindustrialisation, therefore, became entwined with the debate over Britain’s long decline as a trading nation, going back over a century. It was seen not only as an economic decline but as a national failure, ownership of which in speeches and election propaganda, even in education, struck deep within the collective British cultural psyche. By 1977, if not before, its role as the world’s first and leading industrial nation was finally over, just as its time as an imperial power had effectively ended fifteen years earlier, as Dean Acheson had commented. It was another question as to whether the British people and politicians were prepared to accept these salient facts and move on.

British industry’s share of world trade fell dramatically during these years, and by 1975 it was only half what it had been in the 1950s, falling to just ten per cent. Nor could it maintain its hold on the domestic market. A particularly extreme example of this was the car industry: in 1965, with Austin minis selling like hotcakes, only one car in twenty was imported, but by 1978 nearly half were. In addition, many of the staple industries of the nineteenth century, such as coal and shipbuilding, continued to decline as employers, surviving only, if at all, through nationalisation. In addition, many of the new industries of the 1930s, including the car industry, were seemingly in terminal decline by the 1970s, as we have seen in the case of Coventry. Therefore, deindustrialisation was no longer simply a problem for an old Britain, it was also one for a new England. It was even a problem for East Anglia because although it was not so dependent on manufacturing, and services were growing, agriculture had also declined considerably.

Alternatively, the government’s failure adequately to support research and development has been blamed for Britain’s manufacturing decline, together with the exclusive cultural and educational backgrounds of Westminster politicians and government ministers, and Whitehall civil servants. This exclusivity, it is argued, left them ignorant of, and indifferent to, the needs of industry. Employment in manufacturing reached a peak of nine million in 1966. After that, it fell rapidly, to four million by 1994. Much of this loss was sustained in the older industries of Northwest England, but the bulk of it was spread across the newer industrial areas of the Midlands and Southeast.

Between 1973 and 1975 there was the first of three severe recessions. When Wilson returned to number ten in February 1974, he faced a huge balance-of-payments crisis and the tumbling value of the pound. He was trying to govern without an overall majority at a time when the economy was still recovering from the effect of the oil price shock, with inflation raging and unemployment rising. Inflation reached twenty-four per cent by 1975, and it came to be seen as a far more urgent problem than unemployment. Furthermore, the fragile and implausible Social Contract now had to be tested. Almost the first thing Labour did was to settle with the miners for double what Heath had thought possible. The new Chancellor, Denis Healey, introduced an emergency Budget soon after the election, followed by another in the autumn, raising income tax to eighty-three per cent at the top rate, and ninety-eight per cent for unearned income, a level so eyewateringly high it has been used against Labour ever since. Healey also increased help for the poorest, with higher pensions and subsidies on housing and food. He was trying to deliver for the unions by upholding his side of the social contract, as was Wilson when he abolished the Tories’ employment legislation.

In October 1974, a second general election gave Labour eighteen more seats and a workable overall majority of three. Much of Healey’s energy, continuing as Chancellor, was thrown into dealing with the unstable world economy, with floating currencies and inflation-shocked governments. He continued to devalue the pound against the dollar and to tax and cut as much as he dared, but his only real hope of controlling inflation was to control wages. Wilson insisted that his income policy must be voluntary, with no return or recourse to the legal restraints of the Heath government. The unions became increasingly worried that rampant inflation might bring back the Tories. So, for a while, the Social Contract did deliver fewer strikes, which halved and halved again the following year. Contrary to popular myth, the seventies were not all about mass meetings and walk-outs. The real trouble did not begin again until the winter of 1978-79.

But the other side of the social contract was not delivered. By the early months of 1975, the going rate for increases was already thirty per cent, a third higher than inflation. By June inflation was up to twenty-three per cent, and wage settlements were even further ahead. The government then introduced an element of compulsion, but this applied to employers who offered too much, rather than to trade unions. Nevertheless, Healey reckoned that two-thirds of his time was taken up in managing the inflationary effects of free collective bargaining. In his memoirs, he reflected:

‘Adopting a pay policy is rather like jumping out of a second-floor window: no one in his senses would do it unless the stairs were on fire. But in postwar Britain the stairs have always been on fire.’

Denis Healey (1989), The Time of My Life. Michael Joseph.

Healey did, however, manage to squeeze inflation downwards. He also reflected that, had the unions kept their promises, it would have been down to single figures by the autumn of 1975. At the same time, Healey continued to tax higher earners more, concentrating tax cuts on the worse off. Though notorious (somewhat unfairly) for promising that he would make the rich howl with anguish and that he would squeeze them until the pips squeak, Healey argued that it was the only way of making the country fairer. He never accepted the Tory tenet that higher taxes stopped people from working harder and instead blamed Britain’s poor industrial performance on low investment, and poor training and management, as others have done since.

What we now know is that Wilson wasn’t planning to stay long in his second premiership. There are many separate records of his private comments about retiring at sixty, after two more years in power. If he had not privately decided that he would go in 1976, he certainly acted as if he had. The question of who would succeed him, Jenkins or Callaghan, Healey or even Benn, had become one about the direction of the Labour government, rather than a personal threat to Wilson himself, so there was less rancour around the cabinet table. He seems likely to have known about his early stages of Alzheimer’s, which would wreak a devastating time on him in retirement. He had already begun to forget facts, confuse issues and repeat himself. For a man whose memory and sharp wit had been so important, this must have taken a huge toll. It was Jim Callaghan who finally replaced Wilson at number ten after a series of votes by Labour MPs. But for three turbulent years, he ran a government with no overall majority in Parliament, kept going by a series of deals and pacts, and in an atmosphere of constant crisis.

Callaghan was the third and last of the consensus-seeking centrist PMs after Wilson and Heath, and the first postwar occupant of the office not to have gone to ‘Oxbridge.’ In fact, he had not been to university at all. The son of a Royal Navy chief petty officer who had died young and a devout Baptist mother from Portsmouth, he had known real poverty and had clawed his way up as a young clerk working for the Inland Revenue, and then as a union official, before wartime naval service. Like Healey, he was one of the 1945 generation of MPs, a young rebel who had drifted rightwards while always keeping his strong trade union instincts. He was a social conservative, uneasy about divorce, homosexuality and vehemently pro-police, pro-monarchy and pro-military. He was also anti-hanging and strongly anti-racialist. As Home Secretary, he had announced that the permissive society had gone too far. On the economy, he became steadily more impressed by monetarists like the Tory MP Keith Joseph. He told the 1976 Labour Conference, used to Keynesian doctrines about governments spending their way out of recession, …

‘… that option no longer exists and that insofar as it ever did exist, it worked by injecting inflation into the economy … Higher inflation, followed by higher unemployment. That is the history of the last twenty years.’

Yet Callaghan is forever associated with failure in the national memory. This was due to the Labour government’s cap-in-hand begging for help from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Healey had negotiated a six-pound pay limit with the unions that would eventually feed through into lower wage increases and thereby lower inflation. Cash limits brought in under Wilson would also radically cut public expenditure. But in the spring of 1976 inflation was still rampant and unemployment was rising fast. Healey told Callaghan that because of the billions spent by the Bank of England supporting sterling in the first months of the year, a loan from the IMF looked essential. In June, standby credits were arranged with the IMF and countries including the United States, Germany, Japan and Switzerland.

Healey had imposed tough cuts in the summer but by its end, the pound was under intense pressure again. On 27th September, he was meant to fly out to a Commonwealth finance ministers’ conference in Hong Kong with the Governor of the Bank of England, but so great was the crisis and so panicked were the markets that he decided he could not afford to be in the air and out of contact for so long. In full view of the television cameras, he turned around at Heathrow and headed for Treasury, where he decided to apply to the IMF for a conditional loan, one which gave authority to the international banking officials above Britain’s elected leaders. Almost simultaneously, the Ford workers went on strike. Close to a nervous breakdown, and against Callaghan’s advice, Healey decided to dash to the Labour conference in Blackpool and make his case to an angry and anguished party. Many on the left were making a strong case for a siege economy; telling the IMF to ‘get lost,’ cutting imports and nationalising swathes of industry. Given just five minutes to speak from the floor, the Chancellor warned his party that this would risk a trade war, mass unemployment and the return of a Tory government. He shouted against a rising hubbub that he would negotiate with the IMF, which would mean…

“… things we do not like as well as things we do like … it means sticking to the very painful cuts in public expenditure … it means sticking to the pay policy.“

Denis Healey, Chancellor of the Exchequer during the economic storm, made a characteristic point (or two) to his opponents at the Labour conference.

So, with the cabinet watching on nervously, the negotiations started with the IMF, which insisted on severe funding cuts. Callaghan and Healey naturally wanted to limit these as far as they could, but the IMF, with the US Treasury standing behind them, was under pressure to squeeze even harder. The British were in a horribly weak position, not least because the government was riven by arguments and threats of resignation, including from Healey. The cabinet was split over what levels of cuts were acceptable and whether there was any real alternative in the form of a leftist siege economy. Callaghan and the lead IMF negotiator held private talks in which the PM warned that British democracy itself would be imperilled by mass unemployment. But the IMF was still calling for an extra billion pounds worth of cuts and it was only when Healey, without telling Callaghan, threatened the international bankers with yet another Who runs Britain? election, that they gave way. The final package of cuts was announced in Healey’s budget, severe but not as grim as some had feared, but still greeted with headlines about Britain’s shame.

As it turned out, however, the whole package was unnecessary from the start. The cash limits Healey had already imposed on Whitehall would cut spending far more effectively than anyone realised. More startling still, the public spending statistics, on which the cuts were based, and especially the estimates for borrowing, were wildly wrong. The public finances were stronger than they appeared. The IMF-directed cuts were therefore more savage than they needed to be. Britain’s balance of payment came back into balance long before the cuts could take effect and Healey reflected later that had he been given accurate forecasts in 1976, he would never have needed to go to the IMF at all. In the end, only half the loan was used, all of which was repaid before Labour left office.

Factory workers strike and picket over low pay and closures in 1977.

Following the IMF affair, the pound recovered strongly, the markets recovered, inflation fell, eventually to single figures, and unemployment fell too. But the contraction of manufacturing began to accelerate and there was a national and international swing to the right as a reaction against perceived high-taxing and high-spending governments. Demands were being made that governments cease propping up ‘lame duck’ industries with public money. Attacks on trade union power continued, coming to a head in the ‘Winter of Discontent’ of 1978-79, when there was an explosion of resentment, largely by poorly paid public employees, against a government income policy they felt was discriminatory.

Rubbish piled up in London during the ‘Winter of Discontent’ of 1978/79.

Appendix II: HRHs Prince Charles & Princess Anne – Vision & Work:

Following his Investiture as Prince of Wales, Charles was sent around the world as the heir to the throne and the House of Windsor-Mountbatten’s new star. Returning to Cambridge the following year, he finished his studies and took his bachelor’s degree.

He then went to the Royal Naval College in Dartmouth, where his mother and father had first met and where Prince Philip had trained as an officer in the Royal Navy before the Second World War. Charles also trained at the Royal Air Force College, becoming a helicopter pilot. From 1971 to 1976 he took a tour of duty in the Royal Navy. As Prince of Wales, Charles wanted to make a difference. He possessed a personal vision of harmony between human society and the natural world. He was outspoken in talking about the environment which was then viewed as being a niche interest and a marginal issue, and he was therefore seen by many as being quite eccentric. But he continued to develop his interests in gardening, sustainability and conservation, in addition to architecture, spirituality and social reform. He shared many of these interests with his father. On leaving the Navy in 1976, he founded The Prince of Wales’s Institute for Architecture and was involved with urban regeneration and development projects. He also set up The Prince’s Trust to help young people get into work and the Business in the Community scheme. In addition, he oversaw the management of the Duchy of Cornwall.

Throughout the 1970s, pressure grew on Charles to marry. He loved sports, especially playing polo, and was seen as one of the world’s most eligible bachelors, appearing on covers of magazines and tabloid newspapers, and with beautiful society women, including Camilla Shand, who later married and then divorced Andrew Parker-Bowles.

The Royal Family Tree, 1894-1990:

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Princess Anne, also known as Princess Royal, is the Queen’s only daughter. She was given this title by the Queen in 1987. She is a keen and capable horsewoman and won the European Championships in 1971. For this, she was also voted BBC Sports Personality of the Year by millions of television viewers. She represented Great Britain and Northern Ireland in the 1976 Olympics in Montreal. In 1970 she became President of the Save the Children Fund, gaining great admiration for her tireless work for her charity around the world, as seen in the photo below (the princess is in the centre, wearing a saffron top).

Sources:

Andrew Marr (2007, ’08, ’09), A History of Modern Britain. Basingstoke: Pan Macmillan.

Philip Parker (2017), History of Britain in Maps. Glasgow: HarperCollins.

John Hayward & Simon Hall (eds.) (2001), The Penguin Atlas of British & Irish History. London: Penguin Books.

Gwyn A. Williams (1985), When Was Wales? Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Majesty & Grace IX: The Reign of Elizabeth Windsor, 1963-78: Part 1 – Rebellious Britons.

Protest & Planning, 1963-68 – Youth, Vietnam & Grosvenor Square:

The 1960s were dramatic years in Britain. Demographic trends, especially the increase in the proportion of teenagers in the population, coincided with economic affluence and ideological experimentation to reconfigure social mores to a revolutionary extent. In 1964, under Harold Wilson, the Labour Party came into power, promising economic and social modernisation. Economically, the main problems of the decade arose from the devaluation of the currency in 1967 and the increase in industrial action. This was the result of deeper issues in the economy, such as the decline of the manufacturing industry to less than one-third of the workforce. By contrast, employment in the service sector rose to over half of all workers.

Young people were most affected by the changes of the 1960s. Overall, the period from the early 1950s to the mid-1970s was a long period of economic expansion and demographic growth which helped to fuel educational development in England. Education gained new prominence in government circles and student numbers soared. By 1966, seven new universities had opened: Sussex (pictured below), East Anglia, Warwick, Essex, York, Lancaster and Kent.

From a pamphlet on the History of Architecture.

By 1972 there were forty-five universities, compared with just seventeen in 1945. By 1966, seven new universities had opened, including the University of East Anglia and the University of Warwick at Canley near Coventry. More importantly, perhaps, students throughout the country were becoming increasingly radicalised as a response to growing hostility towards what they perceived as the political and social complacency of the older generation. They staged protests on a range of issues, from dictatorial university decision-making to apartheid in South Africa, and the continuance of the Vietnam War. But not all members of the ‘older generation’ were ‘complacent’ and many joined in the protests.

Above: A Quaker ‘advertisement’ in the Times, February 1968.

The Vietnam War not only angered the young of Britain but also placed immense strain on relations between the US and British governments. Although the protests against the Vietnam War were less violent than those in the United States, partly because of more moderate policing in Britain, there were major demonstrations all over the country; the one which took place in London’s Grosvenor Square, home to the US Embassy, in 1968, involved a hundred thousand protesters. Like the world of pop, ‘protest’ was essentially an American import. When counter-cultural poets put on an evening of readings at the Albert Hall in 1965, alongside a British contingent which included Adrian Mitchell and Christopher Logue, the ‘show’ was dominated by the Greenwich Village guru, Allen Ginsberg.

It was perhaps not surprising that the American influence was strongest in the anti-war movement. When the Vietnam Solidarity Committee organised three demonstrations outside the US embassy in London’s Grosvenor Square, the second of them particularly violent, they were copying the cause and the tactics used to much greater effect in the United States. The student sit-ins and occupations at Hornsey and Guildford Art Colleges and Warwick University were pale imitations of the serious unrest on US and French campuses. Hundreds of British students went over to Paris to join what they hoped would be a revolution in 1968, until de Gaulle, with the backing of an election victory, crushed it. This was on a scale like nothing seen in Britain, with nearly six hundred students arrested in fights with the police on a single day and ten million workers on strike across France.

Modernising Britain, 1963-68:

Andrew Marr has commented that the term ‘Modern Britain’ does not simply refer to the look and shape of the country – the motorways and mass car economy, the concrete, sometimes ‘brutalist’ architecture, the rock music and the high street chains. It also refers to the widespread belief in planning and management. It was a time of practical men, educated in grammar schools, sure of their intelligence. They rolled up their sleeves and took no-nonsense. They were determined to scrap the old and the fusty, whether that meant the huge Victorian railway network, the Edwardian, old Etonian establishment in Whitehall, terraced housing, censorship, prohibitions on homosexual behaviour and abortion.

The map (below) unveiled by British Transport Commission Chairman Sir Richard Beeching in March 1963 marked the symbolic end of the great railway age. Taking an axe, as he had, to great swathes of rural lines, Beeching tried to fend off the challenge posed by the growth of road transportation and left large areas of the countryside with no train services at all. The spider’s web of the track as shown in his report, The Reshaping of the British Railways, with black indicating those routes which were to be closed and red the lines that had been selected for survival (though not all with stopping services), was Beeching’s way of solving a problem which had been apparent for some time: the railways were simply not profitable. Ticket revenues and freight charges were hopelessly inadequate to defray the expenses of running a comprehensive network, particularly as successive governments had taken the way of political least resistance by acceding to demands for higher wages in the rail industry, while at the same time keeping a ceiling on fare increases.

There had been some rationalisation already. Around 1,300 miles had been closed by 1939 and after the nationalisation of the railways in 1948, the new British Transport Commission had pared down another 3,300 miles by 1962. But the salami-slicing of selected lines could not stem the losses, which had reached just over a hundred million in the same year. Many feared that the unspoken policy of combining unstoppable costs with an unmovably large network would lead to the death of the railways. Beeching, on secondment from ICI, at the time Britain’s largest manufacturer, stepped in with a solution that was as unpalatable as it was logical. His report provided a stark analysis that fifty per cent of Britain’s rail routes provided only two per cent of its revenues and that half of the 4,300 stations had annual receipts of less than ten thousand pounds. Some lines covered barely ten per cent of their running costs. To save the arterial rail routes, Beeching proposed ripping out the veins, ruthlessly shutting down railway tracks where there was no prospect of a profitable service, or where routes were duplicated. He earmarked for closure half of those stations still operating in 1962 and five thousand miles of track, about a third of the total remaining.

There were howls of protest and a few lines in Scotland, Wales and the southwest of England were reprieved. Some stretches were saved and turned into heritage railways, but most remained neglected and grassed over. The losses that Beeching had hoped to stem continued. It was estimated that the savings were only thirty million per year, compared with continuing costs of a hundred million p.a. by 1968. In the same year, a new Transport Act accepted that the railways would need to receive a subsidy for a further three years. But the British government, subsequently, never did rid itself of the need to subsidise the country’s rail system. Yet the rail system avoided complete collapse, and in terms of passenger numbers, prospered, so that journeys, which had declined from 965 million a year in 1962 to 835 million in 1965. The railways were also made more efficient with the closure of almost six thousand miles of track and two thousand stations after the Beeching report of 1963. Thereafter, they concentrated on fast intercity services and bulk-freight transportation. Beeching’s axe may have wounded the railways, but the blood-letting ultimately allowed them to survive, and even, in many areas, to thrive.

The Troubles in Ireland & Terrorism in Britain, 1964-1974:

In 1963 Terence O’Neill had become Prime Minister of Northern Ireland. His government’s policies of economic modernisation coincided with and encouraged a growing self-confidence among the Catholic middle classes, who were willing to accept the continuing participation of Ireland provided that they were given equal status within Northern Ireland. This confidence found expression in the civil rights of the mid-sixties, which campaigned in particular on issues of discrimination against the Catholic minority in housing and electoral gerrymandering. O’Neill’s Catholic-friendly rhetoric began to alienate the more conservative fringes of unionism, but it was the emergence of the radical People’s Democracy movement and its socialist anti-state wing that made the prime minister’s standing within his own party increasingly difficult.

The stump of Nelson’s Pillar, on Sackville Street (Now O’Connell Street).

When Nelson’s Pillar in the centre of Dublin was blown up by the Official IRA on 8th March 1966, the biggest controversy about it was why it had taken 157 years for the demolition to happen. Constructed circa 1808, the Protestant Ascendency class who had erected it had then celebrated. For many, the resentment had run deep. Almost fifty years after the Easter 1916 Rising in Dublin had blazed the trail towards Irish Independence and the establishment of the Republic, an English colonialist still towered over every other notable in Ireland’s capital city, they groused. The reason it had taken fifty years to remove the pillar was to be found within the capital itself, but the reason for it happening in 1966 had much to do with what had been taking place in Ireland’s partitioned northern city, Belfast. There, and in other towns in the North, Nationalist politics had moved onto the streets, where demonstrations and counter-demonstrations frequently led to riots.

For Nationalists in Ireland, both North and South, Northern Ireland was an artificial state kept in being by the control of the Protestant majority from 1922 onwards. By 1962 it was in disarray. A powerful civil rights movement arose on behalf of the nationalist (and usually Roman Catholic) minority. But, in practice, attempts to maintain inter-religious and intercultural harmony broke down.

The radicals may only have wanted a fully democratic society, but the majority of the province’s population increasingly saw this as a return to the age-old struggle for power between unionists and nationalists. While the last unionist government at Stormont from 1969 to 1972 were trying to create a consensus by granting most of the civil rights demands, the revival of the latent violent sectarianism made the province ungovernable.

The Westminster government deployed troops in the province in 1969 and moved into Belfast and Londonderry to preserve order. An alarming spate of bombing attacks on English cities signified that the Provisional IRA and Sinn Fein were taking the almost century-long struggle into a new and sinister phase. Then, in 1972, the most violent year of the Troubles, Westminster and Whitehall took over the government of Northern Ireland through Direct Rule. In that year, over four hundred people in the province lost their lives as a result of political violence.

A rioter throws a petrol bomb at British soldiers and police in Belfast in 1972.

The British government had only reluctantly become involved. Its subsequent policies were aimed at finding a political solution by creating a middle ground where the liberal wings of nationalism and unionism could find a consensus that would eventually make the militants of both sides redundant. This strategy proved unsuccessful, not least because of the nature and internal logic of direct rule. Because they were denied direct access to power, both sides could attack British policies as inappropriate and for failing to deliver their respective demands. At the same time, paramilitaries of both sides could drive the point home by violence that was, at least in part, justifiable in the eyes of their respective communities.

On the afternoon of May Day in 1971 John Evans, manager of the hugely popular Kensington boutique Biba, walked nervously downstairs into the store’s basement. There had been a series of outlandish phone calls warning about some kind of bomb, which to start with had simply been ignored by the assistant on the till. However, five hundred women and children had been evacuated by the time Evans pushed open the door of the stock room. There was an almighty bang, a flash and a flame and a billow of smoke. The Angry Brigade, mainland Britain’s own terror group, had struck again. They had chosen Biba, they said in their statement, because they saw boutiques as modern slave houses, for both their staff and customers. What they did not seem to realise was that Biba’s customers found it liberating, not oppressive. In some ways, the Biba bombing was the event that marked the end of the sixties dream. Two of the main forces behind the youth culture were at war with each other, the fantasy of the Angry Young People and that of the benign hippies as part of the consumer culture of cool clothes. The two subcultures, Biba and the Angries were two sides of the same coin of sixties youth culture.

The small group of university dropouts who made up the Angry Brigade would go to prison for ten years after a hundred and twenty-three attacks, but they are little remembered now. But they were the nearest Britain came to an anarchist threat, both anti-Communist and anti-Capitalist. That also made them anti-liberal. Western democracy, Stalinism, the media, the drug-taking hippy culture, modern architecture and even tourism were all targets for attack. More broadly and seriously, in the later sixties and early seventies, with significant minorities on the march from Brixton to Belfast, the liberal consensus in the United Kingdom seemed to be breaking down just as it had almost done in 1910-14. Beneath the veneer of public contentment, there were, in reality, divisive forces deeply entrenched in British society in the sixties. In the period of Harold Wilson’s first premiership (1964-70), a wide range of radical groups were exploding into revolt. The Angries were an extreme, violent manifestation of this revolt, but many young Britons were finding the values of consumerism and conformity unappealing in a world whose ecology was being disturbed and whose very existence was threatened by weapons of unimaginable horror.

Clearly, then, in the early seventies violence, even in the form of anti-State terrorism, had become a common theme on both sides of the Irish Sea. If there was one moment when the ‘troubles’ became unstoppable it was 30th January 1972, ‘Bloody Sunday’, when troops from the Parachute Regiment killed thirteen unarmed civilians in Londonderry. Albeit reluctantly, Edward Heath introduced internment without trial for suspected terrorists. He authorised the arrest and imprisonment in Long Kesh prison of 337 IRA suspects. In dawn raids, three thousand troops had found three-quarters of the people they were looking for, though even among these were many old or inactive former ‘official’ IRA members. Many of the active ‘Provo’ (Provisional IRA) leaders escaped south of the border. Protests came in from around the world. There was an immediate upsurge of violence, with twenty-one people killed in three days. Bombings and shooting simply increased in intensity. In the first eight weeks of 1972, forty-nine people were killed and more than 250 were seriously injured. Amid this already awful background, Bloody Sunday was an appalling day when Britain’s reputation around the world was damaged almost irrevocably. In Dublin, ministers reacted with fury and the British embassy was burned to the ground.

The tragic event in Londonderry made it easier for the ‘Provos’ to raise funds abroad, especially in the United States. This support emboldened the ‘Provos’, who hit back with a bomb attack on the Parachute Regiment’s Aldershot headquarters, killing seven people, none of them soldiers. The initial escalation of violence in ‘the province’ led to the imposition, by degrees, of direct rule by Whitehall. But all British political and administrative initiatives encountered perennial problems: one side or the other, and sometimes both, was unwilling to accept what was proposed. Ted Heath believed that he needed to persuade Dublin to drop its longstanding constitutional claim to the North, and, simultaneously, to persuade mainstream Unionists to work with moderate Nationalist politicians. His first Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, a new post made necessary by direct rule, William Whitelaw, met the Provisional IRA leaders, including Gerry Adams, for face-to-face talks, a desperate and risky gamble which, however, led nowhere. There was no compromise yet available that would bring about a ceasefire.

So, ignoring the Provos, the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 proposed a power-sharing executive of six Unionists, four Nationalists (SDLP) and one non-sectarian Alliance Party member. It failed because the majority of Unionists would not accept an Irish dimension in the form of the proposed Council of Ireland, bringing together politicians from both sides of the border with powers over a limited range of issues. This was what nationalists demanded in return for Dublin renouncing its authority over Northern Ireland. Too many Unionists were implacably opposed to the deal, and the moderates were routed at the first 1974 election. While the British government’s approach became subtler with regard to unionist concerns, a formula that was acceptable to both sides remained elusive and was to do so for another quarter of a century. At the time, Heath concluded:

‘Ultimately it was the people of Northern Ireland who threw away the best chance of peace in the blood-stained history of the six counties’.

Nonetheless, the level of political violence subsided after 1972 within Northern Ireland itself. With hindsight, ‘Bloody Sunday’ had been an exceptional, tragic event that no one had anticipated, despite the presence of British troops on the streets of Belfast and Londonderry. In most subsequent years considerably more people died in road accidents. In July 1973, however, without warning, twenty bombs went off in Belfast, killing eleven people. Mainland Britain then became the key Provo target. In October 1974, five people were killed and sixty injured in attacks on Guildford pubs and in December, twenty-one (mostly young) people were killed in Birmingham by bombs placed in two pubs in the city centre.

The South Wales Coalfield Tragedy of Aberfan, October 1966:

Aberfan in the days immediately after the disaster, showing the extent of the spoil slip.

Later in the same year as the blowing up of Nelson’s Pillar in Dublin, on 21st October, the people of the British Isles were devastated by the tragedy that befell the Welsh mining village of Aberfan in the valley below the town of Merthyr Tydfil. Twenty adults and a hundred and sixty-six children were lost when a colliery slag tip, soaked by heavy rain, slipped down the hillside above the village junior school, Pantglas, smothering classes of eight and nine-year-olds and their teachers who were just beginning their lessons for the day. Funds were raised in churches and schools across Britain and Ireland for the relief effort being led by local miners. Still, though government ministers rushed to the scene, the Queen and Royal Family were advised to stay away. At the same time, bodies were still being recovered, and it was thought that her entourage might get in the way of the search and recovery operation.

The rescue of a young girl from the school; no survivors were found after 11:00 am

She delayed her visit until nine days after the disaster, a delay that was misinterpreted by some as being callous. However, when she did visit, she was visibly moved to tears and overcome with grief, so much so that she was welcomed into a miner’s house to recover her composure. Many still remember their emotions at this time, as children and parents, especially those who were the same age as the lost children of Aberfan – almost a whole year group had been wiped out. Those visiting the Welsh coalfield today can catch sight of the 194 crosses in the memorial garden from across the Taff valley.

As Prince of Wales, Charles revisited Aberfan on the fiftieth anniversary of the disaster in 2016.

In May 1997, the Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh planted a tree at the Aberfan Memorial Garden. In February 2007, the Welsh Government announced a donation of £1.5 million to the Aberfan Memorial Charity and £500,000 to the Aberfan Education Charity, which represented an inflation-adjusted amount of the money taken to pay to secure the tip. The money for the memorial charity was used for the upkeep of the memorials to the disaster. In October 2016, on the fiftieth anniversary of the disaster, commemorative events took place in the garden and at the cemetery; the Prince of Wales represented the Queen, and government ministers were present to pay tribute. At the time of the anniversary Huw Edwards, the BBC News journalist and presenter, described the need to continue learning lessons from Aberfan:

“What we can do, however—in this week of the fiftieth anniversary—is try to focus the attention of many in Britain and beyond on the lessons of Aberfan, lessons which are still of profound relevance today. They touch on issues of public accountability, responsibility, competence and transparency.”

The dedication plaque at the Aberfan Memorial Garden

In January 2022, there was a call to find a permanent home for the artefacts salvaged from the disaster. These include a clock that had stopped when the tragedy occurred.

Harold’s Bright Young Things & The Technological Revolution:

According to Marr (2007-09), the country seemed to be suddenly full of bright men and women from lower-middle-class or upper-working-class families who were rising fast through business, universities and the professions. They were inspired by Harold Wilson’s talk of a scientific and technological revolution that would transform Britain. In October 1963 Wilson, then Labour leader of the opposition, predicted that Britain would be forged in the white heat of the technological revolution. In his speech at Labour’s 1963 conference, the most famous he ever made, Wilson pointed out that such a revolution would require wholesale social change:

‘The Britain that is going to be forged in the white heat of this revolution will be no place for restrictive practices or for outdated methods … those charged with the control of our affairs must be ready to think and speak in the language of our scientific age. … the formidable Soviet challenge in the education of scientists and technologists in Soviet industry (necessitates that) … we must use all the resources of democratic planning, all the latent and underdeveloped energies and skills of our people to ensure Britain’s standing in the world.’

Above: Grammar School Boy, Harold Wilson, Labour leader and PM

Dedicated Followers of Fashion:

In some ways, however, the new, swinging Wilsonian Britain was already out of date by the mid-sixties. In any case, his vision, though sounding ‘modern’ was essentially that of an old-fashioned civil servant. By 1965, Britain was already becoming a more feminised, sexualised, rebellious and consumer-based society. The political classes were cut off from much of this cultural undercurrent by their age and consequent social conservatism. They looked and sounded exactly what they were, people from a more formal, former time.

Barbara Hulanicki’s Kensington shop.

By 1971, sixty-four per cent of households had acquired a washing machine. This, in addition to the rapid and real growth in earnings of young manual workers, sustained over the past decade, had, by the mid-sixties, created a generation who had money to spend on leisure and luxury. The average British teenager was spending eight pounds a week on clothes, cosmetics, records and cigarettes. In London, their attitude was summed up by the fashion designer Mary Quant, whose shop, Bazaar, on King’s Road, provided clothes that allowed people to run, to jump, to leap, to retain their precious freedom.

Beatlemania had swept the British Isles in the early sixties, and by the middle of the decade the group had become a global phenomenon, playing all over Europe, as well as Australia, Japan and, of course, the USA. By 1967, returning from a trip to India, they recorded their influential album Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band, with its famous art cover. Before breaking up in the early 1970s, they gave up touring and concentrated on recording a string of albums at their Abbey Road studio in London, including Abbey Road, The Double White Album and Let it Be.

Meanwhile, a more working-class sub-culture emerged, particularly in London and the South-East, as rival gangs, successors to the Teddy Boys of the late fifties, of Mods and Rockers followed hard rock bands like The Who and The Rolling Stones. In the summer of 1964, they rode their mopeds and motorbikes from the London suburbs down to Brighton, where they met up on the beach and staged fights with each other. Pete Townsend and Roger Daltry documented the social history of the earlier period in their early seventies rock album and film, Quadrophenia.

‘The Who’ began life as a ‘Mod’ band in the mid-sixties.
By the early 1970s, their hairstyles, clothes and music had changed dramatically.
Over 250,000 went to the Rolling Stones’ open-air concert in the early seventies.
Education – The Binary Divide & Comprehensivisation:

By 1965, the post-war division of children, effectively, into potential intellectuals, technical workers and ‘drones’ – gold, silver and lead – was thoroughly discredited. The fee-paying independent and ‘public’ schools still thrived, with around five per cent of the country’s children ‘creamed off’ through their exclusive portals. For the other ninety-five per cent, ever since 1944, state schooling was meant to be divided into three types of schools. In practice, however, this became a binary divide between grammar schools, taking roughly a quarter, offering traditional academic teaching, and the secondary modern schools, taking the remaining three-quarters of state-educated children, offering a technical and/or vocational curriculum. The grandest of the grammar schools were the 179 ‘direct grant’ schools, such as those in the King Edward’s Foundation in Birmingham, which J.R.R. Tolkien had attended, and the Manchester Grammar School. They were controlled independently of both central and local government, and their brighter children would be expected to go to the ‘better’ universities, including Oxford and Cambridge, from where they would enter the professions.

Alongside the direct grant schools, also traditionalist in ethos but ‘maintained’ by the local authorities, were some 1,500 ordinary grammar schools. The division was made on the basis of the selective state examination known as the ‘eleven plus’ after the age of the children who sat it. The children who ‘failed’ this examination were effectively condemned as ‘failures’ to attend what were effectively second-rate schools, often in buildings which reflected their lower status. As one writer observed in 1965, ‘modern’ had become a curious euphemism for ‘less clever.’ Some of these schools were truly dreadful, sparsely staffed, crowded into unsuitable buildings and submitting no pupils for outside examinations before most were released for work at fifteen. At A Level, in 1964, the secondary moderns, with around seventy-two per cent of Britain’s children, had 318 candidates. The public schools, with five per cent, had 9,838. Many of those who were rejected at the eleven plus and sent to secondary moderns never got over the sense of rejection. The IQ tests were shown not to be nearly as reliable as first thought. Substantial minorities, up to sixty thousand children a year, were at the ‘wrong’ school and many were being transferred later, up or down.

In addition, the selective system was divisive of friendships, families and communities. Different education authorities had widely different proportions of grammar school and secondary modern places; division by geography, not even by examination. A big expansion of teachers and buildings was needed to deal with the post-war baby boom children who were now reaching secondary school. Desperately looking for money, education authorities snatched at the savings a simpler comprehensive system, such as that pioneered and developed in Coventry in the fifties, might produce. Socialists who had wanted greater equality, among whom Education Secretary Tony Crosland had long been prominent, were against the eleven-plus on ideological grounds. But many articulate middle-class parents who would never have called themselves socialists were equally against it because their children had failed to get grammar school places.

With all these pressures, education authorities had begun to move towards a one-school-for-all or comprehensive system during the Conservative years, Tory Councils as well as Labour ones. In 1964 the head of Whitley Abbey School in Coventry concluded that the city council now needed to choose between returning to the grammar and secondary modern school system or going fully comprehensive. Therefore, in the early 1960s at least, grammar schools and selection were still at the heart of Coventry’s so-called comprehensive revolution. There were also comprehensives elsewhere on the Swedish model, and they were much admired for their huge scale, airy architecture and apparent modernity. Crosland hastened the demise of the grammar schools by requesting local authorities to go comprehensive. He did not say how many comprehensives must be opened nor how many grammar schools should be closed, but by making government money for new school buildings conditional on going comprehensive, the change was greatly accelerated.

An early comprehensive school for 11-18-year-olds of differing abilities, taught together.
High-rise homes, Class & Communities:

New housing schemes, including estates and high-rise blocks of flats, plus the new town experiments, undermined the traditional urban working-class environments, robbing them of their intrinsic collective identities. The extended kinship network of the traditional prewar working-class neighbourhoods and communities was replaced by the nuclear family life on the new estates. Rehousing, property speculation, the rise of the consumer society, market forces, urban planning and legislation, all play their role in the further regeneration of working-class culture. In 1972, Phil Cohen, a University of Birmingham sociologist, described these processes in a Working Paper:

The first effect of the high density, high-rise schemes was to destroy the function of the street, the local pub, the corner shop… Instead there was only the privatised space of the family unit, stacked one on top of another, in total isolation, juxtaposed with the totally public space which surrounded it, and which lacked any of the informal social controls generated by the neighbourhood.

The streets which serviced the new estates became thoroughfares, their users ’pedestrians’, and by analogy so many bits of human traffic… The people who had to live in them weren’t fooled. As one put it – they might have hot running water and central heating, but to him they were still prisons in the sky… The isolated family unit could no longer call on the resources of wider kinship networks, or the neighbourhood, and the family itself became the sole focus of solidarity…

The working class family was… not only isolated from the outside but undermined from within. There is no better example of what we are talking about than the so-called ’household mother’. The street or turning was no longer available as a safe play space, under neighbourly supervision. Mum, or Auntie, was no longer just round the corner to look after the kids for the odd morning. Instead, the task of keeping an eye on the kids fell exclusively to the young wife, and the only safe play space was the ’safety of the home’.

However, away from the high-rise blocks, the stubborn continuities of working-class life and culture survived. Nevertheless, the theme of the community became a matter of widespread and fundamental concern in the period. The question emerged as to whether, as the conditions and patterns of social life for working people changed, and as what surplus money there about began to pour into the new consumer goods on offer, people might not only be uprooted from a life they knew, and had made themselves, to another made partly for them by others. This might also involve a shift from the working-class values of solidarity, neighbourliness and collectivism, to those of individualism, competition and privatisation. 

Adding Colour to Real Life – From the World Cup on TV to Roads:

The BBC archive material from the period records how television played a role in this transition to more middle-class attitudes:

Nowadays, there’s a tremendous change, an amazing change, in fact, in just a few years. People have got television. They stay at home to watch it – husbands and wives. If they do come in at the weekend they’re playing bingo. They’ve now got a big queue for the one-armed bandit as well. They do have a lot more money, but what they’re losing is togetherness.

But TV did at least bring families together to watch major events and light entertainment. Many still remember the World Cup of 1966 as the most colourful event of the era, but although a colour cine film recording of the match was made and released later, people watched it live on TV in black and white. Only the hundred thousand at Wembley that day saw the red shirts of the England team raise the Jules Rimet trophy after the match.

For many in Britain, not just England, the event which marked the high point in popular culture was Alf Ramsey’s team’s victory over West Germany. The tournament was held in England for the first time, and the team, built around Bobby Charlton, the key Manchester United midfielder who, along with Nobby Stiles, had survived the Munich air crash earlier in the decade, and Bobby Moore, the captain, from West Ham United, who also had two skilful forwards in the team in Martin Peters and striker Geoff Hurst. Most people remember (in colour, of course) Geoff Hurst’s two extra-time goals and Kenneth Wolstenholme’s commentary because they have watched them replayed so many times since. After the match, however, people dressed up in a bizarre, impromptu mixture of colourful sixties fashion and patriotic bunting and came out to celebrate with family, friends and neighbours just as if it were the end of the war again. The 1970 World Cup, from Mexico, was in colour on TV.

By the mid-sixties, there were also far more brightly coloured cars on the roads, most notably the Austin Mini, but much of the traffic was still the boxy black, cream or toffee-coloured traffic of the fifties. By 1967 motorways totalled 525 miles in length, at a cost of considerable damage to the environment. Bridges were built over the Forth and Severn between 1964 and 1966. The development of new industries and the growth of the east coast ports necessitated a considerable programme of trunk road improvement. This continued into the mid-seventies at a time when economic stringency was forcing the curtailment of other road-building schemes. East Anglia’s new roads were being given priority treatment for the first time. Most of the A12, the London-Ipswich road, was made into a dual carriageway. The A45, the artery linking Ipswich and Felixstowe with the Midlands and the major motorways, had been considerably improved. Stowmarket, Bury St Edmunds and Newmarket had been bypassed. By the end of the decade, the A11/M11 London-Norwich road was completed, bringing to an end the isolation of northern and central Suffolk. Plans to triple the 660 miles of motorway in use by 1970 were also frustrated by a combination of the resulting economic recession, leading to cutbacks in public expenditure, and environmental protest.

The continuing working-class prosperity of the Midlands was based on the last fat years of the manufacture of cars, as well as other goods. But until the mid-fifties, Coventry’s industrial over-specialisation had gone relatively unnoticed, except by a few economists writing in The Times and The Financial Times. This in turn was compounded by the fact that within the British motor industry as a whole Coventry was steadily becoming of less importance as a source of output and coupled with relatively low profits and investment levels, the economy’s stock was slowly ossifying and becoming increasingly inflexible. Yet other car centres, notably Birmingham, Cowley, Dagenham and Luton were subjected to similar pressures but retained the bulk of their manufacturing capacity to the end of the seventies. It is no coincidence that most of what remained of the British motor industry was centred in towns which were dominated by one single large manufacturing plant.

The problem peculiar to Coventry was not only that the local economy became overdependent on the motor industry but that virtually all the automotive firms were, by the 1960s, ill-suited because of their size to survive the increasing competitiveness of the international market. A major reason for Coventry’s long boom was the multiplicity of firms in the motor industry, but in the seventies, this became the major cause of its decline. The only viable motor car establishment to survive this deep recession was Jaguar. The incentives to embark on a vast restructuring of industry, whether national or local, were simply not there, especially since the policy of successive governments was to divert industry away from the new industrial areas of the interwar period in favour of Britain’s depressed areas, or development areas, as they had been redesignated in the immediate postwar period.

Britain as the Sick Man of Europe – The Economy and EEC Membership:

Edward Heath campaigning, unsuccessfully, in 1966.

In the early 1970s, inflation began to rise significantly, especially after Edward Heath’s Conservative government recklessly expanded the money supply, a misguided version of Keynesianism. All the predictions of Keynesian economists were overturned as rising inflation was accompanied by rising unemployment. At first, this was once again confined to the older industrial areas of the northeast, Scotland and South Wales. The rise of more militant nationalisms in the two Celtic nations was now as much concerned with the closure of collieries and factories, and the laying off of labour, as with cultural issues. By 1973, it was clear that the economic problems of Britain were having far more general consequences. The nation’s capacity to generate wealth, along with its share of world trade and productivity, were all in serious, if not terminal, decline. Britain was seen as ‘the sick man of Europe.’

By 1970, after a decade during which Britain had grown much more slowly than the six original members of the Common Market, Heath was in some ways in a weaker position than Macmillan had been. On the other hand, he also had some advantages. He was trusted as a serious negotiator. Britain’s very weakness persuaded Paris that this time, les rosbifs were genuinely determined to join. Pompidou also thought the time was right and he wanted to get out of De Gaulle’s shadow. But France, like the rest of the Community, had for years been struggling to understand what Britain really wanted. This had been particularly difficult in the first seven Wilson years when the British left had been riven by the issue. Heath had only promised to negotiate, however, not to join. But his enthusiasm was in stark contrast to Wilson’s blowing hot and cold. Yet opinion polls suggested that Heath’s grand vision was alien to most British people.

With Heath in power, after over eighteen months of haggling in London, Paris and Brussels, a deal was thrashed out. It infuriated Britain’s fishermen, who would lose control over most of their traditional grounds to open European competition, particularly from French and Spanish trawlers. It was the second-best deal on the budget, later reopened by Margaret Thatcher. Above all, it left intact the original Common Market designed for the convenience of French farmers and Brussels-based bureaucrats, not for Britain. Vast slews of European law had to be swallowed whole, much of it objectionable to the British negotiators. There were some marginal concessions for Commonwealth farmers and producers, but these were granted in return for the bad deal on the budget. The reality was that the negotiators were directed to get a deal at almost any price. At a press conference at the Élysée Palace in 1971, Heath and Pompidou, after a long private session of talks between the two of them, revealed to general surprise that so far as France was concerned, Britain could now join the Community. Heath was particularly delighted to have triumphed over the press, who had expected another ‘Non.’

A national debate and vote in Parliament followed about the terms of entry, but although he had publicly supported British entry before negotiations began, Wilson now began sniping at Heath’s deal. Jim Callaghan, his potential successor, was already openly campaigning against the deal, partly on the grounds that the EEC threatened the language of Chaucer, Shakespeare and Dickens. The Labour left, too, was in full cry: a special Labour Conference in July 1971 voted by a majority of five to one against membership, and Labour MPs were also hostile by a majority of two to one. Wilson announced that he was now opposed to membership on the Heath terms. After the long and tortuous journey to reach this point, the pro-Europeans were disgusted: they defied the party whip in the Commons and voted with the Conservatives. They were led by Roy Jenkins. The left, led by Barbara Castle, Michael Foot and Tony Benn were livid with the sixty-nine rebels. For both sides, this was a matter of principle that would continue to divide the party until the present day. On the night of the vote in the Commons, there were screaming matches in the lobbies between the pro- and anti-marketeers among Labour MPs. After winning his Commons vote on British membership of the Community, Heath returned to Downing Street to play Bach on the piano in a mood of restrained triumphalism.

Tony Benn began to argue that on a decision of such importance the people should vote in a referendum, since a democratic country that denied its people the right to choose its future would lose all respect. To begin with, Benn had little support for this radical thought, since most on the Left despised referenda as fascist devices, subject to manipulation in a parliamentary democracy. Pro-Europeans also feared that this was a ploy to commit Labour to pull out. Harold Wilson had committed himself publicly against a referendum, but he came to realise that opposing Heath’s deal but promising to renegotiate, offering a referendum, could be the way out. The promise would also give him some political high ground. He would trust the people even if the people were, according to the polls, already fairly bored and hostile. When Pompidou suddenly announced that France would hold its own referendum on British entry, Wilson snatched at the Benn plan. It was an important moment because a referendum would make the attitude of the whole country clear, at least for a generation. Referenda also became devices used again by politicians faced with difficult constitutional choices.

Wilson’s Renegotiation & Referendum, 1974-75:

After winning the two elections of 1974, Wilson carried out his promised renegotiation of Britain’s terms of entry to the EEC and then put the result to in the Benn-inspired referendum of 1975. The renegotiation was largely a sham, but the referendum was a rare political triumph for Wilson after the elections and before his retirement in 1976. On the continent, the renegotiation was understood to be more for Wilson’s benefit than anything else. Helmut Schmidt, the new German Chancellor, who travelled to London to help charm and calm the Labour conference, regarded it as a successful cosmetic operation. Wilson needed to persuade people he was putting a different deal to the country than the one Heath had negotiated. He was able to do this, but when the referendum campaign actually began, Wilson’s old evasiveness returned and he mumbled vaguely his support, rather than actively or enthusiastically making the European case. To preserve longer-term party unity, he allowed anti-Brussels cabinet ministers to speak from the ‘No’ platform and Barbara Castle, Tony Benn, Peter Shore and Michael Foot were among those who took up this offer.

The ‘No’ campaign was all about prices, not about ‘sovereignty’. Top: Barbara Castle leading one of many cunning ‘stunts’.

They were joined on the platform by Enoch Powell, Rev. Ian Paisley of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the Scottish Nationalists and others. But the ‘Yes’ campaign included most of the Labour cabinet, with Roy Jenkins leading the way, plus most of the Heath team and the popular Liberal leader Jeremy Thorpe. It seemed to many people a fight between wild-eyed ranters on the one hand and sound chaps on the other. More important, perhaps, was the bias of business and the press. A Confederation of British Industry (CBI) survey of company chairmen found that out of 419 interviewed, just four were in favour of leaving the Community. Almost all the newspapers were in favour of staying in, including the Daily Mail, Daily Telegraph, and Daily Express. So was every Anglican bishop. The Yes campaign, led by Britain in Europe outspent the No camp by more than ten to one. In this grossly unequal struggle, both sides used scare stories. Yes warned of huge job losses if the country left the Community. The No camp warned of huge rises in food prices.

There were meetings with several thousand participants, night after night around the country, and the spectacle of politicians who usually attacked each other sitting down together and agreeing on something was a tonic to audiences. Television arguments were good, especially those between Jenkins and Benn. On the Labour side, there were awkward moments when the rhetoric got too fierce, and Wilson had to intervene to rebuke warring ministers. In the end, in answer to the simple question, Do you think that the United Kingdom should stay in the European Economic Community (The Common Market)? Just over sixty-eight per cent, around seventeen million people voted Yes and nearly thirty-three per cent (8.5 million) voted No. Only Shetland and the Western Isles of Scotland voted No.

Decimalisation was seen as a huge change to daily life, unwelcome to many older people. Though the original decision had been taken by the first Wilson government in 1965, the disappearance in 1971 of a coinage going back to ‘Anglo-Saxon’ times was widely blamed on Heath as part of the move into Europe. Away flew the beloved florins and half-crowns, ha’pennies, farthings, threepenny and sixpenny bits and out went, to the relief of many schoolchildren, the intricate triple-column maths of pounds, shillings and pence. In came the more rational decimal currency. But ‘imperial’ measures remained for milk and beer, and miles were retained in preference to kilometres. By the 1970s, the behaviour of the cliques who ran the country had been replaced as the chief motivation for political cynicism by a more general sense of alienation from ‘the State’ and ‘the Establishment.’ For many older Britons, these were years when change spun out of control. Much of the loathing of Heath on the right of politics came from British membership of the Common Market after 1973, which seemed to many to be the emblem of the ‘rage’ for new, bigger systems to replace the traditional ones. Writing in his diary in 1975, Tony Benn recorded his reaction to the possibility of a Europe-wide passport, revealing how much the left’s instincts could chime with those of the right-wing opponents of European change:

‘That really hit me in the guts … Like metrication and decimalisation, this really strikes at our national identity.’

Reading it in retrospect, the comment seems almost ironic, but at the time these symbols were emblematic of their ‘sovereignty’ for many Britons, whether they were on the left or right wing. More than forty years later, when Britain was considering leaving what by then had become the European Union, the biggest question both about Heath’s triumph in engineering Britain’s entry and then about Labour’s referendum is whether the British were told the full story about what this would mean and whether they truly understood the supranational organisation they were signing up to. Ever since that first referendum, many of those among the 8.5 million who voted against, and younger people who share their views, have suggested that Heath and Jenkins and the rest lied to the country, at least by omission. Had it been properly explained that Europe’s law and institutions would sit above the Westminster Parliament, it was argued, they would never have agreed. The Britain in Europe campaigners can point to speeches and leaflets which directly mention the loss of sovereignty. One of the latter read:

‘Forty million people died in two European wars this century. Better lose a little national sovereignty than a son or daughter.’

Expanding the membership of the EC, 1952-93.

Yet both in Parliament and in the referendum campaign, the full consequences for national independence were mumbled, and not spoken clearly enough. Geoffrey Howe, as he then was, who drafted Heath’s European Communities Bill, later admitted that it could have been more explicit about lost sovereignty. Heath talked directly about the ever-closer union of the peoples of Europe but was never precise about the effect on British law, as compared to Lord Denning who said the European treaty could be compared to…

‘… an incoming tide. It flows into the estuaries and and rivers. It cannot be held back.’

Hugo Young, the journalist and historian who studied the campaign in great detail wrote:

I traced no major document or speech that said in plain terms that national sovereignty would be lost, still less one that categorically promoted the European Community for its single most striking characteristic: that it was an institution positively designed to curb the full independence of the nation-state.

There were, of course, explicit warnings given by the No campaigners among the more populist arguments about food prices. They came, above all, from Enoch Powell, Michael Foot and Toy Benn. Foot wrote in The Times that the British parliamentary system had been made farcical and unworkable. Future historians, he said, would be amazed…

… that the British people were urged at such a time to tamper irreparably with their most most precious institution; to see it circumscribed and contorted and elbowed off the centre of the stage.

So it was not true that people were not told. The truth revealed by opinion polls is that sovereignty as an issue did not concern the public nearly as much as jobs and food prices. By later standards, the position of Parliament was not taken terribly seriously in public debates. As Andrew Marr put it in his 2009 book, A History of Modern Britain:

It may be that sovereignty is always of absorbing interest to a minority – the more history-minded, politically-aware – and of less interest to the rest, except when a loss of sovereignty directly affects daily life and produces resented laws. In the seventies, Britain’s political class was not highly respected, and Europe seemed to offer a glossier, richer future. Though the pro-Community majority in business and politics did not strive to ram home the huge implications of membership, they did not deceitfully hide the political nature of what was happening, either. It was just that, when the referendum was held, people cared less. The argument would return, screaming … to be heard.

Andrew Marr (2007-9), op.cit., p.351.

‘The Booze Cruise’: A popular home-grown cartoon view of the British attitude to Europe in the late seventies & eighties.

The ‘Barber Boom,’ Inflation & Industrial Relations, 1971-73:

If Heath is associated with a single action, it is British entry into ‘Europe,’ but throughout his time in office, it was the economy which remained the biggest issue facing his government. The country was spending too much on new consumer goods and not nearly enough on modernised and more efficient factories and businesses. British productivity was still pathetically low compared with the United States or Europe, never mind Japan. Prices were rising by seven per cent and wage earnings by double that. The short-lived economic boom under the Conservative Heath government and Anthony Barber’s Chancellorship, greatly benefited the local motor industry, temporarily reversing the stall in population growth in manufacturing areas. But Britain’s falling competitiveness was making it difficult, in the early seventies, for governments to maintain high employment by intervening in the economy.

This was still the old, post-1945 world of fixed exchange rates which meant that the Heath government, just like those of Attlee and Wilson, faced a sterling crisis and perhaps another devaluation. Since 1945 successive governments had followed the tenets of Keynesian economics, borrowing in order to create jobs if unemployment approached a figure deemed as unacceptable (in the 1970s this was about six hundred thousand). During the decade, this became increasingly difficult to do as Edward Heath’s government (1970-74) struggled to follow such policies in the face of a global recession associated with the tripling of oil prices in 1973, by OPEC (the international cartel of oil producers). This caused an immediate recession and fuelled international inflation. Faced with declining living standards, the unions replied with collective industrial power. Strikes mounted up, most acutely in the coalfields.

The unions, identified by Heath as his first challenge, had just seen off Wilson and Barbara Castle. Heath had decided he would need to face down at least one major public sector strike, as well as remove some of the benefits that he thought encouraged strikes. Britain not only had heavy levels of unionisation through all the key industries but also, by modern standards, an incredible number of different unions, more than six hundred altogether. Added to this, leaders of large unions had only a wobbly hold on what actually happened on the ‘shop floor’ in factories. It was a time of politicised militancy there, well caught by the folk-rock band the Strawbs, who reached number two in the singles chart with their mock-anthem Part of the Union. Its lyrics included:

“Oh, you don’t get me I’m part of the union, till the day I die…

“As a union man I’m wise to the lies of the company spies…

“With a hell of a shout, it’s ‘out brothers, out!’ …

” And I always get my way, if I strike for higher pay…

“So, though I’m a working man, I can ruin the government’s plan … ”

Almost immediately after becoming PM, Heath faced a dock strike, followed by a big pay settlement for local authority dustmen, then a power workers’ go-slow which led to power cuts. Then the postal workers struck. Douglas Hurd, then Heath’s political secretary, recorded in his diary his increasing frustration:

‘A bad day. It is clear that all the weeks of planning in the civil service have totally failed to cope with what is happening in the electricity dispute: and all the pressures are to surrender’.

Later, Hurd confronted Heath in his dressing gown to warn him that the government response was moving too slowly, far behind events. At that stage, things in the car industry were so bad that Henry Ford III warned Heath that his company was thinking of pulling out of Britain altogether. Yet Heath’s Industrial Relations Bill of 1971 was meant to be balanced, giving new rights to trade unionists while at the same time trying to make deals with employers legally binding and enforceable through a new system of industrial courts. This was similar to the package offered by the Wilson government. There were also tax reforms, meant to increase investment, a deal with ‘business’ on keeping price increases to five per cent and even some limited privatisation, with the travel agents Thomas Cook, then state-owned, being sold off along with some breweries.

But the Tory messages and measures were confusing. Cuts in some personal taxes encouraged spending and therefore inflation. With European membership looming, Anthony Barber, Heath’s Chancellor, was dashing for growth, which meant further tax cuts and higher government spending and borrowing. Lending limits were removed for high street banks, resulting in a growth in lending from twelve per cent per year in 1971 to forty-three per cent per year in 1973. This obviously further fuelled inflation, particularly in the housing market. This led to a huge expansion of credit and capital sunk into bricks and mortar that became a feature of modern Britain.

At the same time, one of the historic constraints on successive post-war British governments was removed by President Nixon in the summer of 1971 when he suspended the convertibility of the dollar for gold and allowed exchange rates to ‘float.’ He was faced with the continuing high costs of the war in Vietnam, combined with rising commodity prices. The effect on Britain was that the government and the Bank of England no longer had to be quite so careful about maintaining sterling reserves. But it opened up fresh questions, such as how far down sterling could go and how industrialists could expect to plan ahead. Heath’s instincts on state control were also tested when the most valuable parts of Rolls-Royce faced bankruptcy over the cost of developing new aircraft engines. He quickly nationalised the company, saving eighty thousand jobs and allowing it to regroup and survive, to the relief of the defence industry. Rolls-Royce did revive, returning to the private sector, providing one example of how nationalisation could work in future.

A campaign poster during the 1972 miners’ dispute.

In 1972, in their first strike for a generation, the miners fought a dramatic battle, putting the country on a three-day week and unhinging the Heath government. This time we’ll win, they said. No one in South Wales needed to ask what last time they had in mind, especially those who still remembered the dark days of the twenties. The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) submitted a demand for a forty-five per cent wage increase to the National Coal Board (NCB). When it was rejected, a national miners’ strike was called in February 1972. The Heath government experienced the full extent of the miners’ ability to disrupt national production and energy supplies, despite the contraction of the industry since the 1950s. The government was wholly unprepared, with modest coal stocks, and was surprised by the striking miners’ discipline and aggression.

Arthur Scargill, then a young, unknown militant and former Communist, organised fifteen thousand of his comrades from across South Yorkshire in a mass picket of the Saltley coke depot, on which Birmingham depended for much of its fuel. Scargill (below centre), a rousing speaker and highly ambitious union activist, later described the confrontation with West Midlands police as “the greatest day of my life.” However, the events of his greatest day represented, for the PM:

‘… the most vivid, direct and terrifying challenge to the rule of law that I could ever recall emerging from within our own country. … We were facing civil disorder on a massive scale.’

The Welsh miners picketed outside the Houses of Parliament during the 1972 Strike, led by their General Secretary Dai Francis (with spectacles).

Heath blamed the police for being too soft. It was clear to him that the intention was to bring down the elected government but he decided that he could not counter-attack immediately. Confronted with the prospect of the country becoming ungovernable or having to use the armed forces to restore order which public opinion would never have tolerated, Heath turned to a judge Lord Wilberforce, for an independent inquiry into miners’ wages. Wilberforce reported that they should get at least twenty per cent, which was fifty per cent more than the average increase. The NUM settled for that, plus extra benefits, in one of the most clear-cut and overwhelming victories over a government of any British trade union to date. Their strategy and tactics were wholly successful. Scargill was quickly promoted to agent, then president of the Yorkshire miners.

A boy stands outside his school, which closed because of a lack of fuel during the miners’ strike of 1972.
The Oil Price Bust, the Coal Dispute & the Three-Day Week, 1973-74:

Obstructionist trade unions were a favourite target of many, particularly after the coal dispute, which had led to a series of power cuts throughout the country and a three-day working week. Attacks on trade union power were becoming more popular owing to a growing perception that the miners in particular had become too powerful and disruptive, holding the country for ransom. Heath and his ministers knew that they would have to go directly to the country with an appeal about who was running it, but before that, they tried a final round of negotiation to reach a compromise. Triggered by the prospect of unemployment reaching a million, there now followed the famous U-turn which so marred Heath’s reputation. It went by the name of ‘tripartism’, a three-way national agreement on wages and prices, investments and benefits, between the government, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and the Trades Union Congress (TUC). The Industry Act of 1972 gave the government unprecedented powers of intervention, which Tony Benn called ‘spadework for socialism’. Heath had leaned so far to try to win the unions over that he was behaving like a Wilsonian socialist.

The unions, having defeated Wilson and Castle, were more self-confident than ever before or since. Many industrial workers, living in still-bleak towns far away from the fashionable big cities, did seem underpaid and left behind. The miners, certainly, were badly paid in these areas in particular. Heath argued that he was forced to accept and apply consensual policies because in the seventies any alternative set of policies, the squeeze of mass unemployment which arrived in the Thatcher era, would simply not have been accepted by the country as a whole. Besides, the economic problems the government and the country at large faced were not primarily the result of high wage claims. Management incompetence or short-termism, leading to an abdication of responsibility and the failure to restructure factories and industries, was seen as a primary cause of economic stagnation. This, as seen in the case of manufacturing in Coventry, was an argument which had some local evidence to support it, although unions at a local, shop-floor level were sometimes equally short-sighted in some instances.

What finally finished off the Heath government was the short war between Israel and Egypt in October 1973, the Yom Kippur War. Israel’s swift and decisive victory was a humiliation for the Arab world and it struck back, using oil as its weapon. OPEC, the organisation of oil-producing countries dominated by the Saudis, had seen the price of oil rising on world markets for some time. They decided to cut oil supplies to the West each month until Israel handed back its territorial gains and allowed the Palestinians their own state. There would be a total embargo on Israel’s most passionate supporters, the United States and the Netherlands. And those countries that were allowed oil would be made to pay more for it. In fact, prices rose fourfold. It was a global economic shock, pumping further inflation into the industrialised world, but in Britain, it arrived with added force. The miners put in yet another huge pay claim, which would have added twice as much again to many pay packets. Despite an appeal from the moderate NUM President, Joe Gormley, the NUM Executive rejected a thirteen per cent pay increase and voted to ballot for another national strike.

The country could survive high oil prices, even shortages, for a time, but these were the days before Brent Crude from the North Sea was being produced commercially. The same was true of natural gas. But Britain could not manage both the oil shock and a national coal strike at the same time. Barber, the Chancellor, called this the greatest economic crisis since the war. It certainly compared to that of 1947. Again, coal stocks had not been built up in preparation, so a whole series of panic measures had to be introduced. Plans were made for petrol rationing and coupons were printed and distributed. The national speed limit was cut by twenty miles per hour to fifty mph. Then in January 1974 came the announcement of a three-day working week. Ministers solemnly urged citizens to share baths and brush their teeth in the dark. Television broadcasting ended at 10.30 p.m. each evening. It was an embarrassing time in many ways, with people having to find other things to do in the dark or by candlelight, yet it also gave millions an enjoyable frisson, the feeling of taking a holiday from everyday routines. The writer Robert Elms recalled:

…this proud nation had been reduced to a shabby shambles, somewhere between a strife-torn South American dictatorship and a gloomy Soviet satellite… a banana republic with a banana shortage … The reality of course is that almost everybody loved it. They took to the three-day week with glee. They took terrific liberties.

This time Heath and his ministers struggled to find a solution to the miners’ demands, though the climate was hardly helped when Mick McGahey, the legendary Communist NUM leader, asked by Heath what he really wanted, answered ‘to bring down the government.’ When the miners voted, eighty-one per cent were for striking, including those in some of the traditionally most moderate coalfield areas. In February 1974, Heath asked the Queen to dissolve Parliament and went to the country on the election platform he had prepared two years earlier: ‘Who governs?’ The country’s answer, perhaps taking the question more literally than Heath had hoped was ‘Not you, mate!’ Meanwhile, Harold Wilson had expected the Tories to win again. A year earlier he had prepared the Opposition’s answer to the questions of union power and inflation which became known as the Social Contract. Observers saw it as a recipe for inflation which also offered the TUC a privileged place at the table in return for very little.

However, Wilson was somehow able to emerge as the calm bringer of reason and order in the election campaign, whereas Heath was hit by a slew of bad economic figures. Then Enoch Powell, Heath’s old nemesis, stepped back into the limelight to announce that he was leaving the Conservatives over their failure to offer the electorate a referendum on Europe. He, therefore, called on voters to vote Labour. This helped to produce a late surge for Wilson, as well as for the Liberals, led by the popular Jeremy Thorpe. Though Labour won the most seats by the slenderest of margins, 301 to the Tories’ 297 (the Liberals had fourteen MPs), no party had an overall majority, so Heath hung on, hoping to do a deal with Thorpe. But he eventually had to concede defeat, and Harold returned to the Palace to kiss hands with Queen Elizabeth for the third time. As Andrew Marr put it:

So Mick McGahey and friends had brought down the Heath government, with a little help from the oil-toting Saudi Royal Family, the Liberals and Enoch Powell. A more bizarre coalition of interests is difficult to imagine.

Andrew Marr (2007), A History of Modern Britain, p. 342.

Other significant changes happened on Ted Heath’s watch. The school leaving age was raised to sixteen. To cope with international currency mayhem caused by the Nixon decision to suspend convertibility, the old imperial sterling area finally went in 1972. The Pill was made freely available on the NHS. Local government was radically reorganised, with no fewer than eight hundred English councils disappearing and huge new authorities, much disliked, being created in their place. Heath defended this on the basis that the old Victorian system could cope with ‘the growth of car ownership and of suburbia, which was undermining the distinction between town and country.’ Many saw it as bigger-is-better dogma. There was more of that when responsibility for NHS hospitals was taken away from hundreds of local boards and passed to new regional and area health authorities, at the suggestion of a new cult that was then just emerging – management consultancy. In the seventies, the familiar and the local seemed everywhere in retreat.

(to be continued; for sources, see part two)

Appendix One – The Queen & Tolkien:

In 1972 – Queen Elizabeth II appointed JRR Tolkien Commander of the Order of the British Empire “for services to English Literature.” Outside Buckingham Palace with his daughter Priscilla.

After the death of his wife, Edith, in 1971, Tolkien’s happiness was added to by the honours that were conferred on him. He received several invitations to visit American universities and receive doctorates, but he couldn’t face the long journey. There were also many tributes within his homeland. He was profoundly moved when, in the spring of 1972, he was invited to Buckingham Palace to be presented with a C.B.E. by the Queen. She had been eleven when The Hobbit was published, and The Lord of the Rings had hit bookstores two years into her reign. Tolkien wrote to his publisher Rayner Unwin about the day,

“… I was very deeply moved by my brief meeting with the Queen, & our few words together. Quite unlike anything that I had expected.”

Humphrey Carpenter (ed.) (1981), Letters of J. R. R. Tolkien. London: George Allen & Unwin, Letter 334.

After everything he had lived through and all the fairy stories he had written, meeting the Queen was a special moment for him. But perhaps the most gratifying of all was the award in June 1972 of an honorary Doctorate of Letters from his own University of Oxford; not, as was made clear, for The Lord of the Rings, but for his contribution to philology.

The following year, on 2nd September, J.R.R. Tolkien died, aged eighty-one. His requiem mass was held in Oxford four days after his death, in the plain modern church in Headington, which he had attended so often since his retirement. Born in South Africa during the reign of Queen Victoria and growing up in Birmingham during the reign of Edward VII, Tolkien researched, taught and wrote in England during the reigns of all four Windsor monarchs (before Charles III), over six decades, from George V to Elizabeth.

(Appendix Two is in Part Two)

Majesty & Grace VIII: The Reign of Elizabeth Windsor – New Age, New Commonwealth & Popular Culture 1958-63.

From 1962 to 1966, HRH Prince Charles attended Gordonstoun School in Scotland, where his father was a pupil.
The long and broad view of the British Economy:

The economic historian, P. Calvocoressi, writing in 1978, provided a long view of the British economy from 1945 to 1975. He saw the failure of successive governments to manage it successfully as the result of their unwillingness to dismantle the ‘mixed’ economy model of private and public sectors. The role of government in the direction and management of the economy had become paramount by the 1950s, even though many Conservatives deplored or sought to evade this development. He pointed out that every government acted within the established system. None tried radically to change it. All governments accepted an obligation to contribute positively to the prosperity of both sectors. Both parties, Calvocoressi concluded, failed to restore the British economy by expanding industry and exports. As a result, the long-term economic decline of Britain they inherited accelerated. Whatever their causes, failures led to political divisions and criticism not only of the policies of the governments but also of the role of government in the mixed economy. He concluded:

Still less had they questioned the existence of the mixed economy. But the failures of this economy … led to questions about the viability of such an economy.

P. Calvocoressi (1978), The British Experience, 1945-1975. Penguin, pp. 105-12.

Because Calvocoressi takes a longer perspective of Britain than other economists and economic historians, his view may not be as valuable in examining the thirteen years of Conservative rule. In particular, he seems to imply that it was not the Conservative governments, nor even the role of government that failed the economy, but capitalism itself. His critique of western social-democratic capitalism seems rather dated, even for the late 1970s. However, his criticism of the failure of successive governments to challenge orthodox economic views certainly accords with the position adopted by Vernon Bognador and Robert Skidelsky, who saw ‘consensus’ as the basis of government policy between 1951 and 1964. The uncritical acceptance by both major political parties of this concept meant that new perspectives for examining old problems could not be forthcoming. The result of this was the creation of an illusion of continuing affluence, as Bogdanor and Skidelsky wrote in 1970:

Ten years ago it was possible, and indeed usual, to look back to the 1950s as an age of prosperity and achievement. This was certainly the the verdict of the electorate which in 1959 returned a Conservative government to power with a handsome majority, for the third time running.Today we are more likely to remember the whole period as an age of illusion, of missed opportunities, with Macmillan as the magician whose wonderful act kept us too long distracted from reality. … what has altered the verdict on the 1950s has been the experience of the troubles of the 1960s, which stem at least in part from the neglect of the earlier decade.

Already by 1964, the appeal of the slogan ‘Thirteen Wasted Years’ was strong enough to give Labour a tiny majority; in the years following it has been confirmed almost as the conventional wisdom. … Perhaps the period of Conservative rule will be looked upon as the last period of quiet before the storm, rather like the Edwardian age which in many respects it resembles. In that case its tranquility will come to be valued more highly than its omissions.

V. Bogdanor and R. Skidelsky, The Age of Affluence, 1951-64. pp 7-11.

But, in reality, from 1955, the British economy was entangled in a series of sterling crises which gradually forced the Conservative Government to pay attention to problems it wished to avoid. Both the Eden and Macmillan governments were distracted by a second illusion, that of their party’s obsession with Britain’s abiding role in the world. In 1962, Dean Acheson, the US Secretary of State made his famous statement Britain has lost an empire; she has not yet found a role. Bogdanor and Skidelsky pointed out that the failure to rethink Britain’s world role was as evident in its economic policies as in its diplomacy. Macmillan foresaw and expedited the final liquidation of the Empire, but he had few ideas about what to put in its place.

Finally, A. Sked and C. Cook looked at the question from a broader viewpoint. Politics may have remained the same but, they argued, society did not. New values, new beliefs and new attitudes began to show themselves in this period. In this way, the idea of consensus came into question, and the illusion of affluence was made apparent. As far as the fiscal and economic policies were concerned, they argued:

… the Tories did very little in their years in power. Cushioned by the turn in the terms of trade they abolished rationing, reduced taxes and manipulated budgets but they gave little impression of knowing how the economy really worked. Little attention was paid to Britain’s sluggish economic growth or the long-term challenge posed by Germany and Japan.

Industrial relations were treated with a ‘we/they’ attitude and no thought was given, until late in the day, to the problems created by Britain’s prosperity. Instead, the Government sat back and did nothing in their belief that there was nothing to do, and for most of the time their energy was devoted to maintaining Britain as a world power whatever the cost to the economy. …

Moreover, Tory economic complacency ensured that the necessary economic growth would never be generated. Not enough money was channelled into key industries; stop-go policies undermined the confidence of industry to invest in the long term; too much money was spent on defence. …

With the economic crises of the early 1960s … it began to be apparent that Tory affluence would soon come to an end. The scandals of the Macmillan era merely served to reinforce the impression that a watershed had been reached in the country’s history, and foreign affairs seemed to teach a similar lesson. …

After 1963-64 then, things were never the same again. But in another sense they were never really different.

A. Sked & C. Cook (1979), Post-War Britain – a Political History. Penguin, pp. 221-5.

Macmillan the Magician to the Rescue of the Empire:

According to the Earl of Kilmuir, in his 1964 Memoirs, Eden’s successor as Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, led his country and his party out of the bitter-black aftermath of Suez. In particular, he began the scramble to dismantle what was left of the post-imperial presence as Britain came to terms with its loss of status, assets and, in an intangible way, national swagger. The country became ever more dependent on the United States not just financially but also for its defence and security. After the Korean War, the US Air Force was allowed eight airfields in Britain. In 1957, after the Suez fiasco, there were sixty US Thor missiles in East Anglia. Indeed, in 1960 the US was allowed to build a Polaris nuclear submarine base at Holy Loch in Scotland.

Cyprus fell soon after Suez. It had been intended as an important base from which Britain could guard the Canal. But during the Suez war itself, it had proved less than useful, because it had no deep-water harbour; after Suez, there was little left in that part of the Mediterranean for it to guard anyway. In 1957 the British government started negotiating with the Cypriot nationalists, and the search continued for other handholds. Kilmuir wrote of the case of Cyprus as a case in point of Macmillan’s command of the House of Commons:

Cyprus was a classic example of this tactical genius. The final settlement of this tactical genius. The final settlement of this distressing episode early in 1959 was a diplomatic triumph for Macmillan, but it must be admitted that it followed the broad lines which had been urged on the Government by Gaitskell and Bevan for a long time. Nevertheless, after both (Macmillan and Gaitskell) had snapped at each other across the Dispatch Box in a crammed House of Commons, it was Gaitskell who gave the appearance of little-mindedness…

The Earl of Kilmuir, Memoirs (1964) pp. 290-91.

In respect of other territories and colonies, they planned the same kind of progress, but in a slow and ‘orderly’ manner. Where their residual imperialism showed through, the evidence that their change of heart was less than complete, was in their continued belief that Britain still had a world role to maintain, and the right to keep hold of certain foreign territories in order to retain it; and in their conception of self-government, which frequently fell short of those of the nationalists. In East and Central Africa, for instance, it stopped far short of majority rule while there were still settlers there, and elsewhere where it stopped short of economic self-government while there were still British firms and shares to safeguard. From the wreck of the old empire, they tried to salvage what was essential: a role in the world, their new white dominions in central Africa and their means to continue exploiting countries they no longer ruled.

Imperialist ambitions for east-central Africa remained lively right through the 1950s, and long after Suez had undermined them elsewhere. When Cyprus began to crumble the first place they thought of replacing it with as their main military base for the Middle East was Kenya. In east-central Africa their allies, the nucleus around which they intended to consolidate their hold, and maintain a British presence in the continent, where the settlers, a small minority everywhere, but one in which many of the colonies already had taken many of the functions and responsibilities of government. None of the colonies except Southern Rhodesia had enough of them to make a transfer of power to them possible, and in Britain as well as elsewhere in Africa liberal opinion made this option impolitic anyway. On the other hand, there was widespread concern in Britain, which the government shared and could work on, that established settler interests should not be entirely abandoned to unpractised African politicians without safeguards.

The British government’s support for the settler cause in Kenya had to contend with what turned out to be the most ferocious of all the nationalist movements that confronted her in Africa, mainly amongst dispossessed and desperate Kikuyu, whose violent methods, involving atrocities and pagan rituals, were used to justify repressive counter-measures. During the ‘Mau Mau’ crisis, ten thousand were killed altogether: 9,600 Africans (mostly by other Africans) and seventy Europeans. In the Kenyan context, ‘multi-racialism’ meant communal elections against a background of very restricted African political activity, and a constitution carefully designed to ensure ‘parity,’ by permitting fifty thousand Europeans the same number of elected representatives as five million Africans.

Empire into New Commonwealth:

The Conservative imperialists’ inability to take in the full extent of their loss was reflected in the conception they had of the new ‘multi-racial’ Commonwealth just beginning to form from the pieces of the old empire. Some of them, like Leo Amery, saw it as a way of preserving Britain’s interests in her former colonies, and her status in the new world of the Cold War. In a way what they hankered after was the older, more ‘informal’ imperialism of the mid-nineteenth century, with all of the rights and none of the responsibilities. But a return to that form of purely economic imperialism was impossible because it required an even stronger base of power in global relations, one that now only the USA possessed. But the effort was made, nonetheless. In the 1950s, on the fronts it had decided to fight on, the Conservative government fought hard to keep some colonies and to give others to ‘the right people,’ most notably in Malaya and British Guiana.

In the late 1950s, despite all the reverses, there was still a sizeable empire left for Britain to save, if it wanted to. As well as a great slice of Africa, there was a score of smaller colonies all over the world which it was thought could never be viable on their own, and therefore would always be content to let Britain rule them, rather than have Russia or China grab them, as was the most likely outcome for a small, isolated state. There were also larger colonies, especially in west Africa, Malaya and the West Indies, whose progress towards independence could not be prevented now, but which might be ‘guided’ towards continuing membership of the Commonwealth and the strength that might still be drawn from imperial preferences and defence co-operation. And, even after Cyprus, there were still strategic British colonies in the world – Malta, Aden, Singapore – to keep a secure framework for British world influence to be maintained, especially with the nuclear deterrent to back it up.

Nevertheless, it was in this global context, that the second phase of Britain’s withdrawal from its empire took place across Africa in the late 1950s and early ’60s, under the direction of the Conservative governments. On the other side of the imperial account, there were ever-increasing costs to meet, not just in money, but in lives too, as well as in moral credit. The current did seem to be running against Britain in all these regards. In east-central Africa, the effort to hang on had recently resulted in a series of overtly oppressive measures, and several atrocities (or incidents which could be presented as such) that were widely felt to have been uncharacteristic and shaming: the Hola camp incident in Kenya in 1959, in which eleven Mau Mau detainees were beaten to death by camp guards; a state of emergency throughout the Central African Federation that was likened to a ‘police state’ and fifty African rioters shot in Nyasaland. Of the ‘collaboration’ which had helped sustain British colonial rule in the past, there was very little now left in Africa: Britain was having to impose its will by an open display of force, which by this time it was not able to do as easily as in the past.

Realists as well as radicals were now turning away from the empire. The men of industry and finance, who by necessity were the hardest realists of all, had for some time been aware of the trend and had begun to make their own arrangements with the trendsetters, the empire’s successor states, to protect and further their interests in the best ways they could. They might have regretted the loss of their imperial padding but they came to terms with it. They made treaties with whoever was in command: in South Africa, while they still had control it was the white supremacists, but in tropical Africa, it was the new black nationalists.

Britain’s trading position as a whole was altering, backing away from the empire and ex-empire, and towards Europe. For more and more people in Britain, their real economic destiny now appeared to lie in closer association with the European continent, which was already organising itself into a great ‘Common Market,’ which could make its own terms with the politically independent ‘third world’ outside. The empire, which meant the old type of colonial control over satellite economies, was not necessary anymore, or worth fighting for.

What was left when those with an ‘interest’ began leaving the sinking ship was a residue of mainly emotional commitments to the glory of the empire, which were just not strong enough to persuade a realistic government, which was what Harold Macmillan’s was, to resist all the material pressures pushing the other way. Iain Macleod, who became Colonial Secretary in October 1959, always excused his surrender to colonial nationalism by pleading necessity, though he probably also had a genuinely liberal commitment to independence, as the following quote demonstrates:

‘We could not possibly have held by force to our territories in Africa. We could not, with an enormous force engaged, even continue to hold the small island of Cyprus. General de Gaulle could not contain Algeria. The march of men towards their freedom can be guided, but not halted. Of course there were risks in moving quickly. But the risks in moving slowly were far greater.’

Quoted in David Goldsworthy (1971), Colonial Issues in British Politics, 1945-1961. p. 363.
The Wind of Change:

Macmillan was of the same mind. In his famous speech in Cape Town in February 1960 he told of the ‘shrinking impression’ a tour of tropical Africa had given him of the strength of this national consciousness. It was against this background that Macmillan made his historic comments:

“The wind of change is blowing through this continent and whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact.”

Harold Macmillan’s speech in Cape Town, South Africa, 1960.

A decade after the decolonisation process was initiated in Asia, the wind of change began to sweep through Africa, hastened by the Suez Crisis. The Gold Coast was the first African colony to gain independence, under the new name, Ghana. This set in motion British disengagement from other colonies in West Africa. In contrast to the rich and relatively well-developed colonies in the west, the transfer of power in the eastern and central African colonies was complicated by the competing claims of impoverished black populations and privileged, entrenched European minority settler communities. Yet, despite these difficulties, a combination of African nationalism and the British desire to relinquish costly imperial commitments in the region resulted in independence and black majority rule in most African colonies, with the notable exception of Southern Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe).

Britain in the early 1960s was hustled and harried out of most of her old colonies, and without too much bloodshed. The roll call was an impressive one. In the 1950s the Sudan, the Gold Coast (Ghana) and Malaya had been the only ones to ‘escape.’ In the 1960s, it quite suddenly became a stampede, as the following list shows:

None of the shadows cast by the legacy of the empire was long enough to substitute fully for what had been lost. At first, it was thought that the Commonwealth might. In the 1950s the fact that so many ex-colonies had elected to stay within the Commonwealth led some imperialists to assume a substantive continuity between it and the old empire. The ‘black’ and ‘brown’ nations joined Australia, New Zealand and Canada in an extended family cemented by common bonds of tradition, friendship and mutual interest. Leopold Amery in 1953 speculated that:

‘… other nations now outside it may well decide to join it in course of time. … Who knows but that it may yet become the nucleus round which in the near future a future world order will crystalize?’

Leopold Amery, My Political Life, i, 16.

Queen Elizabeth and Prince Philip visited the Gambia in 1961. Despite the apparent loyalty to the Crown, the country became independent in 1965.

This vision compensated a little for the loss of empire, and while it seemed to do this, old imperialists retained their affection for it and sought (as in the past) to cement its parts more tightly together; for example by trade preferences for Commonwealth countries, and by preserving a definition of ‘British nationality’ (laid down in 1948) which allowed all Commonwealth citizens the right to enter Britain freely, without restriction. But by the sixties, it was becoming clear that the Commonwealth was turning out to be something less than had been hoped. Its members did not have common interests, not even among the ‘white’ dominions, which were too far apart both geographically and in respective perspectives. For the black and brown nations, membership was not an expression of filial gratitude and loyalty. Rather it provided merely a convenient platform on the world stage, from which they could air their grievances and entitlement to a share of what British aid there was going.

There were some ideological differences between the two main political parties on colonial policy, but both Harold Macmillan and Harold Wilson entered number ten determined to retain Britain’s remaining imperial and military possessions. However, both leaders succumbed to economic, political and international pressures, resulting first in Macmillan’s retreat from Africa and then in Wilson’s withdrawal from ‘East of Suez’. The spread, speed and character of decolonisation were not determined by them, but by a mixture of international cold war politics, British imperial interests and local nationalist movements, which varied from region to region. In Egypt, Kenya and Malaya, for example, nationalism took on radical, populist and violent forms, culminating in state-of-emergency declarations by the British governments. Withdrawals were also impaired by communal and ethnic tensions. In contrast, the power transfer was comparatively peaceful in the Gold Coast and the Caribbean.

In fact, the Commonwealth was never united at all. Its new members fought each other, and broke off diplomatic relations with each other and with the ‘mother country.’ In 1961, they banished South Africa, one of its oldest members, from the family, causing considerable indignation among the ‘white’ dominions. As a substitute for the empire, it was a disappointment; the emperor’s new clothes were a sham. But there were some in British public life who continued to value the new Commonwealth but as something rather different from the old empire. It was a means of scaling the barriers of racism and chauvinism going up all over the world, a corrective to the contemporary consolidation of the world into continental blocs and perhaps a kind of moral pressure group within world affairs and a debating society for widely divergent cultures.

The Sad End of Empire:

There were some Britons, from idealistic old liberal imperialists to Fabian anti-imperialists who were generally interested in questions of international cooperation and overseas aid. But the political leaders from both main parliamentary parties soon lost interest in imperial free trade, always a euphemism for imperial protectionism. Instead, they turned to European free trade from 1962 when the first serious overtures to the EEC were made. In the same year, the UK parliament abandoned its noble commitment to ‘common citizenship’ by restricting coloured immigration from the Commonwealth. These two moves revealed a sudden loss of interest in the Commonwealth the minute it ceased to be useful to Britain. For idealistic imperialists, this was a sad end for the empire.

Despite the speed with which the British Empire was brought to an end in the period 1945-65, Britain had no intention of severing all links with its former colonies. On the contrary, the ‘Commonwealth’ was seen as a natural successor to the Empire. Despite the hopes of some Conservatives to the contrary, the formation of the enlarged Commonwealth never allowed Britain to retain any real influence. Although some politicians trumpeted the ideal of a closer association of states as a means of reasserting British spheres of influence in Asia and Africa, Britain’s political leaders soon discovered they were unable to exercise the level of economic and political control that they had hoped to retain.

The Return of British Cultural Self-Confidence & Political Satire:

Britain was a country open to foreign influences, but they were as strong from Italy or Scandinavia as from America – coffee bars, Danish design, scooters and something promoted as ‘Italian Welsh rarebit’ (later known as pizza) were all in evidence. The awesome power of American culture was growing all the time over the horizon. But for a few years, at least, the idea of a powerful, self-confident Britain independent of American culture seemed not only possible but likely. Per capita, after all, Britain was still the second-richest country in the world.

Political satire, which had been exuberantly popular in Georgian times, now returned in full force, from savage cartoons in the newspapers, staged lampoons and the fortnightly mockery of the magazine Private Eye. Among the two million listeners to The Goon Show in the mid-fifties were key members of the next generation of comics, who would sting more, men such as Jonathan Miller and Peter Cook. The latter is considered Spike Milligan’s only rival as the outstanding comic genius of the age. As a schoolboy at Radley in Oxfordshire, he sent a script to the BBC good enough for Milligan to invite him to London for lunch. The bullying that Cook endured at his private ‘public’ school led him to develop mimicry and mockery to deflect bullies. Cook would make them laugh in order that they would not hit him. He was not politically radical, being from a privileged élite in which his father had been a colonial civil servant in Nigeria and Gibraltar. From Radley, he went on to Cambridge, from where there was a direct line from student reviews to the West End. Peter Cook’s generation at Cambridge in 1957 included a number of future cabinet ministers, as well as numerous actors. He once said:

‘One reason that Oxbridge has traditionally produced so many political satirists is that its undergraduates come face to face with their future political leaders at an early age, and realise then quite how many of them are social retards who join debating societies in order to find friends.’

Cook found his voice as a schoolboy and essentially never lost it; the same deadpan philosophical drone spread to Edinburgh’s Beyond the Fringe review, to London and New York. The day when the traditional establishment had to acknowledge the comedy establishment was 28th February 1962, when the Queen visited Beyond the Fringe in London’s Fortune Theatre to see the vicious caricature of her prime minister by Peter Cook. Cook had done his Macmillan at Cambridge and at the Edinburgh Festival Fringe already. In London, he had been playing to packed houses since the previous May. There had been protests and walkouts by people outraged at seeing the Queen’s first minister lampooned in public, but the Queen herself roared with laughter. After this, Macmillan was determined to show what a good sport he was, and that he could take a joke, so he decided to go along too. But when the prime minister arrived, Cook spotted him in the audience and deviated from his script. In an Edwardian drawl, he imitated Macmillan:

“When I’ve a spare evening, there’s nothing I like better than to wander over to a theatre and sit there listening to a group of sappy, urgent, vibrant young satirists, with a stupid great grin all over my silly old face.”

The New Commonwealth & Immigration to Britain:

In Britain, postwar reconstruction, declining birthrates and labour shortages resulted in the introduction of government schemes to encourage the migration of Commonwealth workers, particularly from the West Indies, to seek employment in Britain. Jamaicans and Trinidadians were recruited directly by agents to fill vacancies in the British transport network and the newly created National Health Service. Private companies also recruited labour in India and Pakistan for textile factories and steel foundries in Britain.

Just as Britain was retreating from its formal imperial commitments, Commonwealth immigration into Britain, principally from the West Indies and South Asia, was becoming an increasingly salient issue in British domestic politics. During the 1950s, the number of West Indians entering Britain reached annual rates of thirty thousand. Immigration from the Indian subcontinent began to escalate in the 1960s. The Census of 1951 recorded seventy-four thousand New Commonwealth immigrants; a decade later the figure had increased to 336,000. This immigration was driven by a combination of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. Partition of the Indian subcontinent and the construction of the Mangla Dam in Pakistan continued to displace large numbers of people, many of whom had close links with Britain through colonial connections and later through familial ones.

West Indians in London in 1956.

The 1948 Nationality Act reaffirmed the right of British nationality and free entry to the United Kingdom to all Commonwealth subjects of the Crown, without restrictions. About 125,000 people from the Caribbean came to live in Britain between 1948 and 1958. They were looking to escape the poverty of their own countries. Immigrants also came from other parts of the Commonwealth, including India, Pakistan and East Africa, some arriving as refugees fleeing wars and discrimination. But as growing numbers of Caribbeans and South Asians took up this right of abode, the British authorities became increasingly alarmed.

As more Caribbeans and South Asians settled in Britain, patterns of chain migration developed in which pioneer migrants, usually single men, aided family and friends to settle. The picture below shows female family members and young boys arriving to join their menfolk. Despite the influx of workers from Ireland and the Commonwealth, emigration continued to outstrip immigration.

Birmingham’s booming postwar economy attracted West Indian settlers from Jamaica, Barbados and St Kitts in the 1950s, followed by South Asians from Gujurat and the Punjab in India, as well as from both West and East Pakistan (Bangladesh) from the 1960s. Hostility to Commonwealth immigrants was pronounced in some sections of the local white population. One manifestation of this was the establishment of the Birmingham Immigration Control Association, founded in the early 1960s by a group of Tory MPs.

A Jamaican immigrant seeking work and lodgings in Birmingham in 1955.

Many West Indian immigrants encountered considerable obstacles, including racial prejudice when seeking accommodation, as the photo from 1958 below shows.

The importance assigned to the Commonwealth in the fifties prevented the imposition of the tighter immigration controls that many began to call for. However, by the sixties, Britain’s retreat from the Commonwealth in favour of pursuing links with Europe and events such as the Notting Hill race riots of 1958 heralded a policy of restriction, which gradually whittled away the right of New Commonwealth citizens to automatic British citizenship. Although the Immigration Act of 1962 that followed was intended to reduce the inflow of blacks and Asians into Britain, it had the opposite effect at first: fearful of losing the right to free entry, immigrants came to Britain in larger numbers.

In the eighteen months of 1961-62 before the restrictions were introduced, the volume of newcomers equalled the total for the previous five years, peaking at almost 120,000 in 1962. They remained comparatively high in 1963-64, declining only slowly thereafter.

A South Asian immigrant employed in a Bradford textile industry.

South Asian immigrants first settled in Bradford in the 1950s and ’60s, taking up employment in the textile factories. It was often unskilled work and poorly paid.

Working-class Britain – A North-South Divide?

Working-class Britain may have been getting wealthier but it was still housed in dreadful old homes, excluded from the expansion of higher education and deprived of jobs except for manual, monotonous ones. On 15 August 1962, the Guardian published a long article on its leader page by the chief education officer for Leeds, George Taylor. It was called ‘The Gulf Between North and South,’ the first ‘ranging shot in an engagement that still continues,’ according to Geoffrey Moorhouse in his 1964 book, Britain in the Sixties: The Other England. Moorhouse pointed out that in the two years that had passed since the article was published, many others followed it, both in the Guardian and in other national newspapers, that many hours had been spent on it by television and radio, and that many speeches had been made on it by politicians. Moorhouse remarked:

The idea that over the past few years two Englands have taken shape, one in the North and the other in the South, unequal socially and economically, has become our major domestic preoccupation. … The consciousness of a socio-geographic division in this country is, of course, by no means a new thing. … At least one side of the present debate, the problem of the population drift to the South-east, was foreseen in 1937 in the Barlow Report. But it is doubtful whether there has ever before been such a national fixation with the supposed division of England into North and South on almost every count.

Geoffrey Moorhouse (1964), Britain in the Sixties: The Other England. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. p. 13.

The basic argument of Moorhouse’s book was that such demarcation in the sixties was ‘vague and misleading,’ and that while two Englands did undoubtedly exist in 1964, they could be more precisely defined. George Taylor’s argument started from the observed facts that the nine county boroughs with the highest mortality rates in England were in the industrial North and the ten county boroughs with the lowest mortality rates were South of a line drawn from the Severn to the Thames. As a chief education officer, he suggested that frequent absences from school and lack of vitality in the classroom were caused by overcrowding, poor living conditions and a polluted atmosphere. In addition, the high death rate itself left a number a number of families with only one parent, a well-known reason for children finishing their education as soon as it was legally possible to do so. He went on:

… it is fairly safe to assert that the Northern child will receive his education in and old, insanitary building planned on lines wholly inappropriate for contemporary teaching. His teachers will be too few in number, probably inexperienced, possibly unqualified and, and constantly changing. His modern school will not develop courses to attract him to remain at school until sixteen… because it cannot be sure of of teachers to staff them and lacks amenities to attract them. If he attends a grammar school, its children will be, like him, drawn entirely from the local working-class community… which sees little point in encouraging its children to remain at school until the age of eighteen.

George Taylor, The Guardian, 15 August 1962, quoted by Moorhouse, p.13

Taylor briefly indicated the wider problems of the industrial North, pointing out that one of its more intractable difficulties was a lack of money at reasonable rates of interest, and concluded that without such financial aid, ‘it will not take a generation to complete the establishment of two nations or, in contemporary language, two cultures, divided by a line from the Humber to the Wirral.’ Moorhouse agreed that no one who lived in the North-east, Yorkshire or Lancashire during the late fifties and early sixties could fail to be aware of how much their locations were falling behind the national averages in tolerable housing conditions, mortality, investment and employment. But in the late summer of 1962, there was little sign that the whole country recognised this situation. As far as the Government was concerned it seemed that it was being allowed to drift along on the assumption that something would turn up. The debate stimulated by Taylor’s Guardian article represented a significant turning point. It was followed up by other newspapers, television and radio, and it was not long after all this sudden publicity that the Government took action. Moorhouse thought that Taylor’s comments on the educational frustrations of the Northern child were invaluable, but at the same time, they contained two stereotypes of the North.

Moorhouse’s Map shows his preferred geographical division of England into North and South, and the places mentioned in his book.

Firstly, there was the implication that those attending grammar schools were invariably located in mining areas. Anyone looking at a map of the North of England, wrote Moorhouse, would see that there were a lot of coalfields in the North, but that they were dispersed and certainly not found in areas with the densest population, like Leeds. Secondly, the map reader would have difficulty in deciding where to draw the line between ‘North’ and ‘South’. Was it a line from the Severn to the Thames, or from the Wirral to the Humber? Or sometimes, it would be defined as the seventh-century boundary between the Severn and the Wash. But because commentators, and the nation as a whole, have got into the habit of thinking of a generally poor North and a generally rich South, based on inadequate geographical definitions, two damaging stereotypes followed, painting the North blacker than it was and the South whiter. Scarcely less unfortunate in its side effects was the assumption that all was well in the latter, a land flowing with milk and honey from end to end. This image would not be recognisable, Moorhouse suggested, by the 5,640 homeless people in the care of London County Council in May 1964. He concluded:

Clearly the North-South division depends upon such enormous generalisations shot through with so many qualifications that it is thoroughly unrealistic to use it as a basis for national thinking. … I would suggest that one of our Englands today is a circle whose perimeter is approximately one hour’s travel by fast peak-hour travel the main London termini; the other is the whole of the country outside that circle.

Moorhouse, pp. 18-19.
Popular Culture – Angry Young Men, Sex & Rock ‘n’ Roll:
‘Teddy Boys’, in North Kensington in 1956, with their extravagant dress and aggressive manner.

English society, both Northern and Southern, was beginning to become more violent with an increase in violent crime and riots by ‘Teddy Boys’ in the mid-1950s, so-called because of their return to Edwardian styles of dress, especially long jackets. They also wore tight trousers and pointed shoes. They brought together rock ‘n’ roll dance music, and a reputation for extravagance, insolence and violence that shocked a nation still wedded to prewar values. They were the first representatives of modern youth culture and were followed by the ‘Mods’ and ‘Rockers’ in the early 1960s, their alienation perhaps being fuelled by a new vogue for high-rise blocks of flats. The 1950s also saw the Angry Young Men (and, of course, young women) associated, together with an older generation of pacifists and dissenters, with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and the beginning of protests against the Vietnam War in Britain, as in the USA and elsewhere in Europe.

Meanwhile, the poet Philip Larkin and other writers were more interested in sex. He wrote that ‘Sexual intercourse began in 1963.’ In the 1950s, teenage girls were not supposed to know what it was. While they were supposed to be watching ‘telly’ with their brothers, their ‘mam’ was, according to Alan Sillitoe, in his 1959 autobiographical novel, The Loneliness of the Long-distance Runner, having a good time ‘with some fancy-man upstairs on the new bed she’d ordered.’ Like Moorhouse, Sillitoe was from Nottingham. His book won the coveted Hawthornden Prize for the best work of imagination in prose of 1960.

The 1960s were dramatic years in Britain: demographic trends, especially the increase in the proportion of teenagers in the population, coincided with economic affluence and ideological experimentation to reconfigure social mores to a revolutionary extent. Anti-establishment values spread much wider than the student population. The cultural revolution had a profound effect on sexual behaviour in general, and on women in particular. Sex before marriage became slightly less taboo, and there was a general feeling of ‘sexual freedom’ in some circles. An unexpurgated edition of Lady Chatterley’s Lover, by D H Lawrence, banned as pornography since it was first published in the 1920s, was not released in the United Kingdom until 1960 when it was the subject of a watershed obscenity trial against the publisher, Penguin Books. Penguin won the controversial case and the book quickly sold three million copies.

Lady Chatterley’s Lover.

In Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lady_Chatterley

Shelagh Delaney’s 1958 play, A Taste of Honey, was a breakthrough play for working-class drama, set in Salford and written when she was just nineteen.

The family also underwent important changes. From the 1950s, the household had begun to be transformed, affected by smaller family sizes, helped by the wider availability of abortion and effective contraception, and increased domestic technology. In 1956, only seven per cent of households had refrigerators and sixty-four per cent of households also possessed a washing machine. In addition, the real earnings of young manual workers had grown rapidly, creating a generation that had money to spend on leisure and luxury. By 1960, the average British teenager was spending eight pounds a week on clothes, cosmetics, records and cigarettes. In London, King’s Road, and then Carnaby Street, became the haunt of this generation. Their attitude is summed up by the designer Mary Quant, whose shop, Bazaar, on the King’s Road, provided clothes that allowed people to run, jump, and leap, to retain their precious freedom. Clothes became the symbol of the ‘Chelsea set.’

Stephen Ward (left) was the man at the centre of the greatest scandal of the early sixties, together with Christine Keeler (to his left).

As the sixties progressed, prophets of doom believed that Britain had passed from austerity to affluence and straight on to decadence. The ‘Profumo affair’ was, perhaps, a fitting epitaph to the ‘back-end’ of the affluent era. It was, as Wayland Young remarked, ‘scandal and crisis together.’ It ‘exercised some of the purgative and disruptive functions of a revolution.’ (Wayland Young (1963), The Profumo Affair). The opening sentence of an article about the Profumo affair contained an anecdote that Geoffrey Moorhouse didn’t doubt was being repeated up and down the country, ‘rather more concisely’:

‘ Just upstream from the terrace of the House of Commons is the outlet of a main sewer, and at certain hours of the day, Members leaning on the balustrade can find amusement and occupation in counting the contraceptives floating down to the sea. …’

Geoffrey Moorhouse, op.cit., p. 23.

Moorhouse commented that this had…

… the genuine metropolitan brand of faintly bored, very knowing authorship by one who has spent some time pondering the sewer and its effluent and is something of an expert on Parliamentary topography.

Ibid.

He suggested that this may have been the effect of metropolitan assumptions and attitudes on those with commercial and political power in the capital. As The Times suggested in a leading article in February 1964, …

…The World of Westminster, Whitehall, the West End clubs and even Fleet Street seems curiously remote from what goes on in the rest of the country.

Quoted in Moorhouse, op. cit, p. 26.

Another symbol of the society of the sixties was music. Nowhere was further away from the world of Westminster, Whitehall and the West End clubs than Liverpool and its Cavern Club from where the ‘Merseybeat’ emerged. In 1964, Geoffrey Moorhouse wrote:

… there have been few social phenomena more intriguing or more extensively plotted than the development of pop-music groups in Liverpool in the last couple of years.

Moorhouse, p. 137.
The ‘Fab Four’ as they became known, (left to right) George Harrison, Paul McCartney, John Lennon and Ringo Starr.

No band was more important in this development than The Beatles. They expressed both youth deviance and commercialism and provided British teenagers with an identity that cut across the barriers of class, accent and region. The Beatles (or the Quarrymen as they were first known) were formed in July 1957 and in October 1962 Love Me Do only got to number seventeen in the charts, but in April 1963 From Me to You became their first number-one hit single. By 1964, they had become so established that the music critic of The Times devoted a whole column to analysing their work. He was much taken with its chains of pandiatonic clusters and its submediant switches from C major into A flat major. He even detected in it an affinity with Mahler. Not that this comparison immediately came to Moorhouse’s mind as he penetrated the Cavern Club, the origin of all this euphony. It was a converted subterranean warehouse on Matthew Street, a couple of blocks from Lime Street:

Every night it is open you pick up its spoor by following the line of lounging adolescents in the alleyways around. They are the ones who can’t get in. The bouncer on the door disapproves of unexpected visitors. “This place,” he observes, is becoming a bloody shrine.” And so it is. There are CND symbols and other daubs of paint crudely applied around the entrance. Half-way down the steep wooden staircase you find yourself stumbling into an atmosphere which is thick, sweet, almost tasty.

In the Cavern something like a couple of hundred youngsters are compressed together under three barrel-vaulted ceilings separated by stubby, arched walls. The light is dim and orange except at the far end where three lads are thumping out a number and a girl is singing rustily under glaring arc lamps. The walls are running with condensation. No one seems to notice the extreme discomfort of being there. A handful are drinking Cokes and Pepsis at an improvised bar.

But most of the people in the cellar are just moving spasmodically to the beat of the music, either in couples or individually. Only one couple were snogging quietly in a dimmer corner than the rest. At the end of the number there is a great amount of cheering and clapping but nothing that you’d call hysteria. After a couple of these the visitor, if he is wise, makes for the stairway again because it requires a special Merseyside constitution to withstand more than a short spell in that foetid ill-ventilated hole without passing out.

Moorhouse, op. cit., pp 137-138.

Why, then, did Liverpool become the original centre of popular music in Britain, not Birmingham or Bristol or Cardiff or even London? Most of the groups that first established themselves in Liverpool had some connexion with the seamen on the New York and Hamburg runs. If a member of a group had not himself been to sea, a brother or mate would have been and they would have brought back records from these places, which were both in the front of the jazz evolution.

Bill Haley & his Comets.

In the late fifties, following the rock ‘n’ roll craze that started in Britain with the 1957 tour of Bill Haley and his Comets, all over England, the guitar became the instrument of pop music. In Liverpool, musicians were stimulated by this inflow of recorded material, experimenting with their variations on it, and superimposing their own distinctive styles and sounds on it. Many of them, The Beatles included, went to Hamburg to play there, where there was a market for young musicians who could knock up a good rock tune; the trip to Germany was little more than a pierhead jump for any young Scouse with a few pounds in his pocket. By the time the Beatles came back, their German records had found their way onto English turntables. And, after that, they never looked back.

The cover sleeve for an ‘extended play’ record that was released in 1958.

All this had deep social implications on Merseyside which were first documented by a Liverpool undergraduate, Colin Fletcher, in New Society (20 February 1964). According to Fletcher, the pop groups sprang from and gradually took over the function of the street gangs:

The gang, between the period 1954 and 1958, was not only a microcosm of society; it was relatively speaking, the only society the adolescent knew and felt sure of. This was the situation when rock and roll arrived on Merseyside.

Quoted in Moorhouse, op.cit., p. 139.

There were riots in the cinema showing the Haley film, Rock Around the Clock. Soon, boys who had bought guitars began to try the music for themselves. As they were invariably members of groups their music became the main means of gang expression. As such, it usurped the roles of older habits, such as gang violence, though there was no apparent decrease in levels of violence overall. An additional attraction, especially as they got older, was the effect of their music on girls. They seemed to be “solid gone”… not only over the sound but also those who made it. The pattern of leisure for these adolescents changed from one of group warfare and outbursts of vandalism or worse to one in which the gangs spent most of their time acting as helpmates (‘groupies’) and cheerers-on of those members who could make music. The toughest of them who had always been disposed to crime more than the rest tended also to be the ones with the least taste or aptitude for music.

Beatlemania & the BBC:
Live at the BBC

But Moorhouse claimed that the Mersey Sound had certainly tapped the belligerent instincts of many adolescents. From 1960 to 1964, more than three hundred beat groups had been formed in Liverpool. In 1963, although the overall crime figures rose by nearly ten per cent, juvenile crime was down by two per cent. Moorhouse made an interesting final comment on the futures of the Mersey Beat boys:

The remarkable thing about the young men who have made so much from the Mersey Sound – The Beatles and a dozen other combinations – is that although by now they can probably afford to choose pretty well where they want to spend the rest of their days, none of them, it is said by those close to them, has much desire to leave Liverpool for good.

Moorhouse, op.cit., p.140

But many people in the recording and broadcasting establishment regarded popular music with disdain. The BBC held a monopoly over the radio waves, and, in a deal with the Musicians’ Union and record manufacturers, ensured that popular music was not given airtime. Anyone wanting to listen to popular musicians had to tune into Radio Luxembourg, from which reception was often very poor. At Easter 1964, however, the first illegal ‘pirate’ radio station, Radio Caroline, began broadcasting from a ship just off the Sussex coast. Within months, millions of young people were listening to the station. Radio London and other pirate stations sprang up. Not only did they broadcast popular music, but they also reminded their listeners that any attempt to silence them would constitute a direct attack on youth.

Pop music could be heard everywhere on portable transistor radios and stereo record players.

Brian Epstein’s application for an audition of The Beatles by the Variety Department of the BBC.

However, the BBC was not wholly negative in its response to ‘pop’ music, or at least the Mersey Beat. Between March 1962 and June 1965, no fewer than 275 unique musical performances by The Beatles were broadcast by the BBC in the UK. The group played eighty-eight songs on national radio. Some were recorded many times; others were played just once. Many of them were covers of early rock ‘n’ roll classics by Chuck Berry and others. In his introduction to the 2013 release of these, On Air-Live at the BBC, Paul McCartney wrote:

‘Raised on the BBC radio programmes, one of the big things in our week was ‘Saturday Club.’ We would wake up to this great show playing the kind of music we loved. That was something we really aspired to. Eventually we got to go to that show and be a part of it… out of came ‘Pop go the Beatles.’ We knew we would have to compromise to som extent, but when it came to playing the numbers, we could do them the way we wanted. Then there would be the talk with the rather plummy BBC announcer, who was not from our world at all. We couldn’t imagine what world he was from. …

‘With our manager Brian Epstein having a record shop – NEMS – we did have the opportunity to look around a bit more than the casual buyer. … We discovered ‘Twist and Shout’ by the Isley Brothers, which was a little bit hip to know about. I remember coming down to London and somebody saying, “Wow, you’ve heard of the Isleys!” It gave us this little edge over other bands, who perhaps weren’t scouring the racks quite as avidly as we were.

‘Ringo would get stuff from sailors. … he happened to have a few mates who’d been abroad to New Orleans or New York and had picked up some nice blues or country and western. … We made it our full-time job to research all these things; to go for the road less travelled. …’

Paul McCartney (2013), Introduction to ‘On Air – Live at the BBC’, Vol. 2. Apple/ BBC.

A Social Revolution?

The mid-1950s to the mid-1960s was a period of rapid social change in Britain. It was also a period in which the pace and direction of social change itself became a topic of concern and public debate. The argument then was about whether the many indications of change really added up to a social revolution for ordinary Britons. Its conclusions still remain provisional, and tentative, sixty years later. In that period almost everything changed, at least a little. No segment of society, no corner of the nation, no aspect of life remained untouched. One part of the story is the story of change, emergent patterns, new relationships and conditions for ordinary men and women, and a sense of discontinuity with the past.

In the ‘society of affluence,’ which threw up such paradoxical symbols, it was easy to project the problems that life presented into simple and stereotyped remedies. This was an economic change, certainly, but was it a social revolution? We need another term for a period of massive social upheaval which, nevertheless, left so much exactly where it was; it was a revolution which preserved its fundamental elements even as it seemed to transform them. Ordinary men and women in the fifties and early sixties were caught somewhere inside that double process, trying to make sense of it. They were in a revolving wheel which kept coming full circle.

The Mini & the Great Car Economy:

Perhaps the best symbol of this paradoxical period of the late fifties and early sixties was the Mini. Ten years or so after designing the Morris Minor, in the year of Macmillan’s election success, 1959, Alec Issigonis produced his sketched design, pictured below, for an even more radical car for the developing motoring market. It fitted well with the chic Macmillan era, though the aristocratic prime minister himself would never have bought anything so small and vulgar. Issigonis himself can lay claim to being one of the more influential figures in the history of the car in Britain as well as being about the only industrial designer most people have heard of. The son of a Greek engineer living in Turkey who had taken British citizenship, and a German brewer’s daughter, he had lived his early years on the site of his father’s marine engineering business, watching him transform his drawings into engines.

Issigonis’s original, sketched design for the 1959 Mini.

Issigonis is as good an early example as any of the benefits that immigration brought to Britain. He was a wartime refugee from Smyrna, the port area which had been taken back by Turkey from Greece after the First World War. Issigonis’s father died on the road to exile, but he arrived with his mother in Britain in 1922, virtually penniless. He studied engineering and technical drawing in London before getting work, first for Humber and then for Morris Motors. His Mini-Minor was commissioned in the immediate aftermath of the Suez Crisis when petrol shortages had focussed attention on the case for cheap, economical cars. The country was already latching onto the bubble cars being imported from the continent and soon being made at a factory in Brighton. Issigonis’s brief was to produce something for the British Motor Corporation that could compete with these products, but that was also a proper car, not a motorbike sidecar with its own motor. He not only made it look good, but by turning round the engine and placing it over the wheels, he found a way of making more space for passengers than in any other small car. Issigonis’s design was so radical it needed a complete set of new machine tools to produce; he designed them, too.

The Mini would become an icon of British ‘cool,’ a chirpy, cheeky little car that represented the national character at its classless best. But some of the earliest minis were shoddily built, with a series of mechanical problems and poor trim; more importantly they leaked so badly that people joked that every car should be sold with a free pair of Wellington boots. In fact, for a while, the car looked as if it would be a disaster for Issigonis and BMC. The costings behind it were also questionable. The basic model sold at Ł350, much cheaper than rival British-made small cars like the Triumph Herald (Ł495), the Ford Anglia (Ł380) and even the Morris Minor (Ł416). But the average retail price of the car was Ł500, which probably better reflected the production costs of the Austin and Morris factories that manufactured it en masse.

Yet the Mini had been very expensive to develop and make. Ford, one of its main competitors, tore one apart and concluded that it would cost them more to build than BMC was selling it for. It seems unlikely that to begin with at least, they made any profit, but they eventually sold more than five million. But its success and longevity only really came about due to celebrity endorsement, and even ‘spin.’ Issigonis gave one to Princess Margaret and Lord Snowden as a wedding present, so that they could be photographed whizzing around London in it. The Queen tried one out, and soon Steve McQueen, Twiggy, The Beatles, Marianne Faithfull, and Mick Jagger’s girlfriend, were seen in them too. In this way, became and remained a fashion icon, taking part with the Spice Girls in the opening ceremony of the Olympics in 2012.

BMW’s New Mini (Matchbox version), built to Issigonis’s initial design, but without the faults.

This was completely the opposite image of the original BMC idea of a cheap, no-frills car for the working-classes. The mechanical problems, lack of good teamwork and risky pricing strategy show that there was a shaky side to the Mini story from the start. Issigonis’s biographer concluded that ‘far from being a business triumph for the shaky British Motor Corporation, the Mini was the first nail in their coffin.’ Still, as yet, with fast economic growth and an insatiable appetite for affordable cars, the domestic industry continued to do well. Despite competition from continental and American companies, other British producers were marketing long-lived and successful models, from sleek Jaguars to solid and stately Rover Eights and Fifties. Industrial action was growing, and there was a particularly bad strike at BMC in 1958. Ministers, still largely drawn from public school and aristocratic backgrounds rather than manufacturing or business ones were trying to bring employment to run-down parts of Scotland and the North of England. They were finally responding to the concerns about the growing North-South divide. They persuaded BMC to create a cumbersome and expensive empire of new factories which it did not have the experience to manage properly.

The white heat of the technological revolution.

Little of this was obvious to the ordinary observer back then, in the early stages of popular motoring mania. It was hardly surprising that few bright British engineering students went to work in the British motor industry compared with the best of the Germans and Americans going into their equivalents. Instead, there was ominous talk of the ‘stagnant society.’ But in October 1963, Harold Wilson, then leader of the Labour Opposition and Prime Minister from 1964 and throughout the remainder of the sixties, predicted that Britain would be re-forged in the white heat of the technological revolution.

Successive Conservative governments had failed to understand the structural changes that had occurred in both domestic and international economies. They adopted a policy of complacency. Affluence and consensus were key concepts of the fifties and sixties, but both were based on illusion. In 1964 the Labour Party, under Harold Wilson, came into power, promising economic and social modernisation. In an attempt to tackle the problem of poverty, public expenditure on social services was expanded considerably, resulting in a small degree of redistribution of income. Living standards continued to rise and consumer goods became more available to all.

In the late 1950s new kinds of computers were built, using small transistors instead of electric valves. These still took up huge amounts of space, used up a lot of electricity and often became overheated, causing them to break down. It wasn’t until the 1960s that computers became cheaper and faster. The silicon chip was invented so that computers used less electricity and were able to hold thousands of transistors in a small space. This enabled the development of the micro-computer, changing almost every aspect of British life since.

As the 1960s progressed, alternative sources of energy were discovered, including large reserves of oil and gas. North Sea natural gas and oil came to the aid of the British economy. The EEC did not, however, not until the early 1970s.

Above: An oil rig in the North Sea.

Many ‘foreigners’ in politics and business began increasingly to talk of the ‘British disease’, economic stagnation. So, too, did the British themselves, seeing joining the ‘Common Market’ as a means to boost British exports following the loss of empire.

Sources for the Epilogue:

Geoffrey Moorhouse (1964), Britain in the Sixties: The Other England. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Michael Clark & Peter Teed (eds.) (1972), Portraits & Documents: The Twentieth Century. London: Hutchinson Educational.

Theo Baker (ed.) (1978), The Long March of Everyman, 1750-1960. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books (in association with André Deutsch & the BBC).

Richard Brown & Christopher Daniels (1982), Documents & Debates: Twentieth Century Britain. Basingstoke: Macmillan Education.

Simon Hall & John Haywood (eds.) (2001), The Penguin Atlas of British & Irish History. London: Penguin Books.

Norman Rose (2005), Harold Nicolson. London: Pimlico.

Andrew Marr (2008), A History of Modern Britain. Basingstoke: Pan Macmillan.

Philip Parker (2017), History of Britain in Maps. Glasgow: HarperCollins.